A Modern Introduction to Mādhva Philosophy

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Dvaita Philosophy Resource Centre

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As the title of the book avows, it is a treatise on Madhva's realistic school of Vedānta philosophy in a modern perspective. The author has made the treatise convincing to the modern mind by employing western logical apparatus in substantiating Madhva's ideas. Following the Indian classical tradition, the author has examined the validity of Advaitavedānta, the Absolute Monism of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara as *Pūrvapakṣa*, and logically proved its inconsistencies. He has then established the Dvaitasiddhānta i.e., the Monotheistic Dualism of Madhva. He has successfully brought out the nuances of the realistic school of Indian philosophical thought in this work. A Modern Introduction to Mādhva Philosophy is Prof B H Kotabagi's posthumous publication.

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Preamble: Manipal University Press (MUP) is a unit of Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE) Trust and is committed to the dissemination of knowledge generated within its vibrant academic environment and beyond.

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Foreword

Prof B H Kotabagi was a student of Prof K J Shah of the department of philosophy at Karnataka University, who was a direct disciple of Wittgenstein at Cambridge. I too taught him Sāṅkhya philosophy at the philosophy department. After completing his MA, he joined Karnataka College Dharwad in 1955 as a lecturer of Philosophy. Later he was transferred to Government College, Gulbarga in 1961. He continued his service at the same college for over three decades and taught Philosophy, Logic and Psychology following the styles of Prof K J Shah.

This book is a reflection of his simple and lucid style of presentation. His ability to provide illustrations to substantiate his ideas is evident in the present work. In Chapter I, he discusses major discourses of philosophy as presented by western philosophers. In Chapters II and III he provides a brief account of Śaṅkara's idealist Vedānta philosophy and Sri Madhva's realistic and theistic philosophy. He deals with concepts such as time and space, which is a point of debate among the contemporary western philosophers. Dr Kotabagi presents Śrī Madhvācārya's concept of time and space with a great deal of clarity.

He further discusses the problem of change as expounded by Śrī Madhvācārya. He makes it clear that the substance remains the same though the quality of it is subject to a constant change. Śrī Madhvācārya, a hardcore realist laid down three criteria to ascertain the reality; a) not superimposed, b) the object of valid cognition, and c) *Arthakriyākārī*, that serves the practical purposes. The idea of Madhvācārya that Viṣṇu is the highest and independent reality and all others are dependent realities is brought out lucidly in Dr Kotabagi's work.

Prof Kotabagi presents Madhva's philosophy in modern terms citing modern examples. He compares the views of western philosophers with those of Madhva's philosophy. This volume is certainly useful to modern scholars to understand the Vedānta philosophy of Śaṅkara and Madhva. Unfortunately, the author passed away on March 6, 2011. I place on record my sincere appreciation for Dvaita Philosophy Resource Centre (DPRC) of Manipal Centre for European Studies (MCES), Manipal University (MU) for publishing this valuable work.

Prof K T Pandurangi, MA, PhD - Bengaluru

A Modern Introduction to Mādhva Philosophy is one of the important works of Prof Bhimacharya Hanumantacharya Kotabagi (B H Kotabagi). His keen interest and understanding of both western and Indian philosophies helped him present Dvaita philosophy in a perspective that is welcomed by both traditional as well as modern scholars.

The opening chapter of the book, in its most parts, makes interesting reading even to a layman wherein the author discusses the nature and method of philosophy, and the history of philosophy in the west. One of the western philosophical views severely attacked Advaita, the Indian absolute idealism, another view tried, to do away with metaphysics. It is curious to note how the name 'metaphysics' came into use during the days of the compliers of Aristotle's works, given that even Aristotle had not used it. The discussion on the point of futility or utility of metaphysics is at once amusing and thought provoking. Similarly, the author's attempt to suggest the relation and distinction between philosophy and science is equally interesting.

One of the points of distinction, as pointed out by the author, between western and Indian philosophy is that in the west there is a constant interaction between philosophy and science. It meant that the important developments in one area influence the ideas in the other. The Indian philosophy, on the other hand, is connected with religion. This seems to be one of the reasons for the very slow progress in Indian philosophy, and has perhaps induced the Indian thinkers to attempt at an east-west synthesis, a striking characteristic feature of modern Indian philosophy. The notion that science and philosophy are opposed to each other holds good no more. The realization that philosophy without science is lame, while science without philosophy is blind has its sway.

The author points out that one of the important features of the 20th century is the vigorous development of symbolic logic and the growth of such logic that had a great influence on 20th century philosophy. The author has stressed the significance and importance of symbolic logic in his acknowledgement part of this book and has made an earnest recommendation to the teachers at the Indian traditional schools, where Tarkaśāstra is taught, to teach the students symbolic logic. The author also

deals with the pros and cons of recent views like Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism. The discussion of these various logical systems by the author is illuminating to the experts in the concerned fields.

To set the tone for the exposition of Dvaitasiddhānta of Madhva, the author presents in detail the flaws in the Advaitasiddhānta of Śaṅkara. The author hints at the problems about the significance of the distinction between reality and appearance. He points out that the attempt to clarify the nature of reality and its difference form appearance has given rise to various doctrines of reality – Idealism, Realism, Monism, Pluralism, Dualism, Materialism, Scepticism, Solipsism etc. In recent philosophy, the problem of meaning had become so dominant that the discussion culminated in the slogan for the demand not to ask for meaning but to ask for use. This gave rise to what is known as 'linguistic philosophy'. Linguistic philosophy plays a crucial role in the interpretation of scriptural texts.

The author effectively presents Prof G E Moore's view regarding the function of philosophy. Moore insisted that the function of philosophy was the analysis of common sense beliefs. The conclusions arrived at by the idealists that matter, space, time, change etc., were unreal being clearly against the ordinary belief that they were real, is shocking. Moore, who could not understand how and why one can hold views that are, opposed to the common sense beliefs. He was convinced that the common sense beliefs were true. Moore's contention that the task of philosophy was to analyze clearly the common sense belief and to refute the philosophical beliefs opposed to them, strongly supports the realistic philosophy of Madhva.

Wittgenstein's views presented by the author on the uses of language in describing or explaining philosophical concepts are advantageous in lending support to the central theme of the present treatise. Wittgenstein contends that the preconceived ideas cloud minds, lead one astray, in understanding the uses of language, and thereby in understanding the nature of reality. They are like a pair of coloured glasses through which we look at reality and get its distorted picture. What is required is looking at reality without preconceived ideas. The view of absolute idealism itself is a case in point. The absolute idealist holds that reality is one spiritual permanent systematic whole. This is his criterion of reality or meaning of reality. On this ground, he condemns whatever is material, changing etc., as unreal or as an appearance. Thus, he restricts the use of the term reality to the spiritual and permanent whole. But in practice, the term reality is found applied to material and changing objects. They are regarded as real, as for example, real currency note, real

signature, real photograph, real person, etc. Metaphysics or philosophy involves a vision of reality, a new view of seeing things. Great philosophers, in that sense, are visionaries. This is not something novel to Indian thinkers. An Indian philosophical school or its doctrine is called Darśana, the vision; *darśanāt ṛṣiḥ* a Ṛṣi is a seer, a visionary. It becomes clear from the content analysis of the opening chapter of the present work that the term 'modern' used in the wording of the title of the book is justifiable.

Chapter II of the book contains the scrutiny of what is called *Pūrvapakṣa* in the Indian tradition. The author has had no reservation in appreciating the merit of Śaṅkarādvaita in the opening sentence of the chapter. All the schools of Vedānta claim to derive their doctrines from the Upaniṣats, the concluding portions of the Vedas, the revealed scriptures of Hinduism. The author points out that some modern scholars hold that the Upaniṣats do not contain a single coherent system of philosophy, that there are many important but inconsistent statements in them. Śaṅkara and Madhva, however, have attempted to give a harmonious account of the Upaniṣats. But the inherent inconsistency in Upaniṣadic thought breaks out in their interpretations, which are diametrically opposed to one another. Śaṅkara's Advaita, the absolute idealistic monotheism and Madhva's Dvaita, the realistic pluralistic monotheism are the results of their efforts at the consistent interpretation of the contents of the Vedas and also of their independent or original thinking.

Madhva has criticized Śaṅkara's absolute idealism pointing out that Śaṅkara's Advaita was Buddhism in disguise and it was atheistic because it involved degradation of God. For a better understanding of the philosophy of Madhva, the author has profitably presented a brief consideration of the main points in Śaṅkara's view.

The main tenets of Śaṅkara's Advaita are; a) *Ātmā*, the soul or self is identical with *Nirguṇabrahmā*, b) *Nirguṇabrahmā* is the ultimate reality, c) Nothing other than the *Nirguṇabrahmā* is ultimately real, d) *Saguṇabrahmā*, the Parambrahmā with attributes is the God, is the object of worship, e) The world is practically real but ultimately unreal, it is an appearance of the absolute, f) *Avidyā* or *Māyā* is the cause for absolute appearing as many *Jīvas*, the selves, egos or souls and objects in the world, and g) *Mokṣa* is the ultimate end of life.

The author holds the above tenets under lens one by one and proves logically how they are untenable. For example, take the case of the concept of *Nirguṇabrahmā*. The Advaitin prefers the negative description of the

absolute –*neti neti*. The author points out the defect in such a description. Usually the negative description is used to indicate the lack of something in the person or thing thus described. If we take the negative description of the absolute in this sense, it would mean that the absolute lacks everything and, that it has nothing and hence it is nothing. A positive description of the absolute is likely to mislead us into thinking that the absolute has attributes; the negative description is likely to mislead us into thinking that the absolute is nothing. So the Advaitin tells us to take its positive description as meaning something negative and negative description as meaning something positive. This is unsatisfactory. Thus, the Advaitin is caught in the Advaitic conceptual web woven by himself without finding a way out of it.

Similarly, the *Nirguṇabrahmā* cannot be the subject of worship. Theistically it is hopeless and useless. Hence, Śaṅkara was compelled to introduce the concept of *Saguṇabrahmā*, the God who is to be worshipped. Thus the Advaitin accords a disgraceful position to god.

Another very important concept in Advaita is the theory of *Māyā*. In fact another name for Śaṅkarādvaita is *Māyā*vāda. The term *Māyā* is used in various senses in Advaita; a) deception, b) illusion, c) inexplicability, d) magic, e) skill to produce illusion in others, f) appearance, g) dependence, h) relative etc. The term *Māyā* is used to describe the nature of the world. It is a source of variety, change, activity, difference in the world. *Māyā* has two functions; a) it conceals the nature of the real from us, and b) it produces false belief or *Avidyā* in us. Instead of the real, *Māyā* projects this unreal world and deludes us into thinking that this world is real. The author discusses the concept of *Māyā* at length and points out that it is untenable. The world is unreal is a big paradox, which even the Advaitin finds it difficult to swallow. No amount of theorizing can lead us to the denial of the reality of the world, which is amply supported by scriptures, experience, reason and intuition. The Advaitin draws a strange conclusion that whatever is or can be given in sense experience or perceived is unreal *yad dṛṣṭaṁ tannaṣṭam*.

Similarly, the author examines the Advaitic theory of knowledge, epistemology, and the Advaitic concept of Mokṣa, and quite logically proves that the Advaitic concept of Mokṣa is unsatisfactory.

After subjecting to scrutiny thoroughly and minutely the tenets of Advaitasiddhānta, the author sets himself to present the central theme of his treatise, i.e., Dvaitasiddhānta the philosophy of Madhva, which is another most important and well developed system of Vedānta.

The author mentions the nine important principles of the philosophy of Madhva stated by one of his illustrious followers; a) lord Viṣṇu is the only supreme and independent God, b) the world is real and dependent on God, c) the world consists of five kinds of differences. The difference is basic, essential and eternal, d) the selves are eternal and dependent on the supreme God, e) there are natural internal gradations among the selves. f) *Mokṣa* is pure bliss resulting from the realization of the true nature of ones' self, g) the means to *Mokṣa* is firm, absolute, pure devotion to God based on the knowledge of the majesty of the supreme God, h) perception, inference and verbal testimony are the only means of knowledge, i) the only true or good scriptures are those which reveal the supremacy of lord Viṣṇu.

Madhva divides the reals into two fundamental categories; independent and dependent that is why his system is called Dvaita or Dualism.

Late Prof B H Kotabagi has made a significant contribution to the rich treasure of Dvaita literature through this brilliant work. The author of the treatise displays profound scholarship, firm grip on the western and Indian philosophical thoughts, logical sharpness, brilliant philosophical insights and accurate skill of articulation. The readers would be intellectually elevated by reading the author's treatment of the main tenets of Madhva philosophy, otherwise known as Tatvavāda. The comparison of Lebniz' Monodology with Madhva's Tatvavāda adds novelty to the treatise. To borrow the authors own words, the readers are touched by the pleasant, invigorating breeze of the central theme of the book and feel at home and elated.

As a student of Sanskrit literature, I have been acquainted with the *Prasthānatrayī* – the Upaniṣats, the Brahmasūtra and the Bhagavadgītā, the sources of Vedāntic philosophy. My doctoral thesis has been on the educational philosophy of Dr S Radhakrishnan, who is known as re-interpreter of Śaṅkara's Advaita. The author of the present book, Prof B H Kotabagi, my revered and elderly brother-in-law and my mentor as an academician, had been a person claiming my admiration since my undergraduate days. This made me not to let go off my hands the unique opportunity of writing a preface to the learned author's treatise on the philosophy of Śrī Madhvacārya.

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Acknowledgements

I express my deep gratitude to Dr S Radhakrishan from whose great book 'Indian Philosophy', Volume II, the entire information about Śaṅkarādvaita is derived. It is the source for the views I critically expounded in Chapter II of this book. My numerous quotations from that excellent book show my great indebtedness to the author.

Chapter I is based on the remarkable works of Professors A J Ayer, Urmson, G J Warnock and A C Ewing. I am sincerely thankful to these authors.

Further, for the rest of the work, I have heavily relied on the philosophical work of Śrī Madhva entitled 'Daśaprakaraṇa' in Kannada, published by the Akhila Bharata Madhva Maha Mandala (ABMMM), Bangalore, and equally on the scholarly work 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Sri Madhvacharya' of Dr B N K Sharma. My respectful thanks are due to Sri Vishveshatirtha Svamiji of Sri Pejavara Adhokshaja Matha, Udupi.

I wish to acknowledge that I have made the extensive use of symbolic logic in Chapter I in explaining the ideas of Truth-Function and Extensional Language. This elaborate discourse was done to humbly suggest that if symbolic logic is taught along with Tarkaśāstra to the students of traditional schools, it would enhance their perception to a great extent.

I also thank my sons Dr H B Kotabagi, Dr R B Kotabagi and Dr V B Kotabagi, daughters-in-law Smt Alaka, Smt Meera, and Smt Suvarna and wife for their unflinching support to me. I take the complete responsibility for any errors in the book. I firmly believe that this book would not have seen the light without the kind guidance and blessings of Śrī Madhvacharya. Finally, I affectionately and respectfully dedicate this book to the memory of my late parents.

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Table of Contents

Chapter I – The Nature of Philosophy

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the nature and method of philosophy and to show briefly how philosophizing was done during the last century in the west. It is done through consideration of a few western philosophical views that includes the one that attacked the absolute idealism and another that tried to do away with metaphysics. This would not only lead to a better appreciation of Madhva's doctrines, which aimed to deconstruct Advaita, the Indian absolute idealism, but also helps to establish metaphysics on sound basis.

Philosophy has been defined by some as the clear, serious and systematic account of the universe as a whole, and of man's place in it. The qualifications 'clear', 'serious', 'systematic' are stated in the definition with a view to deny the opinion of many that everyone is a philosopher. The thoughts of a common person would be neither clear nor systematic. Only a few persons would consider things seriously, clearly, and systematically, who deserve to be called philosophers.

Another purpose of this definition is to suggest a relation and distinction between philosophy and science. The sciences give an account of the world. If philosophy also does the same, then how are philosophy and science related? There was a time when the sciences were parts of philosophy; the distinction between science and philosophy was not clearly drawn. The various types of facts and phenomena – physical, chemical, biological, psychological etc., were then merely discussed, but not experimentally studied by the philosophers. When they began to be studied by observation and experiment, the various natural biological sciences developed and became independent of philosophy. Some thinkers state, perhaps with regret, that this led to the narrowing down of the scope of philosophy.

However, this does not seem to be so. For what happened was that the subject matter that was foreign to philosophy became separated from it. This was good for both philosophy and science. For the manner in which

the various sorts of facts were dealt with by philosophers was inimical to have their proper knowledge. it arrested the development of sciences. The bifurcation of sciences from philosophy was beneficial to sciences for it led to their healthy growth. It turned out good for philosophy also for it helped philosophers to fix their attention on what properly belonged to philosophy. Although the bifurcation has been good, the holistic view was inevitably lost. Many branches have now sprung up, dealing with nature and uses of concepts, laws, theories in sciences and other subjects, e.g., the philosophy of natural sciences, biological sciences, social sciences, mathematics, logic, and language of law.[1] This is the most interesting and valuable development in philosophy.

However, it is evident that philosophers' concern with different facts and events was not in vain. It contributed to the origin of sciences, though not to their growth, by attracting the attention of able and intelligent persons towards those facts. These persons gradually realized that they could be more profitably studied by careful observation and experiment. Because of this, the various sciences came into existence. During the last century, the philosophers' emphasis on the linguistic character of their problems and on the study of the uses of language to solve them has given rise to the studies of different aspects of languages. It would not be wrong to say that, philosophers have shown many areas of facts, which could be empirically or scientifically studied. It is also a fact that some ideas of philosophers have led to the fruitful developments in science, e.g., the atomic theory of matter. The contribution of philosophers to the development of mathematics is very great. The history of thought testifies to the fact that, before a certain subject becomes an independent science, it usually is a subject of philosophical discussion.

Philosophy and science are related, yet they are different. This was noticed by some early thinkers and was stated in different ways. Some said, philosophy was concerned with the intelligible, while science, with sensible. Others said, the facts of experience were the subject matter of science and

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[1] Books by the Foundation of Philosophy series – Prentice Hall of India Pvt. Ltd.

not that of philosophy. On the other hand, the concern of Philosophy; was with what the facts of experience implied or presupposed regarding the nature of reality. A few others said that philosophy gave an account of the nature of reality, but science studied the appearances of reality.

Another way of stating the distinction between the two is implied by the given definition; philosophy studies the universe as a whole, while science studies it piecemeal. The world is divided into different kinds of facts; physical, chemical, astronomical, botanical, psychological etc. One set of facts is studied by one branch, and another set of facts by another branch of science. The definition points out that, philosophy does not thus study the universe as a piecemeal but studies it as a whole.

One may object to it by saying that the meaning of the predicative expression of the study of the universe as a whole is not clear. The universe consists of all sets of facts, and since each science studies a certain set of facts, it can be said that all branches of science together study the whole universe. If so, does the expression 'study of the universe as a whole' mean that philosophy is a collection of all sciences? It cannot mean this because the scientists themselves admit that they know not all, but some parts of the universe and that they know very little even about those parts. The conclusion is that we know very little and yet, it is astonishing that so little knowledge can give us so much power. Nor can the expression mean that in future when all sciences together acquire full knowledge of the entire universe, philosophy will become a collection of all sciences. The collection of sciences, though more comprehensive than a single science, would not be systematic, and what is more important is that, since philosophy and science are different, the former cannot be equivalent to the collection of the latter.

The given definition cannot also mean that, just as a particular science formulates laws to explain the facts that it deals with, so also philosophy formulates laws capable of explaining the universe as a whole or all the facts in it. However, though philosophy is far older than science, it has not yet succeeded in stating, as science has done, a single law or theory

acceptable to all. Moreover, the thinkers who accepted this definition have argued that piecemeal study of the world gave distorted account of the world, while its study as a whole led to a correct account of the world, that somehow philosophy was superior to science. Is it possible for the superior equivalent to the collection of the inferior? The merit of the definition is that it emphasizes the comprehensive character of philosophy and it is hoped that the meaning would become clear as we continue to investigate whether philosophy is a collection of all sciences.

The distinction between philosophy and science is now more clearly drawn. Science (except mathematics and logic) differs fundamentally from philosophy in being empirical. The laws or the theories in science are dependent on sense experience, which means that their truth or falsity is determined by the facts of experience. If they are supported by the observed facts, they are accepted as true (or as probably true); if not, they are rejected as false. The final test of truth or falsity of an empirical proposition is sense experience. That is why observation and experiment are of such great importance in empirical sciences. As in Physics, Chemistry etc., to minimize or remove the flaws of any observation and experiment, the tenets of sciences are tested carefully under controlled conditions in observatories and laboratories. As there is always a possibility of finding a negative instance, i.e., an instance that is contrary or contradictory to scientific law or theory, it is accepted when supported by sense experience as probably true.

Nevertheless, the philosophical statements, e.g., 'God is supreme', 'reality is spiritual', 'the world is unreal', etc., are not empirical but they are a priori. A priori proposition is independent of sense experience in the sense that its truth or falsity is not determined by the facts of sense experience. Many philosophers themselves have said that the reality studied by them is transcendent of a beyond-sense experience. If this is so, their statements about reality, which are said to transcend sense experience, can neither be confirmed nor confuted by sense experience. Observation and experiment are simply irrelevant to the truth or falsity of a philosophical statement. That is why there are no philosophical laboratories or observatories.

As some philosophers do not expect refutation of their doctrines by sense experience, they regard them as certain, and constantly use the word 'must' in their statements. They confidently assert, 'reality must be spiritual', 'God must be perfect', 'a physical object must be a logical construction out of the sense data' etc. On the contrary, an empirical scientist seldom uses 'must' in scientific statements because they know that their statements, which may have much evidence in support of them, are liable to be disproved by further observations that may bring to light facts opposed to them. Many scientific laws or theories, which were once thought to be well established, were later modified or abandoned when facts discrepant with them were found. Hence, in empirical sciences, we find the use of 'probably true', which signifies that 'this is so based on the facts known till now'.

Mathematics and logic are also a priori and philosophy resembles them in this respect. Suppose there is a question, 'there are eight cows in the field and nine goats enter, how many animals remain?', we do not go out to see whether there are eight cows and nine goats and count them to find out the total number of animals present i.e., we do not resort to observation, but do calculation 8+9=17. This answer would be correct even if there were no animals in the field. It is true that in teaching children the simple methods of addition, subtraction etc., we may tell them to mix two sets of objects or remove some objects from the given set and then count them. This procedure of teaching and learning is adopted with a view to make the learning of an abstract subject easy for children; it has nothing to do with the determination of the character of mathematics.

Mathematics is deductive in nature. Its method is calculation, which consists in deducing or inferring the conclusion from the given data in accordance with its principles. Similarly, in logic, the conclusion is derived from the set of premises according to logical principles. In these subjects, 'must' is used as an e.g., 8+9 must be equal to 17; the sum of all angles of a triangle must be equal to two right angles; all kings must be mortal because, all men are mortal and all kings are men etc. In these subjects, 'must' signifies deductive or logical necessity i.e., a conclusion

validly drawn from true premises is necessary. Accepting the premises as true but denying the conclusion, which logically or correctly follows from premises would be self-contradictory. Another simple example of logical necessity is 'a father is a male parent' is logically or necessarily true in the sense that its denial 'a father is not a male parent' would be self-contradictory because its predicate denies what is implied by its subject.

However, the philosophical statement, 'the absolute must be the ultimate reality' or 'the soul must be a substance' is not logically or necessarily true as that can be contested. 'The absolute is not the ultimate reality' or 'the soul is not a substance' is not self-contradictory. This shows that the philosophical use of 'must' is different from its logico-mathematical use. In philosophy, it does not mean 'logically or necessarily true'. The 'must' in philosophy is a persuasive must and a philosopher uses it to persuade others to accept his view.

Etymologically, philosophy means 'love of wisdom' or 'knowledge'. If it is so, what knowledge is it about? It is said that philosophy gives knowledge about being (reality or existence) and becoming (change or occurrence of events). We believe in the reality or existence of various types of entities–selves, physical objects, God etc. We perceive the happening of different events. The science studies the entities (except God) and events in the world by observation and experiment. It gives empirical knowledge about them.

However, as philosophy does not use observation and experiment, how can it provide knowledge about such objects and the events? The answer lies in the different way philosophy deals with things and events than that of science. Philosophy deals with them through the analysis of basic concepts that are used in our thought and talk about them; these basic concepts are most general, or abstract and pervasive in their application. They are e.g., space, time, cause, self, matter, reality, appearance, substance, quality, relative knowledge, truth, freedom, value, etc. We use them in our dealings with things and they do not perplex persons and us in doing so. However,

when handled by philosophers, they give rise to many perennial problems. The attempts to solve or dissolve such problems are found in both western and Indian philosophy. Such attempts involve philosophical analysis or description of the use of such fundamental ideas. Another usual way of describing the nature of philosophy is to state these perennial problems which it attempts to solve.

The universe is characterized by diversity as it consists innumerable types of objects and events. Our successful living depends on our understanding of things, persons and events in the world. One way of knowing them is to discover what they are and how they occur or behave. We naturally seek for their causes. Thus, causation is one of the basic concepts. The questions discussed by philosophers in this connection are; what is meant by cause? What is the nature of causal relation? Is it a necessary relation? Does modern science abandon the concept of causation?[2] Causation is intimately connected with change. When a thing undergoes some change, we desire to know the cause of its change. Change is related to space and time. When a thing that is in one place, condition or state is found to be in another place, condition, or state, at another time, we say that it has moved or changed. Thus, change, space, and time are basic concepts and the discussion about their nature or significance is the task of philosophy.

Moreover, Einstein's Theory of Relativity involving a big step from 'space and time' to 'space-time'[3] has revolutionized the ideas about space and time by introducing the concept of four-dimensional space, time being regarded as one of its dimensions. This has led to a lot of debate in philosophy, not only about the old questions regarding their nature, viz., whether space and time are substances, relations or qualities, whether they are real or unreal, etc., but also about the problem of validity of Euclidean geometry, which

[2] "Quantum physics thus demolishes two pillars of the old Science, causality and determinism." Lincoln Barnett, The Universe and Dr Einstein, p.33

[3] "... I want to convey to the reader what is involved in the new phrase 'space-time', because that is from a philosophical and imaginative point of view, the most important of all the novelties that Einstein introduced." B Russell, The A.B.C. of Relativity, Revised Edition, p.142

is based on the assumption that space is three dimensional. The result is that new geometrical systems based on the assumptions of four or more dimensional spaces have been constructed.

Indeed, one of the important features of twentieth century is the vigorous development of mathematical (also called symbolic) logic and the philosophy of mathematics and logic. Some great thinkers have developed a system of symbolic logic[4], in which, they have tried to derive the whole of mathematics from a few logical axioms. They held that mathematics and logic were identical. Whether or not their claim is justified, it is a fact that the growth of such logic has had a great influence on twentieth century philosophy.

The growth of other sciences has also influenced philosophical thought. Reduction of matter to energy, introduction of psychoanalytic concepts like the unconscious, ego, super-ego, extra sensory perception, telepathy, clairvoyance, etc., stimulated philosophical thinking. Here, we come across one of the points of distinction between western and Indian philosophy, that there is a constant interaction between the former and science in the sense that the important developments in one area influence the ideas in the other.

Both science and philosophy claim to give knowledge; but do they give the same kind of knowledge? Besides, we claim to know things, persons, methods or techniques, space, time, and even God. How do we know them? Is our claim to know them justified? Such questions have led to the reflection on the nature of knowledge, belief, truth, perception, reason, intuition, mystic experience etc. The problem of knowledge is as important as, if not more important than the problem of being and becoming. In this connection, empiricism, rationalism, intuitionism, dogmatism, scepticism are subjected to critical consideration. There is not only variety but also uniformity in the occurrence of events.

[4] The origin and development of symbolic logic is found in the philosophy of Leibnitz. But it was developed to a far greater extent during the last century.

Science discovers the uniformities and states them in the form of laws of nature. Some of these laws are causal (qualitative) and others are quantitative i.e., they are stated in the form of mathematical equations. It is said that the aim of science is to explain the occurrence of events, and that its theories and laws help to explain the events. There is a lot of difference of opinions among thinkers in this regard. Some thinkers say that scientific explanation is mechanical, tentative or provisional; it is explanation of merely how, and not of why, events occur. As against this, there is teleological explanation, viz., explanation in terms of purpose with which we are quite familiar. E.g., why does one study so hard? Probably, he/she wants to secure the first rank. The teleological explanation, they say, is final, and since it explains why something exists or occurs, it is more satisfactory than the mechanical explanation. However, great scientists have held that science does not explain at all; it merely describes the occurrence of events.[5] This has created the problem of the distinction between explanation and description. Thus, there is a big problem regarding the nature of explanation for philosophy to discuss.

There is a great deal of philosophical discussion about the concepts of substance, attribute and relation. It is common to distinguish a thing from its qualities and relations. This has given rise to several questions like; what is a substance? Is it different from its qualities and relations? If it is, how is it related to qualities and relations? Are relations subjective or objective, external or internal? Are mind (self) and body different kinds of substances? If they are, how are they related? Is the world of science consisting of tiny packets of electrical energy, attracting, and repulsing one another in accordance with some laws different from our ordinary world of solid objects? Is it self-immortal? What is meant by self-identity and freedom of will? Can we know the minds of others? Philosophers have found such problems intractable or insoluble. They have answered them but as usual in philosophy, the answers given by one are denied by others.

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[5] "Accordingly Scientists such as Mach, Ostwald and Karl Pearson have insisted that the only real world is the sensible world and that scientific theories are merely descriptions of the sensible world." S Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, p.391.
To solve this problem Stebbing has introduced the conception of Constructive Description.

The concept of God is critically examined with a view to know his attributes, his relations to man and the world. Are there good grounds for the belief in the existence of God? Is God the creator of the world? What is the meaning of creation? Is evil real? Are the values; truth, goodness, beauty – objective or subjective? Is God the embodiment of such values? Such profound questions have vexed the minds of philosophers.

There are problems about the significance of the distinction between reality and appearance. This distinction is so pervasive or universal that it enters into every field of our life. The attempt to make clear, the nature of reality and its difference from appearance has given rise to various doctrines of reality – idealism, realism, monism, pluralism, dualism, materialism, scepticism, solipsism etc.

In recent philosophy, the problem of meaning had become very dominant for a few decades. Many theories or criteria of meaning were formulated, debated, and abandoned. Then the slogan came 'do not ask for meaning, ask for use,' heralding the rise of what is known as 'linguistic philosophy'. The misrepresentation or mis-description of the uses of certain expressions or concepts was diagnosed to be the source of philosophical problems. Hence, it was believed that such problems could be solved or dissolved by describing the relevant uses of those linguistic expressions or concepts correctly and clearly.

It is relevant to remark here that a philosopher who asks, what is mind?, what is matter? etc., is not an ignorant person. He knows how such terms or concepts; mind, matter, God, reality etc., are ordinarily used and he himself uses them correctly and successfully in his practical life. Yet, in doing philosophy, he asks such questions showing that he is perplexed or somehow dissatisfied about what is said or known about them. Further, he does not seek information about them in the way in which scientists seek it. What then would satisfy him? It is extremely difficult to answer this; for it is related to the conception of what is intellectually and rationally satisfying or to the vision of reality or to the standards or norms used in judging what is true or false, real or unreal, good or bad. Every great philosopher

has had his own conception of the rationally satisfying vision of reality which accounts for the difference in the views of great or original philosophers.

For further understanding of the nature of philosophy, it is better to consider some recent views like logical atomism and logical positivism in which, we find the consideration of the nature of its propositions, arguments, method etc., which is the most fruitful way of understanding its nature.

Logical Atomism

Its main features are: a) it is not a physical (scientific) atomic theory as the terms 'atomism' in its name may lead one to suppose a philosophical view built on the foundation of certain logical principles. Bertrand Russell, its originator says, "the kind of philosophy, which I wish to advocate, which I call logical atomism, is one, which has forced itself upon me in the course of thinking about the philosophy of mathematics ... I shall try to set forth a certain kind of logical doctrine and on the basis of this, a certain kind of metaphysics."

According to many thinkers, metaphysics: the study of the nature of reality, is the most important branch of philosophy. It is a fact that the name 'metaphysics' came into use long after the inception of philosophical thought. Even Aristotle did not use it. It was brought into use later by the compilers of Aristotle's works. The work to which Aristotle gave the title *The First Philosophy* came after his work called *Physics* in compilation. Hence, it was called 'Metaphysics' which literally means 'after physics'.

Metaphysics has had a chequered lot. It was admired, respected, upheld by some, neglected as useless, or severely attacked by others. Socrates was indifferent towards it. He thought that nothing practically or morally valuable could be gained by discussing its problems. David Hume came down heavily upon it and forcefully directed us to "commit it to flames" for, he said, "it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."[6] Kant, after careful, arduous,

[6] David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sec. II.

patient inquiry into the nature of its statements and arguments concluded that it was logically impossible but psychologically unavoidable.[7]

The most dangerous attempt to overthrow metaphysics was made by the logical positivists during the first half of the last century. The main point of their attack against it was, not that it was useless or impossible, but that it was meaningless. The most interesting, but ironical, is the fact that logical atomism, which is fully and deeply metaphysical, gave birth to logical positivism, which tried to destroy not only the metaphysics of logical atomism, but all kind of metaphysics. For this, 'patricidal' attempt, logical positivism had to pay such a great price that it disappeared from the philosophical scene within a short period of about three decades.

Logical atomists (except Wittgenstein) had no doubt at all about the significance or value of metaphysics. Their aim was to build up the best metaphysical system on sound logical principles, and in the opinion of many, they were very, though not fully, successful in doing so. "Logical atomism was presented as a superior metaphysics which was to replace inferior ones, not as an attack on metaphysics as such. Indeed, as presented in the documents of its hey-day, logical atomism is one of the most thorough going metaphysics, yet elaborated. This is true in spite of the anti-metaphysical strain, which is to be found in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* alongside metaphysics. For breadth of sweep, clarity, depth and consistency, it can have few rivals."[8]

According to Russell, atomic facts are ultimately real. However, he did not hold that atomic facts were only real, for he admitted that there were other kinds of facts; viz., general, negative, intentional - which were irreducible to atomic facts. His view was pluralistic realism directly opposed to absolute idealism. But other rigorous atomists differed from Russell in

[7] "That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we to avoid inhaling impure air should prefer to give up breathing altogether. There will, therefore, always be metaphysics in the world". Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

[8] Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.4

this respect. Their thesis was that only atomic facts were real and the other kinds, if any, were reducible to atomic facts. They struggled very hard to reduce other kinds of facts to atomic facts but they themselves realized that their efforts were in vain. Analysis was supposed to be the sole method of philosophy. This was given up as a consequence of realization of the impossibility of reductionism and another method, which may be called 'linguistic or conceptual description,' was adopted.

A succinct hence inadequate, explanation of these points follows; the concept of proposition is one of the basic concepts in logic. Any statement that can be true or false is a proposition, e.g., this flower is blue; the moon is nearer to the earth than the sun etc. They are propositions because they can be characterized as either true or false. However, the commands, questions, exclamations, and expressions of feelings, e.g., sit down, what are you doing? How beautiful is the sunset! Hurrah! are not propositions because, they can neither said to be true nor false. A proposition states a fact and its truth or falsity depends on its relation to the fact stated by it. Russell holds the correspondence theory of truth, which roughly states that a proposition is true if it corresponds to, and it is false if it does not correspond to the fact stated by it.[9] Facts are constituents of the world; they are objectively real.

Propositions are classified in many ways. A brief statement of some of them is necessary to understand logical atomism and logical positivism. In traditional (Aristotelian) logic, they are first divided into categorical and conditional propositions. The former are further divided into four types: a) Universal affirmative, these affirm a predicate of every member of the subject class, e.g., 'all leaves are green'. b) Universal negative, these deny a predicate of every member of a subject class, e.g., 'no politicians are honest'. c) Particular affirmative, which affirms a predicate of 'some' members of the subject class, e.g., 'some men are rich'. d) Particular negative, the subject

[9] But correspondence theory of truth is not accepted by Wittgenstein who holds that a sentence is a picture of a fact. According to B Russell, "in a logically perfect language the words in a proposition would correspond one by one with components of the corresponding act." Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.18

class, e.g., 'some birds are not white'; 'all' and 'some' are called quantifiers, the word 'some' is interpreted to mean 'at least one'. The conditional propositions were divided into two kinds; a) hypothetical and b) disjunctive. The hypothetical proposition states that the consequent depends upon the antecedentm, e.g., if it rains, the harvest would be good. The disjunctive proposition states that two or more disjuncts are alternatively related, i.e., if one of them is false, the others are true; but all disjuncts may be true but all cannot be false.

Traditional logic contains another important distinction between 'form' and 'matter' of propositions and of inferences. This is most important in two respects; a) logic is the study of the principles of validity of inferences and it was realized that validity depends on form, and not on matter of inferences. This facilitated the use of symbols in logic. b) This distinction brought out the fact that logic, like mathematics, is a formal science. In traditional logic, a few symbols are used to show the forms of propositions and inferences. This requires some explanation. Take for example, a) all men are bipeds, b) all flowers are fine, c) all books are useful. These differ in their subject matter. The matter of a) are men and the number of their legs, b) are flowers and their quality and c) are books and their usefulness, the same? However, their form is the same. Used as 'S' for any subject term and 'P' for any predicate term, their common form is shown, as 'all S is P'. This is the form of all universal affirmative propositions. These are called A propositions.

'No rose is green', 'no elephant is small' have the form 'no S is P', which is the form of all universal negative, (called E) propositions.

'Some men are kind', 'some trees are big', are of the form 'some S is P', which is the form of all particular affirmative, (called I) propositions.

'Some houses are not small', 'some things are not cheap' have the form, 'some S is not P' which is the form of all particular negative, (called O) propositions.

Similarly, the form of inferences can be shown by using symbols. a) All useful things are costly, all metals are useful ∴ all metals are costly;

b) all mammals have external ears. All whales are mammals ∴ all whales have external ears. These two inferences differ in their matter but agree in having the same form. To bring out their form, three symbols are required, for in each of them, there are three terms. The three symbols used in dealing with all inferences containing three categorical propositions are; i) 'S' for the minor term, (i.e., the subject of the conclusion); 'P' for the major term, (i.e., the predicate of the conclusion); M for the middle term, (the term that occurs in both premises but does not occur in the conclusion). Using these symbols, the form of these and all other such inferences is shown as all M is P, and all S is M ∴ all S is P. All inferences of this form are clearly valid. Aristotle discovered many other forms of valid inferences.

Russell divided propositions into atomic (simple) and molecular (compound). This is not an exhaustive classification because he says that there are other kinds of propositions.

Atomic proposition (simple proposition) states an atomic fact i.e., 'this is green', 'this is red', 'that is sweet' etc. According to Russell, these are examples of atomic propositions. Atomic facts (this being red, this being green, that is being sweet) are expressed by them. An atomic fact, e.g., 'this is green,' contains a simple element or predicate, 'green'. It is simple in the sense that it cannot be analyzed into simpler terms. If someone asks us 'what is green?' The only way of answering is to show him green colour. 'This', 'That' are logically proper names or demonstrative symbols. Russell gives the following definitions;

'Particulars = Terms of relations in atomic facts' [Def.]

'Proper names = Words for particulars' [Def.]

"Particulars have this peculiarity - - - that each of them stands alone and is completely self-subsistent. Each particular that there is in the world does not in any way logically depend on any other particular."[10] Thus, an atomic fact consists of a particular characterized by a simple predicate or consists

[10] Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.1

of two or more particulars connected by a simple relation. E.g., 'this shade of red is brighter than that shade of green', 'this is sweeter than that'. In symbolic logic, different symbols are used to refer to the elements in the atomic facts.

Greek letters ∅, Ψ are used to stand for simple predicates, R for a simple relation and lower case letters from the beginning of the alphabet, 'a, b, c' are used to refer to particulars. Using such symbols, the form of an atomic proposition consisting of a simple predicate characterizing a particular is shown as ∅a or Ψb and of that two particulars joined by a relation are shown as Rb (or R ab). There may be any number of particulars connected by a relation in an atomic proposition.

"The simplest sort of a proposition then will be one which consists solely of a proper name and a simple predicate. This sort of proposition Russell calls atomic and the facts that such propositions state are atomic facts." [11] The particulars are called constituents, predicates, and relations (the general elements), the components of atomic facts. However, the distinction between simple (atomic) and compound (molecular) propositions does not require the consideration of the internal elements and structure of simple propositions; it does not depend on the analysis of a simple proposition into its elements. This distinction belongs to prepositional calculus in which the completely simple proposition is taken as one unit; and small letter 's, p, q, r, s', etc., symbolize such propositions. These are prepositional variables, i.e., 'p' stands for anyone, 'q, r, s' for any other propositions.

A compound proposition is one that consists of simple proposition joined by logical constants or connectives. These are words which seem quite unimportant from our ordinary point of view but which are logically important because they are the bases of certain types of inferences. The axioms and the theorems derived from them in prepositional calculus are rules regarding the correct use of logical constants in valid inferences of a certain type.

[11] G J Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, p.34

These logical connectives are:

a)	'and' (also its equivalents)	Conjunction
b)	'or' ... (inclusive sense)	Disjunction
c)	'if - - - then' ...	Material implication
d)	'if and only if' ...	Material equivalence
e)	'not' ...	Negation

a) If two or more simple propositions are joined by 'and', the resulting compound proposition is called conjunction, b) if by 'or', disjunction c) if by 'If - - - then' material implication d) if they are joined by 'if and only if' the compound proposition is called material equivalence and e) a proposition containing 'not' is called negation.

Different symbols are used for logical constants:

a) Conjunction (and) is symbolized by '.' (He is old and he is weak – p and q – p. q. the proposition p, q in conjunction are called conjuncts. There may be any number of conjuncts in conjunction.

b) Disjunction (or) is symbolized by 'v' (It is soft or it is red; p or q – p v q) p, q in disjunction are called disjuncts; there may be any number of disjuncts on it.

c) Material implication (if - - - then) is symbolized by '⊃'. If he is healthy then he is happy, if p is q then p ⊃q. The part beginning with 'if' is called Antecedent and that which begins with 'then' is called Consequent. 'Then' is omitted in some such propositions. Antecedent and Consequent can themselves be compound propositions. E.g., if that boy has ₹ 5/- and he gets ₹ 15/- more from his father or mother, he can buy a book, or a bag or a pen (p. (qvr)) ⊃ (svt v u).

d) Material equivalence – 'if and only if' is symbolized by '≡'. E.g. if and only if he passes the examination, he will be appointed to that post – if and only if p than q – p ≡ q.

e) Negation (not) is symbolized by '~'. He is not wise. Here "he is wise" is denied. So not (he is wise) ~ p.

Such compound propositions are called truth-functions. They can be either true or false. However, unlike simple propositions, their truth or falsity does not depend upon their correspondence with compound facts for Russell and other logical atomists denied that there were molecular facts. Admission of molecular facts would have gone against the very spirit of logical atomism.[12]

How can then the truth or falsity of a compound, also called truth-functional, propositions be determined? The reply given is that their truth or falsity depends on the truth or falsity of their constituent propositions. This is the very meaning of the most important concept of truth function. A compound proposition, the truth or falsity of which is solely determined by the truth or falsity of its constituent propositions said to be a truth function of its constituent propositions.

Conjunction, disjunction, implication, equivalence, and negation are truth-functions. There are rules for determining their truth-values (i.e., truth or falsity) based on possible truth-values of their constituent propositions. If a truth function contains one prepositional variable p, there are two possibilities of truth-values of p; viz., a) p true b) p false. If it has two variables p, q, there are four possible combinations of truth-values of p, q; a) p true – q true b) p true – q false c) p false – q true d) p false – q false. If it has three variables, p, q, r, there are eight possible combinations of truth-values of p, q, r, (2x2x2). If it has four variables, p, q, r, s, there are sixteen (2x2x2x2) possible combinations of truth-values of p, q, r, s, and so on.

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[12] But Russell had doubts about this. He himself suggested that under certain conditions molecular facts would have to be admitted. He argued that a universal affirmative proposition, e.g., all crows are black (or any other of the form 'all S is P' when analysed stated that 'x is a crow implies X is black is always true' is, a fact. It would not be true if there were not such facts as 'this is a crow implies this is black'. But such facts are molecular facts. He hoped that this difficulty would be solved, but if it could not be solved, then molecular facts would have to be admitted. Commenting on this Urmson says, "... It is wonderful and admirable thing about Russell how candidly and exhaustively he would raise difficulties about the views he has fathered. His distaste for infanticide could never prevail against his hatred of error." Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.75

The rules for determining the truth-values of truth functions based on combinations of truth-values of their constituents are:

a) Conjunction; A conjunction is true when all its conjuncts are severally true, it is false when one or more or all of its conjuncts are false. This can be shown in a truth table. The construction of truth tables is one of the methods of determining validity of inferences involving truth-functions. Let us take a conjunction having two conjuncts, i.e., p . q

Truth table

p	q	p.q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

b) Disjunction; disjunction is true when one or all of its disjuncts are true; it is false when all of its disjuncts are false. Its truth-table is p v q.

p	q	pvq
T	T	T
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	F

c) Material Implication; it is false only when p antecedent is true and q consequent is false; in all other cases, (i.e., when both p, q are true, when both are false, and when antecedent p is false and consequent q true) it is true. Its truth table is

p	q	$p \supset q$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

d) Material Equivalence; $p \equiv q$ is true when both p, q are true and when both are false; it is false when one of them is true and other is false. Its truth table is $p \equiv q$.

p	q	$p \equiv q$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	T

e) Negation; ~p is true when p is false; it is false when p is true. Its truth table - ~p.

p	~p
T	F
F	T

By taking negation and one of the other truth-function as basic, other truth-functions can be defined in terms of them, e.g., taking disjunction or conjunction and negation as basic, material implication can be defined as follows:

$p \supset q \equiv \sim p \vee q \equiv \sim (p \cdot \sim q)$ [DF]

Thus, the truth-functions can be shown to be inter definable or equivalent.

Compound statements or truth functions are classified into three kinds based on the character of their truth tables; a) tautologies, b) contradictions, c) contingencies. Tautologies are those truth-functions, which are true for all possible combinations of truth-values, (i.e., truth or falsity) of their constituent propositions, or if the main column of the truth table of a truth-function contains only Ts, then it is a tautology and it is logically true.

E.g., take a) pv~p It is a tautology for it is true

TTF whether its constituent is true or false.

FTT Its main column contains only Ts.

b) (p ⊃ q) ≡ (~q ⊃ ~p) It is a tautology

TTT T FTF for main column of

TFF T TFF its truth table

FTT T FTT contains only Ts

FTF T TTT

Contradictions are those truth-functions, which are false for all possible combinations of truth-values of their constituent propositions or if the main columns of the truth table of a truth function contain only Fs, it is a contradiction. It is logically or necessarily false.

E.g., take

a) p ~p

TFF

FFT

These are contradictions for the main columns of their truth tables which contain only Fs. They are always false.

b) (p ⊃ q) . (p. ~q)

TTT F TFF

TFF F TTT

FTT F FFF

FTF F FFT

Contingencies are those truth functions, which are true for some possible combinations of truth-values, and false for other possible combinations of truth-values of their constituents, the main columns of their truth tables contain both Ts and Fs.

E.g., take

$(p \supset q)$	$\supset$	$(q \vee r)$
TTT	T	TTT
TTT	T	TTF
TFF	T	FTT
TFF	T	FFF
FTT	T	TTT
FTT	T	TTF
FTF	T	FTT
FTF	F	FFF

This is a contingency. The main column of its truth-table contains both Ts and F. Similarly, conjunction, disjunction, material implication etc., are contingencies for main columns of their truth tables which contain both Ts and Fs.

Thus, we see that whether a truth-function is a tautology or a contradiction, it can be determined solely by logical methods. Hence, it is said that they do not give any information about the world.[13] However, empirical statements (contingencies) which do give information about the world happen to be true under certain conditions and false under other conditions. To determine their truth or falsity, observation of facts and phenomena in the world is necessary.

The symbolic language of *Principia Mathematica* is completely truth-functional. It was thought to be the skeleton of perfect language and the essential structure of ordinary language. The ordinary language was held to be completely truth functional in its essence, that is, it was thought that it consisted of atomic propositions and truth-functions constructed out of atomic proposition by means of logical connectives. This view that ordinary language was truth functional was called the extensionality thesis.

The metaphysical doctrine of logical atomism was derived from the extensionality thesis. Russell held that language used with caution was a guide to reality. Our judgements (i.e., assertions and denials) stated in

[13] "Tautology and contradiction are not pictures of reality. They exhibit no possible state of affairs. For one allows every possible state of affairs, the other none." Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, 4.462

language are propositions. Our knowledge of the world or reality consists of propositions. Thus, language is an essential tool of our knowledge of reality. Language consisting of atomic (simple) propositions and their truth functions can give us knowledge of the world or reality only if the reality consisted of atomic facts. It is these facts, which are stated or pictured by atomic propositions or sentences, constitute our knowledge of reality. Thus, logical atomists held that language in the final analysis would be seen to consist of simple propositions and the world, of atomic facts alone.[14]

However, Russell, the impartial seeker of truth, pointed out that there were hurdles in the way of achieving this aim and that unless and until they were removed satisfactorily, this metaphysical view could not be accepted. It should be noted that the defects or difficulties in logical atomism were brought out gradually by the logical atomists themselves and not by its opponents. Russell set before other logical atomists the task of solving the following problems:

He thought that there were facts other than atomic facts: a) He held that there were general facts (besides atomic facts) on the ground that general propositions were not conjunctions or disjunctions of simple propositions on which their truth or falsity depended. Take e.g., the general proposition 'All birds fly' (all S is P). It states that every member of the class of birds flies. It is based on the observation of flying of a few birds. The class of birds is an open or unlimited class. As it contains infinite number of birds, each bird cannot be observed. So 'all birds fly' is not equivalent to the conjunction of singular propositions, 'this bird flies and that bird flies'. However many birds we may observe, there still will be birds unobserved by us, for the generalization covers past, present, and future birds.

This can be made clearer by distinguishing a general proposition from an enumerative proposition, i.e., one about the limited class. E.g., a class

[14] "They all shared a single ambition ... of establishing the thesis that there were in reality only atomic facts and in language atomic and molecular propositions. These atoms linguistic or factual were the final or the nearest approach to the final residue in analysis. They laid bare the essential character of language and of the world." G J Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, p.36

in a school consists of fifty students. The teacher after enquiry comes to know that every student in the class has come from a rural place. Instead of stating his findings in fifty singular statements like 'Ramesh has come from this village, Ashok has come from that village' etc., the teacher can summarize by the statement, 'all students in this class have come from villages'. Since, this class is a closed or limited class; it is possible for the teacher to ask every student about his native place. This is not so in the case of a generalization about an unlimited class. However, such a proposition can be true or false. If we find a single bird which does not fly, then 'all birds fly', will be false.

Until the discovery of such contradictory instance, the universal proposition is accepted as true. Since, it can be true or false and since it is not equivalent to the logical product (conjunction) of singular propositions, Russell concluded that there must be a general fact with which it does or does not correspond. The same is true in respect of all other propositions of the form 'all S is P'. Similarly, it was found that the propositions of the form 'some S is P', which could be either true or false, could not be reduced to the logical sums (or disjunctions) of singular propositions. Therefore, it was, said that there must be general facts with which propositions of the form 'some S is P' did or did not correspond.

b) Russell admitted negative facts. A negative proposition can be true or false. It is true when it does and it is false when it does not correspond with a negative fact, stated by it. Therefore, there must be negative facts.[15]

c) Russell also admitted intentional facts, which are stated by intentional propositions of the form 'X thinks (believes) that p', e.g., 'he believes that the earth is round, he believes that the sun is a planet'. Such a proposition appears to be compound or truth-functional, having p as its constituent. However, this is not so, for its truth value is independent of the truth value of p. For one may truly believe what is false and disbelieve what is true.

[15] "Next he (Russell) held also that there must be negative facts. Since the truth or falsity of negative propositions could not otherwise be satisfactorily accounted for." G J Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, p.35

However, intentional propositions may be true or false. Hence, said Russell, there must be intentional facts to determine the truth-values of intentional propositions. Thus, a simple way of finding out whether a proposition stated non-atomic fact, is to see whether it can be analyzed into atomic or truth-function, i.e., propositions. If it cannot be so analyzed, then it must state non-atomic fact of some kind.[16]

Great minds wrestled with these problems. They had to because the acceptance of them would imply that the ability to extend the thesis, the very basis of logical atomism was false. Wittgenstein and Ramsay held for some time that universal propositions of the form 'all S is P' were infinite conjunctions and general propositions of the form. 'Some S is P' were infinite disjunctions of simple propositions.[17] This was rightly felt to be unsatisfactory as it involved the admission that they could not be analyzed into simple propositions (an infinity cannot be completed) or into their conjunctions and disjunctions.

John Wisdom suggested that the fact that they were not equivalent to logical products for logical sums did not mean that they stated facts other than simple facts. They stated truth functions of simple facts. The difference between general and simple propositions was not based upon the difference in the types of facts stated by them; it is due to the difference in the way in which they stated atomic fact. Simple propositions stated atomic facts more explicitly while general propositions stated them less clearly or explicitly. This was also not acceptable.[18] The discussion of the problem of negative facts ended in the same unsatisfactory manner.

[16] "Thus we see that the guiding principle of Russell's argument is that when a proposition cannot be analyzed into a truth-functional 'complex' of atomic propositions, it must be recognised as stating a special kind of fact. This is clearly a very reasonable type of argument." Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.63

[17] "About these (i.e., general propositions) I adopt the view of Mr Wittgenstein that 'For all x, fx' is to be regarded as equivalent to the logical product of all values of 'fx', i.e., to the combination of fx1 and fx2 and ... and that 'there is an x such that fx' is similarly their logical sum." Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.64

[18] Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.65

The admission of negative facts combined with Russell's theory of correspondence raised the question – did 'not' refer to an element in such a fact? It was agreed that it did not. Then the problem was how to eliminate 'not'? Ramsay once suggested, not jestingly but seriously, that the troublesome 'not' could be eliminated by writing negative propositions, without 'not' upside down.[19]

John Wisdom's attempt to solve the difficulty about intentional facts consisted redefining 'atomic facts in such a way that an atomic fact could according to him, contain other facts'. He said that he believes that 'p', therefore is not compound but an atomic fact. 'I use atomic because I think, I mean by atomic what Russell and others have meant by it. However, they have said that atomic facts cannot contain other facts. My atomic facts can, e.g., 'I observe that this adjoins that', contains 'this adjoins that'.[20]

The discussion of these and other difficulties to be mentioned continued till logical atomists abandoned their two preconceptions and superstitions; a) about language – that language was truth functional and b) about analysis – that analysis should always be in the pattern set before them by G E Moore. c) The relation between language and reality presented a serious problem. Russell's correspondence theory stated that, in a perfect language, there would be one-to-one relation between words in a statement and the elements in a corresponding fact, did not satisfy Wittgenstein. The view seemed to suggest that a sentence was a mere collection of words and a fact, a collection of elements. It appeared to ignore the fact that a sentence and a fact, besides having elements, had also structure. Thus, in a sentence, words, and in fact elements are related in a definite way, i.e., they have structures.

Wittgenstein held a picture theory according to which, sentences were pictures of facts. The concept of 'picturing' refers to the identity of structures. Wittgenstein said that a sentence was a linguistic fact and the fact stated by it, was a real fact; and when the structure of sentence was

[19] Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.71

[20] Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.73

identical with the structure of a fact stated by it, a sentence was a picture of a real fact.[21] The conception of picturing is too deep or difficult to be explained briefly here.

d) The notion of atomic or simple proposition is itself very problematic. This problem is the product of the logical atomists' view that a sentence, which is a right picture of an atomic fact, must contain a logically proper name and a word standing for a determinate quality or relation. Russell argued that ordinary proper names were not logically proper names (demonstrative symbols), they were abbreviated descriptions.

For i) demonstrative symbols, 'this' 'that' can be used to refer to only the objects, which are present before us but ordinary proper names are used to refer, not only to objects present before us, but also to past objects, i.e., those that are not present before us. E.g., in history, we make significant statements about persons and events that existed or happened in the past. ii) Demonstrative symbols do not connote any characteristics of objects to which they are used to refer, they merely denote them but do not describe them.

However, ordinary proper names have two functions, viz., they denote the objects called by them and also connote their characteristics. E.g., 'Socrates' signifies 'master of Plato', 'a Greek thinker, who drank poison' etc. iii) Names of mythological persons or objects have no denotation, but they have connotation. If they had no connotation, they would be meaningless marks or sounds and the mythological statements containing them would be meaningless.

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21 "Language then can be used to express facts, to make statements, because there are linguistic structures, sentences, which are facts, and which have a common structure with facts to be expressed. The identity of structure was called picturing" Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, pp. 79-80.

One simple objection that strikes one is that there is no sufficient similarity between sentence and fact, for the former to become the picture of the latter. This was known to Wittgenstein. His conception of identity of structure or picturing did not involve the idea of similarity only. Hence his conception of picturing was different from its ordinary conception. It was highly metaphysical.

However, such statements are meaningful. Then the doubt arose as to whether there was any symbol or word in language that could be used merely to point to an object without indicating any characteristics.[22] Russell thought that the words 'this', 'that' etc., were logically proper names. However, Wisdom questioned this. He said that they were not demonstrative symbols but abbreviated descriptions.

For the word, 'this' when used by some persons signifies 'the object that he is pointing out'. He said "I have a similar fear about this". If I speak not to myself but to someone else and say 'this is red'. I use this as meaning something like 'the thing to which I am pointing'.[23] Thus, it became very difficult to give an example that is acceptable to all logical atomists of an atomic proposition in language. Russell said "the only kind of word that is theoretically capable of standing for a particular is a proper name and the whole matter of proper names is curious".[24]

This was one of the main reasons that countered the enthusiasm of logical atomists for founding their doctrine on absolutely certain basis. Overlooking the present Wisdom's objection against 'this' being a logically proper name, let us inquire why Russell considered 'this is red', 'this is sweet' etc., as atomic propositions. According to him, 'this' 'that' stand for a particular. A particular is an object of direct or immediate acquaintance or experience and *sense-datum* is a particular. He says, "let us give the name of 'sense-data' to such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardness, roughness and so on. We shall give the name 'sensation' to the experience of being aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour we have a sensation of colour but the colour itself is a *sense-datum*, not a sensation".[25]

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[22] "Logically proper name is a word that stands for an object with which we are directly acquainted ... and indicates an object without ascribing characteristics". Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.84

[23] Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.85

[24] Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.82

[25] Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p.12

The statements about sense-data 'I see red' 'I hear a sound' etc., were thought to be indubitable or absolutely certain, because they stated merely what was directly or immediately sensed. To make it plain, a *sense-datum* statement was distinguished from a statement about a physical object. E.g., 'there is an apple on that table.' When we look at an apple and a table, all that we see directly are red and brown patches of colour of certain shapes and sizes. Hence, it was argued that a physical object statement went beyond (or suggested much more than) what was directly sensed. Our example suggests that an apple, besides being red, is smooth to touch, sweet to eat, it has a kernel containing seeds and a certain smell. Similarly, a cupboard, has not only colour but also has hardness, smoothness, shelves, etc. Being physical objects, they continue to exist even when they are not perceived by any one.

Thus, going beyond what we actually directly perceive, the physical object statements become dubitable. We can doubt whether the apple and cupboard which we say we see, really exist, because of the possibility of occurrence of illusions. However, there cannot be any doubt about *sense-datum* statement for it does not state anything more than what is immediately sensed. The statements about sense-data were called by Russell atomic propositions. So if the logical atomists were successful in showing that reality consisted solely of atomic facts expressed by indubitable atomic propositions, their metaphysical doctrine would have been absolutely certain. However, they did not succeed in their sublime venture. Another factor that contributed to the gradual downfall of logical atomism was construction of many calculus of *Principia Mathematica*, which was the essence or skeleton of ordinary language. Many other thinkers constructed calculus which were as good as that of Russell's. Hence, Russell's claim had to be abandoned.

Prof Urmson has urged that the rejection of logical atomism was not due to the attack against it from its opponents. Many of those who were not logical atomists did not care or try to understand it. Some, who did, could not understand it properly. The logical atomists themselves noticed the difficulties listed above and others like paradoxes of implication, impossibility of reducing physical object statement to the equivalent sets of

sense-data statements, nation statements into equivalent sets of statements about nationals etc. Thus, those thinkers who had eagerly embraced logical atomism came to know that there were thorns in it. This led to the reflection upon and abandonment of the basis of logical atomism that language was truth-functional.

The Method of Philosophy

All logical atomists and positivists believed that analysis of some sort was a proper method of philosophy. In elucidating their ideas about this method, it is necessary to take into account Prof G E Moore's view of it, though he was neither an atomist nor a positivist because, it was he who insisted that the function of philosophy was the analysis of commonsense beliefs. He, with Russell, was a forerunner of the analytic method and others followed him in accepting that method as the only proper method of philosophy, though it was doubtful as to whether their ideas about that method were the same as those of Prof Moore.

The conclusions arrived at by the idealists that matter, space, time, change etc., were unreal went clearly against the ordinary beliefs that they were real. Such paradoxical conclusions shocked Moore who could not understand how and why anyone could hold views opposed to the commonsense beliefs. He set himself the task of defending commonsense beliefs in the reality of matter, space etc., from such attacks. He was convinced that commonsense beliefs were true; that their truth was not at all problematic; what was problematic was their meaning, so their meaning had to be clarified or analyzed. As Warnock puts it, "it is not, as some philosophers have thought that their analysis is clear but their truth is uncertain. Their truth is absolutely certain but their analysis is doubtful".[26] Moore thought that the task of philosophy was a) to analyze clearly the commonsense beliefs and b) to refute the philosophical doctrines opposed to them.

He thought that it was easy to prove the existence or reality of physical

[26] G J Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, p.19

objects. He offered a sample but a famous proof. Here is one hand and here is another hand. Therefore, there are two hands, i.e., material objects. According to him, here the conclusion validly follows from true premises. Hence, it is necessarily true. However, the analysis of premises and conclusion was doubtful. To quote again, what Warnock says, "It is proper to wonder how such propositions ought to be analyzed? The absurdity consists only in supposing that they are not known or that they cannot be proved."[27]

By analysis Moore meant the clear statement of the simple elements and their relations in a complex whole which might be an object or idea. He did not distinguish between analysis and definition. So according to him, only the complex could be defined, for definition consisted in resolving clearly the complex notion into its simple elements and their relations. A simple notion was one which was devoid of elements. Hence, it could not be defined or analyzed. However, this did not mean that the simple notion was unknowable. The indefinable is not unknowable. The simple idea was knowable; indeed, it was the basis of knowledge. We could think of, intent or perceive the simple elements and thus know them. However, to anyone who could not intent or perceive them, they could not be made known by definition, e.g., a man born-blind could not have a notion of a colour.

Moore distinguished between three kinds of definition; a) a verbal arbitrary definition stating in what sense one intended to use a word or an expression, b) conventional definition stating in what sense an expression was usually used in a community, dictionary consists of such definitions, c) a philosophical definition, which according to Moore, was the most important. This brought out the simple notions of which the complex notion was composed. Moore said, "Definitions of the kind that I was seeking for, definitions which describe the real nature of the object denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when the object or notion in question is something complex. You can give a definition of a horse because horse has many different properties and qualities all of which you can enumerate. However, when you have

[27] G J Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, p.20

enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to his simplest terms, you can no longer define those terms. They are simply something which you can think of or perceive and to anyone who cannot think of or perceive them you can never, by any definition, make their nature known ... 'or' ... And so it is with all objects ... which we are able to define, they are all complex, all composed of parts, which may themselves, in the first instance be capable of similar [DF], but which must in the end of reducible, to simplest parts, which can no longer be defined."[28]

The common sense beliefs about physical objects, space and time, etc., are expressed in propositions. The ideas of physical object, space, time etc., are complex. Hence, to analyze them, the propositions containing them should be reduced to propositions about simplest elements or notions. What are their simplest notions?

Take for instance, the notion of a rose. It is a complex consisting of many ideas of its parts or petals and of many qualities such as colour, smell, shape, size etc. Its petals can be separated from its other parts; its qualities can be enumerated. It is easy to do this. We do not need a philosopher to tell us what its parts and qualities are. However, Moore says "analysis is often very difficult... The work of analysis and [DF] is often difficult" (Preface to *Principia Ethica*).

Moreover, the parts of a rose are themselves complex. They have to be resolved into their simplest factors. According to Moore, the simplest elements of any complex physical objects are much more basic than their parts; they are directly apprehended or sensed; they are common to all perceptual experiences, whether or not the corresponding physical objects exist. In dreams and illusions, we see, touch, hear, smell and taste the objects, which do not really exist. However, we do perceive something and this which we perceive does exist as long as our experience lasts but it itself is not a physical object. Moore calls this which is directly or immediately apprehended or sensed and which is present even in illusory experiences,

[28] G E Moore, Principia Ethica, pp.7-8

sense-datum. Since, illusory (false) experiences are too similar to veridical perceptions, they are almost indistinguishable as experiences, and it is held that in veridical perceptions too what is directly apprehended is a *sense-datum.* The directly apprehended colours, smells, sounds and tastes, the tactual data such as smoothness, roughness, heat, cold, etc., are sense data.

The sense data are all those simple elements with which we are directly acquainted or which are immediately given in sense experience. They are the simple elements of which the complex real objects of common sense beliefs (such as space, time, physical object, etc.,) are composed, and the task of philosophy, according to Moore is to analyze such complex conceptions in terms of their sense data. Therefore, the philosophical analysis of common sense beliefs about such objects, according to Moore, means resolving ordinary statements about matter, mind, etc., into sets of equivalent statements about sense data. Thus, Moore takes us into deep unfamiliar philosophical writings. This kind of philosophical analysis is unfamiliar to ordinary people, but it is the proper business of a philosopher. It is neither scientific nor popular but philosophical.

Moore unwittingly sets a model of philosophical analysis to other analysts to follow. The paradigm of philosophical analysis was to take the form of an equation in which the expression or concept to be analyzed had to be stated on the left side and its analysis usually a longer an equivalent expression, on the right side, of the equation. E.g., X is a triangle = X is a plane figure bounded by three straight lines 'or' X is a father = X is a male parent. X is a sibling of Y = X is a brother or sister of Y. It is very easy to give such an analysis of such closed concepts, i.e., concepts that have definite, clear and limited significance, but to analyze the 'open' concepts like chair etc., in the same way i.e., to state the set of statements about sense data, which is equivalent to X is a chair or X is a house, is very difficult.

Subsequently, the analysts found it to be impossible; some attributed their failure to the poverty of ordinary language. The main function of which, they said, was to deal with persons, objects and situations and not with sensory

elements like sense data and hence contained fewer terms referring to sense data than they needed for analyzing the complex conceptions in terms of sense data. Moreover, as it usually happens in philosophy whenever a new expression or a concept is introduced, the concept of *sense-datum* gave rise to many questions such as, are sense data real? Are they subjective or objective? How are they related to physical objects? Can they appear to have qualities that they do not really have? There was a lot of discussion or such problems.

Ayer said that if the *sense-datum* language was to be philosophically useful, the rules governing its use must be framed in such a way as to show that sense data were very different from physical objects. Thus, physical objects are said to be public, to exist even when not perceived to appear to have qualities, which they do not really have etc. Not all this should be allowed in respect of sense data. The sense data must be regarded as private, as essentially dependent on the experience of a person sensing them and as really having the qualities, which they appear to have etc. However, the consequence of regarding physic objects and sense data logically different from one another was to make the analysis of the former in terms of the latter impossible.

The influence of Russell on the conception of philosophical analysis is, at least, as, great as, if not greater than, that of Moore. Russell's theories of descriptions and of logical constructions were eagerly accepted, with slight modifications, as models of analysis.

Theory of Descriptions

Russell's theory of descriptions is concerned with the problem of the nature of and distinction between, a particular and a universal. In anatomic fact, its constituent is a particular and its component, a determinate quality or a relation is a universal. Hence, a simple proposition stating an atomic fact has to contain a term standing for a particular (or a logically proper name) and a term referring to a component (a predicate e.g., red, sweet, or if the component is a relation, then there must be as many logically proper names as are required to complete the sense of the statement). Russell

distinguished logically proper name from the ordinary proper name by saying that while the former had only one function of denoting a particular without indicating its qualities, the latter had two functions, viz., that of denoting and also of indicating the characteristics of the object to which it applied and that the latter was an abbreviated description.

According to Russell, there are two kinds of descriptions: a) definite b) ambiguous or indefinite.[29] The phrases of the form 'the so-and-so', e.g., the highest mountain in the world, the first President of India etc., are definite descriptions and those of the form 'a so and so'. E.g., a brave boy, a world famous novel etc., are indefinite descriptions. Here Russell is mainly interested in definite descriptions, for in uniquely referring to the object to which they apply (if they apply) they appear to function as proper names. Even Russell at one time thought so. He held that every subject term or expression must refer to a name, object or a person (sensible or supersensible).[30] Traditional logicians regarded; a) this is red, b) Socrates is wise (Sciences). The unicorn is dangerous – as singular (simple) propositions of the form, 'this S is P'. Until he formulated his famous theory of descriptions, Russell also thought so. However, in this theory he pointed out that this was a mistake because while b) and (Sciences) were complex or general propositions; a) was a simple proposition of the form – 'this is P' that definite descriptions and ordinary proper names were not demonstrative symbols. This became clear because of the analysis of the propositions having definite descriptions as their subjects.

Take for example, 'the golden mountain is beautiful'. According to Russell's theory its analysis is; "there is one and only one thing which is the

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[29] "By a description, I mean any phrase of the form 'a-so-and-so' or 'the–so-and-so'. A phrase of the form 'a-so-and-so' I shall call 'ambiguous description'; a phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' (in the Singular) I shall call a definite description." B Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p 52

[30] "We can say that 'the round-square is impossible' the round square cannot exist nor can it subsist like a universal redness or justice; but it must have some sort of being just as this 'in'. 'This is red' or that in that is small refers to an object, so round-square must refer to some object, it must name something. B Russell, The Problems of Philosophy

golden mountain and whatever is the golden mountain, it is beautiful." (The analysis of 'A golden mountain is beautiful' would be 'there is an object which is called Golden Mountain and whatever is a golden mountain, it is beautiful').

In the above analysis, the definite description 'the golden mountain' occurs not as a subject but as a predicate and since it does not apply to anything (there is actually no such thing as the golden mountain) the proposition is false. To take another, e.g., 'The author of Abhijñānaśākuntala is world famous.' This proposition is true for both the predicates, 'being the author of Abhijñānaśākuntala' and 'being world famous' which apply to the poet Kāḷidāsa.

A similar analysis of all propositions in which the definite descriptions appear to be subjects shows that they are not really names (subjects) but predicates though grammatically they function as nouns. Logically they are not subjects but predicates. This theory or discovery of Russell was embraced enthusiastically by many thinkers who thought that it showed the mistake in an old philosophical argument that was used to prove some sort of being or subsistence in supersensible world of such entities like unicorns, golden mountains, fairies etc., which did not exist in this world. The argument in brief was that, statements such as 'the unicorns are ferocious', 'the fairies are kind', 'the present king of India is old' etc., were meaningful and if their (apparent) subject terms did not denote anything, they would be meaningless. However, if they are meaningful, their subject terms must denote or apply to some objects; and as such objects did not exist in this world, they must subsist in a supersensible world.[31] Russell's theory showed that though such expressions had no denotation (application) yet they were meaningful; that meaning did not depend upon denotation of terms or expressions.

It was also claimed that Russell's analysis brought out very clearly the form of the fact stated by propositions containing definite descriptions as their (apparent) subjects. Many thinkers were deceived into thinking that

[31] Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, p.23

such propositions were singular (simple) propositions which expressed atomic facts. However, Russell's analysis showed that they were not singular but general propositions stating complex (general) facts.

The form of simple propositions is Øa or Ψb in which, a, b, stand for any particular, and Ø Ψ refer to any attribute; but the symbolic form of a proposition containing a definite description, according to Russell's analysis is; taking Ø to refer to 'the another of Abhijñānaśākuntala' (or any other such definite description) and Ψ to refer to 'world famous' (or to any other such quality). The symbolic form of 'another of Abhijñānaśākuntala is world famous' (or of any other such similar statement) is shown as c) Øc x ≠ c. Ψ_x this may be read roughly as 'there is one and only one person who is the author of Abhijñānaśākuntala and who is also world famous'.

Though this kind of analysis had certain advantages, it was later felt that it was not fully satisfactory, that it was good as far as it went, but it did not go too far. Its two main defects were a) some propositions containing definite descriptions were true but some others were false. 'The author of Abhijñānaśākuntala is world famous' is true while 'the present king of India is old' was false for there is now no king of India. However, the analysis of both was the same. Hence, the analysis itself did not show us which was true and which was false, b) from the point of view of logical atomism, its more serious defect was that it failed to arrive at simple (atomic) facts. The goal of logical atomism was to show that the world contained atomic facts only. This analysis brought out that the facts stated by propositions containing definite descriptions were not atomic but general (or complex) facts. Therefore, the problem whether such facts could be further analyzed into atomic facts shall remain.

To put it in other words, this kind of analysis contained terms like 'object or thing', 'person' etc., not basic elements (or sense data). They were logical constructions, which had to be analyzed into sense data. The statements about objects or persons involved inference from or interpretation of sense data and hence were dubitable. However, the statement about sense data was regarded as indubitable or certain. Russell's theory of logical

constructions was thought to provide a more powerful method of analysis (called reductive analysis) by means of which statements about logical construction could be reduced to equivalent sets of statements about sense data. The conception of logical construction is intimately connected with that of incomplete symbol. John Wisdom has given a simple neat definition of an incomplete symbol, "a phrase is said to be an incomplete symbol if it is once which neither names nor describes what might have been named".

Take e.g., 'the present Prime Minister of India is old'. Here the descriptive phrase refers to a person who exists. Now I am not standing before him, so I cannot, by pointing to him use the demonstrative symbol 'this' i.e., I cannot say by pointing that 'this is the present Prime Minister of India'. But I can go to Delhi, meet him, and say, 'this is the present Prime Minister of India.' Hence, the expression 'the present Prime Minister of India' is not an incomplete symbol. However, 'the present king of India' in 'the present king of India is brave' is an incomplete symbol because it does not apply to any one with whom one can be acquainted.

The explanation of the conception of logical construction is If X is an incomplete symbol, then X^s (i.e., things to which it refers) are logical constructions. For examples, if the expression 'the nation' is an incomplete symbol, the nations are logical constructions. If the expression 'physical object' is an incomplete symbol then the 'physical objects' is logical constructions. If the phrase, 'average man' is an incomplete symbol, then the 'average men' is a logical construction.

Let us now suppose that Y is either a name or description of something, which could be named. Then X^s are logical constructions out of Y^s, if and only if, for every statement (sentence) containing the incomplete symbol X, an equivalent statement (sentence) containing the symbol Y but not the symbol X can be found. One can also say that if X^s are logical constructions out of Y^s, then every statement about X^s can be replaced by one equivalent to it, which says something but not the same thing about Y^s.[32] Thus, to

[32] "Thus we are entering into deep philosophical waters. Philosophy is not now a food for consumption of every one: certainly not of those sycophants who have the gift of the gab

say that physical objects are logical constructions made out of sense data is to say that a statement about a physical object can be analyzed into or reduced to equivalent statements about sense data.

To avoid misunderstanding of the concept of logical construction the following explanations are given:

a) The description of something as a logical construction should not be taken to mean that it is mental. Thus, the statement 'the chair is a logical construction' does not mean that the chair is mental, for it is not an empirical statement about the nature of chair. Such a statement containing the expression logical construction is not intended to give empirical information; it is intended to tell us how the expression 'logical construction' is to be used. This is clear from the fact that if the chair is a logical construction then the expression 'the chair' is an incomplete symbol; i.e., it is not a name nor does it refer to something that can be named. In short, X is a logical construction and is not an empirical statement about the nature of X, but a verbal statement about the incomplete symbol X.

b) The objects (or persons) and logical constructions are of different logical types, i.e., what can be significantly said about the former cannot be significantly said about the latter. Thus, it is meaningful to say that I am sitting on a chair; but it is senseless to say that I am sitting on a logical construction . It is meaningful to say that John is speaking with Brown but it is meaningless to say that one logical construction is speaking with another logical construction.

c) The expression 'logical construction' does not mean 'fictitious'; e.g., unicorns are fictitious; but others are not. Books, chairs etc., are logical constructions but they are not fictitious.

d) The statement X^s are logical construction out of Y^s is not a psychological statement about the way in which we come to know or learn Y^s and X^s. Thus,

to lull their audience; it has become highly technical and its articles are published in special periodicals. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis. p.36

it does not mean that we first learn Y^s and then with their aid, learn X^s. It is a philosophical statement about the analysis of X^s into Y^s. It has been correctly pointed out by some thinkers that saying that these doctrines of Russell are verbal on the ground that they make clear the uses of definite descriptions and incomplete symbols is to underestimate their importance. They do much more than this.

The theory of descriptions contains logical (or some-level) analysis. Its aim is to reveal the logical forms hidden in propositions containing definite descriptions to avoid misunderstanding of the nature of such propositions. This has helped to detect the fallacy in a philosophical argument purporting to prove subsistence of supra-sensible entities. The doctrine of logical constructions is reductive (or new-level) analysis. Its aim is to analyze or reduce the complex whole into its basic elements or realities. "It helps us to get down to ultimate simples out of which the world is built, to gain insight into the structure of ultimate reality."[33] It is metaphysical.

However, this proved to be a mistake, for reductionism came under heavy attack and was given up later.

Logical Positivism

Its main features are; a) rejection of metaphysics, b) principle of verification, c) identification of philosophy with analysis and logic. There were some minor differences in the views of logical positivists but there was agreement in the main general outline of their views. Some of them refused to apply the name 'positivism' to their view on the ground that it was quite different from Auguste Comte's philosophy, which was also called Positivism. To avoid confusion, they called their view Logical Empiricism.

The logical positivists (or empiricists) had great respect for science, mathematics and logics. They admired the great achievements in these fields. Some of them were experts in science and some others in mathematics and logic, they could not tolerate the inflated claim of the metaphysicians that

[33] G J Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, p .171

metaphysics was far superior to science in giving ultimate final knowledge of the reality as a whole. They frankly avowed and declared that one of their aims was to overthrow metaphysics. Their rejection of metaphysics was brief. They rejected it on the basis of a criterion of meaning called the 'Principle of Verification' which was formulated in such a way as to show that science, mathematics, and logics were meaningful while metaphysics was meaningless. Roughly, the verification principle states that a statement is meaningful if and only if, it is either synthetic or analytic.

The logical empiricists divided propositions into two kinds; a) synthetic, b) analytic and not into three kinds as was done by Kant. Kant's classification of judgements (or propositions) is as follows; a) synthetic judgements are judgements in which the predicate is not contained in the subject, e.g., leaves are green. b) Analytic judgement is one in which the predicate is contained in its subject. For example, mother is a female parent. c) Posteriori judgments are judgements which depend on experience in the sense that their truth or falsity is determined by sense experience. d) Priori judgments, which are 'independent of all experiences and even of all senses'.

All analytic propositions are a priori and all posteriori propositions are synthetic; but according to Kant the converses of these are not true; i.e., all priori propositions are not analytic and all synthetic propositions are not posteriori; for there are, says Kant, synthetic priori propositions; i.e., those in which their predicates are not contained in their subjects and which are yet independent of sense experience in the sense that their truth or falsity is not determined by sense experience. Kant holds that all mathematical propositions are synthetic a priori. Other examples of them are 'every change has a cause', 'two things cannot occupy the same space', 'our duty is determined by the moral law.'

A synthetic proposition is one which is verifiable (or falsifiable) in sense experience; it is an empirical proposition, e.g., 'this rose is red'. In synthetic one can see whether or not it is red, if it is found to be red, then the statement is true, if it is not red, the statement is false. Thus, its truth or falsity depends on sense experience. We cannot know its truth value by

merely analyzing its subjects and its denial. 'This rose is not red', may be false, but it is not self-contradictory.

An analytic proposition is one which is logically or necessarily true in the sense that its denial is self-contradictory, e.g., a spinster is an unmarried woman. A husband is a male spouse. These are analytic for their predicates are contained in the significance of their subjects and their denials (e.g., a husband is not a male spouse) are self-contradictory. To know that they are true, it is sufficient to know the meanings of their subjects. The verification principle allows literal significance only to these two kinds of statements.[34]

Now, the metaphysical statements; 'the absolute alone is real, the space is unreal' etc., are not synthetic; they are not verifiable in sense experience. No sense experience can show us whether such statements are true or false. Logical empiricist points out that this is admitted by the metaphysician that the ultimate reality is beyond sense experience. If so, sense experience cannot determine whether it is true or not.

The metaphysician's statements about ultimate reality are true. Nor does the metaphysician arrive at such a statement by means of scientific observation or experiment. He himself says that his assertions about the nature of reality are not known by sense observation, but by a special means of intellectual intuition which is far superior to and different from sense experience. It gives ultimate final, absolutely certain insight into or knowledge about the nature of reality, whereas sense experience gives, at best, probable knowledge or belief about the phenomena in the world.[35]

The logical positivist does not admit the validity of the metaphysical

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[34] "The principle of verification is supposed to furnish a criterion by which it can be determined whether or not a sentence is literally meaningful. A simple way to formulate it would be to say that a sentence had literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable." A J Ayer, Language Truth and Logic, p .5

[35] Carnap Says "Metaphysicians cannot avoid making their propositions non-verifiable because if they made them verifiable the decision about the truth or falsehood of their doctrines would depend upon experience and therefore belong to the region of empirical science. This consequence they wish to avoid because they pretend to teach knowledge which is of higher level than that of empirical Science." Morton White, The Age of Analysis, p.215

intuition. He does not or need not deny the occurrence of mystic intuitions. Whether they occur or not, and if they do occur, what is their nature? are questions about mental events which can be answered by psychological investigation. However, the question about their validity is not psychological, but logical. Hence this belongs to the region of philosophy. Moreover, doubt about the validity of intellectual intuitions naturally arises because different philosophers have had different intuitions about the nature of reality.

One says that reality is spiritual, another that it is material. Some say it is one, others that it is many etc. The problem is how to decide which of these intuitions is valid. There appears to be no criterion or method for deciding their validity. This brings out the basic difference between metaphysics, on the one hand, and science, mathematics and logic, on the other. In these latter subjects there are methods or criteria to decide what is right or wrong, valid or invalid, true or false. However, in metaphysics there is no method or criterion to decide whether a solution to its problem is right or wrong.

One of the reasons for this, which is related to the nature of philosophy, is that the philosopher questions whether these methods or criteria used to decide validity or invalidity, truth or falsity etc., are themselves rational: e.g., the problem of induction is a problem about the rationality or justifiability of scientific method. There is a problem about the deductive method used in formal sciences (mathematics and logic) as to whether it gives knowledge. The problem about the reality of the world is a problem about the propriety of the criteria used in distinguishing the veridical from non-veridical perceptions. Similarly the logical positivist questions the validity of intuition; he argues that its validity is problematic.

Further, metaphysical statements are not analytic for their denials are not self-contradictory. Thus, the denial 'the absolute is not spiritual' is not self-contradictory.

Now, it is easy to see that the metaphysical statements are not meaningful followed from the verification principle. It lays down that only two types of statements, synthetic and analytic are (literally) meaningful.

Since metaphysical statements are neither synthetic nor analytic, it states that they are (literally) meaningless.

It should be noted that the principle of verification condemns, not only metaphysical statements, which are taken seriously by a few people, but also normative moral judgements and religious judgements indeed all judgements of value, which are taken seriously by almost all persons, as literally meaningless on the ground that they are neither synthetic nor analytic.

Ayer distinguishes between literal and emotive meanings. To say that a statement is literally meaningful is to say that it is either analytic or synthetic, that it conforms to the conditions of meaning laid down by the verification principle. The metaphysical, moral and other value utterances, which are excluded by that principle from the class of literally meaningful statements, lack literal meaning but, says Ayer, they may have emotive significance.

Some thinkers have compared metaphysics with lyric poetry. The poetic language has merely (or mainly) the expressive function. It expresses the feelings of the poet about the object, person or situation. The main intention of the poet is not to state what is true or false; but to express his emotions through the poem. Some expressions in his poem, especially those about historical persons or situations may happen to be true. However, the value of his poem consists not in the true expressions, but in the way the feelings are expressed in the poem. It is said that metaphysical utterances are similar to poetic ones in expressing emotions.

However, Ayer and Carnap rejected this. They do not want to concede even this status of poetic utterances to metaphysical sentences. They say that the latter are worse than the former in that they are deceptive in the sense that they appear to state something true or false about the nature of reality when in fact they do nothing of this sort, but merely express feelings. They are misinterpreted to be capable of being true or false. The metaphysicians engage in the vain discussion as to whether they are true or false and whether they are acceptable or to be rejected. However, the

poetic utterances are not thus deceptive. They are not expressed as true. No one questions as to whether or not they are true. All this explains as to why logical positivism was charged with atheism and destruction of all values of life. It had to face a very severe criticism.

The verification principle on the basis of which metaphysics, theology, and value judgements were held to be devoid of literal meaning was attacked on two grounds – a) that its formulation was unsatisfactory and b) that it itself was literally meaningless.

a) The terms 'sense-experience' and 'verification' used in its formulation that the meaning of a non-analytic statement was identical with its verification in sense experience, were subjected to criticism. Verification is a test of the truth or falsity of a proposition. There is, no doubt, some connection between meaning and truth or falsity of a statement. A sentence or utterance that lacks meaning also lacks truth value; a meaningless utterance can neither be true nor false. There must be some sort of difference between a situation that makes a meaningful statement true and the situation that makes it false and to understand a statement properly is to know this difference.

Now the logical positivists say that only the sense experience is necessary to know this difference between a situation that makes a meaningful statement true and a situation that makes it false. This is rejected by other thinkers. They say that this highest state accorded to sense experience by the logical positivists is quite unjustified for there are other types of experiences – religious, moral, aesthetic etc., which can guide us in knowing which statements in such fields are true and false. As Ewing says "There are other kinds of experience besides sense experience the evidence of which has also a good claim to be heard."[36]

Another difficulty was about the kind of verification that was thought to be necessary for determining whether a non-analytic statement was meaningful. Some logical empiricists held that conclusive verification was

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[36] A C Ewing, Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, p.39

necessary, others among them said against this, that the scientific theories, and laws, statements above the past universal propositions of the form "all S is P" etc., could not be conclusively verified for they cover infinite number of instance, past, present, and future. Hence, according to the stipulation of conclusive verification they would be senseless. So they held that partial verification in sense-experience was enough to show that a non-analytic statement was meaningful.

Some proposed falsifiability as the criterion of significance of a non-analytic statement. They said that, though universal propositions of the form 'all S is P' and scientific generalizations could not be conclusively verified, yet they could be conclusively falsified by finding a single negative (contradictory) instance. Thus, 'all roses are red' could be shown to be false by finding a single rose that was not red. However, the conclusively falsifiability criterion is open to the objection that the particular propositions of the form 'some S is P' cannot be conclusively falsified. 'Some S is P' is interpreted to mean 'at least one S is P'. E.g., 'some politicians are honest' is equivalent to 'at least one politician is honest'. It is clear that it is easy to conclusively verify this kind of proposition. If we find a single politician who is honest, this proposition is conclusively verified. However, it is also clear that it is not possible to conclusively falsify this type of statement. Even if we find that no politician in the past was and no politician in the present is honest, this is not sufficient to conclusively falsify 'some politicians are honest', for the possibility of finding at least one honest politician always remains, we may find one in the future, and thus it can never be conclusively falsified. This means that the criterion of conclusive falsifiability cannot be used to determine the meaningfulness of the propositions of the kind 'some S is P'. Hence, it was abandoned and the criterion of partial verification was retained. A statement that cannot even be partially verified in sense experience was regarded as senseless.

Some distinguished direct verification from indirect verification. We ordinarily believe that all statements about single objects, events or persons, are directly verifiable. For we can perceive whether or not the object or person or event has a characteristic stated to belong to it. E.g. 'Rāma is

wearing a white shirt, that flag is red, this water is boiling' etc., we can know whether such statements are true by direct perception.

However, this is denied by some logical empiricists who hold that things, persons etc., are logical constructions and hence statements about them cannot be directly verified. According to them, only the statements about sense data are directly verifiable and all other statements if verifiable admit of indirect verification. The Indirect verification consists in drawing the directly verifiable consequences from such propositions and then testing those consequences by observation or experiment.[37] It takes the form:

"If p then C_1 C_2 C_3 ...". Where p stands for a proposition to be verified and C_1 C_2 C_3 ... stand for consequences drawn for p. This procedure is deductively invalid; it involves the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Let us take a simple example. A detective thinks that 'X is a murderer'. To establish this he argues that 'If X is a murderer' then he must have been present at the place where, and at the time when murder took place, the finger prints on the knife and the blood group of blood stains on the knife, must agree with those of X. X must have some motive to commit murder etc. The detective then verifies such consequences; if he finds them to be true, his supposition about X being the murderer is taken to be true; if he finds them to be false, the supposition is rejected as false. The scientists use indirect verification in testing their hypotheses. The direct or indirect verification in sense-experience is accepted as a test of literal significance of non-analytic statement.

Another distinction between practical (actual) and theoretical (possible) verification is also drawn. Most of the statements about objects, persons or events are practically verifiable; there are no obstacles preventing their verification in sense-experience. The scientists and the ordinary person have already verified and will continue to verify many propositions. However,

[37] Carnap Says "... Indirect verification: A proposition p which is not directly verifiable can only be verified by direct verification of propositions deduced from p together with already verified propositions." Morton White, The Age of Analysis, p.210

there are some propositions, which, though we know how to verify them, are at present cannot be practically verified due to some obstacles. Ayer gives as an example of such a proposition. 'There are mountains on the farther side of the moon' and says that this is verifiable in principle, (we know how to verify it) but it has not yet been actually verified because we cannot go to the farther side of the moon. This proposition, I think has been actually verified.

To take another e.g., 'Chatrapati Śivājī respectfully remembered his Guru when he was in the presence of Aurangzeb'. This is theoretically verifiable but cannot now be actually verified. It should be noted that these various distinctions were drawn to meet the objections to the verification principle. However, the consequence of this was to make that principle too loose to be of any use. The verification principle now takes the form; 'A non-analytic statement is literally meaningful if and only if it is directly or indirectly, practically or in principle, conclusively or partially verifiable in sense-experience'.

Thus, the simplicity, clarity and rigour. which were claimed for the doctrines of logical positivism gradually, melted away. And what is more serious is that even after all such amendments, it was admitted that no formulation of the principle of verification was satisfactory. Logical empiricists themselves frankly or honestly admitted that every formulation of it was either too narrow in the sense that it excluded many non-analytic statements as meaningless which they wanted to regard as significant or it was too wide in the sense it allowed meaning to many statements which they wanted to exclude as meaningless.

b) The status of the verification principle was questioned. It is not analytic for its denial is not self-contradictory. So to be meaningful, it must be synthetic or empirical. It is not empirical also, for the logical positivists did not arrive at it after examining meaningful statements and finding them all to be either analytic or synthetic. The more serious objection is that the logical empiricist himself is not prepared to treat the verification principle as

an empirical statement. For if it is regarded as empirical, it is very easy to overthrow it by pointing to many statements ethical, theological, religious, which are neither analytic nor synthetic but when judged by all conventional accepted criteria of meaning, are meaningful. The logical empiricists attempt to deny literal meaning of them is enough to show that he is not ready to allow any empirical fact as constituting a negative or contradictory instance against the verification principle.

The common men and scientists reject or modify their empirical statements when facts opposed to them are found. Similarly, if the logical positivist had thought his principle to be empirical, he would have rejected or modified it in face of such an objection based on the fact that, them being non-analytic and non-synthetic yet meaningful statements. But, he does not do so; he sticks to his principle and finds fault with the evidence. This he does by saying that such statements are literally meaningless. This distinction between literal and emotive meaning in his device to escape from the paradox that all non-analytic and non-synthetic, i.e., all metaphysical, theological, value, etc., statements are meaningless.

Ewing says that sense-experience cannot set a limit to meaning, it cannot determine that meaning cannot go beyond sense-experience. As he puts it "we cannot tell by sense experience that there is nothing in the meaning of statement which could not be verified by sense experience any more than we could tell by sight that there are no invisible microbes in this room. Therefore, the principle on its own showing is meaningless".[38]

The logical positivists' conception of functions of language is too narrow to be accepted. Their view implies that language has two uses or functions; a) that of stating facts or of giving information and b) that of expressing feelings or wishes. However, later it was pointed out language had many more, indeed countless uses.

To decide whether a statement is non-analytic or non-synthetic, one

[38] A C Ewing, The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, pp.39-40

should understand what it says or means, i.e., it must first have meaning. Thus, the meaningless utterance like *abracadabra* cannot be said to be either non-analytic or non-synthetic. Since the metaphysical, value statements, can be said to be neither analytic nor synthetic, they must be meaningful. However, the application of verification principle to them leads to the conclusion that they are meaningless. Therefore, the principle cannot be a criterion of meaning.

Does logical positivism imply that all those thinkers who thought that metaphysical and value statements were meaningful and hence discussed whether they were true or false were mentally defective? That they were so slow minded as not to recognize their senselessness? The logical positivists answered it in the negative that those thinkers were not mentally defective and indeed logical positivists, being philosophers, were not entitled to make any psychological assumption about their mentality. They said that the metaphysicians made senseless statements, not because they were feeble-minded but because they were deceived by some types of linguistic expressions.

To explain this they give the example of the problem of substance. They point out that the way in which language is used in describing an object seems to suggest a distinction between an object itself and its characteristics. E.g., in the statement 'rose is red' we say that rose is a thing and red is its quality that they are not identical for rose may have another colour without ceasing to be a rose; it may be white or yellow; and there are things other than a rose, e.g., paper or cloth which may be red. Now grammar distinguishes a 'name' from an adjective. This suggests another distinction that a name denotes a thing which can exist by itself while an adjective refers to a quality which characterizes or depends on a thing.

All this has misled philosophers into thinking that every name must denote something which can exist apart from all its qualities and relations, but which is their support or substratum. Since, qualities and relations cannot exist by themselves; they require some substratum to exist or to characterize. This substratum of qualities and relations is called a substance.

But the philosophers who held that every name must denote something were faced with a difficulty, for there are names, e.g., unicorn, which do not denote anything existing in this world. In face of this difficulty they did not abandon their idea (superstition) that every name must denote something; they stuck to it, drew the distinction between existence and subsistence, invented supersensible world and said that though such entities did not exist in this world yet they subsisted in a supersensible world. They did not realize that a name need not denote anything and that a thing is not something more than its qualities.

Another good example of linguistic confusion that led to the same conclusion of entities subsisting in supersensible world is the view that existence is a predicate. The argument in this connection was, the propositions 'politicians are corrupt' and 'unicorns are fictitious', have the same grammatical form. Deceived by this, the metaphysicians thought that they had the same logical form. Now the politicians must exist in order to be corrupt and it was wrongly taken for granted that the unicorns must exist in order to be fictitious. Here the function of the term 'fictitious' is misunderstood; its function is not to characterize something but to deny the existence of a thing. But the term fictitious applied to them implies that they do not exist.

Hence, to remove the contradiction it was held that unicorns did not exist in this world but that they subsisted in a supersensible world. The discovery, which is supposed to be an important stepping stone in the progress of philosophical thought, that existence is not a predicate, led to the rejection of this argument. That existence is not a predicate becomes clear from the following considerations. Take for example the statement 'whales breathe'; this has subject-predicate form. Its analysis is 'there are objects having the characteristics of whales and also the characteristic of breathing'. This is not a tautology; the analysis of 'whales do not breathe' is they are objects having the characteristics of whales but lacking the characteristic of breathing. This, though false, is not self-contradictory.

Generalizing on the basis of this e.g., we can say that an analysis of any

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affirmative subject-predicate type of proposition is not tautological, and that of any negative subject-predicate type of proposition, is not self-contradictory. Now if existence is a predicate then whales exist and 'whales do not exist', would be affirmative and negative subject predicate type of propositions and if they are analyzed as such propositions, then the analysis of affirmative existential propositions should not be a tautology and negative existential proposition should not be self-contradictory. However, the analysis of the former would be a tautology and of the latter, self-contradictory. The analysis of 'whales exist' (as a subject predicate proposition) would be 'there are objects having the characteristics of whales and also the characteristic of existence.' This is clearly a tautology. The analysis of 'whales do not exist' (as a subject predicate proposition) would be 'there are objects having the characteristics of whales but lacking the characteristic of existence.' This is self-contradictory.

Generalizing, on the supposition that existence is a predicate, the analysis of any affirmative existential proposition would be tautological, and of any negative existential proposition would be self-contradictory; and if that supposition was true. This should not happen. Hence, the supposition that existence is a predicate is false, i.e., existence is not a predicate. This brings out that the argument in support of subsistence of supersensible entities is fallacious.

Logical empiricists also held that moral philosophers were victims of linguistic confusion, that they were deceived by the similarity in the grammatical form of example. 'Stealing is wrong', and 'walking is healthy' into thinking that the former like the latter was an assertive statement that can be true or false, when in fact the former is an expression of feeling or a command (don't steal) which can be neither true nor false. These examples are enough to show the kind of explanation given by the logical positivists as to how the literally meaningless metaphysical and value judgements were regarded as significant assertive statements by the metaphysicians. However, this explanation is unsatisfactory. It raises the question that how so many philosophers earlier failed to see that they were deceived by certain linguistic expressions.

Further, some previous philosophers knew that linguistic confusions were at the root of metaphysical views, yet they themselves built up metaphysical systems. For example, Berkeley said of his predecessors that they themselves raised the (linguistic) dust (or confusion) and complained that they could not see. As Warnock says, "philosophers, like other men, are liable to mismanage their own language and to misunderstand the language of others, but they are also exposed to a special risk, they may hold a mistaken theory about language itself." Nevertheless Berkeley himself had a metaphysical view that physical things were collections of ideas in the mind of God.

c) The logical positivists' view gave rise to grave problems about our knowledge of the past and of other minds. The attempts to solve these problems in conformity with their view lead to absurd conclusions. History is a storehouse of knowledge of the past. A statement about the past is synthetic or empirical, so it is literally meaningful. How can it be verified? We cannot physically go back into the past to observe what happened then. Our acceptance of a statement about the past depends on observation of relics of the past. However, the observations of the relics of the past takes place either in the present or in the future; thus the verification of the statement about the past can be done either in the present or in the future. If verification in sense experience of non-analytic statement constitutes its literal meaning then it seems to follow that a statement about the past literally means or says something about the present or future, i.e., such a statement can be analyzed into a set of equivalent statements about the present or future. This is absurd; a statement about the past says something about the past and not about the present or future.

Everyone knows that there are persons (or minds) other than himself and this he knows with certainty. Logical positivism cannot satisfactorily account for our knowledge of other minds. The problem arises due to the privacy of sense-experience. The sense-experiences of each percipient are private to him. He alone can be directly conscious of his own sense-experiences. I cannot be directly aware of the sense-experiences of others and others cannot be directly aware of my sense-experiences. Each one of

us can verify statements only about his own mind, e.g., I am angry, I am in pain, I am feeling pleasure but one cannot verify in one's own sense-experiences the statements about other minds, e.g., he is feeling pleasure, he is angry, you are afraid etc.

It follows according to the verification principle, that statements about my own mind are literally meaningless to me, for I can feel my own pleasures and pains but I cannot perceive or feel pleasure, pain, other feelings and thoughts of others. Since, every person is wrapped in a shroud of privacy of his experience; no one can know that there are persons or minds other than his own.

Thus, the application of verification principle to the knowledge of minds leads to Solipsism, the view that I know that I alone exist, i.e., only statements about my own mind, which can be verified in my experience are meaningful to me, but I cannot know that other minds exist, i.e., statements about other minds are not significant to me because they cannot be verified in my sense-experiences. That this was absurd was known to logical positivists. They also knew that the argument from analogy could not help them to escape from solipsism. This argument in brief is that I have a body and a mind. Others have bodies similar to my body in many respects. Hence, others (probably) have minds.

Some logical empiricists pointed out the following defects in this argument; a) this argument being inductive in nature, at best, leads to the conclusion that other minds probably exists. However, we are quite certain that they exist. b) It is based on a similarity between my body and bodies of others. Since, this evidence is insufficient, it is very weak. c) Its conclusion that there are other minds (or experiences) besides my own can never be verified because of the privacy of experiences. However, the conclusion of an inductive argument, to be acceptable must be verifiable.

Further, there arose the problem of communication by language, since, the experiences of each person are private to him and since the experiences of one are different from those of others, what a statement means to one

may be different from what it means to other persons. If so, how is common understanding of a statement or communication by language possible?

Logical positivists have given different answers to these problems in their different works. It is not possible to discuss them here.

Logical Positivists' view of analysis

The logical positivists' distinguished philosophy from metaphysics. As logical positivists, they were neither scientists, nor mathematicians, not poets. They were philosophers and naturally they thought that what they were doing, viz., philosophy was not meaningless. Metaphysics, they said was literally meaningless; but philosophy was meaningful that the function of philosophy was analysis of the structure of language, especially of scientific or informative language. They identified philosophy with logic or analysis. Their conception of analysis is analogous and disanalogous to logical atomists' conception of it. They accepted Russell's theories of descriptions and logical constructions as models of philosophical analysis. They tried to analyze statements about physical objects minds, states (or nations) into sets of equivalent statements about sense-data, experiences, and individuals' behaviour respectively and found that those were unsatisfactory. However, they differed from logical atomists in regard to the aim of philosophical analysis.

Logical atomists held that its aim was metaphysical that of revealing the structure of facts (or reality) through the analysis of the structure of language. It was possible according to them because they said that there was relation of correspondence or picturing between language and reality (that language used with caution was a guide to reality).

Logical positivists, who rejected metaphysics, could not accept this. They said that the sole aim of analysis was to bring to light the structure of language, especially language used to say something that can be true or false. To the question as to why this should be done they replied that – a) it was interesting or valuable in itself; b) it was likely to be useful to the scientists; c) it was required for preventing thinkers from making senseless or metaphysical utterances; if we did not understand uses of language

properly and clearly we were likely to misuse it and land ourselves in metaphysics.

Some went so far as to say that all talk about things, persons, facts, attributes was metaphysical or senseless. Some said that such talk about things, etc., was really talk about language, though it was a dangerous way of talking about language. Thus, Carnap distinguished between material mode and formal mode of talk or language. Talk about things, facts etc., without quotation marks was material mode while talk about words put into quotation marks was formal mode of speech and these were said to be equivalent. He gave some examples:

Material mode	**Formal mode**
A rose is a thing	'Rose' 13 a thing-word (substantive, none)
It is a fact that a rose is red	'The rose is red' is a sentence (statement)
Redness is a quality	'Red' is an adjective
Five is a number	'Five is a numeral'

"Thus, material mode of speech is a way of speaking which looks like talk about things but is in fact talk about words". Carnap held that language could be constructed by two kinds of rules; a) formation rules and b) transformation rules. The formation rules state what combinations of symbols (words) in a language are correct and which are incorrect. They are rules about correct formation of sentences. The transformation rules are rules about correct deviation or inference of one combination of symbols (sentence) from other combinations of symbols (sentences). They are rules of valid inferences.

But Ayer pointed out that these two kinds of rules might be enough to characterize an artificial or formal (symbolic) language like that of *Principia Mathematica*, but that they were not sufficient to characterize a 'natural' language used in life or descriptive language. Besides these rules,

a language was required what he called 'meaning rules', i .e .. those rules which determined the use of symbols (words) and their combinations (sentences) to apply correctly to things and situations.

A J Ayer said, "It would now be generally conceded that a descriptive language as opposed to a merely formal language is not sufficiently characterized by its formation and transformation rules. But if we are to use and understand a language descriptively we require also rules which correlate certain signs in the language with actual situations and that it is these that I am calling meaning rules" This has been since conceded to Carnap himself who has recognized semantics, I.e., to study of the relation between symbols and objects which they denote or connote (i.e., relation between language and reality) to be a legitimate philosophical study and not a piece of metaphysics (or nonsense) as he used to think it to be earlier. This is enough to show the logical empiricists' view of philosophy as analysis of structure of language unsatisfactory.

Another point is that the sharp distinction between a priori and a posteriori (analytic and synthetic) is called in question. It is admitted that this distinction is philosophically important in so far as it brings to light the difference between statements in pure mathematics (Logic) and empirical sciences by showing the difference in the kind of evidence required to establish each kind of statement, but it is not absolute in the sense that whether a statement is analytic or empirical depends on the use to which it is put. E.g., 'mammals are those animals which have external ears', if offered, as a definition of mammals would be analytic, but if it is regarded as stating the actual criterion or mark for identification of mammals, it would be empirical. Some thinkers have pointed out that physics, chemistry, astronomy etc., are now so full of mathematics that it has become difficult to distinguish the mathematical or analytical from the empirical. Wittgenstein said that there was a very intimate connection between the conception of the world (empirical) and on logical. He said, "a world cannot be illogical. One cannot conceive what an illogical world would be like."

Now there are no logical positivists, enormous changes have taken place

in the ideas of those who were once advocates of logical positivism. As Urmson says, "logical positivism is dead but it did not live in vain." Its death knell was sounded when under the influence of later Wittgenstein (of Philosophical Investigations) a new conception of language and of analysis according to which the paradigm of analysis provided by Moore and Russell was rejected as too narrow or rather, was regarded as only one form of philosophical analysis and other types of analysis were accepted as equally proper.

The following types of analysis are described by Ayer about the division of analysis into different kinds. He remarks that it is to some extent, arbitrary; for there is no hard and fast line of demarcation between them; that they overlap and that they can be classified in other ways.

a) Formal analysis: Consists of a) giving formal definitions of concepts that are important in ordinary and scientific thinking, b) distinguishing different senses of an ambiguous concept used in ordinary speech and defining each of its senses. Its main purpose is not that of giving an account of ordinary usage of a concept but making it precise in such a way as to make it more useful to science. For example, Einstein's definition of simultaneity, which shows the ordinary concept of simultaneity, to be defective and refined. Aristotle's and Tarski's definition of truth. c) Trying to construct a deductive system of scientific and ordinary statements (or thought). d) Critically studying the structure of scientific theories and arguments, the grounds in support of scientific procedures, such as preferring one scientific theory to another when both are able to explain the same set of facts, examining the steps taken to abandon or modify a scientific theory, stating the conditions under which an observation statement confirms a hypothesis etc. The use of logical symbolism is often found in this type.

b) Logical grammar is concerned with a) the clarification and justification of certain philosophically important distinctions between concepts, e.g., the distinction between particulars and universals, sentence and proposition, generalization of facts (enumerative propositions) and generalization of law (universal propositions), analytic and synthetic etc. Ayer warns us against

misunderstanding the significance of logical grammar. This should not be thought to be a trivial verbal activity on account of its being described as logical grammar, or as merely the study of structure of language. He now admits that it also gives important information about 'the character of the world which it serves to describe'.[39]

c) Analysis of ordinary usage of language: Here, Ayer deals with the method of analysis of ordinary usage of language employed only by Austin and his followers 'the so-called school of ordinary language philosophy' and distinguishes it from the method used by Wittgenstein.

Austin and his followers were interested in the very minute, rigorous and systematic analysis of nuances of expressions and distinctions in the ordinary English usage. They regarded such an analysis as an end in itself and not merely as a means to the solution of philosophical problems. It is admitted that Austin's ability to detect and describe even small differences of uses of expressions was so great and rare that very few others could do it in the manner in which he did it. He and his followers respected ordinary usage and common sense beliefs and were not in favour of altering them.

Austin attacked his predecessors for their almost exclusive concern with one function of language, viz., its informative (assertive) use, which consists of propositions or indicative sentences stating what can be true or false. According to him what they did was not illegitimate or wrong but partial because it was only one among many equally important uses of language; they neglected these other uses of language. Some talked of emotive use, but their treatment of it was perfunctory.

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[39] "... in assigning to this group of questions the heading of Logical grammar, I do not mean to say that they are merely verbal in a sense that might be taken to imply that they are trivial. Apart from their intrinsic interest, their examination throws light not only on the working of language but also on the character of the world which it serves to describe. There is in any case no sharp distinction between investigating the structure of language and investigating the structure of the world since the very notion of there being a world of such and such character only makes sense within the framework of some system of concepts which language embodies." A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, p.49

It was Wittgenstein who first asserted that language had many uses, indeed, countless uses and Austin's work is similar to (but not identical with) that of Wittgenstein. Further Austin said that his predecessors' study did not cover the whole field of indicative sentences for there were indicative sentences which did not express propositions, there function was not assertive but performative and this use of language was also neglected by them.

Austin has paid particular attention to 'performative sentences', i.e., the function of which was not that of expressing propositions; but the very utterance itself of them was performance of some act. E.g., saying that 'I know' is to vouch for the truth of what one claims to know, saying that 'I congratulate' is to do the act of congratulating. So some say, that such utterances can be judged as honest or dishonest, sincere or insincere, but not as true or false. Because they are not reports or statements about the act that one is doing but is doing of the act itself. However, Ayer disagrees with it and comments that such utterances can be taken as doing both the jobs; a) as reports about what one is doing and hence as being true or false and b) as acts that can be judged as honest or dishonest, sincere or insincere.[40] Of philosophizing with bias or preconceived ideas Austin's work has been useful and fruitful to some extent in dealing with problems about knowledge responsibility, freedom of will etc.

d) 'Looking at facts' is the name given to the method of describing uses of language relevant in solving philosophical problem that is found in the later works of Wittgenstein and Ryle.

Wittgenstein emphasized the close connection between a meaning of a word or an expression and its use. The reason for the shift in emphasis from meaning to use was his realization that the views offered by himself and others, as answers to the question in meaning were misleading, inadequate, and or wrong. He declared 'do not ask for meaning; ask for use'. Looking at the working of "a language convinced him that language was used not

[40] A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, p.50

for one purpose of stating facts but also for a variety of other purposes; for questioning, commanding, advising, story-telling etc."

To show how language is used in very many different ways he describes 'language games' which are the descriptions of different uses of relevant expressions. So it was Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations who diverted the attention of philosophers (including himself in his earlier period) from their 'obsessive concern' with meaning of one sort to the impartial descriptions or considerations of many uses of language. In his earlier work *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* Wittgenstein was far more seriously and rigorously concerned with meaning; that too with one sort of meaning which consisted in stating facts or propositions, than any other philosopher. Asking for meanings of basic concepts such as space, time, cause, mind, matter, God, and of meaning itself – many works dealing with meaning of meaning were published in isolation from the contexts in which they were ordinarily used, was diagnosed by him to be the sure source of philosophical problems. Hence, he held that solution or dissolution of such problems consisted describing the uses of such concepts without pre-conceived ideas – in ordinary normal or proper contexts.

The best example of philosophizing with bias or preconceived ideas about some such concepts is to be found according to Wittgenstein, in his own *Tractatus*. It is remarked that the later work of Wittgenstein was mostly a criticism, not of the doctrines of other thinkers but of his own earlier view. He advocated logical atomism in his *Tractatus*. The pre-conceived ideas or 'superstitions' about language underlying logical atomism were recognized to be the following; a) The fundamental use of language had one purpose of stating facts, b) the meaning of a statement (or sentence) depended on its correspondence with or picturing an atomic facts, c) language had the hidden but precise truth-functional structure – the same. 'Structure as that of a logical calculus.'

Wittgenstein rejected by implication these superstitions about language in his *Philosophical Investigations* as a result of looking at uses of language, with an open or impartial mind. He said; a) there are – countless different

kinds of use of what we call symbols, words, and sentences. And this multiplicity is not something fixed. b) "The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement, we see that what we call 'sentence' and language, have not the formal unity that I imagined, but are families of structures, more or less related to one another."

According to him, the pre-conceived ideas cloud or bewitch minds, lead us astray, in understanding uses of language, and thereby, in understanding the nature of reality. They are like a pair of coloured glasses through which we look at reality and get its distorted picture. The cause of bewitchment of our intelligence is language itself. What is required is looking at working of language and at reality without pre-conceived ideas. To take our own e.g., the absolute idealist holds that reality is one spiritual permanent systematic whole. This is his criterion of reality or meaning of reality. On this ground he condemns whatever is material, changing etc., as unreal or as an appearance. Thus, he restricts the use of the term reality to the system of spiritual and permanent whole.

It is true that the concept of reality is used to refer to the mental or spiritual and permanent in the sphere or religious thinking but our use of it is not restricted only to such entity. For we do apply it to material and changing objects; we regard them as real. Indeed it is used in many types of contexts. We speak of a real significance of a passage, real currency note and bond paper, real signature, real photograph, real purpose, real person or object etc., as against superficial significance, false currency note or bond paper forged signature, pretended purpose, impostor, imaginary object etc.

The absolutist refuses to look at the facts referred to by these multifarious uses of the concept of reality which do not support his view point; he condemns them as unreal false, or apparent; he accepts only those uses of reality that are in favour of his view. Against such a thinker what would be better than describing the facts and using the concept properly according to the situations in such a way so as to lead him to see that his

way of looking at or describing facts, is partial, improper and illegitimate, to make him realize that the concept of reality ordinarily used is not defective. Hence there is no need to change it and that the multifarious uses of that concept are not its weakness, but are its strength. (The example needs to be worked out in greater detail and in a more convincing manner but the above (inadequate) account is enough if it leads to some understanding of what Wittgenstein says).

From this it is clear that this kind of study of uses of language is not merely verbal or trivial. Language involves a consolidated conception of reality and the proper study of its structure and uses reveals the nature of reality. Philosophy is an important, a very serious study of the nature of reality through the study of the uses of natural language. Wittgenstein did not belittle the significance and profundity of philosophical problems. He thought that many of them have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes, their roots are as deep in us as the importance of our language.

John Wisdom a close follower of Wittgenstein agreed with him in holding that philosophical problems and doctrines involved linguistic confusion; besides this, he said that, they embodied linguistic penetration.[41] This can be roughly explained by taking the concept of knowing. Some philosophers say that we cannot know what is going on in the minds of others. The reason for this may be confusion about the concept of knowing. We say that; a) I know that there is a table here, b) I know what I am thinking or feeling, c) I know what he is feeling or planning etc., d) I know that 2+3=5, e) I know that God exists and he is perfect. In these examples, though the term 'know' is used, it is used in a different way in each sentence here. This becomes clear when we consider the grounds for the claim of knowledge in them. In a) the ground is sense experience, in b) introspective awareness, in c) experience associated with the nature of the situation including the

[41] "Such remarks, though false and confused can be also illuminating ... when they suggest or draw attention to a terminology which reveals likenesses and differences concealed by ordinary language." Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, p.92

behaviour and speech of a person, in d) basic definitions and principles of mathematics from which 2+3=5 can be deduced and in e) the ground for the claim to know may be the direct intuitive experience of the speaker or of another person, or arguments for the existence and perfection of God or some religious authoritative source or a sacred book.

The philosopher who says that we cannot know the mind (experiences) of others may confuse 'knowing' with introspective awareness of one's own experiences or with the quite certain knowledge of mathematical truths. In the first case, the paradigm of knowledge is taken to be introspective awareness and in the second case the paradigm of knowledge is deductive knowledge. Thus, what the philosopher whose intelligence is bewitched by these paradigms says about our knowledge of other minds comes to is that we cannot have the introspective awareness of experiences of others or that we cannot know with deductive certainty the experiences of others. When thus stated, what he says is seen to be true. Though he is confused about the concept of knowledge, yet he has noticed the difference, which may strike him as the most important discovery, between introspective or demonstrative knowledge on the one hand and knowledge of other minds on the other, and he announces this insight in a peculiar or paradoxical way.

Similarly, the logical positivist's statement 'Metaphysics is meaningless' is the result of the confusion about the use of the term 'meaning', it is due to the undue restriction of the scope of the use of the concept of meaning of what is empirical or analytic; yet it involves insight into the difference between science and mathematics (logic) on the one hand and metaphysics on the other. Ayer who once rejected metaphysics as meaningless, now admits that the careful consideration of its arguments gives insight into the functioning of basic concepts (or insight into the nature of reality).[42]

Wittgenstein method of describing the uses of language differed from

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[42] "... we see that Zeno's paradoxes and not just ingenious sophistries. By taking them seriously we obtain unexpected insight into the behaviour of our concepts of space and time and motion". A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, p.21

that of Austin.[43] Wittgenstein's descriptions of uses of language were not very detailed, minute and systematic; they were general; "they took the form more often of hints, clues and of pointers than of set exposition." Austin's descriptions were detailed and systematic. Wittgenstein's purpose in giving relevant descriptions of uses of language – not only actual but sometimes imagined uses – was to solve or dissolve a philosophical problem and to remove the conceptual confusion that was the cause of a philosophical problem. Such a description was regarded by him, not as an end in itself, but as a means to solve a philosophical problem. The description of linguistic usage, he said gets its light, its purpose from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems. They are solved, rather by looking into the working of our language.[44] Austin thought it was valuable or an end in itself; it should be done whether or not it was relevant to the solution of philosophical problems.

As Ayer remarks, "where Wittgenstein chiefly differs from the analysis of ordinary usage is that he has little or no interest in usage as such." His descriptions of it are framed with a view to resolve philosophical problems which he sees above all as sources of perplexity. The reason for this difference is that Austin thought that ordinary language which has a long and established usage embodies both broad and minute distinctions between concepts and the study of both gross and broad or general and minute. Subtle and specific conceptual distinctions, brings to light facts about the world and men; i.e., about the nature of reality. Thus, we can get knowledge of reality by studying language for its own sake.[45] But Ayer's reaction to Austin's procedure was different. While to some extent, philosophically was valuable, he remarked that the procedure which involved paying too much

[43] Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, pp .148-154
A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, pp.49-52

[44] A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, p .52

[45] "Thus Professor Austin is concerned with our everyday language not merely, as Wittgenstein was mainly, because it serves to correct those prejudices which engender some philosophical problems but also because it provides innumerable pointers to facts and distinctions...". Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, pp.151-152

attention to minute usages was its weakness.[46] Some other thinkers doubted whether it was philosophical at all. Thus, how far description of linguistic usage should go was itself a problem. This is the essence of philosophy. Most often, the ways suggested for the solutions of its problems gave rise to new problems.

The method of informal analysis, used by Wittgenstein and Ryle, is dealt with under the heading 'looking at facts'. Ayer described it as, "the method of considering what typically has to happen for such and such a concept to be satisfied is characteristic of much that passes under the heading of informal analysis.'"[47] Its negative characteristics are, a) it does not involve the use of logical symbolism, b) its outcome is not usually a definition and c) its positive characteristic is that it is rearranging or re-describing the facts covered by a concept in such a way so as to enable one to get an insight into the functioning of that concept.

Ayer takes the problem of distinction between knowledge and belief to illustrate the nature of informal analysis. It may be thought that the distinction between them consists in a) the difference between the states of mind, that knowing is one kind of state of mind and believing is another state of mind; and or in b) the difference between the object of knowledge and the object of belief. This would be wrong; for the distinction between knowledge and belief consists in the ways in which those concepts are used. Confirming the discussion to knowing or believing a proposition, Ayer argues that "I know that p implies that 'p is true' and so, I know that p, but p is false, is self-contradictory. However, I believe that p does not imply that 'p is true', for p may be false. We may and do often believe what is false. So I believe p but may be (or is) false" is not self-contradictory. (Of course, what we claim to know may turn out to be false, in that case we say, 'I thought or believed that p was true but I was mistaken'). We take back our claim to know p. Thus, the difference between knowledge and belief is not mental but logical. It is not that knowing is an infallible state of mind but

[46] A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, p.50

[47] A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, p.54

just that we use the word 'know' in such a way that to say something is known to be the case implies that it is true.[48]

Further the difference between knowledge and belief does not depend upon the nature of their object, for the same propositions known by some may be believed by others. Thus, 'A has murdered B' is known by the murderer A and B C, D who actually see A killing B, but it is merely believed by the police till they find adequate evidence in favour of it. This brings out another difference between knowledge and belief. A proposition is said to be known when we have sufficient good grounds supporting it; it is said to be believed when it is accepted without any evidence or on weak insufficient evidence. Ayer now takes a case to explain how Wittgenstein used this method to deal with it. Wittgenstein used it to show that some thinkers who thought that a certain factor must be present for a proper use of a concept were wrong because the presence of that factor was not at all necessary for the purpose of correct use of that concept. For example, take the case of the concept of recognition.

Some thinkers were of the view that a mental image must be present in recognition. An account of recognition which they gave was roughly as follows: A person perceives an object at one time (t_1) in place (p_1) and recognizes it at a later time (t_2) in another place (p_2). When he perceives the object at time (t), he forms a mental image of it, retains the image in his mind; when he perceives the object at a later time (t_2) in (p_2) he compares the object with his mental image, finds them to be similar and recognizes the object, i.e., identifies it as the same object perceived at (t_1) in (p_1). Thus, the use of the concept of recognition (or our statement 'I recognize this object or person') implies the existence of a mental image with which the object or person is compared.

Instead of thinking that this account must be true, Wittgenstein asks us to look at what actually happens when we recognize some object or person (or when we use the concept of recognition). When we do so, we see that

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[48] A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, p.50

in all cases of correct recognition, mental image is absent, that recognition, when right, is as smooth and direct as perception and the mediation of mental image is not needed. It is only in a few cases, in which we are doubtful about the identity of the object before us we try to identify it by remembering, which may, but not necessarily, involve mental images, as to where and when we had perceived it and in such cases recognition is slow and indirect. Taking this which happens rarely as a paradigm of recognition or assuming that this must happen in all cases of recognition would certainly be wrong.

In support of this, it is pointed out that the assumption of mediation of mental images in recognition leads to infinite regress which shows that the assumption is baseless.

Let us assume that a mental image$_1$ is required to recognize an object. However, for that purpose, mental image$_1$ has to be recognized as an image of that object and not of some other object. For this purpose, the mental image$_2$ would be needed to recognize mental image$_1$. Similarly mental image$_3$ for recognizing mental image, mental image$_4$ for recognizing mental Image$_3$ .... and so on ad infinitum. The infinite regress can be stopped only by accepting that an image can be recognized immediately or directly without the intervention of another image. However, if an image can be identified directly, then the object itself can also be identified directly, without the help of any image; and hence the assumption is false.[49]

With the change in the conception of philosophical analysis, there has occurred a corresponding change in the conception of metaphysics. No thinker now likes to brush it away curtly or without careful consideration of the nature of its propositions and arguments, as meaningless or worthless on the basis of some criterion of meaning. Even those who once did reject it as meaningless on the basis of verification principle are willing to consider carefully and in detail its arguments and conclusions which imply that metaphysics is meaningful; for there cannot be detailed and careful study of what is meaningless.

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[49] A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, p.54.

They also believe that such a study helps us to have an insight into the uses of concept (or into the nature of reality). Thus, besides considering in a general way the metaphysical views of rationalists, empiricists etc. Ayer deals in detail with the metaphysical arguments of Zeno and McTaggart against time, space, and motion and arrives at the conclusion that though the conclusions of these arguments are paradoxical, yet the study of those arguments gives us insight into the workings of the concepts of space, time, motion and the relations between them.

Now almost all philosophers, I think, would agree with Dr Wasman's view that metaphysics (or philosophy) involves a vision of reality, a new view of seeing things. Great philosophers are seers or visionaries, who may have the vision of reality,[50] which may differ from the ordinary view or who may have insight into not only the great merits of the vision of reality embodied in our ordinary way of thinking and speaking but also into the demerits of the new vision. These thinkers, naturally try to show, (as Madhva did against Advaita, and as Moore, Russell and others did recently against absolute idealism). The great superiority of their visions, that has strong basis in tradition, in day to day thinking and speaking of the people, which is thought to be speculative, utopian, is socially and morally highly dangerous.

Thus, Madhva pointed out that Advaita was Buddhism in disguise, or nituitism. It was atheistic because it involved degradation of God, and that it was an evil that led the believer to hell. His thorough and proper study of the Vedas, Gītā, Mahābhārata, Rāmāyaṇa etc., inspired him with

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[50] a) A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, pp. 55-57

b) "What is decisive is a new way of seeing and what goes with it, the will to transform the whole intellectual scene. This is the real thing and everything else is subservient to it". Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, p.136

"The arguments he will offer, the attacks he will make, the suggestions he will advance are all devised for one end, to win other people over to his own way of looking at things to change the whole climate of opinion ... what is decisive is that he has seen things from a new angle of vision. Compared to that everything else is secondary." Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, p.141

the sublime vision of reality which he has explained and defended in his theocentric system of philosophy according to which lord Viṣṇu is the ultimate independent supreme or highest complete *Pūrṇa* and infinite reality on whom everything else in the universe depends and devotion to whom is the sure way of attaining *Mokṣa*, the highest end of life .

His system is admirably or thoroughly consistent and as a result of commentaries on it by his great disciples, it has become quite lucid. His numerous quotations from the Vedas, Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata etc., are intended to show that his vision is deep-rooted in authoritative sacred works and in our living tradition. As the tradition lives in the minds and conduct of the people, his vision is present in our day-to-day thought speech and act.

The metaphysician is eager to communicate his vision of reality to others. He argues in favour of his own views, attacks the views of others, involving visions different from his own visions of reality; in order to persuade others to see things in the way in which he sees them. In doing so, the metaphysician of the speculative type having new vision, is faced with a difficulty. To gain his end, he has to make others understand his view point and this he can do, only by using ordinary language. If he invents a new system of symbols or language to communicate his new vision, people will not understand him till they learn his new language. He is forced to depend upon ordinary language, which involves a vision of reality different from his new vision. This is one of the reasons for the philosophers' complaint against ordinary language that it is inadequate or defective to express their vision of reality.

Hence, philosophers modify, reclassify ordinary concepts, and introduce new concepts and new distinctions in order to make ordinary language a more and more suitable means of communicating their visions. This explains as to why philosophers are many times led to make paradoxical statements. Russell seems to think that paradox is an essential characteristic of philosophy. He says, "the point of philosophy is to start with something. As simple as not to seem worth stating and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it."[51]

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[51] Warnock, English Philosophy since 1900, p.33

The occurrence of new visions and the consequent conceptual changes are not confined to metaphysics. They occur in a particular science.

All great discoveries or inventions in a science involve new vision. Thus, the heliocentric theory introduced a new way of looking at astronomical phenomena that was different from that involved in geocentric theory. A new conception of origin of species was introduced by the theory of evolution. It entirely changed the former conception that man had descended from man. The theory of relativity contains new vision about space, time and about the relation between them. However, such visions and conceptual changes in science differ from those in metaphysics into respects; a) the new ways of looking at phenomena in science are empirical but those in philosophy are a priori (I_3). The visions in science are confined to a limited field of study. Thus, the conceptual change with regards to the origin of species had no influence on the theory of relativity. The metaphysical vision is far more comprehensive than the scientific vision; the former usually embraces the whole of reality or most of it. Its aim seems to be that of looking at the whole of reality in a new way.

The view that philosophy embodies a vision of reality is not something novel to Indian thinkers. I think that it would not be an exaggeration to say that this view of philosophy as containing a vision of reality is as old as Indian philosophy. This view is implied in the very name given to a school of Indian philosophy or to a doctrine propounded by it. An Indian philosophical school or its doctrine is called 'Darśana', which means vision.

Chapter II – Śaṅkarādvaita

There is no doubt that Śaṅkarādvaita, whether or not one agrees with it, is a highly developed system of Vedānta. The Vedas are the Hindu revealed scriptures. They are the basis of many Indian philosophical systems[1]. All the schools of Vedānta claim to derive their doctrines from the Vedas especially from the Upaniṣats. The Upaniṣats are called Vedānta because they are the concluding portions of the Vedas and they contain the essence of the philosophy of Vedas. Śaṅkara and Madhva, the founders of two different schools of Vedānta[2], and the brief consideration of whose doctrines is the subject-matter of this book, have commented, each from his own philosophical stand point, on principal Upaniṣats[3]. They have also quoted passages from other scriptural sources in support of their views.

Some modern scholars hold that the Upaniṣats do not contain a single coherent system of philosophy, that there are many important but inconsistent statements in them[4]. Śaṅkara and Madhva insist that this incoherence in them is not real but only apparent, and hence it can be reconciled. Each has attempted to give a harmonious account of Upaniṣats. However, the inherent inconsistency in Upanisadic thought breaks out in their interpretations which are diametrically opposed to one another. Śaṅkara's 'absolute idealism' and Madhva's 'realistic pluralistic monotheism' are the

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[1] Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrvamimāṁsā, Uttaramīmāṁsā (*Vedānta*) are the schools of Indian system. These are called Āstika systems in the sense that they accept the Vedic teaching. Cārvāka, Jainism, and Buddhism are called Nāstika systems in the sense that they reject Vedas. But some modern scholars claim that the roots of Jainism and Buddhism are to be found in the Vedas.

[2] Advaita school of Śaṅkara and Dvaita school of Madhva.

[3] Īśāvāsya, Talavakāra, Ātharvaṇa, Māṇḍūka, Ṣaṭpraśna, Kāṭhaka, Chāndogya, Aitareya, Taittirīya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Kauśītaki, and Śvetāśvatara are also important.

[4] "The Upaniṣats do not yield any consistent view of the universe ... but Śaṅkara insists on interpreting the Upaniṣats in a single coherent manner." S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), pp.467-68

results of their efforts at the consistent interpretation of the contents of the Vedas, and also of their independent or original thinking.

Śaṅkara's position in Indian thought is in some respects, similar to that of Hegel in western thought. Both maintain absolute idealism, though there are important differences in their conceptions of the absolute reality and the world. Just as the successors of Hegel were required to take account of his views[5], Indian philosophers subsequent to Śaṅkara too had to consider, favourably or unfavourably, his views. Madhva is no exception. He has severely criticised the absolutism of Śaṅkara. So the better understanding of the philosophy of Madhva requires, at least, a brief consideration of Śaṅkara's view.

Śaṅkara's most important concepts are; a) *Ātmā*, the Soul or Self, is identical with the '*Nirguṇabrahmā*, b) *Nirguṇabrahmā* is the ultimate reality, c) Nothing other than the *Nirguṇabrahmā* is ultimately real. The attributeless and differenceless Brahmā is the one and the only one ultimate reality, d) *Saguṇabrahmā* is the object of worship Brahmā with attributes is *Saguṇabrahmā* the God, e) the world is practically, empirically or provisionally real but ultimately unreal, ultimately it is an appearance of the absolute, f) *Avidyā*, the material cause and *Māyā*, the adjunct of Īśvara that makes us experience the world is different from the *Jīvas*, g) *Mokṣa* is the ultimate end of life.

Ātmā, the Self

Śaṅkara, like many thinkers, wanted to build up his system of philosophy

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[5] "It is a remarkable tribute to an enormously muddled but brilliant German Professor of the nineteenth century that almost every important philosophical movement of the twentieth century begins with an attack on his views. I have in mind Hegel". A G N Flew, Age of Analysis, p.13.

In twentieth century B Russell and G E Moore gave death blow to Hegelianism and Bradley's absolute idealism so much so that Prof L T Hobhouse, in his metaphysical theory of the State, said that criticising Hegelianism and Bradley's absolutism was like 'flogging a dead horse'. What Moore and Russel did in the twentieth century was begun by Rāmānuja against Advaita and was brilliantly carried on and almost finished, by Madhva about more than nine hundred years ago really a highly remarkable and an admirable achievement.

on a basis which was absolutely certain. The existence of matter is not certain in this sense for its existence can be doubted or denied, without paving way for scepticism. Our senses and memory are sources of information about matter, but they are unreliable. We are all subject to illusions and hallucinations. Our waking life may be a long dream. This kind of doubt or denial of matter itself does not guarantee the reality of matter. However, there is an entity, the existence of which is absolutely certain and that is the 'self'. Everyone is aware of his own self. None can deny or doubt its existence. For in questioning, 'do I exist?', or in saying 'I do not exist' one implies that one exists, i.e., one's self exists. The self is the basis of all our activities, thoughts, feelings, desires etc. Though the existence of the self is absolutely certain, its nature is not known[6]. The empirical ego and the self are different, according to Śaṅkara. To understand clearly Śaṅkara's conception of the self, the difference between them must be noted.

Every ego is a complex whole consisting of its body, sense, motor, internal organs, *Buddhi* (the intellect) memories and thoughts, feelings and emotions, desires and purposes, decisions, and actions. It is a subject matter of psychology, biology, and physiology. It acts to get satisfaction of its desires, suffers pain or enjoys pleasure. It is subject to various physical and mental changes, which are supposed to affect reciprocally one another. The ego is an individual or a person, a knower, a doer, and a reaper of consequences of its actions. It is in bondage. It is involved in the cycle of births and deaths till it becomes free from bondage.

It is usual to distinguish the subjective from the objective events. The mental states and events are usually regarded as subjective, and material, including bodily changes as objective. The subjective factors – thoughts, feelings, desires etc., are said to be private to the individual, in the sense

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[6] "Each function and faculty, the gross body and the vital breath, the senses and the internal organ, the empirical 'me' appear only on the basis of and in relation to the *Ātmā*". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.476

"The 'I' must be distinguished from the 'not I' which includes not only the outer world, the body and its organs, but also the whole apparatus of understanding and the senses". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.477

that they can be directly (introspectively) known only by the person in whose mind they occur. He is the sole judge of the truth about them, for they are not available for public inspection or observation. Others can know them only indirectly by the speech, facial expressions, or the behaviour of that person.

The objective factors

The material (bodily) changes of a person are not private, but public in character, in the sense that they can be observed by many persons. Hence, the statements about them made by one person can be verified by others. Their truth or falsity can be ascertained by many persons through observation and experiment. To put it in linguistic terms, it makes sense to say that 'I observe that you are sitting'; but it does not make sense to say that 'I observe or sense your thoughts and feelings'. This shows a close relation between language and reality.

The language, which we use in describing material reality, makes no sense when used to describe the nature of mental reality. For instance, it is meaningful to say that 'this piece of cloth is red and three feet in length', but it is meaningless to say that 'my thoughts or feelings are red and three feet in length'. The difference in the nature of matter and mind is thus embodied in the different ways in which we describe them.

It should be noted that the Advaitin distinguishes the subjective from the objective in a different way. According to him, anything that can be the object of knowledge is objective. Our mental states or events which can be known by each introspectively, which are the object of psychological studies are, says the Advaitin, as much objective as the material (bodily) changes that are studied by physicists and physiologists. However, the Advaitin does not hold that bodily and mental events are identical or that they are reducible to one another.

Śaṅkara holds that the self can never be the object of knowledge. It is pure consciousness. The self and the object are contradictory to one another. The object is other than the self, which is always a pure, bare subject or consciousness, and never an object. For the object is - not self,

and hence the self cannot be not-self. It follows that the self is different, though it is the ultimate basis of the series of bodily and mental events that constitute the ego. The ego (psycho-physical organism) is mutable and finite, but the self (pure consciousness), is immutable, infinite, eternal and complete. It is self-existent in the sense that its being and nature are dependent upon itself, and not upon anything other than itself. According to the Advaitin there is nothing real other than the self. It is truly real because 'it has being in itself and for itself' and it is truly the subject, for 'being pure consciousness, it can never become the object'.[7]

The self is attributeless and differenceless; it is devoid even of the distinction of knower, known and knowledge[8]. It is neither the doer, nor the enjoyer. It is infinite, eternal, pure intelligence and pure bliss.

However, the ego is limited in its knowledge and power. We do not know, and cannot do, many things. The ego (an individual) is a doer, knower, and enjoyer or sufferer. It enjoys pleasure or suffers pain in this life or in future lives, resulting from its good or bad deeds in this life or in its previous lives.

The self is the universal for it is the ground of all reality. The degree of reality possessed by anything is derived from the self. The ego is the individual or particular. Each ego has its own material adjuncts – the body, sense, motor and internal organ[9] which are the results of its own *Karmā*.

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[7] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.477

[8] "It is undifferenced consciousness alone which is unaffected even when the body is reduced to ashes and the mind perishes". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.480

It is pure consciousness or mere awareness, the supreme principle in which there is no differentiation, of knower, knowledge, the known the infinite the transcendent, the essence of absolute knowledge. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.481

[9] The internal organ is supposed to play a vital role in the cognitions or experiences of a person. The internal organ along with the Self gives rise to our cognitions. "The cause of cognition is not the ultimate consciousness alone but this consciousness as qualified by the internal organ" S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.487

and which are different from those of other egos. Similarly, the thoughts feelings and other experiences and actions of one person are different from those of other persons. Thus, the psychical differences among individuals are associated with the differences in their physical adjuncts which themselves are dependent on the *Karmās*, the past deeds of the persons.

According to another similar analysis, the ego consists of the physical adjuncts, cognitive, conative, affective experiences and the *Sākṣī*. *Sākṣī* is the absolute that has internal organ as its limiting adjunct[10]. It is described as the attributeless mere onlooker but not the doer and enjoyer of the fruits of the actions of the ego. The *Sākṣī* or the witness-self is different from the ego which acts and enjoys or suffers. The *Sākṣī* and the internal organ enable the ego to know the objects. When the *Sākṣī* illumines the modes assumed by the internal organ we get knowledge. In waking life, the *Sākṣī*, internal organ, and senses work together in such a way as to enable us to have experiences of objects. In dreams, only the *Sākṣī* and the internal organ function; in dreamless sleep the internal organ merges in *Avidyā* and the *Sākṣī* functions along with *Avidyā*.

Jīvasākṣī, the individual witness-self is distinguished from *Īśvarasākṣī*, the God witness-self on the ground that the limiting adjunct of the former is the internal organ, while the limiting adjunct of the latter is *Māyā*.

There is a difference in the way in which the internal organ is related to the *Jīva* and to the *Jīvasākṣī*. The internal organ is a part or an invariable distinguishable feature of the *Jīva*, but it is an external condition or separable feature of the *Jīvasākṣī*. So long as the ego is in bondage its *Sākṣī* is associated with the internal organ. However, in *Mokṣa*, the *Jīvasākṣī*,

It enables us to become aware of pain, pleasure, fear, anger and transmits message coming from external senses. It is plastic, transparent and capable of assuming different modifications or forms. In seeing and hearing it is supposed to go out to the objects and to take their forms which when illuminated by the consciousness become perceptions. In dreams, outer senses are dormant but internal organ is active, hence we experience various mental images. Doubt, decision, understanding, concentration and remembrance are said to be its modes.

[10] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.490

the pure consciousness remains without the internal organ. Similarly, *Māyā* is an invariable feature of Īśvara, but a separable condition of *Īśvarasākṣī*.[11]

Thus, the individuality or personality is determined by both – the self and the material adjuncts[12]. The self alone cannot cause individuality for it is differenceless, while individuality implies differences. The self being universal and indivisible is equally present in all persons. The material adjuncts alone cannot cause individuality for they are unconscious, but individuality or personality involves consciousness. However, the statement that the sole ground of individuality is moral determination which includes knowledge, actions and experience seems to be opposed to the above statements[13]. This position can be understood or reconciled in the following way:

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[11] "The internal organ enters into the very constitution of the *Jīva* while it remains outside screening the *Jīvasākṣī*. In the former case it is *Viśeṣaṇa*, an attribute in the latter case, *Upādhi* a limitation". In the footnote it is further explained that "an attribute is an invariable distinguishing feature, as blueness in a lotus. A limitation is a separable distinguishable feature, as the red flower standing in the vicinity of a crystal which seems to be red owing to its presence" while the ultimate consciousness particularised by *Māyā* is *Īśvara*, the same consciousness conditioned by *Māyā* is *Īśvarasākṣī*. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.490

[12] There are statements which support it. "Śaṅkara agrees that a not-self remain an integral element of personality". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.556

The *Jīva* is subject-object, self and not-self, reality and appearance. It consists of the *Ātmā* united or individuated by the object. It is the *Ātmā* in association with *Ajñāna*". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.596

"The limiting adjuncts give individuality to the different souls of the world. They determine the nature of the body, the caste of the *Jīva*, the duration of life, etc. The souls are different on account of these adjuncts and there is no confusion of actions or fruits of actions". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.601

[13] The basis of individuality is to be found not in the *Ātmā* or the *Upādhis* but in moral determination which is a complex of *Vidyā*, the knowledge, *Karmā*, the works and *Prajñā*, the experience. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.597

It may be noted that, according to Advaita, moral decision is an appearance. The Brahmā or *Ātmā* is above morality. It cannot be said to make moral decisions. Moral concepts cannot be applied to it. Moral decisions are made by *Jīvas* or embodied selves, considered as *Saguṇabrahmā*. And *Jīvas*, Advaitin says, consist of self and not-self, reality and appearance. Thus, the problem of individuality is a problem about the relation between reality and appearance.

Now, if the opposition between the above statements is taken to be real then we may say that it is due to *Anirvacanīyatva*, the indescribability (mysteriousness) of the relation between reality and appearance, which is repeatedly asserted by the Advaitin. The relation between reality and appearance is complex and it is hard to find a definite and clear explanation on this. If the opposition between the statements is taken not as real but as apparent, we may say that moral decision or determination is a mode of internal organ, a product of *Avidyā*, the nescience.

In dreamless sleep, the internal organ is said to merge in *Avidyā*. And the Advaitin says that our ordinary and scientific knowledge, which involves the beliefs that this world is real, that there are many real egos, that the self is different from Brahmā etc., is nescience. So whether we say that individuality is due to limitation of pure consciousness (or Brahmā), by material adjuncts or by moral determination, we are saying that it is due to self's limitation by *Avidyā* or *Māyā* [14].

The self is complete in the sense that it does not lack or want anything. The ego is full of wants and it acts to get its needs satisfied. It is subject to

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[14] "*Avidyā* or logical knowledge causes the sense of individuality of the empirical self ...". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.596

"Individuality is due to *Karmā* which is the product of *Avidyā* ". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.634

In discussing the difficulties in the concept of *Avidyā* and its relation to *Ātmā* or *Brahmā* it is said that "*Avidyā* cannot be the cause of individuality for it cannot exist unless there are individuals". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.576

moral principles and Vedic injunctions. Its character and actions are judged in terms of moral values; right or wrong, good or bad. The self has no object of worship nor is itself God.

The ego is a worshipper of Īśvara or God. The self is free but the ego is in bondage. The cause of its bondage is *Ajñāna* or ignorance about the nature of ultimate reality. When the ego or a person, through deep study of Vedas under a proper preceptor, self-study, contemplation and deep concentration on the ultimate truth, intuitively realises his true nature of being the transcendental infinite eternal pure consciousness i.e., being indeed the Brahmā, the ultimate reality, he becomes dissociated from the material adjuncts and *Avidyā* and attains freedom from *Saṁsāra*.

In short, *Ātmā* the self is transcendent, infinite, eternal, permanent, independent, indivisible, complete, ultimate, passive (actionless) onlooker, pure consciousness, pure bliss, and sole absolute reality. The ego or the person is the same self-limited by the material adjuncts, ignorant, finite, mutable, empirical, relative or dependent, incomplete, bound, doer, knower, and enjoyer or sufferer.

It is *Ātmā*, the self and not *Jīva*, the ego that is identical with *Nirguṇabrahmā*. *Nirguṇabrahmā*, the absolute is the ultimate reality. Since, the absolute is identical with the self, it is all that the self or *Ātmā* is. It is absolutely certain, immutable, infinite, eternal, independent, complete, indivisible, super sensuous, pure consciousness and pure bliss. Śaṅkara prefers to describe it in negative terms as non-spatial, non-temporal, unchangeable, non-relative, impersonal, attributeless, and differenceless. He warns us against misunderstanding of the absolute as 'nothing' on account of its negative description. He holds that it is not *Śūnya*, the nothing, but it is the fullest and the richest reality. It alone is the ultimate reality. Everything other than it is unreal. If anything other than absolute has some degree of reality it derives its degree of reality from the absolute. Thus, it is the ground of whatever degree of reality other things have. The Advaitin does not regard the conception of degree of reality as objectionable.

The Advaitin thinks that the negative description of the absolute is

forced upon him by the utter difference between the absolute, on the one hand, and the empirical, moral, religious objects on the other coupled with the nature of ordinary language.

a) The Advaitin's conception of reality as infinite, immutable, eternal is inapplicable to the things in the world which are changeable, finite, spatial, temporal, sensible and divisible. The absolute is devoid of all such qualities; it is also beyond morality and religion. To emphasize the difference between the absolute and such objects the Advaitin prefers neti neti, the negative description of the absolute.

b) Intimately connected with, indeed, as a consequence of a), is the fact that the ordinary language is adequate for describing the objects in the world and for expressing our moral and religious ideas. It has to be thus adequate simply because it is devised for that very purpose, namely for making statements about empirical moral, religious objects. However, the absolute is utterly different from them; then the ordinary language becomes unsuited for saying precisely and positively anything about the absolute[15]. The Advaitin tells us that whenever the absolute is described in positive terms, these terms should be taken as denials of their antonyms. For instance the absolute is permanent = the absolute is unchangeable. The absolute is pure consciousness = the absolute is non-impure non-unconsciousness. The absolute is transcendent = it is non-sensible, non-temporal, non-spatial etc.[16].

Usually the negative description is used to indicate the lack of something in the object or person thus described, e.g., 'he is not rich means he lacks

[15] Strictly speaking individuality belongs to *Sūkṣmaśarīra*. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II. (Oxford University Press. Delhi), p.286

Making statements, i.e. saying something true or false, is not the only function of ordinary language. As Wittgenstein pointed out, it has countless other uses.

[16] It can only be described as the other of its otherness. It is *Sat*, the real, i.e., it is not *Asat*, the unreal. It is *Cit*, the consciousness, i.e., it is not *Acit*, the unconsciousness. It is *Ānanda*, the bliss, i.e., it is not of *Duḥkhasvarūpa*, the nature of pain. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.537

wealth'. If we take the negative description of the absolute in this sense, then, the absolute admits of negative description alone. It would follow that the absolute lacks everything, that it has nothing and hence that it is nothing[17]. However, the Advaitin says that only the feeble minded think that the absolute is nothing. For it is the highest and the only reality[18]. When we take its negative description in its shallow sense we are led to think that it is nothing. However, such a description has deeper meaning; it denotes something but conveys a far profound meaning.[19]

Thus, we find that the Advaitin lands himself in a quandary. A positive description of the absolute is likely to mislead us into thinking that the absolute, which is really attributeless. The negative description is likely to mislead us into thinking that the absolute, which is the highest reality, is nothing. So he tells us to take its positive description as negative, and negative description as positive. Thus, the Advaitin is caught in the Advaitic conceptual web woven by himself without finding a clear way out of it.

A thing can be described either affirmatively or negatively. If both these ways of describing Advaitic reality are, inadequate or unacceptable, the only alternative left for the Advaitin is to remain silent. There is a story in which a great sage, an Advaitin, remained silent when repeatedly requested by his disciple to teach him the ultimate truth. When the disciple requested him again the sage said, "I am teaching you, you do not understand. The *Ātmā* is silent." Yes, the best way to teach Advaita is to remain silent about it for the simple reason that it involves that which by its very nature is inexpressible. This also follows from Śaṅkara's view that the absolute can never be the object. If we talk or think about it we make it the object of our talk or thought, and it becomes non-self.

[17] "Brahmā is free from space, attributes motion function, and difference, being in the highest sense and without a second, seems to the slow of mind no more than nothing". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.538

[18] "It is the highest truth, perfect being, and the fullest freedom". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.537

[19] "The words used are negative but what is meant is intensely positive". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), pp.535-36.

Saguṇabrahmā

The *Nirguṇabrahmā* cannot be the object of worship or God. According to theism, God is the best, the perfect, and the highest person who loves and protects his creatures. He is the one towards whom, the humans can turn in prayer and worship to get their grievances and sins redressed and by whose grace, they can attain the highest goal of life *Mokṣa*, the salvation. However, the absolute is not a person; not he but is 'it' without any qualities, feelings and relations. The concept of *Nirguṇabrahmā* may be philosophically satisfying to Advaitins but theistically it is hopeless and useless. The formless, characteristicless, impersonal absolute cannot be God[20].

Śaṅkara who was himself highly religious, who has since been regarded as the chief preceptor of Advaita school of thought, had to provide a place for God in his conceptual scheme. The *Saguṇabrahmā* occupies the position of God in Advaita. To fill in the void of the object of worship, the concept of *Saguṇabrahmā*, i.e., Brahmā with attributes is introduced. The distinction between *Nirguṇabrahmā* and *Saguṇabrahmā* is, to some extent, parallel to that between the *Ātmā* and *Jīva*.

The *Nirguṇabrahmā* is the absolute but not the *Saguṇabrahmā*; the *Ātmā* is the absolute but not the *Jīva*. The *Ātmā* and Brahmā have the same characteristics of being consciousness, all pervasiveness and bliss[21]. The *Ātmā* with the adjuncts, like body, internal organ etc., which make it limited, active and bound is the *Jīva*, the embodied self. Similarly the absolute in association with *Māyā* (*Prakṛti*, the matter) is *Saguṇabrahmā*.

The *Saguṇabrahmā*, the Advaitic God, is the supreme person who is

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[20] The absolute of Saṁskāra rigid, motionless and totally lacking in initiative or influence cannot call forth our worship. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.659

[21] This statement is inaccurate; it has to be modified as "*Ātmā* and *Nirguṇabrahmā* have the same characteristics..." It may be noted that the Advaitin is forced to speak of *Nirviśeṣa*, the charactersticless Brahmā as having characteristics. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.517

beyond the reach of our limited reason; his existence cannot be established by reasoning. Śaṅkara holds that the traditional arguments for the existence of God are defective, and that the only basis for the belief in the existence of God is the authority of Vedas[22].

The Advaitin describes God in terms of characteristics usually attributed to God. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and immanent in nature, the creator, ruler, preserver, destroyer, and mover of the universe. He is the first cause of the universe which is full of variety, change and motion. The world depends on God. Śaṅkara denies the existence of objects independently of consciousness[23]. Some objects are contents of human consciousness, others which are not, are the contents of God's consciousness.

The distinction between the knower and the known which is inapplicable in the case of the absolute, becomes applicable in respect of God and the world. God is the highest subject (knower) and the world is the object (the known). The world, in spite of its variety and change is not chaotic. The universe contains uniformity or regularity, the events happen in it according to laws, and hence their occurrence is predictable; there is a marvellous adaptation of means and ends, and it is a place wherein the human beings reap the fruits of their deeds and work for realisation of *Mokṣa*. Such a world could not have been produced by the unconscious matter; its cause must be the omniscient and omnipotent, i.e., God.[24]

There is much evil and little good in the world. According to Śaṅkara, the presence of evil in the world does not count against the existence of

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[22] "The reality of God transcends our rational powers of conceiving as well as comprehending. Only if we resort to scriptural insight of the seers as recorded in the scriptures can we be certain of God". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.545

[23] "Objects have no existence for themselves and if they are not contents of my or your consciousness, they are the contents of divine consciousness". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.498

[24] "So the omniscient, all-powerful, eternal, all-pervading Īśvara is the cause of the world". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.547

God; for God is not responsible for evil; human beings are responsible for it. Their happiness or misery, their good or bad fortune are the effects of their own good or bad deeds. They reap as they have sown. God's only function in this regard, is to allot the fruits of actions according to the deeds of their doers. God is never tainted by evil. At the time of dissolution, the impure world returns to God but it does not soil. His nature 'for the effect is said to lose its distinguishing qualities when it merges into its cause'. Till the time of next creation, the world exists in Īśvara in its potential form. In creation, the potential world becomes the actual world.

The concept of God, the Īśvara is complex, because it involves the concepts of the absolute and *Prakṛti* (*Māyā*), the matter. The world which is full of variety and change cannot be explained in terms of the absolute alone, which is, invariable immutable and identical. The *Māyā* or *Prakṛti*, which is the source of change and difference, cannot by itself produce the world, for it is unconscious or unintelligent. Advaitin believes that causation involves intelligence, that to produce anything a cause must itself be intelligent or it must be guided by intelligence.

So the cause of the world must consist of both, the Brahmā, the the pure intelligence and *Prakṛti*, the unconscious changing element. Both change and permanence characterise the world. Hence, its cause must have both these characteristics. The Brahmā in God is the principle of consciousness and permanence, and the *Prakṛti* in God is the changing unconscious and dynamic element[25].

God and the world are thus relative. God is the knower and cause of the world and the world is the known and an effect. Being relative, both are appearances[26] of the absolute.

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[25] "Īśvara combines the two principles of Brahmā and *Prakṛti*". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.556

"Īśvara, the Brahmā associated with *Prakṛti*, is the efficient and material cause of the world". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.549

[26] "Śaṅkara is opposed to all attempts to think the absolute. The moment we think of it, it

The absolute thought of as the cause of the world, and thus brought into relation with the world, is God. When we think of the absolute in this way, it appears to be the highest object of our thought, i.e., as God, all objects of thought, of our ordinary, scientific and logical knowledge, are appearances. Hence, God and the world are appearances. The absolute appears to change into the world of multiplicity and mutability, but it does not really do so. If it really changes into the world, the world would be real or the absolute would be an appearance. Both these alternatives are denied by the Advaitin. However, the world, says the Advaitin, is the actual modification of the nature of God. The element of *Prakṛti* in his nature becomes transformed into the world under the intelligent guidance of the God. Since, *Prakṛti* is a part of nature of God, its three attributes *Satva*, *Rajas*, *Tamas* belong to Him but he is said to be far above them. "He has the three *Guṇas*, and is also said to transcend them." There are different forms of God.[27]

In the history of the universe, many millions of years intervening take place between the cycle of creation and dissolution. During the period of dissolution, the whole universe exists in its subtle or potential form in God, till the beginning of the next creation, which occurs when God wills to become many or to change himself into the various objects of the world. The creation of the world means transformation of what is in subtle or potential form in God into its gross or actual form. The transformation of the potential into the actual requires energy. This energy of God in creation is *Māyā*.

It is clear that creation does not mean production of something entirely new (or coming into existence of what was non-existent), and dissolution does not mean total annihilation of something (or non-existence of what was existent). For *Saṁsāra*, the world has no beginning or end. Creation

becomes a part of the world of experience". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.541.

[27] God is said to have different forms. The unity of all *Jīvas* in the waking state is his Virāṭvaiśvānara form, the unity of all subtle *Jīvas* is his Hiraṇyagarbha form and the unity of all *Jīvas* as *prajñās* is Īśvara. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.552

and dissolution are different phases of the world. Creation is a process of actualisation of what was potential in God and dissolution is existence in potential state in God of what was actual. Thus, the potential is transformed into the actual and the actual into the potential in the processes of creation and dissolution respectively.[28]

It is through God that the connection between the absolute and the world is established. The pure consciousness or the absolute in God's nature, being immutable, does not change, but *Prakṛti* or *Māyā* in him is transformed into the objects of the world, not suddenly but gradually, according to the definite order of evolution of the world.

Prakṛti evolves in the definite order of *Mahat*, *Buddhi*, *Ahaṅkāra*, sense and motor organs. It proceeds from the subtle to the gross forms; dissolution proceeds from the gross to subtle forms. Creation is not an arbitrary or whimsical act of God. It involves a plan or purpose. Of course God does not create with a purpose of satisfying his need, for God has no wants as he is complete and perfect.

The purpose or plan involved in creation is the moral and spiritual welfare or development of the persons (egos) in bondage. Creation is described as Līlā, the sport on the part of God. His nature is full of bliss and kindness and creation is an easy overflow of his unlimited bliss and kindness for his creatures. The world is a stage wherein the individuals act for the attainment of their moral and spiritual ends. Their parts in this moral and spiritual drama are determined by their previous good or bad deeds or *Karmās*.

Since, *Karmā* is an unconscious factor, it itself cannot allot what is due to each individual on the basis of his previous good or bad deeds. God, the omniscient, allots to the individuals the merit or demerit on the basis of their *Karmā*. He provides them with opportunities to develop spiritually according

[28] Strictly speaking, there is no creation at all; since the *Saṁsāra* is beginningless and endless. Creation and destruction are stages in the process of *Saṁsāra* which is from eternity to eternity". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.548. "Creation is expression in the plane of space-time of what already exists in God".

to their deeds. How they utilise the opportunities and what they actually become depends on their *Karmās* and efforts.

The kind of world that develops out of *Prakṛti* in God is determined by the accumulated *Karmās* of the individuals who are going to live in the world. Thus, the main determinant of creation is the *Karmās* of the individuals, and the influence of God is of minor importance. The theists are naturally dissatisfied with this view in which the omnipotence of God is to some extent checked by the individuals' *Karmā* and his infinity is limited by matter *Māyā* that is coeternal with him.[29]

The theists have severely criticised the Advaitic conception of God. According to them God is the best, highest, purest, perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, infinite, eternal, supreme person and he is the ultimate reality. There cannot be anything higher or better than God. However, Advaita holds, not only that the absolute is higher than God, but also there is some defect in God. Change and activity, says the Advaitin, are essential characteristics of God, but these are the defects that make God an appearance.[30]

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[29] "Since the world is only a scene of atonement for the works of an earlier existence, the role of God as a creator is a secondary one".

"The admission of a formless matter coeternal with God clearly involves limitation on the infinity of God". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.558

[30] "For Īśvara changelessness and inactivity are impossible". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.557

"...so long as creation and destruction are real movements in the life of God, the latter is not above time, but subject to time, so that even as creation and destruction belong to the empirical world Īśvara belongs to it". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.558

"Īśvara has less of reality than the absolute being and other objects represent an increasing deprivation of reality". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.552

"The highest Brahmā becomes the lower Īśvara through association with pure limitation when one conceives of it". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.590

The theists point out that this view is tantamount to atheism. They say that God who is an appearance cannot be a fit being for worship. i.e.. he cannot be God. To describe God as an appearance is not only utterly false, but also sacrilegious; it is to commit an unpardonable sin. They argue that it is better openly to say that there is no God, than to hide that atheism by saying that God exists as an appearance; that it is wrong to say that Advaita is atheistic only from ultimate the Pāramārthika point of view because, a) the Advaitic doctrine of degrees of reality is unacceptable, b) this doctrine cannot be atheistic at one level and theistic at another level.[31]

Further, they say that the Advaitic idea of first degrading God to the level of appearance, and then trying to upgrade him, by saying that he is the highest, purest appearance, having the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience etc., lacks clarity. Further, transparent body of pure *Satva*, does not save Advaita from the charge of atheism, because, on that view, God yet remains an appearance. This approach also involves the admission on the part of Advaitin that their conception of God is unsatisfactory and the theistic conception of him is correct.

What one can say in favour of Advaita is that its view of God is a logical consequence of its basic tenet that the absolute, the ultimate reality, is non-dual. The Advaitin cannot hold consistently with this tenet that God is also ultimately real, for then he would be admitting two ultimate realities. Nor can he identify God with the absolute, for though the essence of God is the absolute, still there are fundamental differences between the two. Of course, the Advaitin says that Brahmā is non-different from Īśvara (as he also says that Brahmā is non-different from the world).

However, in this context the expression 'non-different' is used by him in a technical sense of his own, and if this sense is not kept in mind, such statements become highly misleading. According to Advaitin, 'non-different does not mean identical but it means dependent'. So that Brahmā is non-

[31] "Hence despite its elaborate theology, Advaita regards itself as essentially atheistic where the ultimate reality is concerned. Advaita does not say that there is no God, but only that God is *Māyā*." Archie Bahm, The world's Living Religions, p.139

different from Īśvara means that 'Īśvara is dependent on Brahmā'. Similarly Brahmā is non-different from the world means that the world is dependent on Brahmā. In the sense that the basis of degree of reality of Īśvara or the world is Brahmā.

Incidentally, it should be noted that the Advaitin hates and denies difference or distinction of all kind, but his system is full of distinctions. He has the ready explanation that all these distinctions are there only at the level of logical or *Vyāvahārikasatya*, the empirical knowledge, which is really no knowledge at all but is merely *Avidyā*, the nescience, (which implies that his system itself is *Avidyā*), but at the ultimate level there cannot be any distinctions at all.

In the face of such difficulties some modern sympathetic followers of Śaṅkara maintain that his doctrine is not atheism but super-theism. They argue that atheism holds that God does not exist but the world exists, theism that both God and the world exist, but Śaṅkara holds that God alone is real but the world is unreal. Thus, Śaṅkara gives all importance to God alone.[32]

However, this seems a very strange interpretation of Śaṅkara's view. If, according to Śaṅkara God is the only supreme reality as it is stated in this interpretation, what becomes of his doctrine of *Nirguṇabrahmā*? There are two alternatives; a) God should be held to be identical with *Nirguṇabrahmā*, and this seems to be the implication of this interpretation. If so, a) the concept of *Nirguṇabrahmā* would become superfluous. b) The world would be real because it would be the actual transformation of *Prakṛti*, the nature of real God. c) Hence, God would not be the only reality, the world would be

[32] "If God connotes among other things the supreme reality, Śaṅkara's theory is not surely atheism but the logical perfection of the theistic faith. Indeed, whereas atheism believes only in the world and not at all in God and ordinary theism believes in both the world and God, Śaṅkara believes only in God and God only. For him, God is the only reality. Rather than denying God, he makes most of God. If this type of faith is to be distinguished from ordinary theism (or belief in personal God) the word for it should be not atheism but super-theism". P N Rao, Introduction to Vedanta, Bhavan's Publication, pp.100-101

another reality and admitting two realities would mean abandoning Advaita. d) Logical or empirical knowledge would not be *Avidyā* or ignorance, but would be *Vidyā*, the knowledge for it would be the knowledge of real world. e) The selves would be different from God. In short, this alternative would involve the total collapse of Śaṅkara's view.

If this alternative is modified by saying that God is the only supreme (or highest) reality which implies that nothing else than God is real, then the terms 'supreme' (highest etc.,) lose all their significance, because such terms are used in situations where many things are compared in some aspect. If nothing other than God is real, one cannot say that God is supreme (highest) and hence Śaṅkara cannot be said to be making most of God.

The second alternative is to hold, as Śaṅkara does, that *Nirguṇabrahmā* and God are different and since the former is said to be the only reality, the latter would be an appearance, and the world which issues from the nature of God, would be unreal. However, Advaita would then be atheistic. This shows that one cannot silence and convince the theist that Advaita is theistic or better than theism by coining new phrases. The strain of atheism in Advaita is a legacy from early Buddhism with which Śaṅkara was very well acquainted and by which he was influenced.[33]

Some argue that Advaitic view of God should be considered in relation to its religious tradition and practice in which God is highly esteemed. The follower of Advaitic religion believes that God is creator, maintainer and destroyer of the world; the supreme person who is responsible for the objectivity and uniformity of the world and that without whose grace attainment of *Mokṣa* is impossible. This is true but this does not show that Advaita philosophy is super-theistic; all that it shows is that there is an

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[33] "If we introduce the reality of an absolute Brahmā into early Buddhism, we find the Advaita vedānta again". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.473

"Scepticism about the preconceptions of common sense and first principles of thought is what Śaṅkara inherited from the Buddhist thinkers". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.485

irreconcilable conflict between Advaita philosophy and its religious thought and practice.

Śaṅkara felt the need to explain the world and saw that his conception of attributeless, motionless, changeless Brahmā could not explain the world full of attributes, change and motion. Even the statement 'the world was *Māyā*, the appearance of Brahmā' was not an explanation of the world, for it gave rise to the question. How could Brahmā cast its shadow of the world which was quite unlike it? So, as explained earlier, Śaṅkara was forced to introduce the concept of *Saguṇabrahmā*, the Īśvara or God to do all that which he thought should be done but could not be done by the concept of *Nirguṇabrahmā*. Instead of recognizing that the concept of *Nirguṇabrahmā* was empty, he made it superior to that of God. How can such a view be called super-theism?

Māyā

This is another very important concept in Advaita. In fact, another name for Śaṅkarādvaita is Māyāvāda.

Some scholars say that the *Māyā* theory is not to be found in the Upaniṣats and that it is a fabrication of Śaṅkara. The reply given is that, though *Māyā* doctrine in its fully developed form is not there, yet its basic elements, viz., a) the mystery about the creation of the world[34] or in the context of Advaita about the relation between the absolute and the world, b) the idea of unreality of the world, are found in the Upaniṣats. However, the critics say that Śaṅkara has misunderstood these basic factors and hence his doctrine of *Māyā* based on the misunderstanding is false.

Thus, a) Śaṅkara takes the felt-mystery about the creation of the world to signify that the universe is *Anirvacanīya*, the inexplicable or indescribable or *Mithyā*, the unreal. But what it really signifies is a great wonder about the potency, intelligence, greatness and glory of God for having created

[34] At the centre of Śaṅkara's system is the eternal mystery of creation in which every movement of life and every atom of the world is implicated. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.656

the real world which is so full of variety, beauty, order and adjustment. It is expression of deep devotion to God involving, a) The exclamation 'Oh, how great and wise must be he, the creator of this real universe', b) the attribution of the creation of the unreal world to God detracts from the perfection and the glory of the Lord. How can the seers, who had the intuitive experience of God, as full, perfect and the highest, do so? How can they say that God created the unreal world?

However, what is more important than the origin of Māyāvāda is its philosophical worth. Even if it were an original idea of Śaṅkara it would reveal his philosophical genius provided that it was clearly and consistently worked out to fit in the system of Advaita.

The term *Māyā* is ambiguous. It is used in various senses in Advaita. Its ordinary significance is illusion, inexplicable, magic and skill to produce illusion in others. It is used in all these and also in some technical senses like appearance, dependent, relative, in Advaita.

a) The term *Māyā* is used to describe the nature of the world. Whatever exists or occurs, if it is not self-explanatory, must have an explanation as to how or why it exists or occurs. According to Advaita, the world exists, though it is unreal, and it is not self-explanatory. It depends on the absolute; it derives its degree of reality from the absolute. Dr S Radhakrishnan says that '*Māyā*' in one of its senses connotes what is relative, dependent or derivative.

b) *Māyā* is a source of variety, change, activity difference in the world. The statement 'the world depends on the absolute' should not be taken to mean that the absolute alone is sufficient to explain the world. The absolute itself is inactive, changeless, differenceless. So it cannot explain the world containing change, activity and difference. Hence *Māyā*, the cause of change is also required to explain the world. However, it alone cannot do this, for it is unconscious and to cause anything it requires the guidance of conscious or intelligent principle. Thus, the absolute and *Māyā* are necessary and jointly sufficient to explain the world.

c) Īśvara is the combination of the two. He is the absolute associated with *Māyā*. *Māyā* is the energy of Īśvara by which he creates, maintains, and destroys the world. *Māyā* energizes or activates the inactive absolute in these cosmic processes. However, this does not mean that God is controlled by *Māyā*. God controls *Māyā*.

d) *Māyā* has two functions; i) it conceals the nature of the real from us. So long as we are under the influence of *Māyā*, we cannot have intuitive realisation of the absolute. ii) it produces false belief or ignorance (*Avidyā*) in us. Instead of the real, *Māyā* projects this unreal world, and deludes us into thinking that this world is real and that *Ātmā* and Brahmā are different. This delusion is *Avidyā*.

e) But Īśvara is not deluded by *Māyā*. Īśvara is compared to the magician, *Māyā* to his skill or power to produce the magic show, the world to the magic show projected by the magician and we are compared to the spectators. Just as the magician is not deceived by his show, God is not deceived into thinking that the things produced by him are real. We are naturally deceived, for the magician – God – is invisible and intangible, and we do not know what he is doing and how he is doing it. Though the absolute is the ground of the world, it does not actually transform itself in to the world; it only appears to change into the world. This appearance of the absolute as the world is *Māyā*. Further the connection between the absolute and the world is mysterious. How the pure absolute comes into contact with impure *Māyā* and through it creates the world, is mysterious, or inexplicable. The world is neither real nor non-existent; it is indescribable, as 'is' or as 'is not' or as both, 'is and is not'.

f) The doctrine of *Māyā* is not a simple statement of facts, it is a metaphysical interpretation of facts, and that too from a point of view, which is quite untenable, certainly is not what we are and what is around us for the simple reason that we are real, the world around us is real. No amount of theorizing can lead us to the denial of the reality of the world, which is amply supported by scriptures, experience, reason and intuition. The best philosophical view is that we and the world are real, and are dependent on the supreme lord, the real of reals.

It is said that the concept of *Māyā* "registers our finiteness and points to a gap in our knowledge." However, if *Māyā* indicated merely that we did not know many things, that our knowledge was limited, that we were finite beings, all philosophers holding all sorts of views (except the Advaitin) would have accepted it. I think that no philosopher except the Advaitin has denied our finiteness and limitation of our knowledge.[35]

However, most philosophers do not accept Māyāvāda from which it follows that the significance of '*Māyā*' is not confined to the indication of our finiteness and limitation of knowledge. On other hand, it is a consequence of a certain vision of reality, the acceptance of which involves acceptance of the doctrine that the world is Mithyā, the unreal, and all that which is ordinarily regarded as knowledge is really ignorance. Most philosophers have strongly denied this, hence they have rejected Māyāvāda.

The concepts of *Adhyāsa* and *Avidyā*, the nescience are very intimately related to the concept of *Māyā*. *Adhyāsa* is defined as "the tendency to confuse the transcendental and empirical standpoints."[36] If we believe that

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[35] I have put in the brackets "except the Advaitin because he holds that our fruitiness including limitation of our knowledge is merely a contingent, unnatural, temporary fact about us for, says he, every one of us, is naturally essentially, really the absolute, i.e., infinite pure consciousness and hence our finiteness is *Māyā*, the unreal. Of course, all empirical facts, according to Advaitin are *Māyā*, and since whatever he holds is an empirical fact, it is *Māyā*, the unreal or false. It is in place to state here that some theists have argued with me that it is wrong to praise Advaita by saying that it finds divinity in every one on the ground that it holds that the self is the absolute. They say correctly the question of divinity does not arise at the level of the absolute for it itself cannot be said to be divine. The absolute is merely the it without qualities, it is not a supreme person. Further Advaita distinguishes between Īśvara, the God and *Jīva*, the individual. It has to distinguish them if it wants its concept of God should serve the religious purpose of being the object of worship. For prayer, worship, all devotional acts imply that one who worships and God whom one worships are different, though they may not be absolutely different. There may be a few similarities between them. The attributes and potencies which are infinite and eternal in the case of God may be temporary and very limited in man, e.g., God is omniscient and omnipotent. But man's knowledge and capacity to do things are very much limited.

[36] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.574

the world is ultimately real or that the absolute really changes into the world, there is confusion of standpoints; a) *Pāramārthika*, the transcendental and b) *Vyāvahārika*, the empirical. This confusion of standpoints is said to be natural to the human mind. Everyone from infancy to old age, takes this world to be ultimately real. As long as we remain human beings, we cannot help becoming the victims of this confusion. Only when the absolute is realised, we become free from it because then, the transcendental standpoint alone remains and *Adhyāsa*; confusion between the standpoints disappears. In other words, when the absolute is intuitively realised, the absolute alone is felt (seen) to be real, and the world of plurality is sublated as an illusion, as in the case of rope snake, when we come to know that it is a rope, the illusion of snake disappears.

Adhyāsa is also described "as the appearance of a thing where it is not when the light appears double, or when the rope appears as a snake, we have *Adhyāsa*."[37] The confusion of the self with the ego which occurs when we attribute the characteristics of the latter, such as activity agency, enjoyment to the former, is *Adhyāsa*. Epistemologically, all our non-tautological judgements about reality involve *Adhyāsa*, and hence are false. Our ordinarily so-called knowledge consisting of such judgments is false. A characteristic (attribute or relation) predicated of reality is something other than reality, it is an appearance.

Since, reality cannot be characterized by an appearance such a statement is false. To put it in other words, according to Advaita the ultimate reality is *Nirguṇa*, the attributeless and *Nirviśeṣa*, the characteristicless. Hence, all judgements attributing any characteristic to reality must be false.[38] *Adhyāsa*,

[37] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II. (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.505

[38] All judgements are false in the sense that no predicate which we can attribute to the subject is adequate to it. We have either to say reality is reality or say that reality is X, Y, or Z. The former is unless for thought, but the latter is what the thought actually does. It equates the real with something else, i.e., non-real. To attribute to the real what is different from it is what Śaṅkara calls *Adhyāsa*, or attributing to one thing what is different from it". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.505

the cause of plurality, change and activity, has no beginning or end, and natural.[39]

Adhyāsa leads to *Avidyā*.[40] *Avidyā* literally means absence of knowledge, the ignorance. However, Śaṅkara has completely changed its significance. According to him, all our empirical religious, moral, scientific knowledge is *Avidyā*, or false. This meaning of *Avidyā*, suits his own purpose of denying the reality of the world. For the object of wrong cognition or illusion is unreal. If our knowledge is *Avidyā* or false, then its object, the world, must be unreal.[41]

According to Śaṅkara, 'our knowledge is *Avidyā*' is also shown by the fact that it involves relational thinking, viz., affirming or denying a predicate of a subject, stating a relation between two or more objects, inferring a conclusion from the premises about objects, space, time, causation, God, good, beautiful, self, etc.; and the relational or logical mode of thinking can never give us knowledge of the absolute, which is relationless, attributeless, and beyond logic; at best, it can tell us something about appearance. Only

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[39] This *Adhyāsa*, which gives rise to the world of subjects and objects, is said to be *Anādi*, the beginningless, *Ananta*, the endless, *Naisargika*, the natural possessed of *Mithyājñānasvarūpa*, the form of wrong knowledge the cause of agency enjoyment and the activity of the individual souls and patent to all. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.507

I think that describing it as endless is wrong for if it is endless then the intuitive realisation of Brahmā would be impossible. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.506

[40] But later it is stated that *Avidyā* is a tendency towards *Adhyāsa*. "*Avidyā* or the natural tendency to *Adhyāsa* is involved in the very roots of our being and is another name for our finitude" S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.508.

[41] *Avidyā* in the Upaniṣats is only ignorance as distinct from knowledge possessed by the individual subject. In Śaṅkara it becomes the logical way of thinking which constitutes the finiteness of the human mind. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.575

"All our knowledge is strictly speaking *Avidyā*, the non-knowledge". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.506

by the intuition, which is immediate and without any distinction or relation, can the absolute be realized. Such an intuition of the absolute is praised as higher wisdom and our knowledge is condemned as a fall from intuition (or as lower knowledge).[42] *Avidyā* is not only the source of ignorance but also of sin and misery.

Avidyā is said to be neither real nor unreal for it disappears, when the absolute is intuitively realized. It is not unreal, for it appears and is felt by us. We, who take the world to be real, are under its influence. However, how can it be neither real nor unreal? Advaitin says it is inexplicable. The problem about its locus is also much discussed. It cannot be in the absolute as some Advaitin think, the nature of which is one of eternal light repugnant to *Avidyā*.[43] Then it can exist only in the individual. Some say that *Ātmā* associated with *Avidyā* is the ego or the individual. This raises the questions. How can *Ātmā* which is said to be Brahmā, the pure eternal light become associated with impure *Avidyā*? If association of *Avidyā* with *Ātmā* gives rise to individuals, then how can *Avidyā* have its locus in the individuals? For it to exist in the individuals there must already be individuals? The existence of individuals must precede the existence of *Avidyā*. Advaitin's answer again is, it is indescribable or inexplicable. It is this kind of repeated response on the part of the Advaitin to escape from difficulties that has invited the correct criticism that "in this system, which maintains that everything transcends explanation unreasonableness, is no objection."[44]

The relation between *Māyā* and *Avidyā* is not clear. Sometimes *Avidyā* is said to be the source of the world of appearance. "There are passages in Śaṅkara where the world of experience is traced to the force of *Avidyā*."[45] If

[42] "*Avidyā* is the fall from the intuition, the mental deformity of the finite self that disintegrates the divine into a thousand different fragments". I do not think that the author is justified in using the word 'divine' in its theological sense for the absolute is different from God.

[43] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.576

[44] Parthasarthi Mishra, S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.578

[45] Again "Śaṅkara frequently traces the whole plurality of appearances including that of Īśvara to *Avidyā*". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.578

so, the critics said that, the world would become a subjective or an illusory creation of each ego. However, Radhakrishnan urges that subjectivism is not the considered view of Śaṅkara, for a) Śaṅkara severely criticises Vijñānavāda, the subjectivism of Buddhism;[46] and b) *Avidyā*, according to Śaṅkara is not merely subjective but is also objective. The source of the world of experience considered in relation to the ego is called *Avidyā*, while considered in relation to objects and events is called *Māyā* (*Prakṛti*). The world is unreal but it is not illusory.[47]

The world

According to Advaita, the world is unreal. The Advaitin could have deduced very easily the unreality of the world from his, unusual or novel conception of reality. According to him, the reality is non-dual, self-existent (independent), indubitable, immutable, absolute (non-relative), differenceless, qualityless, actionless, complete, universal, infinite indivisible transcendent, perfect pure consciousness and pure bliss. That it is a novel conception of reality is quite clear. The Advaitin knows this. It agrees with his frank intention, which is to give *Apūrva*, a new knowledge.[48]

It is also clear that this conception of reality is not satisfied by any content of the world. The world or its contents is spatial, temporal, and sensible; it is full of change, difference, motion. It follows that the world

[46] "... Śaṅkara rejects all attempts to reduce waking experience to the level of dream. He does not admit that the world is a product of mere *Avidyā*. *Avidyā* in Śaṅkara is not a mere subjective force but has an objective reality. It is the cause of *Pṛthvyādiprapañca*, the whole material world, which is *Sarvasādhāraṇa*, the common to all *Avidyā* is positive in character an objective force beginingless and existing both in a gross and subtle form; practically *Avidyā*, Māyā, and *Prakṛti* are identified." S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.582

[47] "When we look at the problem (whether the world is subjective or objective) from the objective side we speak of *Māyā* and when from the subjective side we speak of *Avidyā*. Even as Brahmā and *Ātmā* are one so are *Māyā* and *Avidyā* one". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.587

[48] "*Smṛti*, the memory is not included under right knowledge, since novelty is said to be the feature of all knowledge". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.488

is unreal. If the Advaitin had adduced his conception of reality as the sole reason for the unreality of the world, then his view would have been rejected by the simple objection that his conception of reality was quite arbitrary and that the world was known to be real. And this would have been the right response. However, the Advaitin seems to use his conception of reality as one of the reasons and not as the only reason for his view that the world is unreal[49].

The hackneyed example here is seeing a rope as a snake or a shell as silver. His analysis of such an illusion is that there is a basis for the illusion. Here the basis is rope (or shell) which is ordinarily, but not by the Advaitin regarded as real. When we say on seeing the rope that 'this is a snake', the word 'this' (or its equivalent) is used to denote the basis or the 'real' object. In an illusion something else (snake or silver) is superimposed on the basis; what is thus superimposed is illusory, unreal (or an appearance).

The superimposed has two functions; a) it conceals the nature of the basis (or of the real) from the percipient. This is its negative function b) instead of the 'real', it shows up something other than the 'real' (or basis), e.g., snake (or silver) which is different from the rope (or shell). This is its positive function. These functions of the superimposed are the same as those of *Māyā*. The Advaitin holds that the superimposed is not real but it exists[50] as long as the illusion lasts. When by further investigation we find that there is only the basis (rope or shell), the superimposed (snake or silver) disappears. So long as we think that there exists the superimposed we are labouring under a mistake or *Avidyā*, the ignorance. However, when we find that there is really a rope or a shell (the basis) the ignorance and with it the superimposed vanish, and knowledge dawns upon us.

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[49] "It is not real because it is not eternal. As the Advaitin puts it, the real cannot be real now and then, here and there, but always and everywhere". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi)

[50] This is Advaitins big paradox "that which does not exist may be real; while that which does, may not be so; for the real it is impossible to exist." S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.527

This analysis of illusion is used for his metaphysical purpose by the Advaitin. From this analysis of illusion, the Advaitin draws a strange conclusion that whatever is or can be given in sense experience or perceived is unreal or an appearance. From this it follows that the world is unreal; for its contents can be perceived by us. Only the absolute is real. It is the basis of the world. The world is superimposed upon the absolute. Just as a snake superimposed on a rope is unreal, so also the world superimposed on the absolute is unreal.

This *Māyā*, the superimposed world conceals from us the ultimate truth that the ultimate reality is non-dual (one) attributeless, immutable, eternal, pure consciousness and in its place projects before us the world consisting of many changing things. We are deluded into believing that this world of variety, motion and change is real. This is *Avidyā*, the ignorance, which is the cause of our bondage. When the absolute is intuitively realised, the *Avidyā* and with it the world, disappears.

We immediately think of an objection to the Advaitin's above argument; viz., that we know that some of our perceptions are false, but most of our perceptions under normal conditions of observation are veridical, in the sense that we perceive things as they really are. Hence, we distinguish the illusory (unreal) from the real objects. We say that illusory objects are subjective, private, temporary and practically useless while the real objects are objective, most stable or permanent and useful. However, the Advaitic view abolishes this distinction, for it holds that all objects in the world, like illusory ones, are unreal.

The Advaitin replies to this objection by drawing the distinction between degrees of reality. He insists that his view does not deny the distinction between the 'real' and the 'illusory', that the distinction between them still holds on his view. According to him, his view does not adversely affect our ordinary ways of thinking and living and scientific research. These would continue in the same way as they have done so far. He holds that there are three degrees of *Sat*, the reality; a) *Pāramārthikasat*, the absolute reality. This is the highest, the ultimate reality. The *Nirguṇabrahmā* alone is

ultimately real. b) *Vyāvahārikasat*, the relative, practical or empirical reality. Advaitin holds that the things which are regarded as real by common sense are not absolutely real but are relatively or practically real.

Strictly speaking, they are not real, though they exist. They are said to be less real than the absolute for they are characterized by contradiction, difference and change. In respect of degree of reality, they are in between the absolute, the sole highest and richest reality and the non-existents like a square circle, a lotus in the sky etc., which are not at all experienced or perceived by us. However, the objects in the world are perceived and used by us. So they exist, they have some degree of reality which they derive from the absolute. They are more real than the illusory objects. c) *Prātibhāsikasat*, the illusory and dream objects are brought under this category. These are the least real objects. They are subjective and temporary. They are thought to exist only as long as the illusion or the dream, in which they appear, lasts.

Thus, the Advaitin accepts the ordinary distinction between the 'real' objects and 'illusory' objects by saying that the former are more real than the latter. On this ground, some question that when he allows a small degree of reality even to the illusory objects, how can he deny the reality of the world? Our waking life according to him is not a dream. The world with its contents is real for us who are in *Saṁsāra*, the bondage. It is seen to be unreal only when the Brahmā is realised. Just as a lion in dream is believed to be real as long as one dreams, and is seen to be unreal on waking up, so also the world is real as long as we are in bondage, and it is seen to be unreal, on the attainment of *Mokṣa*. The world exists as an appearance of Brahmā.

Another argument to show that the world is an appearance is based on the concept of causation. The Advaitin argues that the concept of causation involves contradiction; for if the cause and effect are different, they cannot be related, and if they are the same, it is meaningless to say that they are related by causal relation, because this implies that they are different. Further, causation involves change. The Advaitin says, that the concept of change is contradictory for change implies identity, but what is the same

or identical cannot change and what changes cannot be identical. Thus, the concept of change is discrepant; since causation involves change, the concept of causation, however useful it may be in science and practical life is, from the Advaitic point of view, unacceptable. As the concepts of cause and change are applicable to the contents of the world, Advaitin says, the world is full of discrepancy or contradiction.

Now the real must, at least be free from contradiction. The world contains contradiction, so it cannot be real. In stating the relation between the absolute and the world, the Advaitin says that the absolute does not really change into the world but only appears to do so. The absolute is not the creator of the world; God is its creator but God, like the world, is an appearance, one appearance gives rise to another appearance. The statement that 'the world is Mithyā, the false (illusory)' does not mean that the world is nothing or that it is completely unreal like a lotus in the sky. For, the world exists because we perceive its contents but none has perceived a lotus in the sky. However, the world is not real, for it is not consistent, eternal and immutable. It is neither real nor unreal. It is indescribable.

The world is not identical with the absolute, but it is non-different from the absolute. Non-difference does not mean identity. It means independent non-existence. The world does not exist independently of the Brahmā. The absolute is the ground of the world; if there is no absolute, there cannot be the world, but if there is no world, there can be the absolute. The absolute is independent of the world in the sense that the non-existence of the latter does not and cannot in any way affect the former.

Let us pause to consider these arguments. a) In the first argument, from the occurrence of illusions, dreams, etc., in which what we perceive is ordinarily judged to be unreal, the Advaitin seems to infer that whatever we perceive is unreal. Now the illusions, dreams, hallucinations constitute only some but not all of our perceptual experiences. However, the conclusion is about all perceptions. The argument seems to be that some perceptions are false. Therefore, all perceptions are false.[51]

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[51] "The world is not identical with Brahmā, only it has no separate being apart from or independent

This is not a deductive argument. If it is regarded as a deductive argument, it would be invalid. There cannot be a valid deductive step from 'some' to 'all'. It appears to be an inductive argument (there seems to be an inductive leap from 'some' to 'all') but it is not really so. The Advaitin seems to draw the conclusion 'all perceptions are false'; from the actual observed facts of occurrence of illusions, dreams, etc. Though such facts as illusions are important to the psychologist, who is interested in carefully observing and describing them, their actual occurrence is not relevant to the philosopher.

We have seen that observations and experiment are not required in philosophy. All that the philosopher needs is the possibility of occurrence of illusions. If what the philosopher thinks possible is also actual, it strengthens his supposition, but it need not be actual.[52]

Thus, the occurrences of illusions, do not seem to function as actual instance supporting the conclusion 'all perceptions are false', but they seem to function as examples clarifying the conclusion (all perceptions are false, like perceptual experiences in illusions dreams etc.). They do not function as actual instances supporting the conclusion is clear from the fact that the Advaitin would not admit any actually perceived negative instance as falsifying his conclusion.

Thus, if we tell him that we perceive this table, this pen, this book and they are real, the Advaitin would not admit that his conclusion is false. On the contrary, he would try to find fault with the negative instance adduced by us and continue to maintain his conclusion. For instance, he may say that table, pen, book, such objects change or that they are spatio-temporal, and hence they are unreal.

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of underlying cause". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.585

"The world is not the absolute, though based on it. What is based on the real and is not the real itself, can only be called the appearance or phenomenon of the real.". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.584

[52] A J Ayer, The Problems of Knowledge, p.88

However, the scientist using the inductive argument admits that his generalization is false, when the contradictory instances to it are found. He will then either modify it or abandon it. That is why such a great importance is given to observation and experiment in science. Further, philosophers holding different views have drawn different conclusions from the occurrence of illusions, dreams, e.g., the Advaitin's conclusion is that all our perceptions are false, but Dvaitin's conclusion is that most of our perceptions are veridical, only a few of them are false. The facts are the same, but the views are different. Thus, one can say that the philosophers are concerned with the interpretations of facts in the light of their visions. Also their arguments are persuasive in the sense that they are intended to persuade the reader to accept their visions of reality. Now, let us consider the conclusion 'all perceptions are false' or the world is unreal or an appearance. There are two legitimate usages, of perceptual terms – see, hear, smell, taste, touch.

According to one usage to say that 'an object X is perceived, seen, or touched', implies that 'X exists'. According to another usage 'X is perceived' does not imply the existence of X. We speak of seeing, touching things in dreams, and we regard such things as non-existent. Which one of these usages is intended is usually clear from the context. In waking life, under normal conditions of observations, if one says "I see a table there", it is taken to imply that the table exists (or is real). However, if one says, "I saw a table in my dream", it is taken to imply that the table does not exist (or is not real). It may be noted that in ordinary usage, the distinction between the real and the existent, is not drawn, i.e., to say that 'X is real' is understood to imply that 'X exists' and vice versa; 'X exists' is taken to imply that 'X is real'.

Now, the Advaitin seems to take advantage of both usages of perceptual words. According to him 'X is perceived' implies that 'X exists', and it also implies that 'X is unreal'. This helps him to say that "Unreal the world is; but illusory it is not". He distinguishes between reality and existence.

This is an arbitrary or a new distinction not sanctioned by ordinary usage of 'reality' and 'existence'. He declares that "it is impossible for the real to exist". Here by 'impossible' he seems to mean 'logically or necessarily

impossible'; i.e., he seems to hold that the real is necessarily the non-existent. In other words, from the statement that 'X is real' it logically follows that 'X is non-existent'. If so, then according to the accepted rules of logic, he should also hold that, from 'X is existent'. It logically follows that 'X is not real'. For example, 'the world exists. Therefore, the world is necessarily unreal'.

He does not want definitely to commit himself on this point. It is pointed out that some statements of Śaṅkara imply that the world is unreal, it is a dream[53]. It is also said Śaṅkara rejects the subjectivism. Subjectivism was boldly accepted by the grand-preceptor of Śaṅkara, Gauḍapāda and some later Advaitins[54]. He distinguishes the world of objects from the dream-world by saying that the former has more reality than the latter. This doctrine of degrees of reality is a considerable departure from the common sense. We usually say that a thing is either real or unreal; it cannot be more or less

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[53] "... Śaṅkara points how *Avidyā* is the force that launches us into the dream of life". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.574

"When we see the reality of the Brahmā, the appearance of the world will flee away". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.575

"This view when exclusively emphasized, suggests that there is no plurality at all apart from the individual's *Avidyā*. All change and motion, all growth and evolution, all science and speculation are reduced to dream, shadows and nothing more". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.579

[54] "As a stick burning at one end, when waved round, quickly produces an illusion of *Alātacakra*, a circle of fire so is it with multiplicity of the world, Gauḍapāda". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.453

"Gauḍapāda recognises that the object of waking experience is common to us all, while those of dreams are the private property of the dreamer; yet he says, "as in dream so in waking the objects seen are unreal". His contention is that whatever is presented as an object is unreal. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.454

There is a contradiction in Gauḍapāda's stand. But to the Advaitin who holds that the world is full of contradictions, this one more contradiction does not matter at all. "Gauḍapāda reduces all reality to mental impressions and declares that latter have no objective causes". "The apparent universe has its roots in *Citta*, the mind and does not persist when the mind is abolished". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.580

real. However, the Advaitin says that a thing is absolutely real or absolutely unreal or more or less real. The *Nirguṇabrahmā* is absolutely real, while the world is relatively real. There are statements of Śaṅkara which show that he accepts the objectivity of the world.[55]

The doctrine of degrees of reality not only denies the Law of Excluded Middle,[56] but also doubts or questions the ordinary standards used in judging the reality of objects. We judge the objects of normal waking experience to be real and the illusory and dream objects to be unreal. This, says the Advaitin, involves the assumption that the ordinary standards are proper or right, but according to the Advaitin, this assumption is unjustified or wrong.

There is still a higher standard of reality, the absolute standard, according to which the objects of waking life are unreal. If from the ordinary standpoint dream objects are unreal, from the absolute standpoint the ordinary objects can be seen to be unreal. The Advaitin insists that we must be beware of confusion of standpoints or standards. This kind of confusion occurs when we transfer the attribution of what is proper to one level or standpoint to another level. According to the Advaitin, if we assert that 'there appears to be the absolute', there will be confusion of standpoints.

Vyāvahārikasat, the conception of appearance is properly applicable to the world, but not at all applicable to the absolute. The reality of the absolute is certain, there cannot be any doubt about its reality; hence using

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55 "We perceive objects, we do not merely contemplate apparitions. We perceive things as they are, and they are what they appear to be". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.497

This means that a thing is identical with its appearance, i.e., the ordinary distinction between reality (a thing as it really is) and appearance (a thing as it appears or seems to be) is denied.

56 The Law of Excluded Middle states that a thing is either real or unreal (a proposition is either true or false). These are the only two alternatives, there cannot be a third alternative, i.e., more or less real (true). But according to Advaita a thing can be absolutely real, i.e., *Nirguṇabrahmā* or absolutely unreal like a lotus in the sky, or more or less real like world.

the language of appearance (or seeming) in respect of the absolute is quite inappropriate. The absolute can only be said to be real. Similarly, if we assert that 'the world is real', there will be confusion of standpoints. Advaita holds that the world is unreal, and the conception of reality is not applicable to the world; only the concept of appearance is applicable to it.

In Advaita, 'there appears to be a world' is equivalent to 'there is a world, i.e., the world exists'. The Advaitin does not distinguish between existence and appearance. "We perceive things as they are, and they are what they appear to be." He argues, "whatever is perceived exists; the world is perceived; so that world exists" and whatever is perceived is an appearance; the world is perceived; hence the world is an appearance. Thus, Advaitin denies the distinction between an object and its appearance. On his view, "there appears to be an X but there is no X" would be self-contradictory but according to ordinary usage it is not at all self-contradictory.

These considerations are intended to show that the statement 'unreal is the world, but illusory it is not' is false, for they show that the world, according to Advaita, is illusory. Advaita holds that it is inappropriate to say that the world is real. It involves confusion of standpoints *Adhyāsa* or *Avidyā*, which is the bane or fall of human race. It is true that the Advaitin allows that the world can be said to be more or less real – more real than the dream and less real than the absolute. It is appropriate to say that 'the world is an appearance'.

It may be noted that when speaking about illusory or dream objects, the language of seeming or appearance is usually regarded as proper, e.g., "there seems to be a snake but really there is no snake." There appeared to be an elephant in my room in my dream etc. According to Advaitin this way of speaking, thinking or believing, which is regarded as appropriate in speaking about illusory objects is also the appropriate way of speaking about the world or objects in it, which is sufficient to show that the world according to him, is illusory.

His statement that the objects of waking life are what they appear, i.e., his denial of the distinction between a thing and its appearances, or

reduction of a thing to its appearances means the same. It is appropriate to say that illusory and dream objects are what they appear. When they cease to appear they cease to exist. When I wake up from my dream the elephant disappears.

The Advaitin says that the ordinary objects also disappear when there is metaphysical awakening, i.e., when Brahmā is realized. To hold that the world is not illusory, the Advaitin has to accept the ordinary distinction between a thing (or existence) and its appearance; but this he cannot do so, for accepting that distinction would cut at the root of his system.

One may say that the Advaitin accepts that distinction between the real and illusory in his conception of *Vyāvahārikasat*, the practical relative or empirical existence and *Prātibhāsikasat*, the illusory existence. Does he do so? Thus, we come to the consideration of his conception of degrees of reality.

I have already remarked that this view of reality breaks the Law of Excluded Middle, and goes against the ordinary conception that, in respect of reality (truth) there are only two alternatives; real or unreal, by introducing three alternatives; absolutely real, absolutely unreal or more or less real. This view involves the setting up of a new norm or criterion of reality, viz., the real must be one, eternal and permanent pure consciousness. The strict application of this criterion of reality to the objects of the world leads the Advaitin to hold that the world is unreal because the objects of the world fail to satisfy that new criterion.

However, the world is unreal is a big paradox which even the Advaitin finds very difficult to accept. He thinks that his distinction between relative or empirical reality and illusory reality shows that the paradox is not severe, that it is not opposed to common sense. It helps him to meet the obvious, simple objections; a) we know that the world with all its variety and change is real; no amount of persuasion can lead us to believe that it is unreal; b) from time immemorial, human beings have believed in the reality of the world. Are they all slow minded and is the Advaitin alone quick witted?

c) If Advaita is true, ordinary and scientific knowledge, morality and religion would become false, but they are not false; Advaita is not true.

The doctrine of degrees of reality helps the Advaitin to reply 'do not worry'. Common sense, science, morality and religion all would go on in the same way, on my view as they have gone on the belief that the world is real. No harm will be done to them by my view; because, for us, who are in bondage, *Vyāvahārikasat*, the world which is full of multiplicity and change is real. The distinctions between the real and the illusory, a thing and its appearance knower, known and knowledge, the concepts of cause, matter, time, space etc., will be valid or correct. Thus, the Advaitin can accept all that is usually accepted as real or true. However, he cautions us that this is so only from the relative or empirical stand point, and at the absolute level, all this is seen to be false and the *Nirguṇabrahmā* alone is seen to be real.

This doctrine is not simple or easily intelligible. The obvious objection to it is that the absolute criterion of reality that the real must be one eternal, permanent, is quite arbitrary. Hence, the Advaitin's argument that, since the world does not satisfy that criterion, the world is unreal or apparent is merely rhetorical. The reason as to why the Advaitin has fabricated that unusual criterion of reality seems to be that of condemning the world as unreal, or apparent. He does not want to apply the honorific term 'real' to the world. If no object in the world falls under it or if it is inapplicable to anything in the world, and if it is not to be empty or meaningless, it must apply to something else.

Advaitin says that it applies to *Nirguṇabrahmā*, the sole reality recognized in his system. Then the question regarding the relation between the absolute and the world arises. The Advaitin answers it by saying that the world is an appearance of the absolute. This statement is quite unintelligible. For, we say that, 'A is an appearance of B', when there is some resemblance between the two; and there can be resemblance between the two only when some characteristics of one are like some characteristics of the other. If so, there cannot be any resemblance between the absolute and the world, because the absolute is said to be attributeless.

The Advaitin allows that the absolute can be described positively provided that such description is not misunderstood. Thus, the absolute can be described as one, eternal etc. If we do so, then we see that the qualities ascribed to the absolute are contradictory to those attributed to the world (or to its objects). Hence, again there cannot be any similarity between the absolute and the world. The statement that the world is an appearance of the absolute is thus seen to be incomprehensible.

Another possibility is that, just as the Advaitin uses the term reality in a special sense of his own, he must be using the term appearance in a special sense of his own, and it is not difficult to find what that sense is. He says that that which exists but is not real itself must be an appearance. Now, he admits that the world exists. He also says that it is not real. So it must be an appearance. However, what does this mean? If it means that the world really exists as appearance, he must accept that the world is real and abandon Advaita. However, if it means that the world only appears to exist as an appearance, he must accept that the world is illusory. However, the puzzling thing is that he says it is not illusory; it has some degree of reality; that it is more real (or less illusory) than the illusory and dream world.

Another objection to it is that, our ordinary classification of objects is into real or unreal. However, the Advaitin classifies them into absolutely real, absolutely unreal or more or less real. His third classification includes our ordinary real objects and illusory objects; the former, according to him, are more real than the latter. However, it is also correct to say that the ordinary 'real' objects, according to him, are 'illusory', but are less illusory than the illusory objects or that the *Prātibhāsikasat* is an appearance of appearance, illusion of illusion. This gets support from the following consideration:

The Advaitin holds that it is proper or correct to say that the world is an appearance. If so, while speaking about the world (or objects in it) the language of seeming or appearance must be used; we must always say that there seems to be a table, there appears to be a book etc. We should never say, that 'there is a table', for this is likely to be interpreted as stating that 'a table there is real' which according to him, is incorrect, as it involves the confusion of standpoints.

A little reflection shows that this argument is illegitimate. Common sense recognizes, a) that the use of 'appear' or 'seem' in speaking about imaginary or illusory objects, and other objects about the existence or qualities of which we are in doubt, is proper, b) there is a limit to the use of 'appears' or seems; in dealing with objects of waking experience. When there is sufficient good perceptual evidence, which practically leaves no doubt about such an object, we are justified in saying that such object (say table or chair etc.), is real or that it really has such and such qualities. In such normal conditions of observation, it would be wrong on our part to state that 'there seems or appears to be a table', as the Advaita insists that we must always do so to avoid confusion of standpoints. If we go on using 'appears' 'seems' in such conditions where there is no scope for practical doubt, it would be quite misleading.

Others can retort "what more do you want?" What are you in doubt about say the table is real or it really is brown. The very insistence of the Advaita that we must always go on using "seems or appears", to avoid confusion of stand points, irrespective of the fact as to whether or not we are in doubt about the object, shows that the Advaita regards the world or its objects as illusory. Further, it robs the force or significance of expressions 'seems', 'appears' etc., for their function is to suggest doubt, using them where there is no scope for practical doubt would be misusing them.

It must be admitted that there is always a logical possibility of doubt about the object, even in normal conditions of perception, in the sense that, the most favourable perceptual evidence, does not logically guarantee the reality of the object. The statement 'it seems to thousands of people under normal conditions that there is a table, but really there is no table' is not self-contradictory.[57] However, logical guarantee or certainty is different from practical (or empirical) certainty, which is all that is needed, and it must be emphasized, which is only available in asserting the reality of the objects in the world.

[57] What does not involve a contradiction is logically possible and what is logically possible may be practically impossible, e.g., it is logically possible for me to fly in the air with a speed of 10,000 mph but it is not actually possible. If a denial of a proposition involves self-contradiction then it is logically certain, e.g., father is male parent is logically certain.

Advaitin says that it is always logically possible to doubt the existence of the objects or the qualities possessed by them, however good and great evidence in their favour may be. Hence, we must always use 'seems' or 'appears' in thinking and speaking about them. The reply to it is that, his argument is illogical for he demands logical certainty in regard to existence or qualities of the objects, where it is logically impossible to get it.

Thus, the doctrine of the degrees of reality, especially, the conception of *Vyāvahārikasat*, does not serve the purpose for which it is introduced; viz., that, of showing that, the world is not illusory, or that, that Advaita agrees with common sense. The Advaita cannot escape from the conclusion that the world is illusory.

There is one more argument which shows that the world is real, and hence Advaita is false. It is argued that Śaṅkara refutes mentalism or subjectivism, the view i.e., everything is mental or exists as an idea in the mind. In support of this, Śaṅkara's statement is quoted. It amounts to saying that those who hold that everything exists in the mind, themselves deny it. They admit that, there are objects outside the mind when they say that objects appear as if they are outside the mind. By making suitable modifications in that original statement of Śaṅkara so as to make it include his view, it can be turned against Advaita itself.

We are compelled to admit that physical objects are real. For no one knows the column or a wall as illusory or as more or less real, but everyone knows that the column and the wall are real objects. Everyone knows this is shown by the fact that, those who deny the reality of objects bear witness to this, when they say that the object perceived seems as if it were real. If the original statement is a refutation of subjectivism, this modified statement is a conclusive refutation of Śaṅkarādvaita.[58]

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[58] "We are compelled to admit objects outside our knowledge (*Upalabdhi*). For no one knows the column or a wall as a mere form of knowledge, but everyone knows the column and the wall as objects of knowledge. And that everyone knows this is shown by the fact that those who deny outward objects bear witness to this when they say the form perceived internally seems as if it were outside". This is an excellent remark, but when it is modified as below, it

Advaitic argument that the basic concepts of cause, change, space, time etc., involve contradiction; and the world consisting of them is full of contradictions and hence it is unreal, is quite untenable. The term 'cause' has many related senses such as produce, make, etc. A cause is said to produce an effect or to make the effect to happen. The Advaitin seems to hold that not only in cases of human productions but in all cases of causation, such factors are present. This seems to be the significance of the statement that what is material or unconscious cannot cause or produce anything without the guidance of intelligence.

Thus, it is said that *Prakṛti*, being unconscious, cannot by itself i.e., unaided by intelligence, produce the world; *Karmā*, which is unconscious cannot by itself produce its effects etc. Thus, causation is assimilated to conscious agency. A cause is thought of as a conscious agent as something active, and an effect as a patient as something passive.

Accordingly, Īśvara, combining in himself *Māyā*, the consciousness and energy is regarded as the cause (creator) of the world. *Māyā* in him goes on changing into the objects of the world under the conscious guidance of Īśvara. It should be noted that this kind of causation is confined to *Vyāvahārikasat*, the empirical reality. Īśvara is an appearance and the world is an appearance. One appearance produces another appearance. This view of causation is called the activity view. It is clear that it is philosophical and not a scientific view of causation, for science does not hold that conscious guidance is a necessary factor in all causation.

It is also clear that strictly speaking the absolute cannot be called a

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is seen to overthrow Śaṅkara's view of the world, the basis of this modification is the same as that of Śaṅkara's original statement viz., our common ways of thinking and speaking or our consolidated ordinary experience, about the physical world "we are compelled to admit that physical objects are real,. For no one knows the column or a wall as illusory or as more or less real, but everyone knows the column and the wall are real objects. And that everyone knows this is shown by the fact that those who deny the reality of objects bear witness to this when they say that the object perceived seems as if it were real". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.497

cause, because it is without any activity or energy. It is on this ground that the Advaitin denies creatorship to the absolute and brings in Īśvara as the creator of the world. Moreover, the absolute and the world are not on the same level of being. The absolute is real, while the world is unreal. Consequently, the Advaitic view of the relation between the two is full of difficulties. The Advaitin cannot hold that they are totally unrelated or different for in that case *Mokṣa*, the realization of Brahmā becomes impossible to attain for the empirical ego. He says that the absolute appears to change into the world. This conclusion also follows from his view that cause and effect are ultimately identical.

If so, then saying that they are different, or that they are related by a relation, as we commonly do, would become false. This can also be stated as cause and effect are one and the same, but they appear as different or as two. It is interesting to note that the Advaitic explanation of identity goes against its accepted connotation. Its usual significance is stated in the logical truth that if A is identical with B, B must be identical with A. However, according to the Advaitin cause and effect are identical 'means' the effect (world) is identical with the cause (the absolute) but the cause is not identical with the effect.[59]

Thus, the Advaitin denies the above logical truth; he modifies the

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[59] "Discussing the question of causality and its metaphysical truth of identity, Śaṅkara says that the effect is identical with the cause, and not the cause with the effect". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.585

On the one hand the Advaitin says that it is inaccurate to speak of causal relation between Brahmā and the world, "the relation of cause and effect cannot be applied to the relation of Brahmā and the world, since cause has meaning only in relation to the finite modes of being where there is succession". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.566

On the other hand, he speaks of the Brahmā as the cause and of the world as an effect". The effect is manifested world beginning with *Ākāśa*. The cause is the highest Brahmā. With this cause, in the sense of highest reality, the effect is identical, having no existence beyond it". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.567

Such highly misleading or contradictory statements abound in Advaita which is applauded, of course, by the Advaitins only, for its logical rigour.

significance of identity. On Advaitic view, a causal statement has two meanings: a) When it states the relation between the absolute and the world it suggests cause produces the effect or cause appears to become or change into the effect i.e., *Brahmavivartavāda*. b) When stating the relation between the empirical things or events, it means that a cause, guided by some intelligence produces or changes into the effect.

The Advaitin's argument that the world is full of contradictions and hence unreal is equally unsatisfactory, as it involves rejection or unjustifiable modification of the Law of Contradiction. 'Contradiction' is a relation that can hold between propositions only. Two propositions are said to be contradictory if they cannot be both true and cannot be both false, i.e., if one of them is true the other is false, and if one of them is false the other is true.

However, according to the Advaitin two propositions which can be true together or false together are contradictory. Take the case of change, which he regards as contradictory. 'Yesterday this leaf was green but today it is yellow'. These are about a change in a leaf and clearly they are not contradictory because they may both be true or both false. Similarly 'A is a finite thing' and 'A is dependent on (or in any other way, related to) B' are in the accepted sense, not contradictory. The Advaitin is an expert in inventing contradictions where really there are no contradictions[60].

Moreover, the statement that the world is full of contradictions is opposed to his own view of degrees of reality. There he holds that what involves contradiction e.g., square circle, is absolutely unreal; it is never

[60] "The real is what is free from self-contradiction but the world is full of contradictions. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.502

"Every finite thing presents the contradiction that it is not only finite i.e., confined within itself, but is also relative in the sense that it hangs on another. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.532

"... causality is a relation and all relations are ultimately unintelligible ... Since cause and effect are identical change and causation are only appearances". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.510

perceived. Consistently with this, he should hold that the world which is full of contradictions is absolutely unreal. However, he is not prepared to hold this.

On the contrary, he inconsistently allows some degree of reality to the world. The fact that he is forced to do so shows that the world is not unreal, that it is real. This also completely over-throws Advaitin's *Anirvacanīyavāda*, the theory of indescribability. The Advaitin argues that what involves contradiction cannot be described, e.g., square circle. It cannot be described as square because it is also circle, it cannot be described as circle because it is also square and it cannot be described as both – square circle because it cannot be both. Similarly, the world cannot be said to be real because it is unreal; it cannot be said to be unreal because it is cognized, and it cannot be said to be both real unreal because that is impossible. Therefore, the world is indescribable. The simple answer to it is that it has been proved that the world is describable as real.

The considerations so far adduced have shown that the Advaitin's statement that 'unreal is the world, illusory it is not', is self-contradictory for if the world is unreal, it must be illusory. However, the Advaitin is not prepared to accept the illusoriness of the world. If the world is not illusory, it must be real, not in his sense of relatively or empirically real, but real without any qualification. Thus, these considerations show that the Advaitin is completely mistaken in holding that the world is unreal, for the world is real.

Now, we come to the biggest objection against Advaita that its conception of ultimate reality, the *Nirguṇabrahmā*, is entirely empty, or the absolute is nothing. That the Advaitin himself is aware of the nothingness of the absolute is shown by his repeated assurance that it is not 'nothing'. It is not to remove or dispel our misunderstanding it as 'nothing', that he repeats that it is 'not nothing'. He does this to escape from the disappointment or despair resulting from his knowledge that his unbridled reasoning has led him to this utter blank or void – the *Nirguṇabrahmā*. Whatever may be the psychological reasons, logically too the *Nirguṇabrahmā* is nothing.

The fact is that a thing is what it is because of its qualities. The qualities depend on a thing in the sense that they characterize it. However, it is also true that a thing depends on qualities in the sense that if it is devoid of any quality, it does not exist, hence, it is nothing. It follows that the absolute, which is said to be *Nirguṇa*, *Nirviśeṣa*, an object without any quality or characteristics is nothing. It is a linguistic convenience that has led the Advaitin into thinking that the absolute is something. Thus, it is a fact that, in denying qualities of thing, we have to go on using 'it' or its equivalent in all such statements, e.g., it is not real, it is not white, it is not small, it is not big, and so on indefinitely.

In all such infinite number of negative statements the word 'it' remains unchanged. The Advaitin eagerly catches hold of this 'it', like a drowning man catching hold of a straw, and wrongly thinks that 'it' refers to permanent infinite eternal *Ātmā* or Brahmā devoid of all qualities. If *Nirguṇabrahmā* is nothing, the Advaitic conception of intuitive realization of Brahmā or *Mokṣa* is meaningless. Madhva has emphasized that *Nirguṇabrahmā* is *Śūnya*, the nothing.

The Advaitic theory of Knowledge

According to Advaita, knowledge, as it is ordinarily understood, involves the knower, the known and the cognitive relation between the two. The knower is an ego or a person, the known is the object physical or mental, which he claims to know. The knower is a complex whole of consciousness, *Antaḥkaraṇa* (*Buddhi*) senses and the body. In the process of knowing, consciousness, physiological factors, and an object are present. When the modifications in Antaḥkaraṇa, which is very fine and plastic, are illuminated by consciousness, the knower gets knowledge of those objects which caused the modifications. The consciousness and bodily changes, though thus related, are different.

It has already been stated that knowledge and truth are very intimately related. The claim to know involves the assurance about the truth of what is claimed as known. Knowledge implies truth. 'I know that he is honest', implies that 'he is honest' is true. Consequently, 'I know that he is honest, but he may not be honest' would be self-contradictory. This distinguishes

knowledge from belief. Belief does not imply truth. 'I believe that he is honest, but he may not be honest' is not self-contradictory. We can have many false beliefs but we cannot have false knowledge.

It is true that sometimes we claim to know something which subsequently is found to be doubtful or even false. People claimed to know that the sun revolved round the earth, which later on was rejected as false. In such cases, we say that they thought or believed that they knew it, but really did not know it or that they were mistaken in their belief. Thus, nothing that is doubtful or false is accepted as knowledge, but only what is true is regarded as knowledge.

However, it does not follow that 'we cannot think what is not true.'[61] This is a paradox. The argument adduced in support of it is that if we admit that we can think what is not true, we cannot know the truth. For, we can decide that a certain thought or belief is true by using a certain standard of truth, and adopting any such standard of truth is itself a thought, the truth of which requires to be tested by another standard and so on *ad infinitum*. This argument is unacceptable. For when we are in doubt as to whether a certain thought is true, we use a certain accepted standard to remove the doubt. If our thought conforms to that standard, we accept it as true. If it does not conform, reject it as false.

What we do not do is that we do not doubt whether or not the standard itself is right. If we have this doubt, it cannot be a standard at all. What is used to remove doubt cannot itself be subjected to doubt, e.g., take a clear case of deciding the length of a piece of cloth. When we are in doubt about the length of a piece of cloth, we take a metre stick, use it to measure the length of that piece of cloth and accept its length as shown by measurement.

If we have genuine doubt i.e., doubt based on good grounds, about the accuracy of the metre stick, it is senseless to use it as a standard of measurement. If we doubt the accepted norm without having good reasons

[61] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), 500

or a better standard, our doubt will be insincere and baseless. Moreover, the Advaitin himself says that our thoughts or beliefs that the world is real, the selves are many and that they are different from the absolute are false, and hence constitute *Avidyā*, the nescience. "Not only these judgements, but all judgements', says he, "are false".[62]

If the term 'thought' in this statement is taken as equivalent to 'knowledge', the statement that we cannot know what is not true becomes true. And it is a usual practice in Advaita of using familiar terms in new senses which leads to confusions.

The question that naturally arises is that if the truth (validity) of knowledge is self-evident then how to account for error and doubt. Advaitin's answer is that error or doubt in thought is due to sensory impediments and psychological impediments like passions and prejudices. The function of logic is not to reveal the truth, but to make our thought clear by removing prejudices[63].

According to Advaita, there is a distinction between lower knowledge and higher wisdom. This distinction corresponds to the distinction between *Vyāvahārikasat* and *Pāramārthikasat*. Lower knowledge is knowledge of *Vyāvahārikasat*; higher wisdom is intuitive realization of the *Nirguṇabrahmā*. Lower knowledge includes ordinary, scientific, religious, moral, social, psychological knowledge. But Advaitin state that it is non-knowledge, *Avidyā*, because it involves distinctions, relations and qualities. It does not

[62] "Śaṅkara allows that truth and error both have reference to objects. But in the ultimate sense there is only one *Vastu*, the reality i.e., Brahmā, and no idea corresponds to it, and so all our judgements are imperfect". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.501

"All judgements are false in the sense that no predicate which we can attribute to the subject is adequate to it". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.505

[63] "Logical proof enables us to break down the obstructing veils and reveal the self-evident character of truth". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), pp.501-502

correspond to the ultimate reality, which is without quality, relation and distinctions.

Perception, inference and even scriptural testimony are all means to lower knowledge. It is true that the Vedas contain eternal wisdom. They describe the absolute. As collections of letters, words and sentences written on paper or some other material, Vedas are not eternal. They cease to exist at total dissolution and begin to exist at next creation in the form of utterances of God. However, their meaning is eternal. Their truth is self-evident. They teach the identity of *Ātmā* and Brahmā, that the ultimate reality is one.

However, knowing the *Ātmā* or Brahmā by the study of the Vedas is not the same as the intuitive realization of the Brahmā. The former is mediate or indirect and relative; it is indeed nascence; while latter is immediate, or direct and absolute. Still Vedic teaching is valuable in its own sphere. The sages were well versed in spiritual matters. Just as in science and other fields we accept the statements of experts, so also we should accept the teaching of saints and sages about the spiritual matters[64].

According to Advaitin, mere logical thinking which is independent of scriptural teaching embodied in tradition, leads to scepticism.[65] The way of escape from this is to make reason subservient to spiritual experience, in the sense that it should accept spiritual insights as matter for deliberation, clarify their meaning and support them. The utterances of mystics embodying their spiritual insights require interpretation and these interpretations may be

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[64] "To accept *Śruti* is to accept the witness of saints and sages. To ignore *Śruti* is to ignore the most vital part of the experience of the human race". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.516

[65] "If we depend on thought, we have to doubt the world, doubt our being, doubt the future, end our life in doubt". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.516.

"Logic by itself leads to scepticism". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.516

doubtful or wrong. Reason or logical thinking is useful in showing which are defective or wrong, and which ones among them are right.[66]

The scriptural teachings about the nature of the ultimate reality are authoritative. The sensory perception in the field of empirical matters and intuition are superior to *Śruti*.[67] The intuitive realization of the absolute is the highest kind of experience. It is pure consciousness and bliss, in which there is no distinction between the subject and the object, the knower and the known. The *Ātmā* and Brahmā are directly experienced to be one. The subject ceases to be a subject in the sense that it loses its finitude, on seeing directly the identity of self with Brahmā, the universal ground of reality.

The particular or the individual merges with the universal. If the ordinary analysis of knowledge into the knower, the known, and the cognitive relation between the two is taken as essential or necessary character of knowledge, the intuitive realization of the absolute is not knowledge as it does not contain this distinction.[68] The Advaitin is aware of this because he does not call it 'higher knowledge', but calls it 'higher wisdom'. He says that it is similar to artistic insight.[69] The critics say that just as the *Nirguṇabrahmā* is ontologically nothing so does this intuitive realization have no epistemological value. The intuitive realization of Brahmā seems to have affective value; it is a feeling of unity or oneness and nothing more. This raises a few questions; it is said that Advaita gives great importance to

[66] "Śaṅkara' recognises the need of reason for testing scriptural views ... *Tarka*, the reasoning which works as an auxiliary of *Anubhava*, the intuition is commended by him". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.517

[67] "*Śruti*, of course, has to conform to experience and cannot override it ... The highest evidence is perception, whether it is spiritual or sensuous...". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II. (Oxford University Press, Delhi). p.518

[68] Madhva declares that it is not knowledge since there is no object to be known. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II. (Oxford University Press, Delhi). p.510

[69] "It has kinship with artistic insight rather than animal perception. It is immediacy which is higher and not lower than animal perception". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II. (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.513

knowledge, but is it true? What is the place of knowledge in Advaita? What is ordinarily said to be knowledge, according to Advaita, is nescience.

The intuitive realization of Brahmā is also quite different from knowledge. So the critics say that its theory of knowledge is really a theory of no-knowledge. If so, the study of the Vedas is futile. It may be replied that *Avidyā* or lower knowledge about the ultimate reality gained through the study of Vedas under a proper guru is valuable because it is necessary for attaining the intuitive realization of Brahmā. It is of course destroyed on intuitive realization.

The objection to it is that a) if *Avidyā*, the mediate lower knowledge is necessary for intuitive realization, when the former is destroyed the latter will also be destroyed. Hence, nothing, not even pure consciousness will remain.[70]

The Advaitic conception of *Mokṣa*

All Indian philosophical systems except Cārvāka hold that among Puruṣārthas, the four goals of life viz., *Dharma*, the duty or virtue, *Artha*, the wealth, *Kāma*, the desire and *Mokṣa*, the liberation or salvation – the *Mokṣa* is the highest one, that it is an end in itself while the other three are means to it; but each system has a different conception of it. Indeed, the main function of philosophy according to Indian thinkers is to make clear the nature of *Mokṣa* and the way to attain it. The thinker has to delve deep to consider the nature of the agent (self) who is required to act, the nature of situation and of the wider universe (the reality) in which the agent has to act., the probable consequences, of courses of action that can be chosen by the agent, and among them the best course of action that the agent can undertake to do. In short, it involves ontological, epistemological and moral inquiry.

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[70] "So long as there is knowledge, *Mokṣa* is not reached, but until we obtain knowledge of Brahmā, there can be no *Mokṣa*... It is admitted that there is no knowledge in the ultimate state and the abolition of the highest knowledge itself is brought out by a number of similes". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.645

The differences between the three major Vedāntic systems Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita, can be viewed as due to their different conceptions of *Mokṣa*. It is generally accepted that to attain *Mokṣa* one should become free from the sense of 'I' and 'mine' (*Ahaṅkāra* and *Moha*). And to become free from the sense of 'I' and 'mine', the Advaita holds that one must totally merge oneself in the absolute – the total extinction of individuality or particularity is needed, that only the universal absolute, but no individual or particular, must be real. The Viśiṣṭādvaita says, that both the individual or self and the absolute must be real, but the individual must be real as an organic part of the whole reality.

The Dvaita maintains that the self and God are both real and that an individual must become a genuine devotee and a humble servant of the supreme lord by renouncing everything worldly i.e., himself, his kith and kin and wealth. The doctrines and discussions about the self, the world and absolute or God contained in these systems can be regarded as attempts at supporting and explaining rationally these views of *Mokṣa*. The other systems of Indian thought are also concerned with *Mokṣa*.

This aspect of Indian thought is responsible for its estimation and also its criticism as being pragmatic in character. It is said to be concerned, not with the disinterested search for truth, but with the attainment of the practical end. That this view is not correct is shown by the study of these systems, each of which contains theories, based on critical considerations, about the nature of knowledge and truth, appearance and reality, and which, this is important to note, insists that knowledge of truth is necessary for the attainment of *Mokṣa*.

According to Śaṅkara, *Mokṣa* is the intuitive realization of the identity of *Ātmā* the self with Brahmā. The Brahmā is reality, consciousness and pure bliss, i.e., spiritual in character. *Mokṣa*, oneness with Brahmā, is a spiritual state, but it is not a value or an ideal. The Advaitin holds that identity of the self with the absolute is eternal; it is always there though it may not be known to us. Thus, *Mokṣa* is an eternal spiritual fact. It is the true nature

of the self, which shines, when *Avidyā* that conceals it is removed.[71] The realization of *Mokṣa* is not attaining something new, something which one does not possess, but it is finding that which one always has but of which one is unaware of till intuitive realization. Since it is eternal, it cannot be regarded as a product of divine grace or of *Karmā*, for a product by its very nature has a beginning and an end.

Mokṣa, besides being *Sat*, the reality and *Cit*, the pure consciousness is also *Ānanda*, the pure bliss. It is taken for granted as a fact about human nature that all human beings desire things, that give pleasure or happiness, and none desires things that produce pain or misery[72]. The pleasures or their opposites experienced by us are not permanent or everlasting. Some of them are momentary and others last longer. Even the happiness enjoyed in heaven is not permanent. It is a product of *Puṇya*, the merit resulting from the performance of good deeds, and when the merit is exhausted the heavenly joy disappears, and the individual again becomes subjected to the cycle of pleasure and pain, birth and death.

However, *Mokṣa* is the supreme and permanent bliss. The liberated individual never returns to *Saṁsāra*. Moreover, the pleasures enjoyed here are mixed with pain. The joy that results from eating good food is preceded by hunger, pangs, and when it disappears after sometime, is again followed by pain. However, *Mokṣa* is pure eternal bliss unmixed with pain. The liberated soul is free forever from pain, birth and death, and from the various adjuncts that render it finite and relative. It is seen to be infinite and absolute by its very nature. It is free from attachment to the world. It is not at all touched by the plurality, change and ups and downs of the world.

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[71] "*Mokṣa* is a matter of direct realization of something which is existent from eternity, though it is hidden from our view". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.636.
This state of *Mokṣa* is none other than one's own inherent nature as Brahmā and is not an acquired state like *Svarga*, the paradise. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.640

[72] "Everyone in all the three worlds strives for the sources of happiness and not for those of misery". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.613

Even the *Jīvanmukta* – the individual, who is liberated while he is alive and continues to live in the world till his death, is completely free from the attachment to the world.[73] He is full of peace and bliss in the midst of *Avidyāleśa*, the happenings of the world. Indeed, the liberated soul directly sees that the absolute alone is real, and the world is unreal. This does not mean that the liberated self is a changed or transformed self. The concepts of change, transformation, modification, involve contradiction, and hence are not applicable to the liberated self which really is the absolute. The liberated self is as it always is, only it is free from its accidental adjunct i.e., *Avidyā*.

Nescience about the nature of the real, confusion of the real with the unreal or appearance is responsible for the attachment or bondage to the world, and its disappearance or detachment or freedom from the world or *Saṁsāra* is *Mokṣa*. The liberated self is above morality and religion in the sense that the moral and religious concepts, principles and practices are inapplicable to it. It being the absolute, cannot be said to be good or bad, virtuous or vicious, devout or pretentious (ostentatious), pious or insincere. The reason is that morality and religion are, according to the Advaitin, full of distinctions and contradictions and the liberated soul (the absolute) transcends them.[74] Religion and morality are confined to the *Vyāvahārikasat*, but the liberated self is *Pāramārthikasat*.

According to Śaṅkara, *Mokṣa* is open to all.[75] No soul by its very nature

[73] "On attainment of freedom, nothing happens to the world, but only our views of it alter. Its fleeting things, which have a bewildering fascination for the unwary, no more trouble the liberated". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.637

[74] "God is no God if he is not the All; if he be the all then religious experience is not the highest. If God's nature is perfect, it cannot be so, so long as man's imperfect nature stands over against it, if it is not perfect, then it is not the nature of God. There is thus the fundamental contradiction in religious experience clearly indicating that it belongs to the province of *Avidyā*". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.651

[75] This seems to be opposed to the statement that only those whose hearts are pure desire *Mokṣa*. "The desire to know Brahmā springs only in the person whose mind is pure, who is

is debarred from attaining it. All souls are the same in being one with the absolute, but this does not mean all attain *Mokṣa*. The intuitive realization of oneness with the Brahmā is not easy. It requires a development of good character and a thorough study of scriptural and Advaitic texts under a proper Guru, the preceptor.

The *Jīvanmukta*, who has already realized the direct spiritual insight into the identity of the self with the absolute, would be the best Guru to guide the aspirant for *Mokṣa*. The disciple should be adept at doing all his *Dharmas*, the duties - *Sādhāraṇa*, the universal as well as *Viśeṣa*, the specific duties.[76]

The universal duties or virtues are those which ought to be done or cultivated and their opposites avoided, by all human beings irrespective of their religion, nationality, language, caste, class, sex, etc. They are obligatory on all human beings. They are such duties as speaking truth, keeping one's promises, helping the weak, earning one's livelihood by right means, learning etc. By habitually and scrupulously doing such duties the aspirant for *Mokṣa* is required to develop such virtues as honesty, kindness, benevolence, steadfastness in doing one's duties, forgiveness or tolerance, respect for the right to private property and life, temperance, prudence. He

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free from desires, and who, free from deeds done in this birth or in previous ones, becomes disgusted with the external ephemeral medley of ends and means". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), pp.615-616.

Of course, the contradiction can be easily resolved by saying that though people desire happiness they do not know what gives them happiness, only those who are pure in mind and heart know this etc. On this ground some have argued that *Kāma* is more important than *Mokṣa*, because without the desire for *Mokṣa*, no one would strive to attain it.

[76] The term *Dharma* is used in my senses. It is derived from the root *Dhṛ* (*Dhar*) which means to support, to uphold. In its widest sense it means that which supports natural order (the uniformity of nature) and the social order. It also means justice, rightness, duty, conduct, virtue sacrifice, non-violence, charity, religion, thing's nature etc. Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa says "*Dharma* is created for the well-being of all creation", "all that is free from doing harm to any created being is certainly *Dharma*, for, indeed, *Dharma* is created to keep all creation without any harm." "*Dharma* is so called because it protects all, it preserves all that is created. *Dharma* is that principle which is capable of preserving the universe".

must be free from egoism, selfishness, pride, hatred, sloth, fear, jealousy resentment etc.

Further, he has to do the specific duties. These are also the duties that belong to all, but they are not the common duties even of all Hindus, because they differ from one *Varṇa* and *Āśrama* to another. Hindu society has been divided into four *Varṇas*; a) *Brāhmaṇas* b) *Kṣatriyas* c) *Vaiśyas* and d) *Śudras*. Each *Varṇa* has its own duties. The main duties of Brāhmaṇas are, acquiring knowledge and imparting it to others, guiding people in doing religious rites; of *Kṣatriyas*, defending the society from external attacks and internal disturbances, maintaining law and order; of *Vaiśyas*, producing and distributing goods, and making the society prosperous; and the main duty of the *Śudras* can be summed up by saying that they were required to help the other three Varṇas in such a way as to enable them to do their duties in the best possible way.

Similarly, the life of an individual has been divided into four Āśramas; a) *Brahmacarya* b) *Gṛhastha* c) *Vānaprastha* d) *Sanyāsa*. The main duty of *Brahmacārī* is to acquire knowledge by studying under a proper Guru and to serve his Guru in various ways. The *Gṛhastha* has to perform *Yajñas*, the sacrifices and other religious rites of various kinds, and to look after the members of his family including servants and cattle. One who opts for *Vānaprastha*, had to leave his home and reside in a forest, was required to study, meditate and do penance. This stage may be described as the beginning of gradual detachment from worldly affairs and pleasures, and having concern for *Mokṣa*. *Sanyāsa* involved the total renunciation of *Saṁsāra* and rigorous performance of penance and a very deep concentration on ultimate truth (or God).

It should be noted that doing universal and specific duties very sincerely and living a religious life by observing sacrifices, rites etc., does not guarantee attainment of *Mokṣa* within the span of a single life. Many lives may be required to attain it. Thus, we see that though *Mokṣa* is open to all, it is not within the reach of all, for this training oneself for it is too rigorous to be accomplished by all. This Advaitic view of morality, religion and *Mokṣa*

has been the target of severe attack. It has been pointed out that this view deprives moral and religious life of all importance or significance.

a) According to Advaita, the world is unreal; morality and religion, which are exclusively human concerns, are confined to the world. They are full of activity, distinctions and contradictions. Hence, they are unreal. If this is so, there is no reason or justification for endeavouring to achieve moral and religious excellence. If all distinctions are unreal, then the distinction between good and bad, right and wrong, virtue and vice, etc., is unreal (i.e., there is no distinction between them) and hence there is no reason for preferring to do the good or right and for avoiding to do the bad or wrong. This objection cannot be met by saying that it holds good only if the world is held to be illusory. However, Śaṅkara holds that the world is unreal but it is not illusory.[77] We have seen that this is unacceptable.

Moreover, even if we accept the view that the world, though unreal, is not illusory, we can see that the Advaitic view is quite unsatisfactory. For on this view, the world is an appearance. If so, we have to say that morality and religion are also appearances. Not only this, according to Advaita, they are important appearances. They are indispensable for salvation;[78] man has to live in this world, he has to prepare himself for salvation. The strict observance of moral principles and religious rites leads to acquisition of various virtues, strengthening of character and *Cittaśuddhi*, the purification of mind, which are essential for salvation.

Thus, it may be said, that Advaita gives due importance to the world, morals and religion. This is true; but, it should be noted that in spite of all this, they are condemned as appearances. This ambivalence on the part of Advaita, of giving importance and reducing them to the level of the unreal or either upgrading or downgrading them with a purpose to maintain its own thesis, is quite arbitrary or objectionable. Thus, Advaita says that man

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[77] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II. (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.621

[78] Virtue and vice have no moral weight for the Supreme ... S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.621

is not really man (i.e., he is not a finite, temporary, particular, being) but he is really infinite eternal universal Brahmā). Thus, it upgrades man by describing him in a way in which he is not at all described.

The world, morals and religion are not usually said to be unreal or appearances, but Advaita says that they are unreal or appearances. Thus, condemns them. Against this, it is quite proper to say that man is man, the world is real world. These truisms do not indicate the refusal to go on a philosophical journey with Advaitin, but they show that Advaitic journey which is full of thorns, leads to nothing. Advaita correctly points out that man is not self-sufficient and complete, that there is a *lacuna* in him, and that he has strong desire to make good the deficiency in him. However, Advaita wrongly holds that he wants to fill in the deficiency by becoming something other than man i.e., the absolute. Man knows that he is finite, incomplete and imperfect. He knows that it is impossible for him to become infinite, complete, and perfect, and by always remaining a man – a finite being, he can or ought to become better and better. No amount of argument on the part of Advaitin to persuade man to believe that he is infinite, complete or perfect will lead man to believe so.

b) The Advaitic conception of *Mokṣa* is unsatisfactory. We have seen that the *Nirguṇabrahmā* is *Śūnya*, the nothing. There cannot be Nirviśiṣṭa, Nirguṇī, an object which is without any characteristic or attribute and since *Mokṣa* is an intuitive realization of oneness of self with *Nirguṇabrahmā*. *Mokṣa* is, on Advaitic view 'nothing'. It is total merger or extinction of the individual in the absolute or nothing. The Advaitin is aware of this criticism.[79]

Even the positive description of Brahmā as *Sat*, *Cit*, and *Ānanda* does not help the Advaitin to escape from this objection. It is *Sat*, the reality of no one, *Cit*, the consciousness of no one, and bliss enjoyed by no one, for it is not an individual but a universal. It is inconceivable that there can be consciousness and bliss which belong to no one.

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[79] Even as Brahmā seems from our empirical point of view a mere nothing, so the state of *Mokṣa* seems to be a dead loss... melting away into non-existence. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.641

c) There is no need to bother about the Advaitic conception of *Mokṣa*, because on Advaitic view itself it is impossible to attain it. According to Advaita, to attain *Mokṣa*, total removal of *Avidyā*, the ignorance is necessary. To remove *Avidyā*, Vidyā, the knowledge is necessary. Now according to Advaita, the intuitive realization of Brahmā is quite different from knowledge, for the latter involves, the distinction between the knower and the known, but the former is without any distinctions. Since it is other than knowledge, it cannot destroy *Avidyā*. Then there is (ordinarily called) knowledge derived from perception, inference, study of scriptures, teaching of Guru, meditation etc.

All this, according to Advaita, is derived, relative, full of relations and distinctions and contradictions and indirect, hence it is really the *Avidyā* non-knowledge or ignorance. Hence it cannot remove *Avidyā*. There is nothing in Advaita to remove *Avidyā*. Hence, *Avidyā* always clogs the individual, he can never become free from it. Therefore he can never attain *Mokṣa*.

d) The concept of *Jīvanmukti*, the liberation while one is alive is not without serious difficulties. The *Jīvanmukta* is a liberated soul living in this world. Though liberated, he is yet embodied. However, his body is not effective in the sense that it does not conceal the nature of reality and mislead him into thinking that the world is real. It does not bind him and make him finite. However, what is the role of *Jīvanmukta*? It is said in some passages that all activity is denied to him and this is consistent with the Advaitic view that the absolute is without any activity. The difference between liberation and activity is emphasized to such an extent that where one is present, the other cannot be present. Thus, it is said that activity is finally due to *Avidyā*. *Avidyā* gives rise to Kāma, Kāma the desire to activity directed towards the satisfaction of desire.[80]

Since, liberation is a spiritual state in which *Avidyā* is absent, it must

[80] False knowledge is the basis of all selfish desire and activity. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.623

also be a state in which desire and activity are absent.[81] The results of *Karmā* are temporary but salvation is eternal. So *Karmā* cannot lead to salvation, *Karmā* and *Avidyā* are not opposed. Hence, the former cannot remove the latter.[82] *Karmā* is always undertaken for the fulfillment of desire; *Mokṣa* is incompatible with the presence of desire.[83] *Karmā* involves the distinction between doer, the work done and its object or result, but *Mokṣa* is without any distinction.[84] It follows that *Mokṣa* and *Karmā* cannot co-exist. If an individual acts he cannot be liberated. If he is liberated he cannot act. *Karmā* is not even a means to *Mokṣa*. *Jñāna* or spiritual insight is the only means to freedom.

The *Jīvanmukta* is said to act. Since, he lives in the embodied state he has to breathe, eat and drink. Besides these, he is said to do the unselfish, altruistic acts that lead to the welfare of the community. He is above moral and religious principles and practices. They are not binding upon him. He leads a saintly life. His way of living becomes a model for others to follow.[85] He is the best teacher and preacher of Advaita. Thus, there appears to be a contradiction in allowing activity to the *Jīvanmukta*.

"Śaṅkara holds that the knowledge of the inner self is antagonistic to *Karmā* and cannot co-exist with it even in a dream". But sometimes the opposition between action and freedom is denied.[86] In some passages the

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[81] ... since selfish attachment that moves to action is absent in the case of the released soul, he does not act at all. Action which arises from *Avidyā* cannot coexist with a true knowledge of the spirit. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.620

[82] "*Karmā* cannot dispel *Avidyā*, since the two are not antagonistic". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.628

[83] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.628

[84] *Mokṣa* is impossible with perception of difference and *Karmā* is impossible without perception of it. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.628

[85] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), pp.619-620

[86] "Is the state of *Mokṣa*, or release from *Saṁsāra*, consistent with work for the world? Śaṅkara is inclined to answer this question in the negative, since all activity, with which we are familiar presupposes a sense of duality, and is not consistent with the realization of the truth of non-duality.

attempt is made to resolve the difficulty by saying that the word *Karmā* is ambiguous. If *Karmā* means selfish activity, it is opposed to liberation. The liberated soul can never be selfish. However, unselfish, disinterested activity undertaken for the well-being of community is not opposed to *Mokṣa.*[87] All these considerations show that the confusions, of which there is abundance in Advaita, make it difficult to say what exactly or definitely is Advaitic view.

The strongest objection against Advaitic conception of *Jīvanmukti* is put forward by Madhva. Madhva correctly points out that in Advaita there cannot be the state of *Jīvanmukti* in between bondage and liberation. Or that the concept of *Jīvanmukti* has no place in Advaita for that concept does not harmonize with other Advaitic conceptions. According to Advaita the intuitive realization of Brahmā alone is sufficient to achieve *Mokṣa.* Nothing else or more than the direct spiritual perception of Brahmā is required to attain *Mokṣa.*

Indeed, it would not be wrong to say that in Advaita, *Mokṣa* means immediate knowledge of Brahmā. When the direct spiritual insight that the self and Brahmā are identical, the world is seen to be unreal and the Brahmā

Still, so far as Jivanmuktas are concerned, activity is allowed. It follows that activity, as such is not inconsistent with the truth of non-dualism ... There is not an essential antagonism between action and freedom". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), pp.630, 643-644

[87] "This whole discussion is permeated by ambiguous usage of the word *Karmā.* If *Karmā* means activity undertaken by an individual for the fulfilment of this or that private end, it is inconsistent with spiritual insight. Impersonal action, on the other hand, undertaken by an individual after gaining insight for the sake of general ends, does not bind the doer, does not commit him to the life of *Saṁsāra. Karmā,* in the former sense, cannot coexist with spiritual insight. If *Jñāna* and *Karmā* are opposed as light and darkness it is *Karmā* in the sense of selfish activity and *Jñāna* in the sense of unselfish wisdom. According to Śaṅkara what the released soul does is not to be called *Karmā.* The activity of the liberated soul for world solidarity (Lokasaṁgraha) is not *Karmā* strictly speaking". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.630

When and to whomsoever the notion of the personal ego conveyed by "Aham, I and the notion of personal possession conveyed by 'mine' cease to be real, then he is the knower of *Ātmā*'. S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.625

alone to be real, just as in rope-snake illusion, when one comes to know that the object before him is a rope, the snake is known to be illusory or unreal. If so, says Madhva, it is impossible for *Jīvanmukti* state to exist between *Saṁsāra* and *Mokṣa*. For, just as darkness disappears as soon as light comes, so also the *Avidyā*, the ignorance and with it, its effect all *Karmā* including *Prārabdhakarmā* and suffering must disappear as soon as the intuitive direct knowledge of Brahmā occurs.

Further, as soon as the suffering disappears, *Mokṣa*, the state of pure bliss must be attained. There cannot be a gap between bondage i.e., the state of *Jīvanmukti* and intuitive knowledge of Brahmā or *Mokṣa*. If there is a gap between them, then, for the attainment of *Mokṣa*, direct spiritual knowledge of Brahmā only cannot be held to be sufficient. Hence, the Advaitic view that it alone is required, would be wrong. Thus, the Advaitin cannot consistently accept the concept of *Jīvanmukti*, and immediate knowledge of the Brahmā alone is sufficient for *Mokṣa*.[88]

The concept of *Jīvanmukti* is accepted in Madhva's doctrine, and it is in harmony with his view of *Mokṣa*. Madhva holds that *Sākṣātkāra*, the direct intuitive knowledge of God, is necessary for attaining *Mokṣa*. However, it is not by itself sufficient, for other factors are also necessary for *Mokṣa*. He holds that *Sākṣātkāra*, which is the result of constant meditation on God by a righteous person of noble character and pure heart, leads to unshakeable, or firm, deep and pure devotion to God.

This in its turn, leads to God's grace i.e., God becomes pleased with the devotee and the God moved by mercy, grants *Mokṣa* to his devotee. But even after getting *Mokṣa*, the devotee may continue to live till the complete exhaustion of his *Prārabdhakarmā* i.e., the *Karmā*, which has begun to yield its fruit. This life of the Mukta devotee during the period, which may be of short or long duration between attainment of *Mokṣa* and ending (exhaustion) of the *Prārabdhakarmā*, is called *Jīvanmukti*.

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[88] Śrimadanuvyākhyāna, Sarvamūlagrantha publication, p.32

Chapter III – Madhva's Theory of Relativity

General Characteristics of Madhva's Doctrine

When one leaves the unfamiliar, strange and perplexing area of Advaita and enters into the familiar, clear, and profound area of Dvaita, which is another most important and well developed system of Vedānta, it is a feeling of elation. Madhva was rightly endowed with the title of Ānandatīrtha, which means, he whose *Śāstra* or doctrine gives joy. This was said by his preceptor who was an Advaitin, but who under the brilliant influence of Madhva was inclined to accept Dvaita philosophy.

The nine important principles of the philosophy of Madhva are succinctly stated by one of his illustrious followers. They are: a) Lord Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa is the only supreme and independent God. He is ultimately real and absolutely independent. All else is dependent on Him. It is because Madhva divides the reals into two fundamental categories; i) independent ii) dependent – that his system is called Dvaita or Dualism. b) The world containing embodied souls and objects of various kinds is real, it is dependent on God Viṣṇu. c) Difference is basic essential and eternal. The world consists of five kinds of eternal differences, which are the basis of its multiplicity and variety. d) The selves are eternal and dependent on the supreme God. e) There are natural internal gradations among the selves; some selves by their very nature are higher than other selves. The gradations among the selves are based on i) the scripturally determined number of auspicious qualities possessed by them ii) the level of their achievement of fitness to reach *Mokṣa*, the final goal of life in short, on the very nature of the selves. f) *Mokṣa* is pure bliss resulting from the realization of the true nature of one's self. g) The means to salvation is firm absolute pure devotion to God, based on the intuitive direct knowledge of the majesty of the supreme lord. h) Perception, inference and verbal testimony are the only means of knowledge. i) The only true or good scriptures are those which reveal the supremacy of lord Viṣṇu. They sing or affirm his glory, thus making his greatness known to the

deserving selves and thereby enabling them to attain *Mokṣa*, the salvation by the grace of merciful lord Viṣṇu.

Among these, the principle of the supremacy and independence of lord Viṣṇu is, according to Madhva, the most important. Madhva is never tired of highlighting the glory of the supreme, God Viṣṇu.

His system of philosophy is a harmonious blend of his metaphysical theistic or religious and moral views. It is a theory of realities. Among them, especially of the supreme lord Viṣṇu, the real of the reals, of fundamental values and of the way of life based on the intuitive wisdom of the great sages and also, which requires to be emphasized, on his own original findings and clear thinking. It is not dogmatic though it pays due respect to the past, and it is not revolutionary though it is rational, original and critical. His view aims at the proper satisfaction of all aspects of human personality – intellectual, religious, social and ethical. The modern western common belief that "it is the business of the philosopher to tell men how they ought to live ... is based on a fallacy[1]", would have been quite unacceptable to Madhva, who held that it was exactly the business of the philosopher to tell men how they ought to live.

The fact is that Madhva is a metaphysician (a philosopher) and also a preceptor of the highest rank. He is respected as the head pontiff of Vaiṣṇavism, an important branch of Hinduism. Madhva's view implies that some persons are better than others in dealing with ethico-religious matters or in prescribing a way of life. Hence, they are morally or spiritually fit to advise others, that the old practice of giving moral advice to others is not based on a mistake.

It is said that "the philosophy of Madhva is the religion of a prophet who interprets the mind of the lord to his followers, that it is a sectarian theology."[2] This is a very inaccurate and biased estimate of Madhva's view.

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[1] A J Ayer, Philosophy in the 20th Century, p.15

[2] P N Rao, Introduction to Vedanta, pp.147-148

For, Madhva's philosophy is first and foremost a theory of reality; that is, it is metaphysics of high order consisting of detailed account of his ontology and epistemology. He most appropriately called it *Tatvavāda*. Tatva means the real and Vāda means a theory or doctrine. Thus, it is the doctrine of reality.

Other names such as dualism and pluralism suggested by the modern scholars are, in one or other respect, inappropriate for it. If dualism is taken to mean a theory holding that there are two independent realities and pluralism means that there are many independent realities, then Madhva's view is neither dualism nor pluralism; for Madhva holds that there is only one independent reality – God – and all other realities are dependent on Him. Further, one of the names of lord Viṣṇu is Tatvam.[3] As the supreme God Viṣṇu is the centre, the core of Madhva's doctrine, the name Tatvavāda is quite appropriate for it.

As a theory of reality, his philosophy is put forward for consideration not only by his followers or by a certain sect, but by all thinkers. Its metaphysics is as good as, nay, as we shall see, far better than that of any other school of Indian philosophy. The moral and religious way of life taught in it is based on the profound consideration of the scriptural concepts of self, world, God, *Mokṣa*, *Karmā* etc.

The mere fact that Madhva's thesis of the personal God Viṣṇu being the supreme reality on whom all else depends, does not rob it off its deep and universal metaphysical significance and transform it into sectarian theology. It is true that Madhva was a great religious leader and social reformer. His contributions to these fields are very valuable. His ideas on religious and social matters are open for critical evaluation and since they are rational, they are acceptable to all.

Madhva's Conception and Classification of Tatvas, the Realities

Madhva has given two classifications of the real entities, which differ in

[3] In Viṣṇusahasranāmastotram lord Viṣṇu is called *Tatvam*.

some details but which agree in the general characteristics of 'being' given from the metaphysical and theistic or spiritual points of view.

In one work, the real is defined as that which is not superimposed.[4] This is a negative definition of the real. It states what the real is not; that the real is non-superimposed. Since the term 'superimposed' is used to mean illusory or unreal, this definition states that the real is not illusory or unreal. This is logically true for its denial would be self-contradictory.

According to Madhva, the factors in all illusions are a) basis b) that which is superimposed on the basis and c) the similarity between a) and b). There is also a role of unfavourable conditions of perception, which may be physical or mental – such as defective sense organ, insufficient light and or distance between percipient and an object, anxiety or anticipation to perceive something. E.g., when a rope is perceived as a snake, there is a rope that is the basis and on it is superimposed a snake which is illusory. The reason for its imposition on rope is the similarity between the rope and the snake in some respects. When we perceive a rope under unfavourable conditions, the similarity between it and a snake leads us to wrongly perceive it as a snake. The rope appears as something other than itself i.e., as a snake. The existent rope appears as a non-existent snake. This happens in all illusions; *Adhiṣṭāna*, the basis is perceived as something other than itself, the existent is perceived as some non-existent object. In shell, silver illusion, non-existing silver appears as existing or existing shell appears as non-existing silver. An illusion conceals the nature of the real by showing it as something other than itself.[5]

Some thinkers hold that though the objects, which appear in illusions and dreams do not exist in places and times in which they appear to exist, yet they do exist in some other places and times. Madhva denies this.

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[4] *anāropitam tatvaṁ - pramitiviṣayam*. Tatvasaṅkhyāna of Daśaprakaraṇa, p.15

[5] Illusion consists in an unreal or a non-existent object or relation being presented in immediate perception as real and of really existing object or relation as not existing. B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.191

He holds that such illusory objects are not relatively, but absolutely non-existents; that they do not exist in any place and time. The very significance of describing them as illusory is that they do not exist at all. It is true that snakes and silver exist in the world, and that we do perceive them as snakes and silver. They are, on most occasions, the objects of our veridical perceptions; they are perceived as they really are. When our perceptions of them are veridical or true, they are not at all described as illusory, they are said to be real. However, those perceived in dreams, hallucinations and illusions are illusory; in the sense that they do not exist at all. Also, they cannot be said to have a lower degree of reality as compared with actually existing objects or that are given in our veridical perceptions, which are said to have more reality.

According to Madhva, the talk of more or less reallty is absurd. An object is either real (true) or unreal (false). These are the only two possible exclusive alternatives. It cannot be more or less real. Thus, Madhva denies the Advaitic conception of degrees of reality. Further, he also rejects the Advaitic distinction between reality and existence. We have seen that the Advaitin distinguishes between the real and the existent.

He says that the existent object is spatio-temporal, temporary, finite, changing, an object of perception or knowledge; while the real is transcendent, eternal, infinite and permanent, and it can never be an object of perception or knowledge. He also says that to think of the real as an object of knowledge is to deprive it of its reality and to reduce it to the status of the appearance, that the real is studied by metaphysics while the existent, by physics.

Madhva does not accept this distinction. For him, the real is the existent and the existent is the real. In one of their most important senses of these terms that is relevant here, reality and existence mutually imply one another. The proposition 'X is real', where X stands for a physical object or a person,

implies that 'X exists', and 'X exists' implies that 'X is real'. It follows that it is senseless to hold 'For the real. it is impossible to exist'.[6]

According to Madhva, for the real, it is necessary to exist, the distinction between the real and the existent, like another Advaitic distinction between degrees of reality (truth), is quite arbitrary. Rejecting the Advaitic narrow sense of the real; Madhva holds that the real can be independent or dependent, eternal or temporal, transcendent or spatio-temporal, permanent or changeable, perceptible or intelligible, infinite or finite, conscious or unconscious.

He recognizes this wonderful variety among the reals. It follows that the world consisting of objects existing in space and or time and subject to various sorts of change is real. Thus, we realize the great importance of Madhva's conception of the real as showing that the world is real. It is sufficient to overthrow Advaitic absolutism.

In another work, the real is defined as the object of correct or veridical cognition.[7] This is an affirmative definition of the real and is intimately connected with the first definition of the real as something non-superimposed. Our cognition is non-veridical or false when we cognize an object as something other than itself, it is correct or true when we cognize an object as it really is.

If we perceive a book as a book, our perception is valid or true, but if we perceive a book as, say, a small box, our perception is incorrect or false. Since, the object of false cognition is not real, the object of true cognition must be real. Besides existence, consciousness and activity are recognized

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[6] "Is wrong in thinking that the distinction between reality and existence pervades all philosophical thinking eastern and western, for in many philosophical systems (e.g., Jainism, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems etc.) this distinction is not made". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.527

[7] Tatvam Prameyam. Tatvaviveka of Daśaprakaraṇa

as other aspects of the reality.[8] Whatever is conscious or active is real, but the converse of this is not true. We cannot say that whatever is real is conscious or active; for, Madhva holds that there are unconscious, or inactive reals, e.g., material objects are unconscious and inactive, but they are real.

This helps Madhva to maintain that the world, selves and God are real. Some thinkers held that the perceptible i.e., the world alone is real; other thinkers, that the world is unreal; that the absolute, which is identical with self, and which transcended the world is the only reality. But Madhva holds that the world, selves, and God are real.

There is also the pragmatic aspect of the real. According to Madhva, the real is useful in practical life. The other characteristics of the real such as being objective, in the sense of capability of existing when not perceived by us; being public, in the sense of capability of being perceived by many persons at the same or different times and places, etc. In short, those characteristics, which distinguish the real from the subjective, private transitory illusory ones, are acceptable to the Dvaitins.

In 'Tatvasaṅkhyāna', the reals are first divided into two types; a) independent and b) dependent. The supreme God Viṣṇu alone is *Svatantra*, the independent; while all other reals are in the dependent category, they are dependent upon the highest God for their existence and nature. lord Viṣṇu is generis in being the only independent real. He is the highest, the greatest the supreme sovereign, the inner ruler of everything. Everything in the universe is what it is and does what it does because of its dependence on him. He is the *raison d'etre*, the sufficient and necessary ground, the ultimate explanation of everything. Everything that exists and happens depends on him, in the sense that if he did not exist, there would not exist anything, but he can exist even when there does not exist anything. Indeed, during the period of *Mahāpralaya*, the total destruction, he exists alone with

[8] "Reality in the ordinary sense of the term may consist in one or more of the three aspects of existence, consciousness and activity". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.51

his consort Lakṣmī; but nothing else exists. He being the ground of all reals, eternal as well as the temporary reals is described as the real of reals and the eternal of eternals.

Every classification is done with a certain purpose. The purpose of Madhva's division of reals is metaphysical and spiritual. It is intended to make us fully and clearly aware of the truth that a) there is only one independent supreme God on whom we and the rest of the entire universe are dependent and that b) the only way of attaining *Mokṣa*, is to devote and dedicate ourselves entirely to the service of the supreme God. Its aim is to give us the knowledge of the glory of God and our utter dependence on him, and to tell us how we ought to live to realize *Mokṣa* by his grace. From this point of view, this is the best division of the reals.

There are many other classifications of real entities in Indian thought. In one classification, the reals are divided into substance attributes; relations, activity, generality, particularity, inherence. In other classifications, the reals are divided into conscious, unconscious or into finite, infinite. In such divisions, the uniqueness and the glory of God are not emphatically brought out.

Thus, according to the first division, God belongs to the class of substances, but he alone does not come under that category. For, that class includes substances other than God. He is one among them. Similarly, the class of conscious or of infinite beings will contain God and other conscious or infinite beings. But, in Madhva's independent and dependent division, God Viṣṇu is not one independent real among other independent reals, for there are no independent beings other than the supreme God. God alone is independent; the attribute of being independent belongs primarily properly and exclusively to God Viṣṇu.

There are other attributes, which characterize God alone; they will be considered later. What is important to note here is that Madhva stresses the uniqueness and greatness of God because according to him, the true, pure and everlasting devotion to God depends upon our knowledge

of his boundless glory and of our dependence on him. This division is highly conducive to generate deep and firm devotion to the supreme lord Viṣṇu.

The dependent category is further divided into a) positive (existent) and b) negative (non-existent). That which is immediately perceived or known by us as 'is' is positive, while that of which we are immediately aware of as 'is not' is negative.[9] Three kinds of negation are recognized, a) antecedent negation, this is non-existence or absence of a thing before it is produced, e.g., non-existence of this table (or any other thing) before it was produced.

This kind of negation has no beginning, but has an end. When a thing comes into being, we cannot say that 'it is not', we have to say 'it is'. In such cases, we say that 'it was not, but now it is'. b) subsequent negation, it is absence of an object resulting after its destruction. It has a beginning, but no end. It is a case in which we say, "it was, but now it is not". c) Absolute negation, it is non-existence at all places and times. It has neither a beginning nor an end, e.g., a lotus in the sky, a square circle. These cannot exist at any time and place.

Some thinkers have mentioned another kind of negation called Anyonyābhāva, the mutual negation, e.g., 'table is not a chair' implies that 'chair is not a table,' i.e., non-existence of the table as a chair and non-existence of the chair as a table. But, according to Madhva it is not negation, but it is difference; and since difference is the essential nature of every entity, it is not negative, but something positive, e.g., 'table is different from chair' implies 'chair is different from a table'. Thus, the concept of difference which, as we shall see, plays an important role in Madhva's philosophy, is sufficient to deal with such cases. So, the concept of mutual negation is not required.

The object, the existence of which is denied or which is said to be absent is called *Pratiyogī*, the counter correlate, e.g., 'Rāma is not in the class',

[9] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), p.3

'there cannot be a lotus in the sky.' Here, 'Rāma' and 'a lotus in the sky' are counter correlates.

Some thinkers have objected to the conception of absolute negation, by saying that a lotus in the sky, 'hare's horn' etc., cannot be counter correlates, for anything that is a counter correlate must have the property of 'counter correlateness' (just as anything that is red must have the property of redness) and to have it, they say, it must exist. Since a hare's horn, a flower in the sky can never exist, they cannot be counter correlates.

The Dvaitin's answer to this objection is that a) these objectors accept the conceptions of antecedent and subsequent negations to which the same objection applies. E.g., this pen did not exist before it was made and it will not exist when it is destroyed; but even when it does not exist, it is regarded as the counter correlate.

So, the actual existence of an object does not exist for it to be regarded as a counter correlate. b) The objectors are mistaken in thinking that being a counter correlate is a property that requires some existent object to characterize. To say that X is a counter correlate is not to say that, the existent X is characterized by the quality of counter correlateness. It is an idea or a description, which may or may not have application or denotation.

This account of negation is not unimportant or trivial. It calls attention to the fact that the non-existence or absence of an object is as important or is as real as its existence or presence.

The absence of say, an elephant here, is as much a fact as the presence of the table here. Just as the existence of a table here makes the proposition, 'there is a table here', true, so also the non-existence of an elephant here makes the proposition. 'There is no elephant here' true. The correspondence theory of truth held by the realists in one form or another requires the recognition of presence or absence of objects or events (or of positive or negative facts) in the world. There is no need to try to eliminate 'not', but there is need for more detailed description of its uses in different contexts.

The positive category is divided into the two classes of the conscious and the unconscious. Only the conscious beings can be aware of moral and spiritual values, and the further division of the conscious beings shows Madhva's concern with *Mokṣa* and its opposite bondage. The conscious beings are divided into; a) those who are ever free from pain and b) those who are affected by pain at some time or the other. Goddess Ramā or Lakṣmī, the consort of the supreme lord Viṣṇu, alone is never affected by pain, which means that she is never bound. She is described as *Nityamuktā*, the one who is always free from bondage or pain.

Śrī Viṣṇu is independent, conscious and ever free from pain, while Rama is dependent, conscious and ever free from pain. Of course there are other important similarities and distinctions between them which will come to light later. She is unique among the dependent conscious beings in that no other dependent conscious being is ever free from pain, and no other such being exists at the time of the *Mahāpralaya*, but Ramā exists then with lord Viṣṇu. All others, Brahmā, Vāyu etc., are affected by pain at some time or the other, or always. Ramādevī presides over the entire material universe and exercises control over other sentient beings and natural happenings, under the guidance of the lord Viṣṇu.

Among conscious dependent beings affected by pain, there are two kinds; a) those who have become free from misery. These are liberated souls. Some among the gods, goddesses, sages, ancesteral divine beings, kings and best human beings are liberated; b) those who are still affected by sorrow or are in bondage. Among these there are two kinds; i) those who are fit for liberation and ii) those who are unfit for liberation. Among those who deserve liberation are some other gods and goddesses, sages, ancesteral divine beings, kings and best humans. The class of those who are unfit for liberation includes those who deserve hell, e.g., demons, monsters, ghosts and bad humans. Some of these are already suffering in hell, and others will go to hell. Once they enter into hell, they cannot escape from it. They are eternally condemned to suffer in hell.

The sub-class of *Nityasaṁsāris* comes under those who are unfit

for liberation. These are conscious dependent selves who are forever in *Saṁsāra*, the bondage, who are born and who die again and again who experience more or less pleasure or pain, happiness or sorrow that are the results of their good or bad deeds.

Madhva does not hesitate to accept the concept of eternal damnation. He is prepared to accept all the consequences, good or bad, favourable or unfavourable, sweet or bitter that follow from the fundamental principles of his system. His doctrine of eternal damnation is a consequence of his view that selves are, by their nature, immutable and different from one another. He holds that the Advaitic view that all selves are essentially and basically Brahmā, the divine ignores the differences among the selves. It is completely baseless. Madhva's view is severely criticized. This will be considered later.

The unconscious dependent reals are divided into three classes: a) eternal b) non-eternal and c) eternal non-eternal. The Vedas, the fifty-one alphabetical *Varṇas*, and *Avyākṛtākāśa*, the uncreated space, belong to the eternal category.

The Vedas are always known to the lord Viṣṇu; they exist in his mind, and he is eternal. At the beginning of the creation of the world, God repeats them in the same way or order; the *Vaidikavarṇas*, their arrangement and *Svaras* are never changed. Vedas are eternal in the sense that they always remain the same in these respects. The Vedas are also described as *Apauruṣeya*, the impersonal in the sense that they are not the works of any person, human or divine. The interesting arguments in support of and against this view and the view that *Varṇas* are eternal will be considered later while dealing with Madhva's epistemology.

Though space and time are brought under different categories (space under eternal and time under eternal non-eternal), the following points are applicable to both (both space and time are real entities). Two kinds of space, *Avyākṛtākāśa*, the immutable space and *Bhūtākāśa*, the mutable space and two aspects of time, its eternal flow and its changing elements

are recognized. Some thinkers say that to say that space and time are real, is to say that most propositions stating spatial relations between objects, e.g., "the moon is closer to earth than the sun," "this book is on the table," "America is to the west of India," "London is in England," etc.; and propositions stating temporal relations, "the train reaches that place earlier (or later) than the bus," "he distributed prizes after (or before) making his speech," "he ran a mile in four minutes," etc., are found to be true.

According to Madhva, space and time are real not only in this sense, but also in the basic ontological sense of having a separate existence from things and events that occupy them. He accepts the absolute theory of space and time. The space and time provide room for the existence of things and for the occurrence of events in them. They are huge containers or vast receptacles of things and events, and they exist even when they are empty, just as an empty box exists.

Einstein's theory of relativity has led to a great amount of discussion about the nature of space and time. A brief digression about the views of western thinkers regarding the nature of space and time seems to be in place here.

The absolute theory of space and time was once accepted by the western thinkers on the following grounds: a) Our ordinary ways of speaking and thinking about space and time suggest that they are very large receptacles. We do say that objects and events exist or occur in space and time. b) This theory was accepted by Newton. The conceptions of absolute space and time were thought to be required for the adequate statement of laws of motion. But there were also many difficulties in accepting the absolute theory of space and time. Since the absolute space and time cannot be perceived by ordinary senses, the empiricists denied their existence.

Many rationalists too thought that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conceive absolute space and time; and that the ordinary way of thinking and speaking about them suggesting that they are vast receptacles of things and events is only a metaphorical way of thinking and

speaking about them. This has misled some philosophers into accepting the absolute theory of space and time. These rationalists have held that space and time are relative to the things and events. According to this relative theory of space and time, which is different from Einstein's Theory of Relativity, space and time are nothing more than sets of spatial and temporal characteristics and relations among things and events. So, if there were not things and events for the relations to hold, there would not or could not be absolute or empty space and time.[10]

"Moreover, space and time cannot be thought of as absolutes existing independent of the objects that appear within them. On the contrary, space is merely the arrangement of things that co-exist, and time, the arrangement of those that succeed one another."

As a result of modifications introduced by Einstein, the absolute theory of space and time has lost whatever little scientific support it had in Newton's theory. Einstein rejected the conceptions of absolute space and time.[11]

Madhva's reply to these objections would be, a) though absolute space and time are super-sensuous, they are not unknowable because they are intuited by *Sākṣī*, the means of absolutely certain knowledge.[12] b) According

[10] W K Wright, A History of Modern Philosophy, p.119
Ewing says "It is best then to regard space and time as simply ways of looking at the spatial and temporal properties and relations of things and events, not as some weird kind of entities over and above the things and events." A C Ewing, The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, p.144

[11] "Along with absolute space, Einstein discarded the concept of absolute time of a steady unvarying inexorable universal time flow, streaming from the infinite past to the infinite future." p.45,
"And just as space is simply a possible order of material objects, so time is simply a possible order of events." Universe and Dr Einstein, p.46

[12] *Sākṣī*, which is really the self-functioning as the means of intuitive knowledge, is said to intuit all super sensible objects, space, time, *Dharma*, the right, *Adharma*, the wrong, good, bad etc. The intuitive awareness of absolute bare time by *Sākṣī* is established on the basis of the awareness of duration in *Suṣupti*, the dreamless sleep. It is generally accepted in Indian thought that in waking experience self, *Manas* and external sense organs function; in dream

to Madhva, the conception of *Mahāpraḷaya* implies the conceptions of absolute space and time. Indian thinkers believe that creation and total destruction occur in cyclic order that creation is followed by destruction and destruction by creation, and so on.

Science seems to lend support to the conception of total destruction of the universe only. Some scientists predict, on the basis of the present level of scientific knowledge, that the universe is tending towards utter destruction after billions of years; and that there is no evidence in support of the creation of the universe.[13] c) Space and time given in our experience are different from their scientific conceptions, just as the ordinary conception of matter is different from its scientific conception. There is no reason to believe that these scientific conceptions are permanent.

Science, by its very nature is always changing or developing system, and hence its present conceptions and theories are likely to change. This does not mean that philosophers should not take them into account. What it suggests is that the conceptual changes in science occur in the context of scientific theories based on empirical evidence, mathematical deductions and equations. So, to understand them properly, this entire vast theoretical context has to be taken into account and that while applying scientific theories to objects given in experience great care has to be taken to avoid misunderstanding their role.

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external sense organs do not function but the self and the *Manas* do, while in dreamless sleep only the self-functions; the *Manas* and the senses do not function. After waking from dreamless sleep we do say many times that "I slept soundly for two or three hours" which shows, it is argued, that self was conscious of bare duration of time. B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.115

[13] All the phenomena of nature, visible and invisible, within the atom and in outer space, indicate that the substance and energy of the universe are inexorably diffusing like vapour through insatiable void. The Sun is slowly but surely burning out, the stars are dying embers and everywhere in the cosmos the heat is turning to cold, matter is dissolving into radiation and energy is being dissipated into empty space. The universe is thus progressing towards an ultimate 'heat-death' when the universe reaches this state some billions of years from now all the processes of nature will cease. There will be no light, no life, no warmth – nothing but perpetual and irrevocable stagnation. The Universe and Dr Einstein, pp.106-107

Many paradoxical statements in philosophy are the results of misunderstanding of their significance. d) Madhva holds that space and time are infinite. For, to think of them as having boundaries is to think of them as having more and more space and time outside their boundaries i.e., it is to think of them as extending infinitely beyond their bounds. They are infinitely divisible, in the sense that there is always a possibility of further dividing aduration of time and an extension of space, whether very small or big, into their smaller and smaller parts.

The absolute space and time are eternal and uncreated. They cannot be thought of as created; for, if they were created, a) they must be non-existent before they were created and b) there must be some stuff out of which they were created. It is not possible to think of both these conditions, i.e., non-existence of space and time, and their subsequent creation out of some material. They must be uncreated and eternal.[14]

However, there arises a difficulty here. According to Vedānta, everything in the universe is created by Brahmā, the God. Madhva accepts this Vedāntic axiom that God is omniscient. It follows that everything including space, time and other eternal substances are created by God. Thus, there appears to be an opposition between logic or reasoning and scripture between the conclusion based on logical reasoning that space and time must be uncreated, and the Vedāntic assertion that everything is created by God. According to Madhva whatever is stated in the scriptures is absolutely true; and the statement that space and time are uncreated is also true. He reconciles them by giving a peculiar meaning to the term, 'creation' and by recognizing created space and time.

The term, 'creation' literally means non-existent thing coming into existence – a production of something out of some material. Since space

[14] Herbert Spencer's similar argument in support of the view that absolute space is uncreated "If space is created it must have been previously non-existent. But non-existence of space cannot, however, be imagined by mental effort. If the non-existence of space is absolutely inconceivable, then necessarily its creation is inconceivable". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi). p.114

and time are never non-existent, and since there is no stuff out of which they can be said to be created, they cannot be said to be created in this sense. According to Madhva they are created in the sense that they are essentially dependent on God for their existence, nature and for any change in their traits. He can, if he so desires, destroy them (and other eternals) and create them again, but he does not desire to do so. Thus, they are 'created' in the non-literal sense of 'creation' signifying their utter dependence on supreme God. Their dependence on God is real creation is a real and not an apparent process. This kind of creation is called *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti.*[15]

Creation involves change. Madhva recognizes two sorts of changes; a) small (partial) change and b) (total) great change. In partial change, the original nature (essence or composition) of a thing remains the same while some of its qualities, relations, activities or utilities etc., are changed. E.g., when a raw mango becomes ripe, its green colour changes into yellow, its sour taste into sweet taste etc. A dirty cloth when washed, becomes clean and bright. Even after such changes, the things – mango, cloth – remain the same and are called by the same names. In total change, the composition, form, qualities and utilities of an object are changed to such an extent that the object ceases to be regarded as the same object.

Hence, ceases to be called by the same name; it is regarded as a new

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[15] As a Vedāntin believing in the *Brahmakāraṇatvavāda* of entire universe, Madhva seeks to reconcile the essential uncreated nature of space (and other, exhypothesi, eternal reals) with the Vedāntic axiom that everything in the universe is, in some sense, created. B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.114

This new doctrine of creation is intended by Madhva to reconcile the existence of certain *Nityapadārtha's* with the all creatorship of God." B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.232

Speaking of creation of eternal substances is paradoxical, "Paradoxically enough, Madhva admits the creation of eternal substance also in a Pickwickian sense of *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti.*" "... Real creation, in his (Madhva's) view means such an eternal dependence of the world of matter and souls on God, as would involve their non-existence in the event of God's will to that effect. His will is the essential condition and sustaining principle that invests them with their reality and without which they would be but void names and bare possibilities. B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.67

object and a new name is given to it. This is the case of formerly non-existent thing coming into existence as a new object; e.g., cotton changing into a piece of cloth. Cotton remains in the cloth, but the latter is not called cotton because the cotton, in becoming a cloth, has changed in its form, composition, quality and utility to a very great extent. So, it is not regarded as cotton and not called cotton. A piece of cloth is said to be the new object made out of cotton.

Similarly, a lump of clay, in making a pot, undergoes so much change in its composition, form, quality and utility, that the pot is regarded as a new object and not as clay though clay is present in it. It is this kind of total change in which the non-existent thing comes into existence that is ordinarily regarded as creation or production. The new objects are non-eternal. We have seen that space and time cannot be said to be created in this way.

According to Madhva, space and time (and other eternals) are subject to a particular kind of creation (change) which, though partial, is yet different from the total and even from the partial change found in non-eternal objects like mango or clay. Hence, Madhva has given a new name, *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti* to the creation that occurs in eternal objects. *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti* means the occurrence of a new (non-essential and mutable) characteristic in an eternal substance according to (or depending on) the will of the other (God).[16] An eternal substance while remaining the same in respect of its substance (or essence composition or structure), yet comes to have a change in its trait as willed by God. God determines what sort of change or new characteristic should occur in what kind of eternal substance.

It should be noted that the existence, essence, properties, relations, changes of everything – eternal and non-eternal, depend upon the will of God. He can destroy and create a new 'anything' and 'everything' if he wills. Hence, God is not forced to take into account; He does not depend on

[16] *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti* means the acquiring of a new trait or complexion that depends on the will of another God. B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.227

the nature of an object while willing to bring about a change in its essence or traits. He is completely independent of everything, while everything else is essentially dependent on him for its existence, nature, attributes, relations and activities.

In short, space, time and other eternal reals are uncreated in the sense of creation. This means coming into existence of something, which did not exist, *abhūtvā bhavanam*, the production of something new out of some stuff; but they are created in the sense that they acquire a new trait depending on the will of God. Some traits acquired by the eternals according to God's will are:

Eternal	**New trait**
Conscious *Prakṛti* or Lakṣmī	Desiring to set creation in motion.
Uncreated space	Coming into contact with tangible entities.
Prakṛti, the un-manifest primordial matter	Evolving in the form of *Mahat* and other reals.
Time	Birth of time – instants in the series.
Mahadādi	Occurrence of expansion and contraction of parts.
Souls	Acquisition of body and senses.
Vedas	Manifestation of the power to connote the sense of words, having an unalterable and definite order or arrangement.

The new traits acquired by the eternals are not essential, coeval and permanent traits; they are changing and do not in any way modify the substratum or essence of such reals. This being so, even after the acquisition of the new trait, the eternal real remains the same, and is called by the same name; e.g., space continues to be called space, time as time and self continues to be called self. The conception of *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti* is an

ingenious original adhoc conception, the application of which is restricted to a) eternal reals and b) their *Viśeṣas*, the changing uncoeval (inessential) characteristics only. Such characteristics appear in and disappear from non-eternal objects, and their appearance and disappearance depends on God.

But it is not *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*, for there is no problem about the production or destruction of non-eternal reals. The problem is about the creation of eternal reals. The problem is, is it consistent to say about the same substance that it is eternal and also created; if so, in what sense? According to Madhva, an eternal dependent substance can be consistently said to be created in the sense of *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti* in which an inessential mutable trait is acquired by an eternal real whose essence or substance remains the same.

It has been pointed out that this view is implied in Madhva's conception of cause. His analysis of the concept of cause brings out that the concept of cause, which implies change signifies two sorts of change; a) total change in which though the same stuff is present in the cause and effect, yet in the process of production of the effect, it undergoes so much change in its composition or nature that it is for all practical purposes regarded as a new thing and b) partial change in which the substance remains the same in its nature and structure, yet acquires some changing trait. This partial change in a trait in an eternal substance is *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*.[17]

[17] The conception of *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti* gives rise to the difficulty about the relation between the concepts of eternality, independence and permanence. Some say that these concepts go together, that what is eternal must be undetermined and hence independent and also that it must be immutable. They argue, since the eternal has neither beginning nor an end (i.e., since it can neither be produced nor destroyed) it must be undetermined and independent; further, the eternal must be immutable, for the eternal is that which remains the same forever. But Madhva denies both these contentions; he holds that the eternal can be determined and dependent and subject to change. Thus he says space, time, souls, though eternal are yet dependent on and determined by God and that they are subject to a change called *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*. The whole matter requires a great deal of discussion. B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.223

Madhva reconciles the two statements; a) everything is created by God and b) there are eternal substances in another way. He recognizes another kind of space called *Bhūtākāśa* which is a product of matter and which occupies uncreated eternal space; it is non-eternal; it is called ether. Similarly, Madhva points out that time has two aspects; a) eternal b) non-eternal. In its eternal aspect, it is a flow of duration from eternity to eternity; it is called Mahakāla, the great time; it has neither a beginning nor an end.

In its non-eternal aspect, time means our every day time measured in moments, seconds, minutes, hours and so on. These elements of time appear and disappear; hence we have the conceptions of past, present and future. Time, in this aspect, is non-eternal. This helps Madhva to show that the demands of both logic and scripture are satisfied without any contradiction. The Upaniṣadic statement about the actual creation of space, and time are said to refer, not to the creation of *Avyākṛtākāśa* and *Mahakāla*, which are uncreated and eternal, but to *Bhūtākāśa* and non-eternal time which are created.[18] Thus, the concept of *Bhūtākāśa* plays an important role in showing that such Upaniṣadic statements are true without infringing the requirements of reason or logic.

Unfortunately, the conception of ether met with the same fate as the conceptions of absolute time and space. Like those conceptions, the conception of ether was accepted by scientists world over for more than two centuries after Newton, but it was rejected by Einstein.[19] Yet Madhva

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[18] "He explains the references to actual creation of *Ākāśa*, in Upaniṣadic cosmology, as referring only to *Bhūtākāśa* and this is the reason why he has admitted two kinds of *Ākāśa*, in his system" B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi)

[19] "And to eighteenth and nineteenth century physicists, it was obvious that if light consisted of waves, there must be some medium to support them, just as water propagates the waves of the sea and air transmits the vibrations we call sound. Hence when experiments showed light can travel in a vacuum. Scientists evolved the hypothetical substance called "ether" which they decided must pervade all – space and matter. Later on Faraday propounded another kind of ether as the carrier of electric and magnetic forces. When Maxwell finally identified light as an electromagnetic disturbance the case for the ether seemed assured." The Universe and Dr Einstein, p.40

deserves great credit for his daring and original thinking in introducing the concept of ether, which played an important role in science till the last century.

Like time, Purāṇas, the sacred lore of Vedic tradition and *Prakṛti* have two aspects of being eternal and non-eternal, and hence they are also brought under the category of eternal – non-eternal. The Purāṇas are not eternal because at the beginning of every *Kalpa*, the supreme lord teaches or repeats them by changing the sequence of their words and sentences. This change in them is their origin. Since they have origin, they are not eternal. But when once they are repeated or known by God, they always stay in his mind, they are never destroyed. Since they have no end, they are not non-eternal.

Prakṛti has two aspects – subtle and gross. In its subtle form, it is the primordial, unconscious, invisible, unmanifested fine matter. In this subtle aspect, it is eternal but dependent on God. *Prakṛti* evolves into many gross forms like *Mahat* and *Ahaṅkāra*. This transformation of *Prakṛti* into gross forms is regarded as its birth or origin. This evolution also has an end. Its origin and end, depending on the will of God, are its creation and dissolution. In this aspect, *Prakṛti* is non-eternal. Thus, it is of eternal – non-eternal kind.

According to Madhva, the material universe has evolved from the primordial matter called *Prakṛti*. Evolution is the process of actualization of what is potentially present in the original stuff. Thus, in the process of evolution, the material world, which is potentially present in the *Prakṛti* becomes actual.[20] Similarly, what is potentially present in the selves becomes

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The Michelson – Morley experiment confronted Scientists with an embarrassing alternative, on the one hand, they could scrap the ether theory which had explained so many things about electricity, magnetism and light. Or, if they insisted on retaining the ether they had to abandon the still more venerable Copernican theory that the earth is in motion. Ibid 43

"He (Einstein) began by rejecting the ether theory ..." The Universe and Dr Einstein" p.44 Also Russell ABC of Relativity by p.27

[20] *Pariṇāmavāda* implies, "the basic identity and stability of the material stuff in and through the various changes it undergoes in its process of development from a subtle to gross form."

actual. This is in harmony with his theory of causation, according to which the cause and effect are neither completely different nor are they fully identical. The relation between them is *Bhedābheda*, the difference-cum-identity.

Causation implies change, but the effect is not entirely new; change implies something that remains permanent. In material causation, the same matter is present in both cause and effect; e.g., wood, the material cause is present in the chair – a product or effect made out of wood. But the material cause and its effect are not quite identical, for the effect is, in some respect, different in nature or structure, qualities, and uses from its cause for practical purposes, it is a new object bearing a new name. Thus, what is potentially present in the material cause becomes actual in its effect.

Madhva's theory of evolution is called *Pariṇāmavāda*. The process of evolution is very complex. The world evolves only after twenty three evolutes have developed out of the primordial subtle *Prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* consists of three *Guṇas*, the constituents called *Satva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. These are the sources or principles of energy. When these constituents of *Prakṛti* are in equilibrium, the evolution does not take place. But when their equipoise is disturbed, the process of evolution begins.

The *Prakṛti* or the original matter and the *Guṇas* or attributes of *Satva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, the principles or sources of energy, are behind the evolutionary process. When the supreme lord wills to create, Śrī Lakṣmī, who is the presiding deity over *Prakṛti* and hence who is also called *Cetanaprakṛti*, the conscious, in distinction from *Jadaprakṛti*, the unconscious or material, is stimulated. In *Jadaprakṛti*, the original proportion between the *Guṇas* is interrupted or agitated. As a result, one *Guṇa* tries to preponderate over others; and the evolutes consisting of different proportions of *Guṇas* (e.g., in one, *Satva* may be more dominant than *Rajas* and *Tamas*; in another, *Tamas* may be more dominant than the others) begin to develop. Evolution is a process of unfolding or making manifest what is potential or unmanifest in *Prakṛti*.

B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.234

It should be noted that *Prakṛti* is never inactive. Even during the period of *Mahāpralaya*, when there is no evolution, *Prakṛti* is active, giving rise to quite similar constituents; i.e., *Satva* modifying into *Satva*, *Rajas* into *Rajas* and *Tamas* into *Tamas* in the same original proportion. This is the unmanifest state of *Prakṛti* and is called *Avyākta*, the unmanifest. But during the evolutionary process, dissimilar modifications with varying proportions of *Guṇas* are produced. These are manifest forms of *Prakṛti*; and in this state, *Prakṛti* is called *Vyakta*, the manifest. The first evolute of *Prakṛti* is *Mahat*, the great also called *Buddhi*, the intellect, which helps the self to take a decision. This may be *Sātvika*, *Rājasa* or *Tāmasa* depending on the dominance in it of *Satva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* respectively.

Ahaṅkāra evolves from *Mahat*. The *Ahaṅkāra* is of three forms, a) Vaikārika, in which *Satva* predominates b) *Taijasa*, in which there is the dominance of *Rajas* c) *Bhūtādi*, in which *Tamas* is dominant. Helped by Taijasa, the *Vaikārika* produces Indriyas, the sense organs. The senses are usually divided into *Bāhya*, the external and *Āntara*, the internal. *Manas*, the internal sense organ is very important because it controls the external organs, helps us in willing, thinking, remembering etc. Its attachment to worldly objects leads to bondage, while its renunciation of worldly pleasures combined with deep devotion to God leads to *Mokṣa*.

The external senses are divided into two groups; each group consists of five senses that are the means of getting perceptual knowledge – ear, eye, tongue, nose and skin. These two groups are called; a) *Jñānendriyas*,[21] the senses of knowledge and b) *Karmendriyas*, the senses of action.

The *Tanmātrās* are subtle forms and *Bhūtādi*, the gross elements are products of *Tamasāhaṅkāra*. The five *Tanmātras* are; a) *Śabdatanmātrā* b) *Sparśatanmātrā* c) *Rūpatanmātrā* d) *Rasatanmātrā* and e) *Gandhatanmātrā* and *Mahābhūtas*, the five gross great elements that evolve from them are the space *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu* the air, *Agni* the fire, *Jalam* the water and *Pṛthvi*

[21] According to Madhva, *Sākṣī* which intuits super sensuous objects and self is also an Indriya called *Svarupendriya*, the spiritual organ.

the earth respectively. This evolutionary process from *Prakṛti* to earth is called *Samaṣṭiṣṛṣṭi*, the primary or complete evolution. It is complete in the sense that the further modifications do not increase the number of *Tatvas*; they remain twenty-four in number. After this, the secondary evolutionary process called *Vyaṣṭiṣṛṣṭi* begins. In this secondary evolutionary process, the compounds and mixtures consisting of five gross elements in different proportions are produced in the forms of infinite number of ordinary objects, including the bodies of humans, animals and plants.

During the period of dissolution, the involutionary process, in which the effects go on merging into their immediate cause, e.g., material objects merge in gross elements, gross elements in *Tanmātrās*, and so on, takes place in the reverse order of evolution. It begins with the things in the world to go back to *Prakṛti* and ultimately to God; on whose will the processes of evolution and involution depend.

The last non-eternal category is divided into: a) Saṁṣṛṣṭa, the vividly evolved b) *Asaṁṣṛṣṭa*, the vaguely evolved. This division is based on the nature of cause and effect. If the cause and its effect are both non-eternal, then the effect is said to be vividly evolved. The universe and material contents are non-eternal. Their causes like *Mahat* and other causes, which are the transformation of subtle *Prakṛti* have a beginning and an end, hence they are also non-eternal.

The universe and all the material objects in it are vividly evolved non-eternals. The subtle forms of *Mahat* etc., are eternal. When the subtle forms come into contact with material atoms, the gross forms are produced. Their gross forms are non-eternal. Thus, the subtle forms of *Mahat* are eternal while their gross forms are non-eternal. So, they belong to the category of vaguely evolved reals.

Here, there is a scope for objection to the effect that since reals in their subtle forms are eternal and in their gross forms non-eternal, they can very well be brought, not under the category 'non-eternal' as is done like time, but under the category of 'eternal – non-eternal'. The reply given to this objection is that the subtle forms of *Mahat* and others bear no separate

names, but they are collectively treated as *Prakṛti*, which belongs to the category of eternal – non-eternal, and hence as the constituents of *Prakṛti*, they have to be regarded as eternal – non-eternal and their gross products as non-eternal reals.[22]

The spiritual aspect is not lost sight of in these two classifications of reals. The spiritual aspect is emphasized in the end by saying that one or more of the auspicious attributes of God – viz., creation, destruction maintenance, control, ignorance, knowledge, bondage (sorrow) and liberation (joy) etc., in more or less degree, are present in the universe and its contents, thereby showing their derivation from, and their utter dependence, on God.

All these attributes are not found in all objects. Material objects have no knowledge, but selves have. Production and destruction, in their ordinary senses, are not present in eternal reals. The presence or absence of these attributes and the degree in which they are present, depend upon the nature of objects. What is important from the spiritual point of view is that the sincere belief (knowledge) that everything depends on the great and glorious God is a great step towards the achievement of liberation.

The two classifications are mostly similar yet, the following changes are found in the second; a) the real is called Prameya, the object of right knowledge. b) The separate category of eternal – non-eternal under which Purāṇas, time, and *Prakṛti*, are brought is found in the first classification but is absent from the second. The explanation given is that each of these has two forms, one of which is eternal and the other, non-eternal.

Time as a continuous flow of duration is eternal, but as consisting of hours, days, etc., which are its natural parts and which have a beginning and an end, is non-eternal. *Prakṛti* in its subtle form is eternal, but in its gross form consisting of its modifications, is non-eternal Purāṇas as the contents of God's mind which is eternal, are eternal, but as consisting of words and sentences that can change are non-eternal.

[22] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), pp.9-10

These forms can be regarded as non-different or different from their reals. If they are regarded as non-different, then *Prakṛti*, time and Purāṇas will belong to the eternal – non-eternal category and in the first classification they are so regarded. If they are regarded as different, then one of their forms will come under the eternal and the other form, under the non-eternal; so there will be no need for the eternal – non-eternal category.[23]

This also explains that the conception of eternal – non-eternal category does not involve contradiction. If the same form was regarded as both eternal and non-eternal, there would be contradiction. Since this is not done, there is no self-contradiction in eternal – non-eternal category.

c) Another point of difference between the two classifications is that in the first, attributes, actions etc., are not mentioned but in the second classification, the subtle forms of attributes of *Satva*, *Rajas*, *Tamas*, five Mātrās are said to belong to the category of eternal while their gross modifications, to the category of non-eternal. Two reasons are given to explain this difference. a) The second classification starts with the conception of the real as the object of knowledge, which may be called epistemological approach to the real, while the first classification starts with the ontological conception that the real is non-illusory.

Since the attributes, actions etc., can be veridically known, they are taken into account in the second classification. b) Madhva holds that attributes,

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[23] Madhva's reasoning in favour of eternal – non-eternal category resembles that of some philosophers in the last century, e.g., Ramsay pointed out that there were good reasons for holding that general propositions were conjunctions and disjunctions of their atomic propositions and other reasons for saying that they were not. John Wisdom argued that there were good reasons for saying that philosophical statements were verbal and also others for saying that they were non-verbal. In this way they tried to make clear the nature of general propositions and of philosophical statements. Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), pp.20–21

*Similarly disregarding Purāṇas, we may say that Madhva has here tried to bring out the nature of time and *Prakṛti* by rejecting the two exclusive alternative views that everything is eternal and everything is changing from one instant to another and asserting that some reals are eternal – non-eternal.

actions etc., can be regarded as non-different from the objects, which they characterize or they can be regarded as different from their substrata. In the first classification they are thought to be non-different, and hence, are not separately mentioned, but in the second, they are thought to be different from their objects, and so are separately mentioned.

Madhva distinguishes attributes into two kinds; a) *Yāvaddravyabhāvī*, the coeval b) *Ayavaddravabhāvī*, the changing. *Yāvaddravyabhāvī* attributes characterize their objects throughout the period of existence of their objects. In this sense, they are permanent, coeval, inseparable and coessential; e.g., the quality of being hot is coeval with fire and the quality of being cold, with ice. Fire remains hot as long as it burns or exists, and ice is cold as long as it exists. Such qualities are non-different from their substrata. But in practice or linguistic usage, they are distinguished through their *Viśeṣas*. The relation between such attributes and their objects is called *Saviśeṣābheda*.

The second type of attributes undergo change while their objects continue to exist. They do not characterize their substrata as long as the substrata exist. They belong to their objects for some time and then they change. They are replaced by some other qualities, e.g., water becomes hot and after some time, it becomes cold; green mango becomes yellow when it ripens.

Such qualities are transient, separable qualities. The relation between them and their objects is identity-cum-difference. When green colour disappears, the mango continues to exist. So, the mango and its colour are different. But as long as the green colour belongs to the mango, it does not look to be different from the mango. So there is identity between them. Hence, the relation between them is called Bhedābheda, the identity and difference.

The distinction between the attributes is important in understanding Madhva's new theory of creation called *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti*, which explains in what sense the eternal substances like time, space can be said to be created since such reals undergo change in respect of their *Ayāvaddravyabhāvī*

attributes (while remaining the same in respect of their *Yāvaddravyabhāvī* qualities). Madhva holds that the relation of identity-cum-difference exists between a) cause and effect, b) transient qualities and their substrata, c) genus and species or particulars, d) *Viśiṣṭa*, the qualified object which is a whole of attributes and substances and *Śuddha*, the non-qualified pure or bare object; and e) part and whole.

d) In the first classification of materials, non-eternals are divided into Saṁsṛṣṭa, the vividly evolved and *Asaṁsṛṣṭa*, the vaguely evolved; but in the second, this division is not found. The explanation of this difference between the two classifications is given as follows; in the first classification, the evolutes, *Mahat* etc., are brought under the category of vaguely evolved things; and the universe and its contents are regarded as vividly evolved things. *Prakṛti* is a stuff from which *Mahat* evolves. *Prakṛti* is its *Upādāna*, the source, *Mahat* is *Upādeya*, that which evolves from *Prakṛti*. The *Upādāna* and *Upādeya* are non-different.

Therefore, if *Prakṛti* and *Mahat* are regarded as one, then *Mahat* becomes vaguely evolved evolute. Since the *Upādāna* of things in the universe is also non-eternal, they become vividly evolved things. In the first classification, *Upādāna* and *Upādeya* are regarded as the same; hence, there is a division of vaguely evolved and vividly evolved objects in this classification. But in the second classification, *Upādāna* and *Upādeya* are regarded as different and hence *Prakṛti*, the origin of *Mahat*, is regarded as eternal. So, *Mahat* developed from *Prakṛti*, is regarded as non-eternal. According to this, there will be only two categories of reals a) subtle or original and b) the gross things developed from subtle forms and hence there will be no category of non-eternal vaguely evolved things. Hence, the division of objects into vividly evolved and vaguely evolved is not made in the second classification.[24]

The simple explanation seems to be that in the first classification, the chain of evolution from *Prakṛti* is that – eternal subtle *Prakṛti* → non-eternal gross *Mahat* etc., → non-eternal physical objects in the universe.

[24] This is the explanation given in Kannada in Daśaprakaraṇa. (ABMMM, Bengaluru), p.21.

Hence as arising from eternal subtle *Prakṛti*, non-eternal gross *Mahat* etc., become vaguely evolved, and non-eternal material things developing from non-eternal *Mahat* etc., become vividly evolved objects. But in the second classification, the subtle form of *Prakṛti* is brought under eternal and its gross form under non-eternal form. Hence, there is no place for eternal – non-eternal category; and as a result of this, no place for categories of vividly evolved and vaguely evolved.

The second classification of reals is better than the first classification because the second is fully dichotomous whereas the dichotomous character of the first is marred by the introduction of the category of eternal – non-eternal reals. Our thinkers knew the value of the division by dichotomy in which the positive and its corresponding negative classes at each step, being contradictory, are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The objection to the dichotomy, which was once raised to the effect that negative class might be empty, no longer holds because in the modern logic, the null-class plays an essential part in the calculus of classes.

Classification of Tatvas, the realities
Tatvasankhyāna Classification
Tatvam, the reality
Svatantra, the Independent lord Viṣṇu
Asvatantra, the dependent
Bhāva, the existent or positive
Abhāva, the non-existent or negative
Prāgabhāva, the antecedent negation
Pradhvamsābhāva, the subsequent negation
Sadābhāva, the ever-non-existent negation
Cetana, the conscious
Acetana, the unconscious
Nitya, the eternal
Nityānitya, the eternal, non-eternal
Anitya, the non-eternal
Duhkhāspṛṣṭā (Nityāduhkhā), the one who is eternally free from pain – Ramā (Lakṣmī)
Duhkhaspṛṣṭa, the other Jīvas affected by pain
Vedas
Varṇa, the letters
Avyākṛtākāśa, the immutable space
Purāṇas, the sacred lore
Kāla, the time
Prakṛti, the nature
Vimuktas, those free from bondage or pain
Duhkhasamstha, those are susceptible to suffering or bound
Asamsṛṣṭam, the vaguely evolved
Samsṛṣṭa, the vividly evolved
Devatā, the deities
Ṛṣis, the sages
Pitṛ, the ancestral divine beings
Cakravartis, the kings
Martyas, the good humans
Muktiyogya, those fit for liberation
Muktyayogya, those unfit for liberation
Mahat
Ahankāra
Buddhi
Manas
The five Tanmātrās
Pañcabhūta, the five elements
The ten sense and motor (active) organs
Tamogas, those who deserve hell
Sṛtisamstha, the eternal transmigrators
Universe and its matters
Praptāndhatama, those who are already in hell
Sṛtisamstha, those yet to go to hell
Daitya, the demons
Rākṣasas, the monsters
Piśāca, the ghosts
Martya, the bad humans

Classification of Tatvas, the realities
Tatvaviveka Classification
Prameyam, the object
Svatantra, the Independent lord Visnu
Asvatantra, the dependent
(Dependent on God for their Being, nature)
Bhāva, the positive
Abhāva, the negative
Cetana, the conscious
Acetana, the unconscious
Pūrvābhāva, the antecedent negation
Aparābhāva, the subsequent negation
Sadābhāva, the ever non-existent
Nitymukta, eternally free from pain Ramā (Lakṣmī)
Srtyuk, those are susceptible to suffering or bound
Prakrti, the primordial nature
Satva, Rajas and Tamas, the three Gunas
Mahat and Prāna
Ahankāra
Pañcabhūtas, the five elements and Pañcatanmātrās
The sense and active (motor) organs
Śruti, the Apauruseya Vedas
Kāla, the time and Deśa (Avyākrtākāśa), the space
Nitya, the eternal
These are eternal in their subtle forms and vaguely evolved
Muktas, the liberated souls
Amuktas, those who are non-liberated and still in bondage
Ucca (Muktiyogya), those deserve salvation
Madhya (Nityāvarta), those eternally transmigrate
Nica (Nityatamoyogya), those who deserve eternal hell
Anitya, the
The modifications of these cause creation, sustenance and destruction. Those modified are

Classification of Tatvas, the realities
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Abhāva, the non-existent or negative
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Acetana, the unconscious
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Pradhvaṁsābhāva, the subsequent negation
Sadābhāva, the ever-non-existent negation
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Duḥkhaspṛṣṭa, the other Jīvas affected by pain
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Nityānitya, the eternal, non-eternal
Anitya, the non-eternal
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Buddhi
Manas
The ten sense and motor (active) organs
The five Tanmātrās
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These are eternal in their subtle forms and vaguely evolved
Prakṛti, the primordial nature
Satva, Rajas and Tamas, the three Guṇas
Mahat and Prāṇa
Ahaṅkāra
Pañcabhūtas, the five elements and Pañcatanmātrās
The sense and active (motor) organs
Śruti, the Apauruṣeya Vedas
Kāla, the time and Deśa (Avyākṛtākāśa), the space
Anitya, the
The modifications of these cause creation, sustenance and destruction. Those modified are

Chapter IV – God Viṣṇu

Lord Viṣṇu is accorded the highest and the most important position in the philosophy of Madhva.

Lord Viṣṇu is the prime mover according to whose will everything in the universe exists, acts or moves.

The most significant attribute of God, according to Madhva, is his plenary independence: lord Viṣṇu alone is the independent ultimate reality; all else in the universe depends upon him. He is independent in the sense that his existence consciousness and functions depend upon himself and not upon anything other than himself. He is self-existent, self-sufficient, self-contained and perfect. He is devoid of defects but epitome of virtues. All others reals who depend on the lord have a few or many defects and are deficient in many auspicious qualities.

Lord Viṣṇu is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent and omnific. He is all pervasive in time and place; i.e., he is not limited by space and time. His nature remains the same in all circumstances; i.e., he is immutable and eternal. He is reality, and the source for reality of everything else; all types of reals derive their reality from God. He is infinite consciousness and infinite pure bliss. He cannot be *Nirguṇa*, the attributeless because he has infinite number of attributes and each of these attributes is limitless. If he is described as *Nirguṇa* at the end of one scriptural statement, it only means that he is devoid of *Satva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. These qualities, being the constituents of the primordial matter *Prakṛti*, are material in nature, and being physical, they cannot belong to lord Viṣṇu who is the ultimate spiritual reality. God's creative activity is not limited to the creation of this universe alone.

He cannot have any form of limit as a limit of any kind is a defect. He has the unlimited power of creating and controlling infinite number of universes[1].

[1] *Anantakoṭibrahmāṇḍanāyaka*

The scripture is the evidence in support of the nature and attributes of God. Since, the scriptures clearly state that God, the ultimate reality, has infinite auspicious attributes, God cannot be *Nirguṇa*. There is no scriptural support for the conception of *Nirguṇabrahmā* which is equivalent to the conception of nothingness.

God is transcendent, supersensible, immanent and guiding spirit of all. He controls all, but is not controlled by any, he creates all but is not at all created by anything; there is nothing superior or equal to him; he is superior to all. He is beside his devotees but away from non-devotees. He has a spiritual body consisting of spiritual attributes such as consciousness and pure bliss.[2]

God is the highest and supreme person. The concept of person does not necessarily imply finiteness or limitation; i.e., the expression, infinite person is not self-contradictory. He is absolutely free from all limitations or defects found in human beings such as ignorance, dependence, suffering, and pollution due to physical body. God is characterized by perfect sovereignty, unlimited valour, lustre and knowledge. He has infinite general and intimate knowledge of everything. Nothing can escape from his purview.

God is self-luminous[3]. He knows that he is omniscient and self-luminous and his omniscience and self-luminosity are one and the same. Some hold that – a) God's knowledge of all – his omniscience, and b) his knowledge of himself as knowing all (self-luminosity) are different; the first being the knowledge of all excluding knowledge of himself, and the second being the knowledge of all including the knowledge of himself. In other words, 'God knows everything', and 'God knows that he knows everything' are different. Hence, God's knowledge is not unitary, but is two-fold.

However, Madhva correctly argues that they are unitary. If God does not

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[2] *Cidānandamayadehavān*

[3] The divine nature is not only all knowing but is self-luminous, God not only knows everything but knows also that his knowledge is all embracing. B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.347

know himself, then he cannot be omniscient that he cannot be said to know all. His omniscience includes the knowledge of himself i.e., the statement God knows all implies that God knows himself. Further, Madhva shows that the view that God's knowledge is two-fold leads to infinite regress and hence is incorrect. Either God knows that he has two different kinds of knowledge or he does not know it. If he does not know it, he cannot be omniscient. Since, he is admitted to be all-knowing, it follows that he knows that he has two kinds of knowledge. The question is, how does he know it: by one of those two knowledge or by a third knowledge. If the first alternative is accepted, it follows that one of the knowledge is self-luminous.

The acceptance of the second alternative disproves the view that God has two kinds of knowledge, and it gives rise to the same question. Does God know this by one of the three kinds of knowledge or by a fourth kind? The acceptance of the former alternative will make one of the three kinds of knowledge self-luminous, and makes this chain of reasoning superfluous. This could have been avoided by admitting at the outset that God's omniscience is self-luminous. If the second alternative that God knows himself by a fourth kind of knowledge is accepted, it would give rise to the same question and to the same sequence of reasoning – and so on *an infinitum*.

Another objection in regard to the omniscience of God is that if God knows all, he must know our illusions. Further, if he knows our illusions, he must experience all our illusions, and hence some of his cognition must be false. This is answered by the logic that all cognition of God is true as he knows the truth and only truth. When we have illusion, God himself has not that illusory experience, but he knows that we are experiencing an illusion, which is true. God sustains 'selves' in these states: *Jāgrat*, the awaken state, *Svapna*, the Dreaming, *Suṣupti*, the Dreamless-sleep, fainting Death, Dissolution, and *Mokṣa*. God bestows on them knowledge, ignorance, sorrow, happiness bondage and *Mokṣa* according to their degree of moral and spiritual fitness.

The selves can attain *Mokṣa* through the grace of God. It is their desire for release or freedom from bondage (sorrow) that gives rise to

the philosophical inquiry into the nature of God, self and the world of all selves – released and bound – are dependent on God.

God creates, maintains, regulates and dissolves the universe according to his desire. The utilization of such external accessories as *Prakṛti*, souls and space in the creation of the universe does not imply that God is dependent on them for creation. On the contrary, they depend on him for their existence, nature and functions. If he wills, God is potent enough to destroy them and create the universe without them. But he does not will so, instead of limiting or mitigating his glory, increases it.[4]

Madhva never allows anything that in any way stands against the majesty of God. God has no beginning or end, he is eternal. This follows from his absolute ontological independence or self-existence. If he has an origin, he would have to be dependent for his being on something existing prior to him, and if he has an end, something other than, and independent of himself would have to exist to cause his destruction. This is impossible, for there cannot be anything independent of him to produce his origin or end.

Lord Viṣṇu is different from the individual selves. Man, however powerful and intelligent he maybe, cannot be the creator and ruler of the universe. If he were the creator and controller of the universe, he would have made himself perfectly happy, infinitely wise, and absolutely powerful. The very fact that though he heartily desires to be happy, and though all his efforts are directed towards getting happiness, he is not completely happy and he is subject to suffering shows his pain and pleasure, misery and happiness depend on factors external to and uncontrollable by himself. It also proves that his knowledge and power are limited and that he is

[4] ......it enhances the greatness of God to make him act, utilize the accessories that are metaphysically dependent on him. B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.326

"In the present case God's utilization of accessories in creation that depend on him does not constitute any loss and abrogation of his majesty" B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.327

not and cannot be the creator and ruler of the world. Man is a creature, while God is the creator, and it is spiritually and metaphysically impossible for them to be identical. It is true that there are a few similarities between the individual self and God. God is Bimba, the archetype, and the self is his Pratibimba, the reflection.[5] lord Viṣṇu alone a) creates, b) maintains, c) dissolves, and d) controls the whole universe; he alone bestows e) knowledge, f) ignorance, g) bondage, and h) liberation upon the selves, in accordance with their natures and deserts.[6] These eight functions or glories of God do not exhaust his nature which consists of infinite number of infinite attributes. None other than the Supreme Viṣṇu has these attributes.

The various attributes of God constitute his very nature. They are not extrinsic but are intrinsic to his nature. God cannot be thought of as a substance having the attributes externally attached to him.[7] The distinction of substance and attribute, existence and essence is not applicable to God and God alone. His existence is his essence and his essence is his existence; that is, existence and essence are absolutely identical in his case. The multiplicity of the essential attributes of God does not destroy his sameness or unity. He remains the same or identical though he has infinite attributes.[8]

According to Madhva, God is knowable by the dependent souls, but none can comprehend fully the infinite nature and majesty of the lord. Even the goddess Lakṣmī, the consort of God, (who is eternally inseparable from

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[5] Madhva's conception of Bimbapratibimba, which expresses the relation between God and self, is original, very fruitful and highly technical. Its brief explanation is given in the following chapter on self.

[6] The lord, if he desires, can delegate some or all of these functions to gods or goddesses under him. In the Dvādaśastotra's Chapter 7, it is stated that Mahālakṣmī does all these functions under *Kripākaṭākṣa*, the graceful vision of the lord Viṣṇu, who is praised there as Ajita.

[7] "They (perfections) are natural to his being and are not, as in Advaita, brought about by contact with *Avidyā*". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.331

[8] B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.345

and very dear to him) cannot know the infinite glory of God in its entirety. Śrī Lakṣmī, being the highest among the dependent souls, knows more about God than other souls. The dependent selves can know the nature of the Supreme according to their degree of ability or fitness. Those who are higher in the scale of *Tāratamya*, the gradations can have superior knowledge of greatness of God than those who are lower in the scale. However, it is impossible for the finite mind to comprehend the whole nature of the infinite. The infinite comprehended entirely by the finite would not be infinite but must be finite. Aiśvarya, the six glories connoted by the name Bhagavān and the eight cosmic activities of the lord, and the other attributes mentioned in the scriptures cannot exhaust the whole nature of infinite God. Nevertheless, God can be known by us to certain extent.

This contradicts the Advaitic contention that the ultimate reality as such, is unknowable on the ground that as soon as it is made the object of our knowledge, it ceases to be the real and becomes an appearance. According to Madhva we can have some degree of knowledge of the ultimate reality or God.

Madhva holds that we can have some knowledge of God, not by sense perception nor by inference, but by the proper study of the genuine scriptures. God, being transcendent, is beyond the reach of our senses. Our sense experience can give us knowledge about things and events in the world i.e., about empirical matter. God is trans-empirical, so he cannot be known by sense experience. Reasoning by itself is also incapable of giving knowledge about God as an intelligent person can put forward counter argument for every argument in favour of existence or nature of God. It is argued by the theists that this universe is a creation (product or effect), and hence it must have a creator. Since this universe is very subtle and complicated and immeasurably very vast, its creator must be omniscient and omnipotent. Further, he loves and protects us, so his nature must be of infinite pure love and mercy. Such a creator is God. The argument stated against it is that creation or production of an object requires physical hands, eyes instruments and material. Since, God has no physical organs such as hands, he cannot create the universe. Moreover, God is neither omniscient nor

omnipotent, nor merciful. None can deny the existence of evil in the world. Human beings (and other animals) are subject to various kinds of sufferings, and this is evil. Now, God either knows the existence of evil or he does not know it. If he does not know it, he cannot be omniscient. If he knows it but cannot remove the evil, he cannot be omnipotent. If he knows the existence of evil and is powerful to remove it, yet he does not want to do so, he cannot be merciful. Thus, it is possible to argue for and against any matter. Hence, Madhva says free reasoning, i.e., reasoning which is independent of perception and or scriptures cannot prove anything.[9] Reasoning can only be an auxiliary in stating clearly the perceptual or scriptural evidence supporting the existence of an object or God, and drawing conclusions from it. Hence, the remaining Pramāṇa, the genuine scriptural teaching alone is the basis of our knowledge of God. The good or genuine scriptures, according to him, are four Vedas, Chief Upaniṣats, Pañcharātra, Mahābhārata and Ramāyaṇa. The Purāṇas and other works, the teaching of which conforms to the teaching of Vedopaniṣats are also genuine.[10] The criterion on the basis of which the genuine scriptures are distinguished from spurious ones is the main purpose of the Vedas which, according to Madhva, is to extol the absolute glory of God, Viṣṇu. The impartial, careful and proper study of the Vedas brings out, says Madhva the infinite majesty of lord Viṣṇu, who is acclaimed to be the independent, infinite, highest supreme and perfect supra-person. The scriptures and other works that accept the absolute independence, supremacy, and perfection of lord Viṣṇu are genuine, while those that do not do so, are spurious. Madhva's interpretation of the purpose of Vedic teaching is highly original and a great contribution to the study of Vedas. Moreover, according to Madhva, the knowledge of the majesty of God is necessary for a firm and pure devotion to God, and is thus a step in the attainment of *Mokṣa*.

Some Vedic scholars have argued that in the Vedas many gods are highly praised. The number of hymns in which some of them are praised is greater than the number of hymns in which lord Viṣṇu is praised. On this ground,

[9] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru),. p.211

[10] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru),. p.151

they have questioned Madhva's assertion of Viṣṇu being the highest among Vedic Gods.[11]

To this other scholars have replied that it is not correct to decide the greatness of a God on the basis of the number of hymns in which he is praised, it is necessary to take into account the importance of the functions ascribed to him;[12] and judged by this standard, Viṣṇu is the greatest among the Vedic Gods. However, this does not seem to solve the problem satisfactorily because it is pointed out that attributes and functions ascribed to Viṣṇu are also ascribed to other Gods in Ṛgveda. It is now accepted by scholars that the impartial study of the Vedas makes it evident that Viṣṇu is the best and the highest among Vedic deities from the very beginning.[13] It is to the credit of Madhva that he, with his deep insight into, and proper study and understanding of the purport and significance of scriptures, recognized and emphasized the absolute supremacy and independence of lord Viṣṇu. In support of this, he has quoted many passages from the scriptures.

Some thinkers may question as to whether it is rational to accept such scriptural evidence in support of the majesty and sovereignty of God. Madhva's reply to it is that it would not be a blind or dogmatic acceptance of an idea to gain some selfish end, but would be perfectly rational to rely on Vedic testimony to know the nature of God. For a) if God is knowable, and Madhva holds that he is knowable, not entirely but to some extent by us, there is no means other than the scriptural teaching to know God, b) the purport of scriptures is an altruistic one that aims at making us know God's nature and to help us to attain *Mokṣa*, c) the Vedas being impersonal

[11] Such scholars may also argue that since the chapter on God in this book is the smallest, God cannot be the greatest. The reply is that the lord Viṣṇu is the very kernel or essence of Madhva philosophy. Hence in every chapter a more or less account of God is given. This chapter contains a very succinct account of God.

[12] "The importance of Vedic gods has not to be measured by the number of hymns devoted to them or by the extent to which they are involved in the thoughts of the Ṛṣis, but by the functions which they perform". Shanbhag, Sir Aurobindo on the Vedas, p.26

[13] "It would be impossible to deny to Viṣṇu the position of a great God in the period of Ṛgveda". The Religion and Philosophy of Vedas and Upaniṣats, p.109

are absolutely impartial and truthful, d) the seers to whom the Vedas were revealed, were universally accepted as trusted source.

Madhva has clear and sound answers to the common atheistic arguments against God. He answers to the objection that God cannot be infinite because the material accessories like *Prakṛti*, limit him, by pointing out that they cannot limit God in any way, for they entirely depend on his will for their existence and nature. When material accessories depend on his mercy, there is no way they can oppose him, instead they have to yield to him.

The reply to the atheistic argument on the existence of evil is that evil exists is a fact. It is not an appearance as the Advaitins hold, but a reality. However, evil is the result of our doings; we are responsible for it and we have to suffer for our wrong doings. That is what justice means, Suffering for the wrong doings and enjoying for the right doings. Yet, as we are responsible for producing evil, we are also responsible for destroying evil by our right doings. If we make sincere efforts to uproot evil, god will be pleased with us and in the end helps us to become free from sorrow or bondage by his grace. Thus, God is just and merciful.

Avatāras, the manifestations of lord Viṣṇu

The idea of *Avatāra*, the manifestation plays an important part in our theological thinking. lord Viṣṇu manifests himself through innumerable or even infinite number of forms. There is no essential difference between them though their outward apparent form may be different. One manifestation may be in the form of fish, and another in the form of man, but their essence or substance is the same. The same lord Viṣṇu takes such forms and all the forms are intrinsically identical with one another. Madhva denies emphatically any essential difference between the lord and his limbs or his attributes or his incarnations. Madhva holds that to think that there are qualitative or intrinsic differences or gradations among the incarnations of

lord Viṣṇu is a sin[14] as lord Viṣṇu is devoid of *Svagatabheda*. Thus, there is unity in the multiplicity of manifestations of God.

Though there are innumerable incarnations of God, few of them are listed here. The five incarnations; Nārāyaṇa, Vāsudeva; bestows *Mokṣa*, Pradyumna – creates, Aniruddha – protects and Sankarṣaṇa – destructs. The eight inacarnations; Viśva, Prājña, Taijasa, Turīya, Ātmā, Antarātmā, Paramātmā and Jñānātmā. The ten incarnations: Matsya, Kūrma, Varāha, Nārasimha, Vāmana, Paraśurāma, Kodaṇḍarāma, Yādavakṛṣṇa, Buddha and Kalki. The twenty-four incarnations; Keśava, Nārāyaṇa, Mādhava, Govinda, Viṣṇu, Madhusūdana, Trivikrama, Vāmana, Śrīdhara, Hṛṣīkeśa, Padmanābha, Dāmodara, Sankarṣaṇa, Vāsudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, Puruṣottama, Adhokṣaja, Nārasimha, Acyuta, Janārdana, Upendra, Hari and Śrīkṛṣṇa. Other incarnations; Dattātreya, Ajita, Dhanvantarī, Mohinī, Vedavyāsa and Śiṁśumāra.

The purpose of *Avatāras* is to control and direct the evolution of the world, revealing to human being the great glory of God; to protect the good and destroy the bad, establishing *Dharma*, the Righteousness in the world. Purāṇas, the sacred lore of Vedic tradition are full of stories about such moral and spiritual deeds of each of these incarnations. lord Viṣṇu lives amongst human beings when he takes the human form to show the right ways of living and of attaining *Mokṣa*.

[14] "... In Madhva's view these various manifestations are absolutely on a par with one another. ... Madhva is vehemently opposed to the idea of making invidious distinctions among these various manifestations of God or putting some on a higher pedestal than others." B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.353

Chapter V – The Self

Madhva holds that *Jīva*, the embodied self is a conscious dependant, yet eternal entity which knows or is ignorant, which feels pleasure or pain, which is bound or released, and which, in its liberated state, enjoys pure bliss[1] in conformity with its intrinsic nature and the will of God. There is no need to prove the existence of a self; its existence is self-evident. Everyone knows that his self exists by experience or intuition. It is denoted by the word 'I', when it is used to refer to the self, e.g., I am happy, I know him etc. Wherever 'I' is used to refer to one's body, e.g., I am fat, I am tall, etc., the word 'I' does not denote the self.

All selves are similar in some respects, they are real conscious eternal. But when one reflects upon the nature of a self, what suddenly strikes one is the differences rather than the similarities among the selves. Each self is unique or individual and distinct from all other selves. The privacy of experience is familiar to all. Everyone can know immediately his own pleasures and pains, ideas and images, desires and decisions etc., but no one can know directly (immediately) the thoughts, feelings, and other experiences of others. Similarly you cannot know my experiences but can know your own experiences immediately. Figuratively speaking, I can enter into my own self and know the happenings there, but I cannot enter into the minds of others and know their mental processes. I cannot have their experiences as I have my own and others cannot have my experiences as each of them has his own experiences. The privacy of experiences of each person is a factor that separates or distinguishes one person or self from another *Jīva*.[2]

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[1] "He who enjoys the happiness and suffers the ills of life, who is subject to bondage and release, is the *Jīva*. He is indeed in position to know himself in all his states as 'I am'." B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass MLBD, Delhi), p.253

[2] "This individuality of experience and the impossibility of our entering into others experiences with the same fourth dimensional inwardness as our own are sufficient proofs of the basic distinction of selves." B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass MLBD, Delhi), p.255

According to Madhva, selves are many, indeed, they are infinite in number; other thinkers who accept the plurality of the selves say that one self is different from another self on the grounds that a) persons are born and they die at different times and places, b) the sensory and motor organs of one are different from those of another person, c) persons differ in their activities. Persons are seen to do different activities at the same or different times and places, d) persons possess the qualities of *Satva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas* in different proportions. In one person *Satva*, in other *Rajas*, in the third *Tamas* may preponderate over other qualities, e) one person may get *Mokṣa*, the liberation while others are in *Saṁsāra*, the bondage. If the self were not many, if there were a single self, there would not be such differences among them.

Madhva's objection to this is that these differences among the persons are quite superficial. They are no doubt the observed differences, but their causes are not at all stated. Madhva also denies that the mere difference in the experiences of selves is the basis of the distinction between them on the ground that the experiences of the one and the same self can be and usually are as varied as those of many selves. Madhva's view is that the immediate feeling or idea that these experiences are my own, that they belong to myself and your direct feeling that your experiences are your own, this *Anusandhāna* is the basis of the distinction between one self and other selves. *Anusandhāna* is described as 'the identifying experienciality in respect of one's own innermost experiences', and this seems to mean 'I am identical with a being who is experiencing (or has experienced) such a pleasure or pain', this seems to be equivalent to the immediate feeling or idea that these experiences are my own, which everyone has in respect of his own experiences. This is said to be the determining factor or criterion of self-identity.[3]

This requires to be considered; for some have raised two objections to it: a) They ask whether self-identity depends on *Anusandhāna* or

[3] "It is this identifying experimentality in respect of one's own inner most experiences of happiness and suffering that determines identity of consciousness or personal identity and no other." B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass MLBD, Delhi), p.256

Anusandhāna depends on self-identity (a question which seems to me to be similar to the conundrum whether a hen is prior to an egg or an egg is prior to the hen) and they are inclined to accept the latter alternative. They argue that a person who appropriates an innermost experience as his own must already be a person having identity; an owner of an experience must be an identifiable person. *Anusandhāna* does not make him the same person. *Anusandhāna* presupposes self-identity. But it is equally possible to argue that a conscious entity (self or a person) must exist before it is recognized to be the same or identical self and for the self to be, it must have experiences which it directly feels to be its own.

According to Madhva, there cannot be a *Nirguṇa* or *Nirviśeṣa* object. The self must have experiences and if the self which feels or knows that the experiences a, b, c, that belong to it also feels or knows that other experiences d, e, f are its own then these experiences too are experiences of the same or identical self (i.e., the self having a, b, c is said to be same self having d, e, f). Thus, it can be argued that self-identity presupposes or depends on *Anusandhāna*. *Anusandhāna* can be admitted as a factor important in producing and discovering self-identity; i.e., as a constituent and a criterion of self-identity.

b) Secondly, it is said that *Anusandhāna* is too subjective a criterion to be useful for practical purposes. The concept of self-identity plays an important role in social and moral life. The fixing of responsibility and transacting with persons in commercial, legal, educational and in many other fields depends on the identity of persons. Take for example, the areas of crime and punishment. Justice demands that a person who is punished for a certain crime must be the same person who has committed that crime. It is a universal principle that a person who gets some fruit, good or bad for an act and the person who has done that act must be identical. The objective criteria such as bodily continuity, date and place of birth, qualifications and profession, consulting the relatives, friends, neighbours etc., finger prints, DNA test etc., are used in determining the identity of a person. *Anusandhāna* has also a place in so far as a person who receives a fruit for an act thinks or feels that he is identical with a person who did that act; but it is rarely

used. Madhva knew this, but he was in search of a criterion or criteria that could be used both in the case of embodied and disembodied (released) souls. It is clear that the objective criteria of self-identity are useless in determining the identity[4] of disembodied selves, while *Anusandhāna* can be used in determining the identity of both kinds of selves.

c) We do not at every moment of our existence, feel or think that a certain intimate experience is our own; it is only on rare occasions we do so. Moreover we forget our experiences; people who become unconscious cannot have *Anusandhāna*. If so, do we lose our identity whenever we are not aware of our experience or when we forget them? Does our identity change frequently? The negative reply is given to this question. It is rightly said that, it is sufficient if we have *Anusandhāna* or feel that an experience is our own sometimes for us to be the same persons.[5] If so, *Anusandhāna* cannot, as Dr B N K Sharma believes, be the logically necessary or the sole criterion of identity. Indeed no criterion of self-identity seems to be logically necessary, because any one or all criteria may mislead us in identifying a person.

Some thinkers use the concept of *Karmā* i.e., the totality of deeds done in previous lives or in this life, to account for the multiplicity among the selves. They hold that the *Karmā* of each self is the cause of observed differences among the *Jīvas* such as the differences in their abilities, actions, bodily forms intellectual and moral qualities, happiness and misery etc. They say that the *Karmā* of oneself differs from the *Karmās* of other selves and produces these different effects.

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[4] Since identifying experimentality is the sole criterion of self-identity, it goes without saying that where it is absent self-identity too must necessarily be non-existent". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass MLBD, Delhi), p.257

[5] "For, it is not claimed that all sentient beings at all times have this identifying experimentality even with respect of their own earlier experiences in the same life, let alone those of previous lives... However, what is contended and affirmed ... in respect of *Anusandhāna* is that a sentient being who sometimes experiences an identifying experimentality with a being is identical with it and one who never at any time in his life does so is not identical with that being." B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass MLBD, Delhi), p.257

Madhva rejects this view. He retorts that it is also unsatisfactory because a) *Karmā* being an unconscious factor cannot by itself produce different effects. An individual cannot have any control over his own *Karmā*. Only God can have control over *Karmās* of individuals. So *Karmā* acting under the guidance or regulation of God produces such different effects. b) This view raises but does not answer the question as to why *Karmā* of oneself differs from the *Karmās* of others. Madhva gives a right reply.

According to him, there are natural (inherent) or essential differences in the natures of the selves which have no beginning and which are the causes of the different *Karmās* and their observed effects in the lives of individuals. This explanation of multiplicity among the *Jīvas* is regarded as final or ultimate.

To proceed with the account of the nature of the self, the self and the body with which it is associated are quite different. The self is spiritual while the body is material in character. It should be noted that except God and Lakṣmī who have only *Svarūpadeha*, all other selves, from Brahmā to the lowest self in the hierarchy of selves, are said to have four *Dehas*, the bodies: a) *Svarūpadeha* is the very intrinsic nature of the self consisting of its moral, intellectual, spiritual qualities. It is not material, it is entirely spiritual. God's *Svarūpadeha* (*agaṇitaguṇagaṇamayaśarīra*) consists of infinite number of infinite perfect spiritual qualities such as *cidānandaikadeha* pure consciousness and bliss. Lakṣmī's *Svarūpadeha* consists of similar spiritual qualities, but they are less in number and degree than those of God; moreover Lakṣmī is entirely dependent on God, while God is absolutely independent.

The other dependent selves are of three kinds: a) *Muktiyogyas*, those who are fit for *Mokṣa*. The *Svarūpadeha* of such good selves consists of pure, good spiritual and intellectual qualities, which go on becoming less and less in quantity and quality than those of selves higher than themselves in the hierarchy. Just as the golden idol is gold, the *Svarūpadeha* is the self itself b) *Tamoyogyas*, those who are fit for hell. The *Svarūpadeha* of such utterly bad selves is full of ignorance, cruelty, misery etc. c) *Nityasaṁsārī*, those who are neither fit for *Mokṣa*, nor for hell are ordinary human beings

whose *Svarūpadehas* consist of some good and some bad spiritual qualities. Their lives are mixtures of some knowledge and happiness, ignorance and misery etc. Since, the *Svarūpadehas* of these three types of selves are selves themselves, like selves they are without beginning and without end, they are eternal.

The three other types of bodies possessed by selves other than God and Lakṣmī are as follows: b) *Liṅgadeha* envelops the *Svarūpadeha* of a self. It is material, subtle, beginningless, but Sānta, it has an end. This consists of Avidyā, the ignorance, which is made up of subtle atoms of material *Prakṛti* and subtle forms of Kāma, the desire and of *Puṇya* and *Pāpa*, the merit and demerit, i.e., *Karmā*. As long as the *Svarūpadeha* of a self is covered by *Liṅgadeha* the self remains ignorant of its consciousness bliss or of its defects. When the *Liṅgadeha* is destroyed, the self realizes its *Svarūpa* or intrinsic nature i.e., its good or bad qualities. c) *Aniruddhadeha* covers *Liṅgadeha*. This *Deha* comes into existence before the birth, i.e., before a self becomes embodied in a tangible and visible gross body. The self itself is eternal, birth means its association with a gross body and death means its dissociation from a gross body, but not from its subtle body. Even after death, the self's association with the subtle body continues till it attains *Mokṣa*. Thus, death is not *Mokṣa*.

Further, A *Muktiyogya* can attain *Mokṣa* even when he is alive. Before the birth of an individual, the constituents of his *Liṅgadeha* i.e., ignorance, desire, and meritorious and demeritorious *Karmā* are stimulated by God to produce the *Aniruddhadeha* for him; as a result of this, the *Liṅgadeha* becomes associated with a particular kind of *Aniruddhadeha*. Thus, *Aniruddhadeha* has a beginning; it has also an end, it is destroyed before the destruction of *Liṅgadeha*. d) *Liṅgadeha* - the constituents are ignorance, desire, *Karmā*, which are causes of *Aniruddhadeha*, continue and take the gross form in *Aniruddhadeha* and produce the gross body. The gross body has a beginning and an end. When an individual dies his gross body is destroyed, but his other bodies including the *Aniruddhadeha* continue to exist in the form of the membranes enveloping his self and preventing him from knowing his *Svarūpa*, which, in the case of *Muktiyogyas*, the very

good selves consists of pure consciousness and pure bliss and also his utter dependence on God. The attainment of *Mokṣa* depends on the intuitive direct vision of God and on God's grace. Without God's grace, even the best self with *Aparokṣajñāna* cannot achieve *Mokṣa*. By God's grace the *Aniruddhadeha* and *Liṅgadeha* obscuring the intrinsic nature of such a self are destroyed and self realizes its intrinsic nature.

Selves transmigrate. A human self may be born as an animal, i.e., it may become associated with a body of an animal. In what kind of body a self becomes embodied in its next birth depends on its ignorance, desire and *Karmā*, which together constitute the cause of its gross body. Hence, these together will be called *Karmā*). It should be noted that according to Madhva, the material cause cannot by itself produce the effect; it requires the guidance of intelligence – human or divine, to produce its effect. This view of causation is based on the analogy of human being producing some object.

Thus, the wood by itself cannot produce the table; a carpenter having the idea of the form of a table and capable of using the accessories – wood, implements, etc., in the required manner, is also needed for producing the table; now the *Karmā* of an individual which is supposed to be unconscious or material, cannot by itself produce the body; nor can the individual self produce it, for the individual does not and cannot know his *Karmā* accumulated during the course of his innumerable past lives. This is the limitation of the finite self which distinguishes it from God. God knows definitely all the quantity and quality of all *Karmā* at the credit of each and every finite self. Under his guidance, the *Karmā* belonging to each self produces the proper kind of body for it; and at birth, a self becomes embodied in it. Thus, the bondage of the self consists in its association with its own subtle and gross physical accessories – ignorance, *Vāsanās* or *Kāma*, the desire, *Karmā*, *Liṅgadeha* and *Aniruddhadeha*.

These subtle and gross physical factors provided by God for the selves are necessary for the actualization of the potential natures of the selves, i.e., for their proper development. To reach their spiritual destinies, the selves

have to become associated with their bodies, i.e., they must be born, they must live, act and get what they deserve, they must become subjected to the cycle of births and deaths. Thus, creation is for our sake and not for the sake of God; it is necessary, not for the fulfillment of any need on the part of God, but for the manifestation of the latent or intrinsic nature of the selves, i.e., for the development of selves (one *Muni's* prayer to God is *sarvabhūtahitārthāya vasusṛṣṭiṁ sadā kuru*) God does not need anything, he is *Nityatṛpta*, the one who is eternally satisfied. But the selves require the environment for their development.

The world is the environment provided by God, in which each self, according to its intrinsic nature, and *Preraṇā*, the divine inspiration, goes on acting and developing, till it reaches its final goal or realizes its own nature. Then a self is either released in which case it enjoys pure consciousness and pure bliss or it is non-released in which case it becomes subject to the chain of births and deaths (it becomes *Nityasaṁsārī*) or it goes to hell depending upon its own nature and the will of God. It should be noted that in whatever state the self may be either released or non-released. It is dependent on God. It is God that binds or releases the selves. God is completely ever-independent, Lakṣmī is in the eternally released state. So it is only the other selves from Brahmā to the lowest selves that can be either bound or released. These must be bound if they are to be released; bondage is necessary for their proper development. Hence, God cannot be accused of cruelty in binding them. He binds them because they, not he, need it for their development according to their *Yogyatā*, the capability.

It is the natures of the selves that invite the type of condition – eternal bondage leading to the state of damnation or to the state of *Nityasaṁsārī* or provisional bondage, which, when destroyed by the self's good efforts and God's grace leads to the enjoyment of pure bliss. God grants to each self just what it deserves, neither more nor less. God is absolutely just and under his governance, each self gets what is due to it. True love consists in the provision of the conditions for the proper development of the object of love and true justice involves distribution of conditions of proper development in accordance with the natures of the selves. This is what exactly God does

in his dealings with selves. Thus, the "qualities of divine justice and divine love" are not "emptied of all meaning and value"[6] in Madhva's philosophy.

On the contrary, these qualities are entirely enriched with meaning and value and God's nature shines with absolute splendour or perfection. Further, the same author objects that Madhva's God is not perfect; he says that desire for creation on the part of God is opposed to his supreme perfection on the ground that feeling, a want or having a desire is a mark of imperfection.[7] This, if true, is a very serious objection, for Madhva does not tolerate even a very slight diminution to the glory of God. But this objection is baseless; the critic fails to take into account the distinction between selfish desire (i.e., wanting or desiring something for oneself) and unselfish desire (i.e., wanting or desiring something for the good of others) God has no selfish desire. He does not want anything for himself. He is Pūrṇa, complete, full or absolutely perfect. He (Acyuta) has no defect of any kind. His desire for creation is unselfish. He desires to create for the development of individual selves. This brings out his loving nature and enhances his greatness or perfection.[8]

From the above considerations, it is clear that God is not playing

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[6] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.751)

[7] "But the difficulty remains that whatever feels a want or has a desire is imperfect and limited. God, on such a view cannot be regarded as the supreme perfection." S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.750

[8] It should be noted that the same critic in dealing with the problem as to whether or not the released soul continues to do *Karmā*, the actions distinguishes between two senses of *Karmā*; a) selfish *Karmā*, b) altruistic *Karmā*. "The whole discussion is permeated by the ambiguous usage of the word *Karmā*. If *Karmā* means activity undertaken by an individual for the fulfillment of this or that private end, it is inconsistent with spiritual insight. Impersonal action, on the other hand undertaken by an individual after gaining insight for the sake of general ends does not bind the doer, does not commit him to *Samsāra*..." S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.630
The present distinction of desire into selfish and altruistic is similar to this. Saying that here the question is about God's desire while, there it is about the activity of the released soul is not an objection to this. For the released soul, according to Advaita, is identical with *Paraṁbrahmā*.

a practical joke on us when he implants in us a desire for heaven while making us unfit for it.[9] It is true that the nature of the selves depends on God, who being omnipotent can alter their nature. He can make all selves fit for heaven, but he does not will to do so, not because he wants to play a practical joke on us, but because to do so would be unjust and irrational. So long as the concepts of good and bad have application, there must be some who are good and others who are bad. If all are made good, this distinction between good and bad would vanish, hence it would be irrational.

Making all fit for *Mokṣa* irrespective of their nature would be unjust. Moreover, altering the intrinsic or essential nature of a self would be tantamount to the destruction of the self and the merciful God, does not desire to do so. It is Advaita which asks us to worship the *Mithyā*; (*Saguṇabrahmā* is *Mithyā*, the false, according to Advaita) which with its *cāru vāk*, the sweet talk of every one being Brahmā implants in us the false hope of every one getting *Mokṣa*, which really is the state of nothingness, that leads to disappointed disillusion and despair, when this truth is realized by the self that aspires for *Mokṣa*.

Madhva teaches the truth, which may be bitter but which is entirely wholesome. His teaching encourages us to face the truth, to do what we can and to get what we deserve according to the grace of the lord. God's dealing with us is not a practical joke. His concern for us is full of justice and love. Hence it arouses in us deep devotion and gratitude to him. Moreover God's ways towards men are not completely known to any one, not even to Lakṣmī, the highest and best among the dependent reals, and the eternal intimate companion of God. So with whom God becomes pleased, on whom he bestows grace is not known. Hence our duty is to follow the way of life laid down by the seers. Those who had the direct vision of the lord and taught by the lord himself, without caring for its fruit or result and leaving it to the lord to deal with us as we deserve. According to Madhva, the spiritual life is never one of dark despair, but it is one of bright hope for the best.

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[9] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.751

The self is self-luminous. It can know itself and also other selves and objects. It is a knower and the known; the subject and the object. This conception of the self as being both subject and object of its knowledge is not self-contradictory, as the Advaitin thinks, but is involved in the very nature of knowledge. Knowledge implies the knower (the subject) and the known (the object) and the object of knowledge can be one's own self or other objects. This is the ground on which Madhva holds that Advaitic conception of spiritual intuition is not knowledge, because it does not involve any distinction, not even the distinction between the subject and object of knowledge.

Advaitic view is not supported by the scripture and experience. The statement that 'a self is self-luminous' does not mean that a self always knows all aspects of its intrinsic nature. We know by experience that a finite self has not only knowledge but that it also suffers from ignorance; that both luminosity and darkness, knowledge and ignorance are its characteristics. *Avidyā* or ignorance, in the case of the best selves fit for *Mokṣa*, is a separable aspect of their essential nature; they can become free from their ignorance when, by their right efforts, their ignorance disappears, direct or intuitive knowledge of the intrinsic natures of their selves dawns on them.

If God bestows his grace on them, they become liberated and enjoy pure consciousness and pure bliss due to them according to their natures in the presence of God. Two points need emphasis: a) The intuitive knowledge of intrinsic nature of a self by itself is not sufficient to attain *Mokṣa*. Besides this, and more important than this, is God's grace in the attainment of *Mokṣa*. Without God's grace, even the best self having direct knowledge of its essential nature and direct vision of God cannot get *Mokṣa*. b) All liberated souls do not enjoy the same kind and the same amount of pure consciousness and pure bliss. The pure consciousness and bliss enjoyed by one self, differ in some respect, from those enjoyed by other selves; this is due to the fact that the liberated souls differ in their intrinsic natures. The liberated selves not only differ from one another in their natures and gradation but they also differ from God.

It follows that the liberated selves are entirely dependent on God. A liberated soul does not become free from its dependence on the lord; it is not independent of God. The soul's dependence on God is eternal; it never ceases. The selves are dependent on God in all their states, bound and liberated in waking, sleeping, suffering from disease etc., their essential or intrinsic nature is to be dependent on God. Their ignorance consists in believing (falsely) that they are independent of God and that their possessions are their own, that they are not gifts from the merciful God. *Avidyā* or ignorance is the effect of *Tāmasāhaṅkāra* and the basic cause of the bondage of selves. It works according to the will of God. God binds the selves and liberates them.

God obscures or conceals some aspects of the intrinsic nature of a self, by means of *Prakṛti*, as a result of which a self becomes ignorant of its true nature including its dependence on God and also of the true nature of God. The former function of *Avidyā* is called *Jīvācchādikā* (concealing the nature of a self from itself) the latter, *Paramācchādikā* (concealing the nature of God). The omniscient God knows the real natures of all selves. It is he alone who reveals the true natures of selves to selves, when they have become mature or fit to receive such revelation from him. The selves and other eternal and non-eternal reals are forever dependent on God. This utter dependence of reals on God is metaphysically significant. It means that though there are many reals other than God, these other reals do not in any way put a limit to omnipotency, independence or to other attributes of God, because they are entirely dependent on God. If God wills he can destroy the other reals and create new ones. But he does not do so because there is no need to do so.

A limit is a sort of defect and God who is *Nirdoṣa* without any defect and *Acyuta* cannot have any limit. He is *Amita*, the limitless. This disposes off Dr S Radhakrishnan's objection "if God were really independent, then there must not be anything to limit him from; dualism makes the independence of God impossible."[10] It is clear that the expression 'freed self' does not mean

[10] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.750

a self which has become independent of God; for becoming independent of God is impossible for a self or for any other real in Madhva's metaphysics. 'Liberated or freed self' means a self which has become free from, which has cast off, its physical subtle and gross shackles or *Dehas*.

The relation between God and a self is said to be like the relation between *Bimba*, the archetype or original and *Pratibimba*, the reflection, copy, or duplicate shadow. It is made clear that *Bimbapratibimbabhāva* is a symbolic or figurative expression, for the relation between God and a self. As such its function is limited, It is intended to bring out that a) God, the *Bimba* is absolutely independent while a self *Pratibimba*, the reflection is entirely dependent on God, b) since God and a self are eternal, the dependence of a self on God is eternal; it is an essential characteristic of a self. Hence, it characterizes the self in bondage and *Mokṣa*. c) God and a self are different and a difference between them is eternal; even the liberated soul is different from God; it depends on God's will for its existence, consciousness, bliss etc.

The liberated does not become identical with *Nirguṇabrahmā*, the supreme Reality (God). How can a self in bondage that is different from the *Nirguṇabrahmā* become identical with it when released? It is clearly or logically impossible. According to Madhva the relation between God and self is not *Bhedābheda*, the identity in difference for they can never be identical, but it is similarity in difference. d) Though distinct from God, a self being a duplicate or reflection of him, is in some respects similar to God. The self like God is real, eternal, conscious, active etc. But these attributes of the self are limited, while in the case of God, they are infinite, unlimited.

The misleading suggestions of *Bimbapratibimbabhāva*, metaphor, that are to be avoided have also been pointed out. a) The ordinary reflection of an object or original is lifeless and as such, it has neither duty towards the original nor an end. But a self is a living being which has a duty towards God and a spiritual end. To achieve *Mokṣa*, the self has to serve God with great and deep devotion, for only by his grace, a self can attain liberation. b) The common reflection requires some external medium in addition to

the original. Thus, a reflection of a face requires mirror, or some smooth surface, water, light rays etc. When the external medium is removed, the reflection disappears. But in the case of the self, no such medium exists, nor it is required for the self to be the reflection of God. So self exists as *Pratibimba* of God as long as God exists, i.e., eternally. But if one objects that without some *Upādhi*, the medium, a reflection cannot occur.

Madhva replies that the very *Svarūpa*, the nature of the self can be taken as a medium for *Pratibimba*. It is an internal *Upādhi* and is called *Svarūpopādhi*. A self's internal *Upādhi* is distinguished from its external *Upādhi*. The internal *Upādhis* of *Jīva* are its essential spiritual factors such as self's eternal dependence on God for its existence activity, consciousness and bliss, which are similar to such attributes of God. Since, *Jīva* is a finite reality, its such attributes are limited while those of God are infinite. The finite being, the self can never become the infinite being - God. These constitute the *Jīvasvarūpa*, the self's, nature, which is self-luminous and as such it can function as an internal medium for the *Pratibimba*.

To the question "since the *Jīvasvarūpa* is the self itself, how can the same self be a *Pratibimba* and also a medium for *Pratibimba*?' The answer given is that this is possible due to the activity of Visesas which enable us to distinguish between these aspects of the self.[11] It is this *Jīvasvarūpa*, the self's nature that is clearly revealed to the self, when it attains *Mokṣa*, by its devotion to and by the grace of, the lord.[12]

The material adjuncts associated with a self, its body, *Manas* and its modes are the external *Upādhis* of a self. These are inessential or separable *Upādhis* of a self. The released soul becomes free from them. But in bondage, a self is closely associated with them, as a result of which, they produce an unclear false idea or belief that they are also elements in the

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[11] "*Viśeṣa* is thus the peculiar characteristic or potency of things which makes description and talk of difference possible where as a matter of fact only identity exists." B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass MLBD, Delhi), p.78

[12] B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass MLBD, Delhi), pp.315-316

very constitution of the self, that the self is not merely the enjoyer or user of the God – given body, wealth, health etc. But it itself is their owner independently of God etc. This is *Ajñāna*, which paves the way for continued bondage and rebirth of the individual while the internal *Upādhis* produce an image or idea which reveals the true nature of the self to the self i.e., its distinction from body and other material possession, its difference from, and its eternal dependence, on, God for its existence and nature. This helps us to understand correctly the description of *Jīva* as a *Nirupādhipratibimba*. This means that a self, in its real nature, is without the external (material) *Upādhis*, while the expression *Svarūpopādhi* means that it consists of internal *Upādhis* which are (spiritual) elements.[13]

Another metaphor of a rainbow given by Madhva to explain the nature of the relation between *Bimba* and *Pratibimba* is said to be better than that of reflection of face in a mirror. The mirror passively throws back the rays falling on it. But in the case of a rainbow where the Sun is *Bimba* (God) and rainbow (*Pratibimba*), the rain drops receive the rays, allow them to pass through them, split them into seven colours. Thus, rain drops act as prisms. Then send out the colours in the form of attractive rainbow in the sky. The rain drops are active. They transform the white rays into rainbow colours. The selves, especially *Muktiyogyas*, are like rain drops. They receive the grace (light) from God and communicate it to others in the form of various virtues and thus make our lives better. The virtues which characterize them are similar, though limited, to the infinite auspicious attributes of God.[14]

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[13] Many other expressions like *Amśa*, the self *Aṁśī*, the God, *Śarīra*, the self, *Śarīrī*, the God etc., are used to indicate nature of the relation between God and self. According to Madhva all such expressions should be understood to indicate the spiritual nature of self consisting of consciousness, pure bliss, similar to those of God but limited and the eternal dependence of self on God for its reality and nature. Other suggestions, if any, of such expressions should be ignored. *Amśas* are of two kinds; *Svarūpāṁśa*, the incarnations of God are identical with his nature, the *Bhinnāṁśas*, the selves which are different from, but similar to him.

[14] "The *Jīva* is the agent, the vehicle for the manifestation of the Divine light falling upon himself. What we know now of God, of his love and goodness, the compassion and other auspicious attributes is from our association with godly men and women, his devotees, who in their lives

Since Madhva holds that the selves are different from God, the ultimate reality, not only in mundane life but also in their released state, he undertakes to show that the Advaitic view that the released soul is identical with *Nirguṇabrahmā*, the ultimate reality is baseless and false. Besides the theoretical refutation of Advaita, Madhva bitterly condemns it by saying that Advaitic view is so irreverent, and sinful that it commits its believers to eternal damnation. It should be noted that this condemnation is not his own, but it is expressed by God and also in the scriptures and here Madhva sincerely follows them.

Since Madhva's arguments against the Advaitic view of identity of self with *Nirguṇabrahmā* refer to Advaitic view about the scriptures, it is necessary to note the following main points of Advaitic view; a) the scriptures teach what is true b) the scriptures teach that '*Ātmā* is Brahmā', hence it is true, c) the study of scripture is necessary to learn this truth, d) only the morally good persons are fit to study scriptures, e) the mediate knowledge gained through the study of scriptures under a preceptor must be converted into intimate, intuitive experience by one's own efforts like *Manana* and *Nidhidyāsana*. This intuitive experience is *Mokṣa*; the realization of true nature of *Ātmā* being *Nirguṇabrahmā*. The following arguments of Madhva prove that a) the identity of the self with Brahmā is false, and if the purport of the Vedas is this false doctrine then the study of the Vedas becomes worthless and b) Advaita which maintains this false view of *Brahmātmaikya* cannot be accepted.

a) Madhva argues that the oneness of the self with Brahmā must be either real or unreal and different or non-different from Brahmā. If it is real and different from Brahmā then there will be two reals; Brahmā and identity. This contradicts the Advaitic view that the absolute alone is real. But the identity is unreal, the Advaitin will have to accept that the absolute and the self are different. This is opposed to *Brahmātmaikya*. This is sufficient to reject Advaita.

manifest these virtues. They are the raindrops; that reveal the majesty and the glory that lies concealed in the white rays of the Sun". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass MLBD, Delhi), p.313

b) Advaita holds that *Ātmā* and Brahmā are one and self-luminous. If the *Brahmātmaikya* is real and non-different from Brahmā (or *Ātmā*) i.e., if it is the essential nature of the *Ātmā* (or Brahmā) then since the *Ātmā* is self-luminous, the *Brahmātmaikya* must be self-revealing. But it is not at all self-evident. Everyone claims to know that he is different from the Absolute. Even the Advaitin admits that on *Vyāvahārika* level the self and Brahmā are experienced as different. This is sufficient to show that they are always different. Madhva holds that difference is not provisional or relative but that it is eternal and absolute, which means that any two objects which are different at one level must be eternally, absolutely, or ultimately different.

c) The Advaitic view is shown to lead to disastrous consequences in regard to Vedas and higher education. It is argued that Advaita robs Vedas of all of their importance and makes them valueless. i) If *Brahmātmaikya* is self-revealing, and it must be so on Advaitic view, the Vedas are not required to teach it. ii) According to Advaita, *Pramāṇa* or means of valid knowledge is that which makes the unknown as known, i.e., by which we come to know something which was unknown, or which gives novel correct information. But if *Brahmātmaikya* is self-luminous. Hence already known, and if the purport of the Vedas is *Brahmātyaikya*, it follows that the Vedas teach what is already known, hence they become *Apramāṇa*. iii) According to Madhva, the *Brahmātmaikya* is unreal or false. If the Vedas teach this falsehood then they cannot be the means of valid knowledge. He says that the *Brahmātmaikya* cannot be the purport of the Vedas. They teach *Viṣṇusarvottamatva*, the supremacy of lord Viṣṇu, *Jīveśābheda*, the difference between God and *Jagatsatyatā*, the self and reality of the world etc. iv) The higher education consisted in knowing the nature of and the relation between God (ultimate reality), self and the world by the study of the Vedas under a proper Guru.

Thus, it involved the *Anubandhacatuṣṭaya*, a system of four factors; a) an eligible student who desires to know and a preceptor who desires to teach him, b) the subject to be taught, c) the objective or aim of study, and d) the relevance of all these. But if *Brahmātmaikya* is self-revealing then there will be no one to know it, no one to teach it, for it is already revealed

and no subject for study. Thus, *Anubandhacatuṣṭaya* breaks down. There will be no point in studying the Vedas.

This explains as to why some have said that Advaita is *Avaidika*, the non-Vedic system like Buddhism. This gets support from the statement of some sympathetic followers of Śaṅkara that he was very much influenced by the early Buddhism.

To all this, the Advaitins' reply is that on their view, the scriptures are valuable and useful. *Avidyā* or *Ajñāna*, the nescience, which is our natural endowment (but which can be removed by the intuitive knowledge of the absolute) conceals from us the nature of the *Ātmā* and its identity with the absolute and leads us to believe falsely that *Ātmā* and Brahmā are different and the world is real. This is also clear from the fact that there are many different and even contradictory views regarding the nature of the Brahmā and *Ātmā*. Each view is claimed to be absolutely true by its advocate. This naturally creates doubt and confusion about their nature. To dispel such doubts and false ideas and to give us (mediate) knowledge about the true nature of Brahmā (*Ātmā*) the study of Vedas under a proper preceptor is necessary. The right and impartial study of the Vedas brings out clearly the oneness of Brahmā and *Ātmā*, which is the real purport of the Vedas.

This reply shows the importance of the concept of *Avidyā* (*Ajñāna* or *Māyā*) in Advaita, which is also called *Māyāvāda*. This reply hinges upon the concept of *Ajñāna*. This is the central concept in Advaita. This explains as to why Madhva makes it the target of very severe criticism. Madhva correctly argues that there cannot be any place for the concept of *Ajñāna* in Advaita. For Advaita holds that *Ātmā*, the absolute alone is real, that it is pure consciousness and self-revealing. If so, how can its nature be veiled by ignorance? How can there be darkness where there is always light? The self-luminous nature of *Ātmā*, the pure absolute cannot be soiled by ignorance. Since, there cannot be ignorance about the nature of *Ātmā*, and there cannot be removal of *Ajñāna*.

The Advaita cannot escape from the dilemma. If *Ātmā*, the absolute is

self-luminous, then the study of the Vedas is not required to know its nature. And the Vedas would be superfluous; but if the nature of the absolute is such as to be covered or polluted by ignorance and study of the Vedas is necessary to know its nature, then it cannot be self-luminous. The Advaitin may argue that the *Ātmā* (Brahmā) is ever free, it can never be bound, what is in bondage is *Jīva*, the embodied self or ego. It is this that desires to attain *Mokṣa*. And we know that the egos or the finite individuals are ignorant. Thus, ignorance has a locus in the egos, it characterizes the egos. When the ego gets knowledge about the identity of *Ātmā* with Brahmā by the study of Vedas under a guru and makes it its intuitive experience, it attains *Mokṣa*. Thus, *Ajñāna*, the study of the Vedas etc., have a proper place in Advaita.

He cannot escape from the difficulty through it. For, according to Advaita, it is *Avidyā* (*Ajñāna*) that projects the one absolute self as the many egos. One Brahmā (*Ātmā*) appears as many egos through *Ajñāna*. This *Ajñāna* is the cause of the appearance of egos. Hence it must precede the egos, it must already exist before the egos exist, and it must exist independently of the egos. Thus according to Advaita itself, it cannot have a locus in the egos. Then where can it exist before the egos come into existence? The only reality in which it can exist is the Brahmā (*Ātmā*). But it cannot exist in Brahmā, which is of the nature of pure consciousness. So Ajñāna has no place in Advaita.

Madhva also uses the concept of *Ajñāna*, and there is a legitimate role for it in his system. His view is that the self is different from God. God is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, and is without any pain etc. But our experience shows that human beings have limited knowledge, limited energy, and are subject to suffering etc. The self has many qualities or aspects, and though the self is self-luminous, some of its qualities or aspects are concealed by the omnipotent God, as a result of which a self suffers from ignorance. Hence, the study of the Vedas under a proper Guru, strict observance of religious and moral principles and rites and the grace of God are necessary to erase or remove *Ajñāna*.

The Advaitin cannot have recourse to such an argument. Because,

according to him the *Ātmā*, the absolute is *Nirguṇa* - without attributes and *Nirviśeṣa* - featureless. Hence, there cannot be any concealment of its attributes or features.

The following objections to *Māyāvāda* are based on its conception of *Mokṣa* and its relation to *Ajñāna*. Advaita holds that *Ajñāna* (*Avidyā*) is the belief that the self and the Brahmā and the world are real and different from one another. The destruction of *Avidyā* is *Mokṣa* i.e., intuitive realization that *Ātmā* and Brahmā are one and Brahmā is the only ultimate reality. Madhva questions as to whether *Mokṣa*, the destruction of *Avidyā* is the essential nature of *Ātmā* (Brahmā) or not. If it is the essential nature of *Ātmā* then since *Ātmā* is eternal, *Mokṣa*, the destruction of *Avidyā* must be eternal; and whatever is eternal is always is.

Therefore, *Mokṣa* being eternal is always existent or real. If so, how can it be the aim or objective of Vedic study? For an aim or objective by its very nature is something which is not now existent or real but which can be brought into existence (or realized) in future by means of certain efforts. Hence, *Mokṣa* which, according to Advaita cannot be an aim or objective of the study of the Vedas and the Advaita Śāstra. Thus, the study of the Vedas and of Advaitaśāstra is fruitless. Some Advaitins try to escape from this difficulty by arguing that destruction of *Avidyā* is *Mokṣa* but it is not the nature of *Ātmā*. For if the destruction of *Avidyā* is real, then it would be opposed to Advaita because there would more than one real, viz., the absolute. *Avidyā* and destruction of *Avidyā* would be real. If it is unreal, *Mokṣa* would be unreal. It cannot be both real and unreal because that would be self-contradictory. Since, *Avidyā* (*Māyā*) is said to be *Sadasadvilakṣaṇa*, really or unreally inexpressible. *Mokṣa*, the destruction of *Avidyā* cannot also be *Sadasadvilakṣaṇa* for a thing, e.g., cloth and its destruction cannot be the same. They must be different. *Mokṣa*, the destruction of *Avidyā* must be *Sadasadvilakṣaṇavilakṣaṇa*, really or unreally inexpressible's inexpressible.

Thus, among the five types; a) *Sat*, the real, b) *Asat*, the unreal, c) *Sadasat*, the real and unreal and d) *Sadasadvilakṣaṇa*, really or unreally inexpressible, e) *Sadasadvilakṣaṇavilakṣaṇa*, really or unreally inexpressible's

inexpressible, *Avidyā* must be of the fourth, and *Mokṣa*, the destruction of *Avidyā* must be of the fifth type. This *Mokṣa*, which is different from the nature of *Ātmā* and which is not yet achieved, can be said to be an aim of study of the Vedas. Hence the study of the Vedas is fruitful.[15]

Madhva's clear and succinct refutation of this reply is that as there cannot be *Avidyā* in the Advaita, there cannot be *Mokṣa*, the destruction of *Avidyā* in it. Or in Advaita that which is not the nature of *Ātmā* must be either *Ajñāna* (*Māyā*) or its effect. If the destruction of *Ajñāna* is different from the nature of *Ātmā*. It must be either *Ajñāna* or its effect. But it cannot be *Ajñāna*, so it must be the effect of *Ajñāna*. Since there is no *Ajñāna* which is the cause, there cannot be its effect i.e., the destruction of *Ajñāna* or *Mokṣa*.

We know by experience that there can be only three types of objects; a) *Sat*, the real, b) *Asat*, the unreal and c) *Sadasat*, the real and unreal in the sense that those objects which exist in one place, at one time but do not exist at another place another time. Thus, experience shows that there cannot be the fourth (*Ajñāna*) and the fifth (its destruction) type of objects.

However, the Advaitins do not abandon the concept of *Ajñāna*. They still hold that *Ajñāna* in the form of *Upādhi* is useful in Advaita, thus they introduce the concept of *Upādhi*. The concept of *Upādhi*, the adjunct (medium) used in two doctrines Śaṅkarādvaita and Bhāskarādvaita, is critically examined by Madhva in his work Upādhikhaṇḍaṇam. According to *Śaṅkarādvaita*, the absolute is the only one ultimate reality. This Absolute, which is infinite, pure, consciousness, is, through the agency of *Upādhi* projected or reflected as *Jīvas*, the embodied selves which are finite centres of consciousness.

The absolute is the *Bimba*, while the egos are its *Pratibimbas*. Just as one candle light (*Bimba*) placed before a row of many mirrors appears as many lights (*Pratibimba*) in the mirrors, which are *Upādhis*. So also the one absolute appears as many egos due to the agency of *Upādhi*. If the mirror is dust-stained, then the reflection in it is defective i.e., unclear or vague. Any

[15] Daśaprakaraṇa (ABMMM, Bengaluru), pp.32-33

defect in the reflection is entirely due to the defect in *Upādhi*, the mirror. Similarly the defects and impurities found in the egos are entirely due to the *Upādhi* (*Ajñāna*). They are not due to the absolute for the absolute is pure. Thus, the *Upādhi* must be different from the Absolute.

In Advaita, the absolute alone is real. Hence, the *Upādhi* cannot be real; for if it were real there would be two reals, the absolute and *Upādhi*, and the Advaitic doctrine would have to be rejected. The *Upādhi* must be unreal (illusory). *Ajñāna* (*Māyā* or *Avidyā*) is the source of everything that is unreal or illusory. So, Advaita must hold that the *Upādhi*, which is an appearance or illusory must be due to *Ajñāna*. Madhva objects that this leads to infinite regress. *Ajñāna* is due to the *Upādhi*. That *Upādhi* is due to another *Ajñāna*$_2$, that *Ajñāna*$_2$ is due to another *Upādhi*$_2$ and to infinite regress.

If the Advaitin replies that the first *Upādhi* alone is the source of all *Ajñāna*, to produce the second, and third *Ajñāna*. So separate *Upādhis* are not required, hence there is no fallacy of infinite regress. Madhva replies that this would involve the fallacy of mutual dependence, i.e., *Ajñāna* would depend on *Upādhi* and *Upādhi* on *Ajñāna*.

To escape from this the Advaitin may say that *Ajñāna* does not directly depend on the *Upādhi*. The *Upādhi* produces the illusion that Brahmā and *Jīvas*, the selves are different from one another and this leads to *Ajñāna*. Thus though the *Upādhi* is dependent on *Ajñāna*, the *Ajñāna* is dependent on the belief in the difference between the absolute and the self, and not directly on the *Upādhi*. Hence, there is no fallacy of mutual dependence. Madhva points out that, if so, then there will be the fallacy of circularity the *Ajñāna* would depend on the difference between the Brahmā and the self, this difference would depend on the *Upādhi*, and the *Upādhi*, which in Advaita has to be an appearance or illusion, would have to depend on the *Ajñāna* (*Māyā*).

In Śaṅkarādvaita, the *Ajñāna*, the difference between the absolute and the self, the *Upādhi* are unreal or illusory. But in *Bhāskarādvaita*, they are real, the relation between the Brahmā and the self is that of *Aṁśāṁśi*, the

whole and part; the self is a part of the Absolute; and as such, a self is different from the absolute (the whole). This difference between them is real, and the *Upādhi*, which is the cause of the difference, is also real. But the difference and the *Upādhi* are not eternal or indestructible. They are provisional, when the *Upādhi* is destroyed, the difference is also destroyed and the identity of the self with the absolute is revealed.[16] Bhāskarācārya gives an e.g., of space and says that the vast space that spreads everywhere is, by its nature, a partless and differenceless whole. E.g., a house is built, its walls, which are *Upādhis* produce differences or parts in the space, and we speak of space of this room, space of that room etc.

This is opposed to Madhva's view of the *Bheda*, the difference and he strongly protests against it. He holds that the difference is the very nature of an object. Hence, the *Upādhi* cannot produce it in a differenceless whole. The function of *Upādhis* is not to create difference, but at best, is to indicate or bring out the already existing natural difference in the whole or object. It is wrong to say that the space is differenceless. There are natural differences in the space. These are not produced by the walls. The walls merely and clearly show the already existing differences in space. Similar argument applies to the destruction of difference between the self and the Absolute. This difference between them is neither created by the *Upādhi* nor is it provisional or temporary. The difference is rooted in the very intrinsic nature of the *Jīva* and Brahmā, and it is eternal permanent and ultimate. It exists between the Brahmā and *Jīva* in the bound as well as the released states of the latter. The released self cannot become identical with the Brahmā.

This gives rise to the question, if there are natural differences in space, then when we are aware of space, we should be aware of those differences also; if so, why are *Upādhis*, required to show those differences?

Madhva replies that though distinction or difference is an intrinsic nature of an object, it is its special or particular or specific nature. Hence

[16] Daśaprakaraṇa (ABMMM, Bengaluru), pp.32-33

sometimes when we have a common or general knowledge of an object, we may not have knowledge of differences that characterize it. In such cases, *Upādhis* are required to indicate the differences or distinctions. This is true. Observing the distinction depends upon careful observation and in our ordinary life we do not observe carefully each and every object that we come across. When we are required to notice the distinctions or details of an object, we observe it carefully under suitable conditions such as bright light, nearness of the objects, its bounds etc., which are *Upādhis* that help us to know its details or distinctions.

According to Bhāskara, One *Ātmā* through *Upādhi*, like *Antaḥkaraṇa*, becomes many egos. Madhva rejects this. If there is only one *Ātmā*, all our bodies must belong to it and when one ego experiences pleasure or pain, other egos also must feel pleasure or pain. They must have the same experiences. But our experience shows that this is false for the experiences of one-self differs from those of others. When one is happy, the others may have pain, fear, anger etc. The conclusion drawn is that the selves (and other objects) are, by nature and not by any *Upādhi*, different from one another and from God.

Against those who still insist that difference is not intrinsic but is created a new by the *Upādhi*. Madhva adduces two more arguments which are typical metaphysical arguments and which resemble Zeno's arguments against motion. To produce a new (the difference in an object), the *Upādhi* must come into contact with the object. Does the *Upādhi* produce the difference by coming into contact with the part or whole of the object? If one answers that by coming into contact with the part. Madhva questions how can there be a part in the object which is a 'partless' or 'differenceless' whole; where does the part come from? For, there cannot be a part unless there is already a difference in the object. If one says that the part is produced by another *Upādhi*. Then, another *Upādhi* also has to come into contact with the part, there must be a difference in the object before the *Upādhi* comes into contact with the object. To escape from this, if one still holds that division was produced a new by still another *Upādhi*, the same answer that there cannot a part without an already intrinsic existing difference, will have to

be repeated and so on infinite regress. The only way to avoid the infinite regress is to accept Madhva's view that difference is intrinsic and natural and is not created by the *Upādhi*.

To consider the second alternative, that the difference is created by the *Upādhi* by coming into contact with the whole object. Madhva says that if the *Upādhi* comes into contact with the whole object. Then it cannot produce any difference e.g., if water flows in the middle of a place, it divides the place into parts. But if water flows over the whole place covering it completely, then no difference will be produced in that place.

Madhva thus rejects the concepts of *Ajñāna*[17] (*Māyā* or *Avidyā*) and *Upādhi* used in Advaita in support of the view that the world, plurality of selves, the difference between *Ātmā* and Brahmā and between other entities, are all unreal, as baseless and useless. He takes up for his critical consideration the Advaitic claim that it has support of Vedas, the scriptures is the identity of *Ātmā* with Brahmā and shows that, though there are some statements which appear, on shallow or superficial interpretation to lend support to Advaita, but which when properly interpreted do not really do so. He then arrives at the conclusion that not a single scriptural statement is in favour of Advaita. His own view is that the import of the scriptures is the supremacy of God, the difference between God and self and the reality of the world. He quotes many scriptural passages in support of his view.

The following scriptural statements which are thought to teach *Brahmātmaikya*, the oneness of *Ātmā* with Brahmā are examined: '*sa ātmātatvamasi* - thou are that'. Madhva argues that this expression occurs as part of a longer statement and that the relevant conjunction in it can be dissolved in a way different from the way in which Śaṅkara dissolves

[17] "*Avidyā* cannot be the cause of individuality for it cannot exist unless there are individuals. If it is the cause of individuality it must exist independent of that i.e. must belong to one ultimate reality, Brahmā. But *Avidyā* cannot belong to Brahmā, whose nature is one of eternal light repugnant to *Avidyā*. It cannot reside in Brahmā, it cannot reside in the individual ..." Dr S S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.576

it. Śaṅkara dissolves it as '*saḥ ātmā tat tvam asi* - thou are that' and interprets it as stating the oneness of the self with the Brahmā. Madhva dissolves the conjunction as '*saḥ ātmā atat tvam asi* - thou are not that'. Though both Śaṅkara and Madhva are grammatically correct, it is quite clear that contextually, Madhva's interpretation is correct while that of the Śaṅkara is Incorrect. The expression under consideration occurs in the dialogue between the sage Uddālaka and his son Śvetaketu. Śvetaketu, after successfully completing his education, has just returned to his father's *Āśrama*. The father realized that his son's mind is full of false pride, that his son thinks that he knows everything, when in fact, he does not know the very basic truth about reality.

Being a sage, the father naturally thinks that such a pride is unbecoming of a scholar. He teaches his son the truth with an intention to mitigate or remove his pride. Does a father, a great sage, in such a situation teach his already-proud son that he (the son) is Brahmā? This is impossible, for such a teaching would have defeated the very purpose of the sage. It would have increased the pride of his son instead of lessening it. So the sage to achieve his end teaches the truth that he (his son) is not Brahmā, the God, that Brahmā is the supreme ultimate independent omniscient reality, and that the whole universe including his son and all other selves are under the complete control of the Brahmā. There is no other alternative than to accept Madhva's interpretation of the text, which does not involve the 'torturing'[18] of the scriptures.

Further, the correct interpretation of the nine illustrations given by Madhva clearly upholds the view that the world is real and that there is

[18] Dr S Radhakrishnan says "the original Vedāntins have tortured the Vedas to make them yield their own doctrines." If anyone has tortured the Vedas, it is Śaṅkara who has done so by Superimposing Advaitic interpretation on the texts.

Dr S Radhakrishnan admits that "Śaṅkara has borrowed a lot from early Buddhism in developing his Advaita." The early Buddhism has been traditionally regarded as non-Vedic system, a system opposed to Vedic teaching. It follows that Śaṅkarādvaita containing non-Vedic ideas from Buddhism, must also be non-Vedic. To show that Advaita is Vedic, and thus to get the support of tradition in favour of it, he had to torture the Vedas to the utmost.

a difference between individual selves, and between God and selves. The illustrations are; a) a bird bound by a rope returning to its abode after wandering here and there, like a self returning to God after its wandering in *Saṁsāra*, b) Honey consisting of juices, c) Sea containing waters poured into it by many rivers, d) a tree and a conscious energy sustaining it, e) a very small or subtle seed growing into a big tree by invisible force in it, f) water and salt dissolved in it, g) a pilgrim and his destination the *Gāndhāradeśa*, h) a patient and goddess presiding over his life, and i) a thief and things stolen by him. Madhva shows that none of these supports Advaita.

In b) and c), the Upaniṣat itself gives the warning that if one fails to distinguish between juices or waters of rivers (selves) on the one hand and honey or sea (Brahmā) on the other, and thinks that they are identical would commit a great sin that he would be reborn as some sort of lower animal. Thus, it rules out identity of self with Brahmā. The statement that juices or waters of rivers enter into or take shelter in honey or sea does not mean that they become one with honey or sea. Similarly, the statement that "selves enter into or take shelter in Brahmā" does not mean that selves are identical with Brahmā. When we enter into a house we do not become a house. In a) "a bird (self) bound by a rope (God, it is he who binds or liberates selves)." Selves are under the control of God. Certainly the ruled and ruler, the subjects and the king are different.

In d) The presence of a conscious power (God) in a tree makes it alive and its absence makes it dead. Similarly, so long as God is in selves, they are alive and experience pleasure or pain and when God leaves their body they become dead material body. Thus, their existence or life depends on God. Hence, selves cannot be identical with God on whom they depend. In e) it is taught that just as the subtle invisible force in a very small seed is the basis of the big tree, so also, God who is beyond the reach of our senses, is the support or substratum of the whole universe.

In f), the same truth is conveyed. When salt dissolves in water, it becomes invisible and intangible but we can know its presence in every atom of that water by tasting it. God, who is super-sensuous is present in every atom

of the universe as its energy. We become aware of his omnipresence and omnipotence by observing the natural phenomena of the universe. Thus in e) and f) God's difference from the things and selves in the universe is affirmed. g) Brings out more clearly the difference between God and self. A citizen of Gāndhāra returning to his country is robbed and left blind folded in the forest to wander. He then meets some person, gets his bandage on the eyes removed with his help and reaches his destination or refuge. In g) the pilgrim represents the ordinary man, a person who removed his bandage the guru. and his country or his shelter, represents God.

The significance is that we (ordinary men) desire to have intuitive experience of God but are blind or ignorant in regard to the way of achieving our goal. A guru, by removing our ignorance, shows us the way to God. Just as the *Gāndhāra* country, the shelter of the pilgrim is different from him, so also God our ultimate and eternal shelter is different from the selves. h) Tells us that we are dependent on God for our life, knowledge and other states. We get knowledge through senses, *Manas* etc.

There are presiding deities of senses, *Manas*, life etc., who are under the control of God. So long as these presiding deities are working according to God's desire, the sick man and others have knowledge, we experience, pleasure or pain, and we live; but when God withdraws these presiding deities, we become dead. a material thing without life and consciousness. Thus, this emphasizes our complete dependence on God and thereby shows the difference between God and man. In i) it is taught that a person having valid philosophical knowledge attains *Mokṣa* while a person with false knowledge suffers punishment.

Thus, when the statement ... "thou are that" is interpreted in the context of these nine instances, it becomes quite clear that it does not affirm the identity between self and Brahmā; but that it states the difference between them by asserting our dependence on Brahmā. In support of this Madhva quotes a passage from Paramopaniṣat which points out that these nine

examples make clear the basic difference between self and God.[19] Further it teaches that *Mokṣa* is attainable only by this knowledge of the difference between God and self; and the absence of this knowledge is sure to lead to moral and spiritual downfall or degradation.

The reasons as to why Śaṅkara misinterprets the scriptures are not far to seek. a) According to Śaṅkara, the essential nature of the *Pramāṇa*, or means of valid knowledge is to give new information, it has to give knowledge of an object which is not yet known. Śaṅkara holds that perception, inference and scriptural testimony are the only sources of knowledge. "Memory is not included under right knowledge since novelty is said to be the feature of all knowledge".[20] Since scriptures according to Śaṅkara, are a source of right knowledge, they must give new knowledge.

The traditional truths known to every one including the Advaitins are; a) Brahmā or God is the supreme person, b) he has infinite number of infinite attributes, c) he creates and controls the world, d) he is different from the selves etc. Since these are already known truths, the Vedas and Upaniṣats cannot teach them. Being a *Pramāṇa*, they must teach something new. Hence, they must teach that Brahmā, the God is attributeless and differenceless, that the self is Brahmā etc., which are shocking. But, as a matter of fact, scriptures do not teach Śaṅkara's monism. Hence Śaṅkara does not hesitate to torture the scriptures to make them yield his monistic view. That is why he imposes a baseless interpretation on the Vedas.

One recent author on Vedānta remarks that Śaṅkara does not quote many passages from the scriptures as if it is a great credit to Śaṅkara. In saying this the author seems to have in his mind the comparison in this respect between Śaṅkara and Madhva for it is a fact that Madhva quotes profusely from that source in support of his view. This author overlooks the fact that Śaṅkara does not do so, simply because he cannot find many passages in support of his view in the scriptures. According to Madhva,

[19] Daśaprakaraṇa (ABMMM, Bengaluru) p.291

[20] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.488

there is not a single statement in support of Advaita in scriptures and what is more important is that, Madhva has shown that his statement that there is not an iota of support for Advaita in scriptures is not an exaggeration.

b) Madhva further argues that even the famous Vedic statement '*aham brahmāsmi* - I am Brahmā' and '*yosāvasau puruṣaḥ sohamasmi* - I am God who is in the sun etc., do not support the Advaitic view of oneness of self with Brahmā. Apparently these statements seem to state that the self and the Brahmā are the same but when they are considered in their context it becomes evident that they really do not do so. *aham brahmāsmi* - I am Brahmā' occurs twice in Bṛhaḍāraṇyakopaniṣat. In its first occurrence the Brahmā himself says that he is Brahmā. Thus, it is tautology, 'Brahmā is Brahmā' it does not at all assert the identity of the self with the Brahmā. In its second occurrence, it is uttered by Vāmadeva in a passage and in that context it means that the inner-ruler of all is one supreme Brahmā. Every term refers to something, to an object, quality, energy or act etc. God is the ground of all nature qualities, energies, actions, etc., of all things and persons. He controls them by being their indweller. Hence every term primarily refers or indicates the Brahmā or God the indweller of all and secondarily to things like table, chair etc. Accordingly the words 'I', 'you' etc., primarily refer to God in me and in you and secondarily to me and to you as persons.

The explanation of *Sātvikajñāna*, the pure knowledge given in Bhagavadgītā supports it. "There is a difference between conscious and unconscious objects. But the indweller in both is one and the same. He is in all objects. This is pure knowledge".[21] Similarly the statement *yosāvasu puruṣaḥ sohamasmi* states, not that myself and God are identical, but that God in me is identical with God in the Sun. this is supported by another Upaniṣadic statement *sa yaścāyam puruṣe yaścāsāvāditye* that means the God in the Sun is the same God who was my inside.'[22]

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[21] Daśaprakaraṇa (ABMMM, Bengaluru) p.314

[22] Daśaprakaraṇa (ABMMM, Bengaluru) p.312

Another argument is that the word *Aham* is used to signify that which is the dearest and the nearest to us. Now God who is pure bliss who is full of love for his creatures, who does not lack or need anything for himself acts for the good (well being) of his creatures is certainly the dearest and nearest being to us. So *Aham* in *aham brahmāsmi* signifies God or Brahmā and the statement asserts that Brahmā is Brahmā.

Advaitins admit that there are only a few statements that assert the identity between the self and the Brahmā (identity-statements) while there are many, indeed, thousands of statements that declare the difference (difference-statements) between them, yet they maintain that the former constitute a stronger evidence than the latter, and that the latter being weaker, cannot overthrow the former hence the essential significance of the Vedic teaching is the identity of the self with Brahmā. This is held on the ground that the essential characteristic of knowledge is novelty. The difference statements do not tell us anything new. The difference between the self and the Brahmā is common knowledge. By experience and reasoning everyone knows that he is different from the omniscient and omnipotent Brahmā.

The difference-statements merely repeat this common knowledge without vouching for the truth of what they state. They are *Anuvādakavākyas*, the repetitive statements. They are not put forward as true statements. They simply repeat what is known by other sources and are silent about the truth of their subject matters. E.g., when we repeat what we have heard from another person, we do not claim that our repetitive statement is true. If we are asked about such a statement 'is it true?' we usually say 'I don't know I repeated what he told me'. The repetitive difference statements are very weak. But the identity statements are not repetitive. The oneness of the self with the Brahmā is known neither by perception nor by reasoning. The identity-statements tell us something new that is independent of other sources of knowledge.

Madhva easily refutes this argument. He points out that the Advaitin's view that identity of the self with the Brahmā is not known by any source

other than the Vedas is equally true of the difference between them, i.e., the difference between the self and God is also not known by any other source than the Vedas. To know the difference between them, we should know both the self and God. Our self is known to us by *Svānubhava*, the self-knowledge derived from *Sākṣī*. God is supra-sensuous. He cannot be known through perception. Inference cannot establish his existence and nature. It is a notorious fact that against any argument put forward by the theist in favour of God's existence. There are many produced by the atheists and thus the matter is doubtful.

God's existence and nature can only be known by the Vedas which are intuitions of what the sages revealed. So the difference statements are not repetitive and weak.

Admitting for the sake of argument, that the difference statements are weak and leaving them aside, still Madhva argues that the identity statements cannot stand against the *Pramāṇas* like *Pratyakṣa* which support not identity but the difference between the self and God. How can Vedic statement support identity when such *Pramāṇas* are clearly opposed to them?

To this the Advaitins reply that since the Vedic statements are *Apauruṣeya*, impersonal. They are free from Pauruṣeyadoṣas, the personal defects-illusion, error etc., which are found in perception inference, and statements from others. So the Vedic statements are absolutely true and very strong while such *Pramāṇas* are very weak. Hence the opposition between Vedic identity statements and the *Pramāṇas* like *Pratyakṣa* cannot in any way adversely affect or disprove the former.

Madhva replies to it by saying that if this is so, then the Advaitin must give up his position that the difference statements are repetitive and weak. For the difference statements being part of the Vedas must also be *Apauruṣeya* and strong they must be without any defect and absolutely true. The stronger cannot depend upon the weaker. Hence the strong Vedic difference statements cannot depend upon or derive from the weaker *Pramāṇas* like *Pratyakṣa*. They cannot be repetitive. They are as strong as, nay, stronger

than, the identity statements because they are greater in number than the identity statements, and also because what they independently state (i.e., difference between the self and God) agrees with what other *Pramāṇas* like *Pratyakṣa* etc., make us know. The same point is emphasized by considering the matter from another angle.

Madhva points out that to know the identity between the self and the Brahmā we must first know them. The self is known by *Svānubhava*, the self-knowledge. It is *Sākṣijñāna* which is absolutely valid or true. Our knowledge of our pleasure and pain and of our existence, which is given by *Sākṣī* or the *Svarūpendriya* is beyond doubt. Hence absolutely true. The knowledge about God is derived from the *Apauruṣeya* Vedas which declare that God is omniscient and omnipotent. This is also absolute truth. Our *Sākṣī* informs us that we are not omniscient and omnipotent. Thus, our *Sākṣī* and Vedas are the grounds of our knowledge about God and the self. No Vedic statement can go against these grounds of our knowledge about self and God. When these grounds definitely point out the difference between God and the self how can one fail to notice the difference between them. They are undoubtedly different. Hence, all Vedic statements including the apparently identity-statements about them must be interpreted in accordance with them i.e., as stating the basic, ultimate eternal difference between the self and God. [23]

Madhva has done so. Thus, he has shown that there is no single Vedic statement in support of Advaita i.e., oneness of self with Brahmā. Madhva's own view is that God and the self are different. This is supported by many passages from the scriptures, by perception and *Svānubhava*.

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[23] Daśaprakaraṇa (ABMMM, Bengaluru), p.314

B N K Sharma says "According to Madhva, it is usual in mystic tradition to use words "I, You All" in the sense of *Antaryāmī*, the inner ruler of all, in describing mystic experiences and intuitions. On the basis of clear and right interpretation of Madhva and the views of many scholars it can be safely concluded that there is no support in the scriptures for the Advaitic interpretation of oneness of self with Brahmā. Shambhag remarks "Hence it can be concluded that the Prasthānatrayī or the triple source of Vedantic does not approve the monistic *Jīvabrahmaikya*, p.193

Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa clearly state *Jīveśabheda* (*Pṛthaktva*) are distinct '*Pṛthagupadeśāt* (Brahmasūtra, ii-26) - Brahmā, the God and *Ātmā*, the self are distinct because of *Upadeśāt* scriptural instructions'. A passage in Kauśītakyupaniṣat says, Brahmā the inscrutable and supreme is distinct from the group of souls. He is perfect, the souls are imperfect. He is ever free they desire freedom from bondage through his grace." The self is different from God in its bound as well as released states. The released soul cannot be one with the Brahmā. It continues to depend on God's grace for its enjoyment of bliss in *Mokṣa*.

God and the self are not distinct in the way in which the whole and its parts are distinct. For the whole and its parts are mutually dependent. The whole depends on its parts and parts on the whole. The relation between the self and Brahmā or God is not that of mutual dependence. God is completely and eternally independent while the selves are entirely and essentially dependent on God. It is true that in some passages in the scriptures a self is said to be an *Amśas* and God the *Aṁśī*. But the *Amśa* and *Aṁśī* relation here should not be interpreted as that of a part and whole; for the contexts make it clear that here relation between a self and God is said to be that of similarity.

Though God and a self are essentially distinct, yet, says Madhva, they are not opposed but similar to one another is some respects. They are similar in having knowledge bliss, energy, etc., though such attributes in God are infinite or unlimited but in a self they are limited. Moreover, souls enormously differ in having such attributes. Some souls have them to a greater extent than others. The *Aṁśāṁśi* relation signifies that a self is similar but inferior to God in some essential features like knowledge, bliss etc., and that it is dependent on God.[24]

***Svarūpatāratamya*, the natural gradation among the selves**

Only the *Tatvavāda* of Madhva contains, as one of its basic views, the

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[24] Daśaprakaraṇa (ABMMM, Bengaluru), pp.207-221, 269-294

doctrine of natural gradation among the selves. Besides being naturally different from God, matter and, from one another, the individual souls, according to Madhva, also intrinsically differ in the degrees of their moral and spiritual ranks. Some souls are morally and spiritually higher than others. God has made an arrangement in which the souls occupy ranks from the highest to the lowest. The hierarchy among them is fixed or permanent and eternal, for it is based on the intrinsic natures of the souls which, according to Madhva, never change. The external factors like body, senses etc., associated with the selves change, but soul's inherent or innate character is immutable. It is true that the innate natures of the selves are dependent on God's will, and if he so wills, he can change or destroy their natures. But he does not will to do so, because the hierarchy among the souls is what he has willed and what he himself has made.

The position of each self in this hierarchy is determined by the extent and quality of its knowledge devotion, energy, bliss, action etc. Each self is a unique moral and spiritual nucleus of certain inherent characteristics which determine the quality and quantity of its knowledge, volition, energy, action, bliss; i.e., the unique nucleus determines its dynamic, spiritual personality (and also its physical characteristics or body). The core of each self is unique in the sense that no two such nuclei of personality are the same. The observed differences in the moral and spiritual make up of personalities and in the lots of individuals necessitate the assumption of the existence of peculiar cores or centres of latent characteristics of selves as the bases of their explanation. Otherwise, the observed differences and inequalities of selves in respect of their knowledge, energy etc., would be inexplicable. This God's cosmic rational hierarchy of selves would be irrational if two or more selves were the same or identical. Hence, each soul is different in some respects from another soul. The innate core of moral, spiritual and intellectual development of souls depends on the will or grace of God.

At the zenith of this hierarchy of souls, is the omniscient, omnipotent, perfect, Paramātmā, the supreme soul the lord Viṣṇu. He is the indweller and controller of all other souls. He bestows knowledge or ignorance, liberation or bondage on others according to their deserts. He is completely

independent and all others are dependent on him. Among the dependent souls, Lakṣmī, his inseparable consort; who was with him in *Sṛṣṭi*, *Stithi*, and *Praḷaya* is the highest. She is unique among the dependents in that; she is *Nityamukta*, the one who *is* eternally free.

Then the Caturmukhabrahmā the architect of the universe, Vāyu, Garuḍa, Śeṣa and Rudra take their ranks in that order in the hierarchy. Viṣṇu is thousand, nay infinite times superior to Lakṣmī in his majesty or splendor, Lakṣmī is thousand-times superior to Brahmā, in short, the soul in the higher rank is hundred or thousand times better spiritually than the soul in the rank below it. Vāyu is *Jīvottama* and Madhva is worshipped as an incarnation of Vāyu. That Madhva is the third *Avatāra* of Vāyu is supported by the Śāstras.

The knowledge of hierarchy among dependent gods and selves is necessary to Vaiṣṇavas, the devotees of Viṣṇu and followers of Madhva. They are instructed strictly to worship gods according to their ranks in the hierarchy to achieve liberation. The worship of God in a higher rank should precede the worship of God in a lower rank. If they fail to do so, and worship deities in a manner involving the violation or infringement of the *Tāratamya*, the hierarchy. They would pave their way to hell. The hierarchy among deities and souls is permanent and eternal as it is based on their eternal essential natures.

Moreover attainment of *Mokṣa* is possible only through the grace of the supreme lord Viṣṇu. It is very difficult, nay, impossible, to secure his grace by directly devoting to or worshipping him alone. To get his grace the devotee is required to ascend the rungs of the hierarchy gradually; his spiritual ascent must be gradual. He must first win the grace of these deities who are great devotees of the supreme lord by worshipping them with his body, mind and heart. It becomes easy for the spiritual aspirant to get the grace of lord Viṣṇu when these deities are pleased with his devotion to them. Especially the grace of Mukhyaprāṇa, the greatest devotee of lord Viṣṇu is necessary before securing the grace of lord Viṣṇu. The lord bestows his grace on those with whom Mukhyaprāṇa is pleased and withholds his grace from those who have incurred the displeasure of Mukhyaprāṇa.

Chapter VI – The World

According to Madhva, the world with all its variety is real, though dependent on the supreme lord Viṣṇu, the real need not be independent or permanent and eternal. The belief in the reality of the world, in which we and other beings live and move, is so basic and universal. It is based on 'the consolidated experience of human beings that to question its reality is absurd and unjustified'. If there is anything, except his own existence, which the common man does not doubt, which he accepts as certain, it is the existence or the reality of the world. To deny its reality is to think like a man, who believes that cutting down a high tree's bough on which he is sitting is profitable to him.

Still there are thinkers who have dared to deny the reality of the world, thinking that they are quite justified in doing so. The Advaitins and other idealists the world over, have denied the reality of the world. Madhva shows that such a view is not only absurd and false but it is quite baseless. Every reason given in support of it is unacceptable, it is also blasphemous and spiritually degrading, for the Śrī Bhagavadgītā declares that those who deny the reality of the world are *Asuras*, the demons.

Madhva holds that the reality of the world and the reality of God are intimately bound up together; they stand or fall together. For God must be *Sarvottama*, i.e., he must be the highest or best of all. Thus, the description of God as *Sarvottama* implies the reality of objects other than God, and his great superiority over them all. If there are no reals other than God, he cannot be *Sarvottama*, hence cannot be God. Thus, if God, the greatest of all is real, the world must be real. But if the world is real, the Advaitin cannot maintain that the self and Brahmā are identical.

For the world is very huge and complicated, hence it requires a creator who is omniscient, omnipotent, infinite, perfect etc., i.e., only God can create it. This brings out the vast difference between God and the individual self. The individual self being limited in its knowledge, power etc., could not be a

creator of the world. In the face of such a vast difference between the two; self and Brahmā. It becomes impossible for the Advaitin to maintain that the self and Brahmā are identical.

Hence, he denies the reality of the world, and by denying all attributes to them, makes the self and Brahmā identical. *Ātmā* or Brahmā, being *Nirguṇa*, *Nirviśeṣa* are, he says, identical. This whole consideration implies that the denial of the reality of the world on the part of the Advaitin is not impartial and rational. It is biased, it is done with a view to maintain that the self and Brahmā are one, which is false, for when they are considered open-mindedly and rationally, they are directly seen to be different. Therefore, Madhva declares that the false Advaitic view of identity of the self with Brahmā cannot be the purport of the Vedas.

Now it is time to consider some details of Madhva's severe attack on Advaita. Madhva rejects every concept, with reasons, introduced or reformulated by the Advaitin to overcome the hurdles in holding his view, and making it appear sound.

a) Just as the unreality of the world follows from the Advaitic conception of the real as that which is eternal immutable, non-spatio-temporal, conscious, etc. So also the reality of the world follows from the Dvaitic conception of the real as that which is eternal or provisional, immutable or mutable, transcendent or spatio-temporal conscious or unconscious. As regards the objects in this world, anything that exists in space, time or is conscious or active is real. Since the objects in this world satisfy this conception of the real, they are real.

However, this may appear arbitrary. It may be said that anyone can define anything in any way he likes, to prove what he desires to prove. But a little reflection shows that while the Advaitic conception of reality is quite arbitrary, the Dvaitic conception, as it states the commonly or universally accepted meaning of the real is not arbitrary but is rational. It may be objected that an Advaitin has a right to introduce new or modify concepts to suit his purposes. This is doubtful, for a right is something rational, the

acceptance of which is beneficial, for example, Scientists introduce new concepts or modify a concept in use. The concept of matter has now been changed. Matter is something that can be reduced to energy.

Therefore, two separate laws of conservation of matter and of energy are not required; the latter alone is enough. This led to the invention of techniques required to change matter into energy, which in its turn is useful in producing electricity etc. But what do we gain by accepting the Advaitic conception of the real? nothing.

On the contrary, we stand to lose everything. We lose the world, God for *Saguṇabrahmā* being in appearance inferior to the absolute cannot be the object of prayer and worship, and *Nirguṇabrahmā*, being impersonal and abstract, cannot be God, and *Mokṣa* which, being merging of the self with the absolute becomes nothing. This explains the seriousness with which Madhva attacks Advaita. He wants to re-establish rationally and convincingly the reality of the world, and the values of life and thus to lead us from darkness to light.

The Dvaita thesis of reality of the world is also supported by other weighty arguments; b) the universal human experience strongly upholds the belief in the reality of the world. Since time immemorial, human beings in all parts of the world have accepted the reality of the world on the basis of their experience. This consolidated human *Anubhūti*, the experience includes not only experience derived from the external senses and the *Manas*, but also the direct or intuitive experience of the *Sākṣī*, the *Svarūpendriya* of the self. And the *Sākṣī*, says Madhva, is the final criterion of truth and validity. Its perception or cognition, e.g., our awareness of our own pleasure or pain is without doubt, defect and error, hence it is absolutely certain.[1] When the human experience validated by *Sākṣī* is the basis of the belief in the reality of the world, its reality must be accepted.

[1] "Whether a given experience is true or false is to be ascertained by the *Sākṣī*. If this *Sākṣī*, the truth determining principle should become tainted even in a single instance there can be no certitude at all in epistemology" B N K Sharma, The Philosophy of Sri Madhvacharya (MLBD, Delhi), p.166

It is indeed strange to note that both Śaṅkara and Madhva declare that in matters relating to the sensible world, perception, and not scripture, is important in deciding their truth or falsity. Śaṅkara says, "Even hundred scriptural statements cannot be authoritative when they say that fire is cold or without light." Nobody accepts as valid that which is against the actually perceived facts. Madhva says "nothing is valid which goes against one's intuitive knowledge", and "the scripture can have no validity if it contradicts experience".[2] Madhva adheres to this statement, but Śaṅkara does not.

Śaṅkara thinks that the unreality of the world is supported by the scripture even when this goes against our experience, which vouches for the reality of the world. It is said that "the Advaitin cannot appeal to experience in order to prove the unreality of the world because, our experience unerringly testifies to its reality. No other means of knowledge can disprove the validity of direct experiences".[3] But while accepting that the validity of direct experience cannot be disproved by any other *Pramāṇa*, the Advaitin does appeal to experience, e.g., in his argument from illusion to prove the unreality of the world. We have already considered this argument, and seen that it cannot bear the weight put on it by the Advaitin. Madhva's view in this connection is true to the fact. Though he holds that the world is real, he does not think that all our perceptions are true. He knows that while most of our experiences are true and a few illusions are false. The objects are perceived as other than what they really are - a rope, an existing object is percieved as a snake, a non-existing object. If such direct experiences – illusions are held to be false and their objects unreal, some ask, why should

[2] It should be noted that in his conception of *Sākṣijñāna* empirical knowledge and knowledge of transcendent objects, e.g., God and values. Madhva sees the distinction between apriori, synthetic and value judgements. For he clearly holds that the distinction between them is based on the type of consideration or evidence required to show that they are true or false.

[3] "The establishment of the very thesis of the illusoriness of the universe *ipso-facto* implies the acceptance of the reality of two universes. One as a Substratum and another as a superstructure". R N Sharma, Quoted by Shanbhag, p.44

"Madhva readily grants that the knowledge of the *Āropita* presupposes the knowledge of *Anāropita* and that no superimposition is possible without the reality of the substratum and Pradhāna, the prototype of the superimposed object".

not one hold that all our perceptions, or direct sense experiences are false, and that the world is unreal?

Madhva's reply is that a) all agree that such direct experiences – illusions are false, that their objects are unreal, and their illusoriness or falsity is established by our own stronger (true) perceptions. E.g., we come to know that it is a rope and not a snake by going near it, seeing it clearly or touching it. These veridical perceptions show that there is no snake, and that the snake experience is false, and we perceive a rope as a rope. Such perceptions are accepted as veridical or true. But the Advaitic view that the world is unreal implies that all our perceptions are false, hence it is false.

Further the Advaitic distinction between existence and reality, which is used to show that world exists but is unreal is baseless and false, for what exists is real and what is real must exist. Thus, the Advaitic distinction between *Pāramārthikasat*, the absolute reality and *Vyāvahārikasat*, the relative reality is untenable. Hence the Advaitin's attempt to escape from the difficulty is not successful. He wants to soften the paradox that the world is unreal, by holding that it is not illusory for it exists. In his view, the world is illusory, and this view is quite wrong.

b) If the Advaitin is not convinced of the reality, and sticks to the view of unreality of the world, Madhva argues that he has to accept the ultimate reality of not one world but of two worlds. This view of Madhva that the argument from illusion implies the reality of two objects is an original one. Though this argument is used in western thought, it is not put to this new use of showing the reality of two objects. In the rope-snake illusion, the rope is real. In an illusion, there must be a real object which appears as something other than itself; the superimposed illusory object is a snake.

To perceive a rope as a snake, the percipient must have perceived a real snake. Unless one has perceived a real object, one cannot have an idea or image of it. Thus, the occurrence of this illusion requires i) a real rope and ii) a real snake. Madhva arrives at the generalization that no illusion can occur without there being two real objects i) one serving as its *Adhiṣṭhāna*, the

basis and ii) another real object the appearance of which is superimposed on *Adhiṣṭhāna*. Similarly, if the world is illusory, then for this world illusion to occur, there must be a real world to serve as its basis, and another real world to serve as the original of the appearance, or copy of which is superimposed on the former. Thus in denying the reality of the world, the Advaitin is forced to accept the reality of two worlds.

The syllogism used by the Advaitin to prove that the world is *Mithyā* neither real nor unreal is unacceptable because it is fallacious. The syllogism is 'whatever is seen or perceived is *Mithyā*, e.g., silver in the shell'. The world is perceived so it is *Mithyā*, unreal. Here, *Mithyātva* is *Sādhya*, the Major this has to be proved of the world. The world is *Pakṣa*, the Minor *Āśraya*, a support of *Sādhya* and being perceived is a *Hetu*, the Middle or the reason given for deducing the conclusion. Madhva points out that this syllogism contains 12 fallacies recognized in Indian Logic.

To mention a few: a) The fallacy of *Pakṣa* occurs when the *Pakṣa* i.e., the *Āśraya*, the support of *Sādhya* is not true (real). Since according to Advaita, *Āśrayī*, the world is not real, the *Mithyātva* cannot be proved of it.

b) *Apprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*, the fallacy of *Sādhya*; the Advaitins may say that "*Mithyā*" does not mean false or unreal, but it means *Anirvacanīya* that which is neither real nor unreal, or that which cannot be described as real or as unreal. Therefore, there is no fallacy of *Āśrayāsiddha*. Madhva replies that since all objects are such that they can be described as real or unreal, there is no entity which is inexpressible or indescribable as real or unreal. The adjective *Anirvacanīya* is not in use. The Advaitin is not justified in introducing the quite unfamiliar adjective *Anirvacanīya*. So his reasoning contains the fallacy of *Apprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*.

c) *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* or *Bādha*, this fallacy occurs when the conclusion is denied, i.e., when the absence of *Sādhya* is proved, by stronger *Pramāṇas*. The Advaitins try to prove that the *Viśva* is *Mithyā* by the means of this syllogism (inference). This conclusion is opposed to *Pratyakṣa* and Vedic teaching. *Pratyakṣa* shows that the world is *Satya*, not *Mithyā*. Similarly, it is

opposed to Vedic sentences like *viśvam satyam* etc. Thus, there is a fallacy of *Bādha*.[4]

The premise of the Advaitic inference, whatever is perceived is unreal (false). The Advaitin holds that the reality of the self is intuitively seen. Yet, he does not say that the self is unreal; he says that the self is real. Thus, that premise is opposed to the Advaitic view of the self.

Similarly, whatever is *Jaḍa*, the material is unreal. The world is material. The world is unreal, cannot be accepted for its premise can be shown to be opposed to the Advaitic idea of Brahmā, hence the Advaitin himself cannot accept it. For material, means the one that is not-knower. The Advaitic view is that the Brahmā is not knower that there is no distinction between the known and the knower in the absolute.

However, the Advaita says that the absolute is not unreal, but is real. If the Advaitin replies that *Jaḍa*, the matter means non-illumination, non-light or non-knowledge, but self is pure illumination (consciousness or knowledge), hence is real. Matter is unreal for it is opposed to the self; then also the reply is untenable, for consciousness must be consciousness of something; knowledge must be knowledge of something etc. There must be some object of consciousness, or knowledge or revelation etc. But according to Advaita itself, there cannot be any object of pure consciousness or knowledge (self). For the self cannot be its object; it is a pure eternal subject and never an object. Advaitin says that nothing other than *Ātmā*, the self is real. So for self (conscious) there is no real object. If it has no object, it cannot be conscious. Thus the self, in the Advaitic view, becomes material and unreal.

Madhva strongly refutes the Advaitic claim that there is scriptural evidence in support of its view of the unreality of the world, and points out that there is ample scriptural evidence in favour of the reality of the world.

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[4] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru) pp.57-68

a) *yenāśrutaṁ śrutaṁ bhavatyamataṁ matamavijñātaṁ vijñātaṁ*[5]. This means that from the knowledge of Brahmā, the absolute all, i.e., the whole world is known. The examples given are as follows; from the knowledge of one lump of clay all things made up of clay are known, from the knowledge of one piece of metal or iron all things made up of that metal or iron are known. This is likely to be interpreted as stating that since the knowledge of one Brahmā makes the whole world known, the world has no separate existence from Brahmā that the Brahmā alone is real but the whole world is unreal. Madhva argues that it cannot be its meaning. For if it were intended to state that the world is an illusion, it should have been clearly stated that knowledge of the Brahmā erases or removes the illusion of the world, e.g., In rope-snake illusion, when we come to know that it is a rope, the illusion of the snake disappears. But it does not state this.

On the contrary, it states that from the knowledge of the Brahmā, the knowledge of the world arises; when the Brahmā is known the world is known. The world must be real for its knowledge to come from the real Brahmā. But when the rope is known, the non-existence of the snake and not the snake is known. What this Upanisadic statement means is that God is the creator of world, God is real and the world that is his creation is real. It also means that the world depends on God, so when God is known, the nature of the world becomes known. The conditions under which the knowledge of the 'one' leads to knowledge of the 'many' are stated by Madhva. They are; i) prominence or importance, when we know a few prominent places of a city, we say that we know that whole city; or a law is more important than its instances, so when we know the law, we come to know the many instances covered by it. E.g., the law of falling bodies states that the velocity of a falling body depends on time of its falling. When we know this, we come to know that all falling bodies obey this law, and that the velocity of their falling increases as the time of their falling increases. ii) When the cause is known, its various effects are known. iii) When one thing is known, the many things similar to it are known. For example, when one cow is known, all cows similar to it are known.

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[5] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru) p.296

There is a similarity between a lump of clay and things made of clay, between a piece of iron and things made of iron. Hence, when clay or a piece of iron is known, the things made of them are known. Now God is *Bimba* and the world consisting of spirit-matter, is his *Pratibimba*. God is the centre of the various qualities and energies or powers found in the selves and the material objects in the universe; the natures of the latter derive from, depend upon God. What is not in *Bimba* i.e., God cannot be in *Pratibimba*, the world. A *Pratibimba* must be similar in some respects to its *Bimba*. Because of its similarity, when God is known, all things in the world are known.

b) *vācārambho vikāro nāmadheyaṁ mṛttiketyeva satyam*[6]. This Upanisadic statement also does not support the Advaitic view that the world is illusory or unreal. *Vikāra*, the modification of a lump of clay, i.e., the various things made up of clay are called pot, jar, plate, etc.

According to the Advaitic interpretation, the various modifications are *Nāmadheya*, mere names. The things bearing those names are not at all real, they are illusory fabrications, their essence, clay, is the only real thing. The clay appears to change into various modifications, but it does not really change at all, the various things are only appearances. Taking a lump of clay to indicate Brahmā and the various things to indicate the world, the Advaitin holds that this scriptural statement asserts the reality of the Brahmā alone, but denies the reality of the world superimposed on Brahmā by ignorance.

The Brahmā does not really change into the objects of the world, but only appears to do so. Madhva has shown that it cannot be its meaning. i) There is no word in this statement referring to the illusoriness of things in this world. The Advaitin superimposes this, or imagines this to be the meaning of this statement by ignorance or bias. Hence his interpretation is wrong. ii) This statement means that just as clay and the things made up of it are real, God and the world are real. iii) The Advaitin takes the word *Vācārambhaṇa* to mean nominal existence but not in reality. Madhva objects that that word is not at all used in that sense anywhere. Further, this

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[6] Daśaprakaraṇa. (ABMMM, Bengaluru) p.302

cannot be its meaning, and this must be admitted by the Advaitin himself for he interprets another word "*Nāmadheyaṁ*" in that sentence as meaning existing only in name. If they mean the same, one of them becomes redundant and the statement becomes meaningless. The supposition of some Advaitins that *Vācārambhaṇa* means *Mithyā* is wrong, for that word is not used anywhere in that sense.

c) i) *anādimāyayā supto yadā jīvaḥ prabudhyate /*
ajamanidrasvapnamadvaitaṁ budhyate tadā //7[a]

ii) *prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṁśayaḥ /*
māyāmātramidaṁ dvaitamadvaitam paramārthataḥ //7[b]

iii) *vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit /*
upadeśādayaṁ vādo jñāte dvaitaṁ na vidyate //7[c]

These three *Kārikās* of Māndūkopaniṣat which are supposed to uphold Advaita are shown by Madhva to support Dvaita.

According to Advaitin these mean: i) When the individual self sleeping under the influence of beginning less *Māyā* wakes up, it realizes the unborn (uncaused) sleepless dreamless absolute i.e., non-duality.

ii) If the world were real it would undoubtedly cease to exist. The duality is a mere *Māyā* or illusion. Ultimately the absolute alone is real.

iii) If the world were a figment of imagination of someone, it is liable to disappear. When real knowledge is obtained i.e., when the ultimate reality (absolute) is intuitively realized, the duality will cease to exist.

It is natural on the part of the Advaitin to seize the expression *Māyāmātram*, to take it as meaning 'The world is *Māyā* or *Mithyā*, the false', and thus to emphasize unduly its importance in supporting his view; but Madhva points out that the Advaitin is not at all justified in doing so, for that expression does not mean what the Advaitin supposes it means. According to Madhva, *Māyā* means inscrutable wonderful energy of God, and *Mātram* means known and protected by God. Therefore, the whole expression *Māyāmātram* means that which is known and protected by the

infinite might of lord Viṣṇu. If the world were illusory, then God's cognition of it would be false. But it is impossible for the cognition of the omniscient God to be illusory or false.God cannot have illusions.

Therefore, God's cognition of the world must be true, which means that its object, the world must be true (real). *Advaitaṁ paramārthataḥ* does not mean that the absolute alone is ultimately real. It means, says Madhva, that God, having none other equal to him (*Advaitam*) is the supreme highest reality. The first part of *Prapañca, Saṁśayaḥ* means if the world has a beginning, then it is destructible; for the objects that have a beginning or are produced are destructible, but the world consisting of five-fold difference, is indestructible. Hence the world is beginning-less and real. The meaning of *Vikalpo kenacit* is 'if the world was imaginary, it would disappear but it is not destructible, so it is not imaginary, but is real'.

The appropriate meaning of the *Kārikās* according to Madhva is a) When a person bound (asleep) by the beginningless power of God is liberated (awakened) by the grace of God, he sees the lord who is devoid of all defects like birth, death, ignorance, illusion or dream, and who destroys the wrong knowledge.

b) If the world consisting of five-fold difference had a beginning, it would undoubtedly disappear, but it does not disappear, so the world is beginning-less; and it is real, for it is known and protected by the wonderful power of the supreme God.

c) The beginning-less world of five-fold difference is real. This should be learnt from the proper teaching of a worthy preceptor. Ignorant persons say that there is no duality or difference.

d) Madhva critically considers the Advaitic view that the world is *Anirvacanīya*, the indescribable and rejects it.

e) Madhva holds that every object is describable in one way or the other. There cannot be an *Anirvacanīya* object; that the concept of *Anirvacanīya* has no application or content; it is empty.

Some Advaitins have tried to meet this objection by pointing out that the objects perceived in illusions and dreams are *Mithyā*. When the rope is seen as a snake, or shell as silver, snake and silver are *Mithyā*, and *Mithyā* means *Anirvacanīya* or inexpressible. Thus, everyone is aware of *Anirvacanīya* object. Madhva refutes it by saying that '*Mithyā*' does not mean '*Anirvacanīya*', it means 'false'. *Mithyā* is not at all used in the sense of *Anirvacanīya* by anyone anywhere. No one say that silver and snake seen in illusion are *Anirvacanīya*, but they say either it is false or unreal.

The Advaitin argues that hare's horn, a lotus in the sky are said to be false; we also say that a snake, silver seen in illusions are false. But there is a difference between the two cases. The hare's horn and a lotus in the sky are not at all perceived by any one, but illusory silver and snake are perceived. Therefore, these are not false in the way in which hare's horn etc., are false. To mark this difference, we say that the illusory snake etc., are indescribable while the hare's horn is false.

Madhva replies that 'silver is false' means silver is non-existent, 'hare's horn is false' means that hare's horn is non-existent. Simply because the silver appears in illusion, its non-existence cannot be said to be different from the non-existence of hare's horn.

The Advaitin argues that there is a basis for the concept of *Anirvacanīya* in the scriptures. He shifts his ground and says that'indescribable' means neither true nor false, or neither real nor unreal. An object which cannot be said to be true (real) or false (unreal) is indescribable. In this sense, scriptures say that *Avidyā*, the Ignorance is indescribable. This is the significance of the scriptural statement. *nāsadāsīt no sadāsīttadānīṁ nāsīdrajo...*[7] Here it is said that in dissolution there were no positive (real) objects, and there were no negative (unreal) objects but *Avidyā*, the *Tamas* was there. Advaitins say that it implies that *Tamas* is neither real nor unreal that it is *Anirvacanīya*, the indescribable. If *Avidyā*, the *Māyā* is indescribable, then its product the world must be indescribable. Madhva easily proves that this cannot be the

[7] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), p.79

correct interpretation, for this argument places the Advaitin in a fix. In the same part of the scripture, it is stated that in dissolution there was Brahmā.

If *Avidyā* is indescribable, then the Brahmā should also be indescribable. But the Advaitins cannot accept it. They hold that Brahmā is ultimately real. Further on the basis of other scriptural passages, Madhva points out that in that context *Sat* does not mean real and *Asat* does not mean unreal. *Sat* means concrete object like earth, water, *Asat* means abstract object like space and it is stated that Brahmā is different from both the concrete and the abstract. If Brahmā is anywhere said to be *Anirvacanīya*, it can only mean that Brahmā is too great and wonderful to be known completely by the finite mind.

Some Advaitins say that *Arthāpatti*, the disjunctive syllogism establishes the indescribability of the world. They argue "the world is either real or unreal or neither real nor unreal". The world is not real; for the real is not sublated, or the sublated is not real. But when the Brahmā is realized, the world is sublated; just as the illusory snake is sublated when we come to know that there is a rope. But the false or unreal object does not appear, or is not perceived, e.g. a hare's horn which is admitted to be false, is not perceived by any one. But the world is perceived. So it is not unreal. So it must be indescribable.

Madhva argues that it is wrong to say that the unreal cannot be known. For when we say that something is unreal, we must know what is meant by unreal and in what way it is different from the real. If the Advaitin says that there could be verbal knowledge of the unreal, but there cannot be perceptual knowledge of it for the unreal cannot be given in sense-experience. To this, Madhva retorts that there is no rule that the unreal cannot appear, it can and does appear in illusions; the non-existent snake appears as existent, and the existent rope appears as non-existent. This is the very essence of illusion. If this did not happen, then how can we be deluded by illusion? But simply because the unreal appears, it cannot be real or existent. The very meaning of "illusory" is false or unreal.

Further, when correct knowledge dawns upon us, the wrong cognition of the real, but not the real itself, disappears, e.g., when we come to know that it is not a snake, then the real object rope is not sublated, it remains; but our wrong impression of the snake disappears. Similarly, when Brahmā, the God is intuitively known, the wrong cognition of or belief about the world that it is uncreated by and independent of God, that it itself has the causal power to produce things etc., disappears. But the world itself continues to exist. No scripture states that when Brahmā is known the world itself ceases to exist.

To this the Advaitin may reply that there is a scriptural statement which states exactly this, e.g., *tarati śokamātmavit*[8]? Advaitin interprets it as stating that when Brahmā, theself is known, the world full of suffering disappears. Madhva denies this, and says that this scriptural statement means that when Brahmā, the God is known, the world ceases to produce suffering just as the statement, "This medicine, when taken, destroys poison means that this medicine stops the poison from producing bad effects."

Further the acceptance of the Advaitic view can be shown to imply the reality (truth) of the world. The Advaitin holds that, that which is sublated is not true (real). Since, knowledge of the Brahmā sublates the world, the world is unreal. But the self is real, because it is not sublated. This means that sublation or *Mithyātva*, the unreality is in the nature of the world. If so when the world is sublated, its *Mithyātva* is also sublated: its *Mithyātva* disappears, and if there is no sublation or *Mithyātva* in the world, the world must be true or real. Briefly, if the world is unreal, then its sublation is unreal or not true. If its sublation is not true, then it is real. Thus in Advaitins view, the world is real. There can be only two alternatives or possibilities in respect of an object; it can be either real or unreal.

The objects in the universe can be divided into two classes; a) real b) unreal. These two classes are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive i.e., an object, which belongs to one of these classes, cannot belong to another class, and there is no object that does not belong to one

[8] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), p.85

of these classes. It is impossible for an object to be real and unreal and to be neither real nor unreal. So there cannot be a world which is *Anirvacanīya* or *Sadasadvilakṣaṇa*, it must be either real or unreal. Whether an object is real or unreal can only be decided by *Anubhava*, the experience. The whole human experience shows that the world is real. An object perceived under normal conditions is real.

The Advaitin's attempt to prove the unreality or indescribability of the world is a total failure. In matters concerning the reality or existence of the universe, inference and *Śruti* are weaker than perception. Some Advaitins have objected to it. They say that in some cases inference or scripture shows that our perception is false. For example, we perceive the moon as big as a plate. But one scriptural statement tells us that the extension of the moon is eighty-one thousand *Yojana*[9].This shows that our perception of the moon as small as a plate is false. We see space as blue. But the inference 'as the space is abstract it cannot have colour' shows our perception of space as blue to be false. Are not scripture and inference more powerful than perception?

Madhva says that we do not come to know that these perceptions are false after reasoning, or after knowing the scriptural statement, we know beforehand that space cannot be coloured, it is beyond perception 'that distant objects appear smaller than they really are' by experience. No sooner do these perceptions arise, than we know them to be false. But illusoriness of perceptions of objects in the world is not known in this way.

If it were decided beforehand that the world is illusory, one would have claimed that all our perceptions of objects are false as soon as they arise. But falsity of some perceptions, like seeing shell as silver, or a pole as policeman is known after carrying out some tests to see whether the objects are really what they appear to be or not; and these tests consist of perceptual experiences. Thus, it is our experience that shows the reality of the world. As the Advaitic view of the world is opposed to our experience, it is untenable. To conclude with the correct and the significant statement of

[9] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), p.102

S N Dasgupta, "there are so many passages in the Upaniṣats that are clearly theistic and dualistic in purport, that no amount of linguistic trickery could convincingly show that they yield meaning that would support Śaṅkara's position that Brahmā alone is the ultimate reality and all else is false."[10]

Difference

Another concept which is intimately connected with that of the universe, and which is strongly defended by the Dvaitins and equally strongly attacked by the Advaitins is that of difference. The Advaitins who hold that absolute is attributeless and differenceless are logically forced to deny the reality of difference, distinction, multiplicity, variety or relation. Difference implies manyness. A thing can be different from another thing. It is a dyadic relation which requires at least two (but at most, any number of) terms or things between which it can hold. Only a very few relations are monadic or reflexive, i.e., they require only one thing to hold, or they hold between a thing and itself, e.g., A is identical with A, A is similar to itself. All other relations require two or more terms between which they can hold. Dvaitins admit the reality of many things and relations among them.

Between the three main real entities a) God b) self c) world (matter) of Madhva's system there is a five-fold difference:

Difference between a) God and self, b) God and *Jaḍa*, the material world, c) self and material world, d) oneself and other selves, and between e) one material object and other material objects.

According to Madhva these differences are eternal, intrinsic and basic; they are inherent in the very natures of the real entities. Another name for the *Viśva*, the universe is *Prapañca*, which connotes the five differences. Since the world is real, these differences are also real. Their reality is established by perception, inference, and scriptures. We directly perceive a difference between one physical object (table) and another object (pen), between one *Jīva*, a person and another, and between a person and a physical object.

[10] S N Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.2

We can know difference indirectly by inference. For example, Electricity and heat are energies. But electricity is used to light our homes and cities; while heat is not so used. Therefore, they are different, or Īśvara is the creator of the world; no *Jīva* can create a world. So Īśvara and *Jīva* are different. Scriptures emphatically declare that the difference between Īśvara, *Jīva* and *Jagat* is real. Though the reality of difference is thus so firmly established, the Advaitins have denied its reality.

a) The Advaitins argue that the concept of difference involves the fallacy of *Anyonyāśraya*, the reciprocal dependence. The knowledge of difference among objects presupposes or depends upon the prior knowledge of difference, and the knowledge of difference depends upon the knowledge of objects. To know objects are different, we must know difference, and to know difference we must know the objects, or without knowing the objects, we cannot know that they are different, without knowing the difference we cannot know the objects. Thus it is said, linguistically, "difference" can be an adjective or a substantive, e.g., God and self are different. Here it is used as an adjective. There is a difference between God and the self. Here it is used as a substantive. To know that it is either an adjective or a substantive, we have to know the difference between the two; and to know the difference, we have to know them.

Similarly in a proposition stating difference, there is *Dharmī*, that which is distinguished from something; and *Pratiyogī*, that from which it is distinguished. E.g., God is different from the self. God is distinguished from self; God is *Dharmī*; self is differentiated from God; self is *Pratiyogī*. To know their status we have to know the difference and to know the difference we have to know their status.

Madhva rejects this objection. The occurrence of the fallacy of reciprocal dependence requires at least two terms or things that are interdependent. The above objection of the Advaitins therefore implies that knowledge of nature of objects and knowledge of difference among them are two distinct but interdependent cognitions. Madhva denies this. According to him, *Bheda*, the difference, is *Vastusvarūpa*, the essence or the nature of

an object. So the knowledge of the nature of an object involves knowledge of its difference from others; knowing an object and knowing its difference are not two, but one and the same cognition. When we know or perceive an object, we at the same time know or perceive that it is different, in a general way, from all other objects, and in a specific way from some objects under consideration. Hence the question whether the knowledge of an object is prior to knowledge of its difference, or the knowledge of difference is prior to that of an object does not arise at all[11]. Hence there is no fallacy of reciprocal dependence.

To this, it is objected that difference cannot be *Svarūpa*, the essence an object. For, to know that A is different from B, we must know A, B and the difference between them. But for the cognition of *Svarūpa* of an object it is sufficient to know *Dharmī*, the object itself is not necessary to know *Pratiyogīs*, the counter corelates (other objects) from which it differs. To state it in a different way, the propositions about the *Svarūpa* of an object are *Nirapekṣa*, the non-relational, they are of the subject-predicate type. For example, chalk is white, while those about difference are *Sāpekṣa*, the relational. They state a relation between objects; for example, chalk is different from pen. Hence they require knowledge of both the related objects.

Madhva replies that if this is so, then the same objection can be levelled against the Advaitic conception of identity. According to the Advaitin, the Brahmā and *Ātmā* are identical and this identity is the very nature of the Brahmā or *Ātmā*. But identity-relation is *Sāpekṣa*. To know that they are identical, we have to know the nature of Brahmā and of *Ātmā* and the identity of the former with the latter; from knowing Brahmā alone or *Ātmā* alone, we cannot know their identity; knowledge of both is necessary. If identity, which is *Sāpekṣa*, is admitted by the Advaitin to be the essence or nature of the Brahmā, then how can he object that difference cannot be

[11] "Madhva says that the very perception of an object is perception of difference An object is what it is on account of its difference from others and on account of possession of certain identifiable characteristics..." R N Sharma quoted by Shanbhag p.86

the *Svarūpa* because it is *Sāpekṣa*? He is not at all justified in raising that objection.[12]

The Advaitin puts forward another objection to Madhva's view that difference is the very essence or nature of an object. He says that if the difference were the nature of an object, then as soon as an object is known, its difference from other objects would be known, so one object could not be confused with another, and we could not have any doubt about the identity of an object. But experience, which according Madhva is very powerful in such matters, shows that we do feel doubt about an object (e.g., is it piece of chalk or a rolled white paper?) and confuse one object with another. In illusions one object is confused with another. Hence difference cannot be the nature of an object.

Madhva denies this. He points out that when we perceive an object, we perceive it as distinct from other objects. If the object does not stand out distinctly from its background, we cannot perceive it as a unique object. e.g., a static white bear in a snow field does not standout from its ground, it is not perceived as a bear; it may be seen as a lump of snow. But when it moves, its difference from its ground is noticed and it is perceived and identified as a unique or specific object. There cannot be any doubt about the fact supported by abundant experience, that to perceive an object is to perceive it as different from others.

Madhva's view accords well with the modern Gestalt conception of Figure and Ground. But this does not rule out the occurrence of doubt in the recognition of an object or of illusion. In the rope-snake case, we generally perceive the object before us i.e., rope as different from various objects in its vicinity. But we fail to notice its specific difference from a snake. And we

[12] Madhva's reply is correct. But rose is different- is incomplete, it needs (*Sāpekṣa*) addition of that from which it is different. Similarly Rose is identical is incomplete till that with which it is identical is added. Madhva correctly points out this similarity between them. But there are also important logical differences between identity and difference. Both these relations are symmetrical but identity is transitive and reflexive while difference is not. Stebbing, Modern Introduction to Logic, p.168

perceive its similarity with a snake, so we percieve it as a snake. What we do when we carry out tests, like going nearer, touching it etc., is that we try to find out its specific differences. When we see that it is specifically or uniquely different from a snake, doubt and illusion vanish, and we see that it is not a snake, but a rope.

Madhva further strengthens his view by showing that its denial leads to an absurd conclusion. Everyone is aware that he is different from the object which he perceives. He knows by experience that his nature is different from that of a stone or a table. If he denies this, then he would have to accept that he is the same as the object of his perception; that he is a table or tree. Is the Advaitin prepared to accept the absurdity that he is what he perceives?

Some Advaitins still object that Madhva's view makes the knowledge of the nature of an object impossible. For, any one object in the universe differs from all others in one or many respects. And if difference is the nature of an object, then all these differences from all other objects would constitute the nature of one object; and to know the nature of one object, one would have to know all these innumerable distinctions between one object and all others, which is impossible.

Madhva admits that it is not possible for us to know all the differences between one object and all the others. Only the omniscient being, God, can have such knowledge of all; and we are not omniscient. But the knowledge of the nature of a thing does not require omniscience. We, who are not omniscient, can have knowledge of the nature of a thing. We do speak of having knowledge of a person or thing. To know an object, what is necessary is not knowledge of its difference from all other objects in the whole universe, but its difference from a few other things with which it is associated, and in which we are interested at a certain time.

Our interest determines the extent of the field of investigations, and the selection of things or events that are relevant to the solution of a problem. Observation is selective and purposive. e.g., if we are interested in

understanding the nature of malaria, we look for the differences between its symptoms, course, cause, cure, medicine etc., and those of other kinds of fever. We always concentrate on what is relevant and ignore what is irrelevant. Malaria differs from wood, stone and from other things; studying the differences between malaria and a stone etc., would be foolishness bordering on idiocy on our part; because it is entirely irrelevant in knowing the nature of malaria. Thus, to know the nature of a thing, it is sufficient to study a few and not all things that are different from it and are relevantly related to it. Scientists do it in their investigations, and we do it in our practical life.

Another important objection to Madhva's view is that, when we speak of, say, pen of A, or colour of A we imply that A and pen, A and colour are not the same. A thing and its nature are not different, they are the same. So if the difference is the nature of A, it should be the same as A; then how can one speak of "difference of A", which implies that "difference" and A are not the same. Hence, that "difference" cannot be the nature of A. Further, the nature of A consists of its innumerable differences from other things; then, the unity, oneness, or identity of A would be exhausted in its differences, nothing of its unity or oneness would remain; it would not be the one and the samething, and if unity or identity is not there, then there would not be difference, plurality or manyness; thus there would be nothing in being.[13]

Madhva meets this objection by pointing out that, though a thing and its nature are the same, we speak of 'nature of a thing' without implying that they are different. Similarly, difference which is the essence or nature of a thing, is spoken of as "difference of a thing," without implying that the thing and its difference are different. Here there is identity between a thing and its nature, but our talk indicates a difference between the two. To the question 'how can we talk of difference where there is identity?' Madhva's answer is that this is made possible by *Viśeṣa*, a unique or particular differentiating potency in a thing. The same answer is given to the question how a thing retains its unity and identity in spite of, and in the face of, plurality and

[13] B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass MLBD, Delhi), p.94

difference in it. A thing does this through its *Viśeṣas*. Difference and identity, variety and unity oneness and manyness etc., are characteristics of a thing. It is one; it is what it is because of its difference from others. It is a whole of parts and aspects or attributes and relations, which are intimately related in such a way as to form a unique system, in the sense that the arrangement of parts and aspects in one thing is not present in another thing.

A thing is not simply, merely, entirely identical with difference, multiplicity in it, or a thing is not difference or manyness; it is not identical, without a remainder with difference. It is difference plus something more unique, it is *Saviśeṣābheda*, the difference with a specific or unique remainder of its own. *Viśeṣas*, the unique powers in substances enable us to think or talk of one thing as having many characteristics. The concept of *Viśeṣa* plays an important role in answering objections or solving problems. The Advaitin cannot deny the reality of difference, because his doctrines of *Anirvacanīyatva* and *Brahmātmaikya* imply difference.

Advaitin says, *Anirvacanīya* means that which is neither real nor unreal, i.e., that which is different from both the real and the unreal. This implies that *Sat* is different from *Asat* and *Anirvacanīyatva* is different from both. If he denies this, then he would have to say that the absolute is *Asat* or it is *Anirvacanīya*. But he is not prepared to accept this. Thus, he has to accept the difference between them. Similarly, his view that the Brahmā and the *Ātmā* are non-different, forces him to accept the concept of difference. For, to know non-difference (absence of difference) we have to first know difference; then only we can decide whether there is, or is not, difference.

Madhva emphasizes the ultimate reality of difference. Difference is not an external, separable provisional characteristic of an object; it is the very core or essence of it. The world consisting of objects and selves is ultimately real; it is full of variety, difference. Hence difference must be ultimately real. The Advaitin may admit that difference is confined to the *Vyāvahārikasat*, the empirical world. Our perceptual knowledge shows difference, plurality in the world. But he says it is not ultimately real, the Brahmā appears as the world of multiplicity due to *Avidyā* or *Māyā*; when the ego becomes free

from *Avidyā* and realizes Brahmā, the difference also disappears, and it sees its identity with the Brahmā. Madhva rejects it; and points out that there are many passages in Vedas which clearly state that in *Mokṣa*, God and self are different, God and world are different, and that the liberated selves some are different from one another.

Some object that difference cannot be *Vastusvarūpa*. For it is a relation between two or more objects. A chair is different from a table, man, fruit, tree, ball etc., of which object is it *Svarūpa*. The answer to it is simple. Being different from a table and others is the nature of a chair, and being different from a chair is the nature of a table and or others. Another objection, 'if *Bheda* is *Vastusvarūpa*, then the object and its difference would be the same, and the terms referring to them would be synonymous'. But the word 'chair' is not synonymous with, 'difference from...', they do not mean the same. If they meant the same, then one of them would be sufficient and the other would be superfluous. But this is not so. Hence *Bheda* cannot be *Vastusvarūpa*.

It is replied that *Bheda* being *Vastusvarūpa*, is non-different from or identical with the object. But it is not completely absolutely identical with the object. It is *Saviśeṣābheda* - identity in difference. A *Viśeṣa* is potency in a thing which introduces difference in identity. The universe of five-fold difference is asserted to be real. In spite of these differences among the liberated selves, they all reside as real friends in the vicinity of lord Viṣṇu. The liberated self which has become free from sin and impurity of any kind is naturally more similar in certain respects to, but not identical with God, than the self is bondage. '*tadā vidvān puṇyapāpe vidhūya nirañjanaḥ paramaṁ sāmyamupaiti*'[14] i.e., on intuitive perception of God, the knower, free from sin and also from merit, which is the cause of temporary happiness and an enemy of liberation (eternal joy), becomes similar to God.

Further inference supports difference between bondage and liberation. The Advaitin who denies difference, must deny the difference between the

[14] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), p.309

state of liberation and of bondage; i.e., he must hold that liberated selves are victims of sorrow, sin, and ignorance, and bound selves enjoy bliss and intuitive knowledge. If this is so, there would be no point in taking the trouble for the attainment of liberation. Thus, the Advaitic denial of difference, by upsetting and uprooting the distinction between bondage and liberation, brings confusion and chaos into moral and spiritual life. Śrī Krishna denies knowledge of identity of self with Brahmā, but affirms the knowledge of the difference between them. If the Advaitic view is correct, then we have to say that Śrī Krishna's knowledge of the difference between self and Brahmā is false or illusory, which to say the least, is blasphemous. The omniscient God cannot be said to have illusory or false cognition. His knowledge of difference is sufficient to prove the ultimate reality of difference.

Chapter VII – Madhva's Theory of Knowledge

Generally, three aspects of human nature; a) cognitive (intellect), b) conative (will) and c) affective (feeling), have been recognized. Epistemology is concerned with the cognitive aspect. Man, as an intellectual being, is a seeker after truth. He wants to distinguish between the truth and the false in all domains of inquiry viz., philosophy, science, and values. This implies that in science or empirical knowledge the distinction between the truth and the falsehood holds good. Hence, the Advaitic view that all such knowledge is *Avidyā*, the false, because it is about the world, which is *Mithyā*, is false. That the Advaitic view is false can be shown by asking a simple question. Is his doctrine that all empirical knowledge is false is itself true or false? If he answers that it is true, he would be admitting against his own view with an element of truth in that field. If he answers that it is false, then it's contradictory that all empirical knowledge is not false, that there are veridical and non-veridical experiences, would be true. Indeed, this is covertly or implicitly admitted by the Advaitin in his recognition of *Vyāvahārikasat*. Here he refuses (viz., reality of the world) to admit through the front door, he is prepared to admit through the hind door.

According to Madhva, the term *Pramāṇa* is used in two senses; it means a) true or valid cognition b) the means by which true cognition is obtained. The former i.e., correct knowledge, is called *Kevalapramāṇa*. The latter i.e., the means of such knowledge is *Anupramāṇa*.

a) The cognition that reveals (with the help of *Sākṣī*, the evidence) the nature of its object as it really is, is the correct cognition, *yathārthaṁ pramāṇam*.[1] The object of knowledge is *Artha*. Knowledge is that does not cognize what is not in its object or that does not reveal its object as something else other than what it really is. Seeing a rope as a rope, knowing that 2+2=4, and God is the only independent reality, are examples of the correct knowledge, *Kevalapramāṇa*. Defectless perception,

[1] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), p.548

inference and verbal testimony, which give correct knowledge, are *Anupramāṇas*.

Thus, doubt and illusion are also not *Pramāṇas*. The doubt as to whether it is a rope or a snake represents an object that is there correctly as a rope but it also represents that same object incorrectly as a snake; and it does not definitely inform us as to which one of them is the case. So it is not a *Pramāṇa*. And, as an illusion shows an object as something other than itself rope as a snake, shell as silver it cannot be a *Pramāṇa*.

Madhva distinguishes four kinds of *Kevalapramāṇa*; a) *Īśvarajñāna*, b) *Lakṣmījñāna*, c) *Yogijñāna* and d) *Ayogijñāna*. Another distinction which cuts across this is between i) *Svarūpajñāna*, the non-sensory intuitive knowledge of the essence or nature of selfhood and ii) *Vṛttijñāna*, the sensory knowledge gained by means of internal and external senses. *Yathārthajñāna*, the valid knowledge may be either *Svarūpajñāna* or *Vṛttijñāna*. *Svarūpajñāna* is knowledge of the existence and nature of the self. It is an immediate, intuitive, indubitable, absolutely certain knowledge about one's own self. Everyone knows, with certainty, his own existence, his pleasures, pains etc. Such knowledge is also called *Svānubhava*.[2] *Īśvarajñāna* and *Lakṣmījñāna* are the nature of *Svarūpajñāna* only; while *Yogijñāna* and *Ayogijñāna* are the nature of *Svarūpajñāna* and *Vṛttijñāna*.

a) *Īśvarajñāna*, the God's knowledge of himself and of all other objects and events is *Svarūpajñāna* i.e., immediate, intuitive, clear, luminous, definite veridical or true, all comprehensive, eternal and independent knowledge. It is a part of his nature. He comprehends all; nothing can escape from his *Divyadṛṣṭi*, the great intuition nothing is unknown to him. His intuitive perception of the world is a ground for the proof of the reality of the world. God's perception of the world must be true. So, the world perceived (known) by him must be real.

b) *Lakṣmījñāna*, the Lakṣmī's knowledge is also *Svarūpajñāna*. Lakṣmī has no complete knowledge of the nature of God; but she knows far more

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[2] '*Svarūpajñāna – Svānubhava*' Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), p.225

about the nature of God, than other dependent selves. She knows all other things though her knowledge of them is not as clear or luminous as God's knowledge of them. Basically, her knowledge is dependent on God. Her knowledge though inferior to that of God, is superior to the knowledge possessed by the other dependent selves, lower than herself in the hierarchy.

c) *Yogījñāna*: those who rigorously practice yoga consisting of doing penance, devout repetition of God's name, *Dhyāna*, the meditation or *Samādhi*, the deep concentration in Truth or God, are Yogīs. By the power of their yogic practice they are able to have *Svarūpajñāna* and *Vṛttijñāna* of past, present and future objects and events. All of them do not deserve to be equal in gaining such knowledge; some gain more and better than other Yogīs. Their *Svarūpajñāna* has no beginning or end. It is eternal and goes on extending depending on the result of their yogic practice. Even in *Mokṣa*, they have *Svarūpajñāna*. Whereas, their *Vṛttijñāna*, though it does not have a beginning, continues uninterrupted till they attain *Mokṣa*. But when they are liberated, they are without *Antaḥkaraṇa*, the mind, hence they have no *Vṛttijñāna*. Thus, *Vṛttijñāna* is not eternal. According to Madhva, *Yogijñāna*, the knowledge Yogī is of three kinds; i) *Ṛjuyogijñāna*, ii) *Tātvikayogijñāna* and iii) *Atātvikayogijñāna*.

i) Those Yogīs who are fit to become the four faced Brahmā, the architect but not the creator of the world are *Ṛjuyogīs*. They have *Svarūpajñāna* and *Vṛttijñāna*, which do not have a beginning and other objects in them. But their knowledge of God is incomplete. They can access all the objects by just thinking or reflection. Their knowledge of God and the objects is more limited and less luminous than *Lakṣmījñāna* but it is superior to the knowledge of the selves lower than themselves. Though their knowledge has no beginning and eternal, their continued yogic practice makes it more luminous (clearer), more specific and more extensive till they are liberated. After their liberation it remains unchanged.

ii) *Tātvikayogijñāna*: the various presiding deities of the *Tatvas*, the reals (Varuṇa, the presiding deity of water, Agni, the deity of fire and others) are Tātvikayogīs. They have *Vṛttijñāna*, without a beginning, but their

knowledge is much more limited than that of Ṛjuyogīs in respect of its range and quality. There are many things beyond the reach of their knowledge.

iii) *Atātvikayogijñāna* is the knowledge of those who are not the presiding deities. Their essence or nature is that it does not have a beginning, but their knowledge is not so; it has a beginning. They cognize *Svarūpajñāna*, only after they rise to a higher spiritual level by their practices. Their *Jñāna* is very much limited.

iv) Ayogīs are the people other than the Yogīs. They include *Uttama*, the best people who are fit for liberation and *Madhyama* and *Adhama*, the other persons who are lower in spiritual hierarchy than the *Muktiyogyas*. The knowledge of *Muktiyogyas* is more extensive and clearer than that of others. Though this view of Madhva is couched in the theological expressions it has a great psychological and epistemological significance. It is a psychological fact that all persons are not equal in knowledge (and other abilities democracy may confer on all the (restricted) equality of all in front of law. it cannot make them all equal in their capacities) that some persons have more knowledge than others.

Its epistemological significance is that it contains a distinction between *Vṛttijñāna*, the sensory or empirical knowledge and *Svarūpajñāna*, the non-sensory (a priori) knowledge. That a priori knowledge expressed in logically necessary propositions is about the nature or essence of the objects or concepts has been accepted by all, e.g., 2+2=4. It states that it is in the very nature of four to be equal to the addition of two and two; or that a number which is not equal to the sum of 2+2, could not, by its very nature, be 4. It is in the very nature of the triangle to be bounded by three straight lines. 'A physical object cannot be in two places at the same time' or 'two physical objects cannot be in the same place at the same time' are about the nature of the physical objects etc.

The same distinction is stated very clearly as the distinction between *Bāhyajñāna*, the external knowledge and *Anubhavātmakajñāna* or *Sākṣijñāna*, the intuitive knowledge. *Sākṣijñāna* is called *Anubhava*. This is always flawless and true or valid. This is better or more powerful than

all other cognitions. External knowledge is that which arises from sense organs, inference and verbal testimony. It differs from *Sākṣijñāna* that it is not always true. It is correct or true only when it is flawless; and under normal conditions it is correct or valid. It is wrong when it arises from defective senses or reasoning defective verbal testimony.

The means of *Vṛttijñāna*, the correct cognition, which are called *Anupramāṇa*, are, according to Madhva, only three, viz., flawless *Pratyakṣa*, the perception, flawless *Anumāna*, the inference and flawless *Āgama*, the verbal testimony.

Pratyakṣa

Perception involves three factors; a) *Jñānendriya*, the sense organ, b) *Vastu* (*Viṣaya*), the object and c) *Sannikarṣa*, the contact between a sense organ and its object. When all these factors are without any defect; perception gives correct or valid knowledge, it is *Anupramāṇa*. But when one or all of these factors are defective it yields false or wrong knowledge, then it is *Apramāṇa*. Some familiar defects of sense organs are blindness, deafness, colour blindness, weak hearing, tongue's capacity for taste becoming weak during fever or disease etc. The defects in the objects are its great distance from the percipient, absence or scarcity of light, similarity of an object to another object etc. Thus, a remotely moving or big object is perceived as static or small object, shell is perceived as silver because of its similarity to the latter, a colour blind man's perception of colours green as blue etc., is wrong. It is through the contact between sense organ and object established by the inner organ that we cognize perceptual knowledge. If the inner (subtle) organ is engaged elsewhere and fails to establish such a contact, then even when the sense organ and object are in right condition i.e., defectless. We do not perceive the object. Thus, sometimes we do not see an object before us, or do not hear the words spoken by a person near us or we may have very vague impressions of them. Because our *Manas* fails to establish the contact between them. In such cases, we say that our mind or *Manas* was somewhere else etc.

Madhva divides *Pratyakṣa* into seven kinds.[3] This division is based on seven *Indriyas* recognized by him. These *Indriyas*, the sense organs are divided roughly into two types; a) *Ātma+svarūpendriya* and b) *Ātma+asvarūpendriya*, those that are different from *Ātma+svarūpendriya*. The *Ātma+asvarūpendriya* is also called *Sākṣī*, the self acting as an *Indriya*, the means of *Vṛttijñāna*, the absolute or ultimate knowledge. That is the nature of *Vṛttijñāna*. The *Sākṣī* has intuitive, valid perception of its own self and its attributes, like bliss, consciousness etc., of mind or *Manas* and its modifications, of *Avidyā*, perceptual knowledge gained through external senses, feelings of pleasure, pain etc., and of time, space and God, *Dharma*, *Adharma*, etc. *Sākṣijñāna* is indubitable and valid knowledge. The *Indriyas* other than the *Svarūpendriya* or *Sākṣī* are the five external senses. They are eye (visualize), ear (hear), nose (smell), tongue (taste), and skin (touch) and the internal *Manas*, the mind (reminiscence). We are familiar with the fact that almost all our perceptual knowledge of objects and events in the world, got from the external senses under normal conditions is true. It is because it is true and its object the world is real and we are able to live and carry out our various transactions successfully.

But our knowledge is not all comprehensive. It is limited both in its extent and depth. We come to know those objects and aspects, and the attributes of them in which we are interested. Though limited, our knowledge can be correct. Our ordinary and scientific knowledge is not *Avidyā*, it is valid knowledge as far as it goes.

Our senses, *Manas*, and intellect are believed to be created by God in such a way as to enable us to have, when they are flawless and conditions are favourable, valid (but limited) knowledge of objects and events. Our knowledge consists of a) perceptual knowledge obtained from the internal and external senses, b) inferential knowledge from reasoning, c) knowledge got from verbal testimony and d) intuitive knowledge yielded by the *Sākṣī*.

To err is human. This is one of the most important criteria to establish

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[3] '*pratyakṣaṁ saptavidhaṁ, sākṣiṣaḍindriyabhedena*' Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), p.562

Jīveśvarabheda, for God by his very essence of being omniscient cannot err, but a human being by his very nature which is limited in its various aspects, cannot help erring. It should be noted that the escape from error, to know the truth, is also human. Our experience shows that almost all of our experiences and judgements are true while a negligible few are false. So a philosophical theory of knowledge must give an adequate account of truth and falsehood. Madhva's epistemology does give a satisfactory explanation of both.

The valid knowledge reveals the nature of its object as it really is i.e., it agrees with the nature of its object; not, of course, with all the aspects or details of its object, for the object has innumerable details, all of which cannot be comprehended by our finite mind; but with those relevant aspects of the object that is sufficient for our cognitive purpose of knowing the object. Truth or validity is not subjective; it does not depend on our thought or feeling. If I feel or think that a certain statement or experience is true, it is not made true by my feeling or thought. Truth or validity is objective; if a proposition or experience is true, then it is true, not because I think or feel it to be so, but because it agrees with the nature of its object or with its fact.

Truth or validity is universal, absolute and eternal. What is true for one person is true for all others. Indeed the expression 'truth for one person' seems absurd. Truth does not admit of degrees, a statement or an experience is either true or false; it cannot be more or less true or false. What is true or false once is always true or false.

There are many theories regarding the relation between the truth or validity and the cognition, on the one hand, and the apprehension of validity on the other hand. It is sufficient to consider two main theories; a) *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda* held by the Naiyāyikas and b) *svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda* or *Prāmāṇyasvatatsva* of Madhva. According to *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*, the doctrine of derived validity, the validity (truth) or invalidity (falsity) of cognition is not an essence of cognition. It is not intrinsic but extrinsic to it in the sense that the cognition itself does not carry the implication of its validity or invalidity. If invalidity or truth were intrinsic to cognition,

then there would be no room for doubt and error in our experience and judgement. But the fact that we doubt or even reject as false some of our cognitions is sufficient to show that validity cannot be inherent to cognition. The fact that we are deceived by illusions shows that invalidity is not intrinsic to cognition. Thus, the Naiyāyikas argue that both validity and invalidity are extrinsic to cognition for they depend on factors other than *Pramāṇa*, the cognition itself and its means.[4]

The validity or invalidity of cognition depends on its correspondence or discordance with the fact, if it agrees with the fact, it is valid (true) but if it disagrees with the fact, it is invalid (false). Its correspondence or discordance with the fact cannot be immediately or directly known. It is known indirectly by an inference from the success or failure of the activity prompted by the cognition. According to Nyāya, the cognition incites some kind of activity. If the activity to which it leads, yields satisfactory results then we come to know that the cognition corresponds with the fact, hence it is valid; but if the results of the activity prompted by cognition are unsatisfactory, we come to know the discordance between the cognition and the reality and also its invalidity, e.g., we perceive some white round object. We pick it up with the expectation that it is a rupee and we find that it is a rupee coin. This test verifies our idea that it is a rupee, so we accept it as valid. But if that object had turned out to be a piece of paper, then we would have inferred the invalidity of our idea.

Madhva rejects this view on the ground that it involves infinite regress. According to this view, the validity of cognition is known by inference, which itself is a kind of cognition. This view states that the validity of one cognition is inferred from another cognition. If so, argues Madhva, the validity of the second cognition will have to be inferred from a third cognition, and the validity of this cognition from the fourth cognition. Thus, there will be no end to this process of repetition. It leads to infinite regress and we cannot

[4] "The Nyāya holds that the validity of knowledge is not self-established, but is proved by something else *parataḥ pramāṇa*' ... "that validity and invalidity are established by something independent of the cognition itself". S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II, (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.125

know the validity of the cognition, if this view is true. But we know that most of our cognitions are valid. So this view is false.

The Naiyāyikas try to meet this objection in two ways; a) by putting a limit to the process of inferring validity, b) by showing that the number of cognitions whose validity we require to establish or know is very small.

a) It may be said that the unending process of inferring the validity of cognition from the results of its verification is not required to know its validity. The verification of one or two other cognitions would be sufficient for this purpose e.g., we may infer the validity of $cognition_1$ from $cognition_2$ and of $cognition_2$ from $cognition_3$ and stop here and accept the validity of $cognition_3$ without further verification and inference. This indeed is what we do in our practical life in respect of most of our cognitions and accepts their validity.

The Dvaitin's immediate retort is that in thus replying the Naiyāyika has abandoned his position and accepted *svataḥ prāmāṇya*, the self-validity of a $cognition_3$ If this cognition can be accepted as valid without further verification or inference i.e., as self-valid, why not accept the first cognition itself as self-valid?

b) The answer to the above question is in this second attempt of the Naiyāyika to support or defend his view against the attack of Dvaitin. The Naiyāyika points out that in our practical life we do not need to know the validity of every cognition. Only when we feel we have a doubt about the truth of cognition, we resort to its verification and infer its validity from the results of the verification. Usually, we do not doubt about the veracity of all our cognitions. We doubt only a few of them. Thus, there is no doubt about the fact that I am now writing with a black pen, that I am sitting in a chair, and that the paper is white. So, I do not wish to know their validity. I blindly accept them as valid without verifying them. Similarly, others accept innumerable cognitions as true without verification. Then there are many cognitions which are beyond doubt, e.g., knowledge of one's own existence, one's own pleasures and pains. Such experiences are accepted directly as valid, i.e., as self-valid.

It is clearly pointed out by Madhva that the defence put up by the Naiyāyika is very weak. The Naiyāyika here admits that the pragmatic test and the inference from it etc., such external aids are required, not to know the validity of a cognition because he himself says, that the validity of most of our cognition is known without them. This means that, they are unnecessary to know the validity, but required to solve a doubt. Thus, their function is confined to clearing the doubts only. When doubt is present, the external means are necessary but when doubt is absent, they are unnecessary, thus their function is confined to the removal of doubt only. They are not required for apprehending the validity, because the validity of cognition is self-established and self-evident.[5]

Prāmāṇyasvatatsva

According to Madhva, the validity is intrinsic, but the invalidity is extrinsic, to cognition.[6] All knowledge derived from its defectless *Anupramāṇa*, the means is *Svataḥ Pramāṇa*, the self-valid. The conception of Svataḥ or *Prāmāṇyasvatastva* implies:

a) For cognition to be valid, nothing more than and nothing other than its flawless means is required; only its flawless means is necessary and sufficient to produce valid cognition.

b) For apprehending validity of cognition, nothing other than the *Sākṣī*, "the *Svarūpendriya* of the knowing self", is required. The *Sākṣī* comprehends both knowledge and its validity.

The flawless external senses, under normal conditions, give valid perceptual, flawless inference, inferential, and flawless *Śabda* an *Āptavacana* gives valid verbal, knowledge i.e., knowledge that comes from hearing or reading correct sentences, the flawless contact between the *Manas* and

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[5] Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), pp.166-171

[6] Thus, it differs from the Nyāya view which holds that both validity and invalidity are extrinsic, from the Sāṅkhya view that both are intrinsic, from Mādhyamikabauddha view that invalidity is intrinsic but validity is extrinsic to cognition.

the *Saṁskāras* yields valid knowledge about the past, and lastly, the *Sākṣī* which is always pure or flawless gives absolutely certain or valid knowledge about our own existence, pleasures, pains and other cognitions.[7] A defective *Anupramāṇa* gives rise to invalid, false cognition. This remark does not apply to *Sākṣī* which is never defective, hence it never gives invalid knowledge.

Madhva accords the most important status to *Sākṣī* in his epistemology. This is clear from the nature and function of *Sākṣī* and from the distinction between *Sākṣijñāna* and *Vṛttijñāna*. Knowledge is a relation between the knower and the known. In the cognitive situation 'I know X' the 'I' the self is the knower while X is the object known. The self is spiritual or conscious: it is *Svaprakāśaka*, the self-luminous and *Paraprakāśaka*, the other luminous. It reveals itself and other objects. The *Sākṣī* partakes the nature of the self, it is like the self-spiritual or conscious, indeed, it is self itself acting as a cognitive organ. It is non-different from the self, but for all purposes it can be conceived and spoken of as different from the self, because of the role of *Viśeṣa* which is a principle of differentiation in cases where there is identity. The relation between the self and its *Sākṣī* is *Saviśeṣābheda*.[8] The *Sākṣī* gives direct intuitive knowledge about the existence and attributes of the self, pleasures, pains etc.

The *Sākṣijñāna* is indubitable and absolutely certain. It is never subject to error and doubt. Of course, a person may tell a lie about his feelings and try to deceive others. He may say that he is feeling pleasure when in fact, he is in pain and pretend to be happy by smiling etc. But he can never deceive himself. he knows that he is in pain and is trying to deceive others. *Sākṣijñāna* is the highest limit in certainty. No cognition other than *Sākṣijñāna* can be more certain than *Sākṣijñāna*. The *Sākṣī* directly comprehends all cognition

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7 *anupramāṇaṁ trividhaṁ, pratyakṣamanumānamāgamaḥ iti | nirdoṣajñānendriyasannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣam, nirdoṣopapattiranumānam, nirdoṣaḥ śabdaḥ āgamaḥ ||* Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), p.551

8 "For the *Sākṣī* is no other than the self. It is also its *Caitanyendriya* (essential sense organ partaking of the nature of consciousness). Its distinction into self and its organ is one of reference and not of essence. Their relation is one of *Saviśeṣābheda* ..." B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), pp.167-169

(knowledge) and its validity, if it is valid. It does not depend upon anything other than itself in grasping the validity (*Prāmāṇyasvatastva*).

But according to Madhva, invalidity is not intrinsic to cognition. It is not self-established and self-evident. It depends on factors that are external to cognition and its *Anupramāṇa* (*Aprāmāṇyaparatastva*). When a cognition arises, no one, without any reason, takes it to be invalid; every one naturally takes it to be valid and true. We do not stop to find out reasons for its truth. This is so even in the case of an illusory experience, which, as soon as it arises, is supposed to be true that a person believes it to be true is shown by the fact that he acts on it; then finds it to be an illusion. If it is not the first thought to be true; it would not be an illusion.

Knowing a false experience as false, an illusion as an illusion, is not an illusion; it is a true cognition. It is only when we feel a doubt about a cognition on the basis of some such factor as its discordance with a fact, incoherence with other cognitions, its practical uselessness or defective conditions of perception (defective sense organ, scarcity of light, remoteness of object) that we try to find out by *Parīkṣā*, the verification or test as to whether or not our doubt is justified. If the doubt is found to be justified, the *Sākṣī* grasps the invalidity of the cognition. The *Sākṣī* waits for the results of the test before determining the invalidity (falsity) of the cognition. Thus, the comprehension of invalidity by the *Sākṣī* depends upon factors other than the *Anupramāṇa* and knowledge produced by it, i.e., *Aprāmāṇya* is *Parataḥ*.

The *Sākṣijñāna* is untainted by doubt or error. It is an indubitable and infallible, flawless source of knowledge. Not only doubt and error have not so far occurred in *Sākṣijñāna* but that they could not occur there i.e., there is no possibility of occurrence of doubt and error in the field of *Sākṣijñāna*, because *Sākṣī* is a spiritual or sentient and intuitive means of that kind of knowledge.

Doubts and errors rarely occur in knowledge derived from perception, inference and verbal testimony. This kind of knowledge is called *Vṛttijñāna* as it depends on sense organs and *Vṛtti*, the modifications in *Manas* or

Antaḥkaraṇa, the mind which are *Jaḍa*, the insentient or material in nature. The *Sākṣī* comprehends *Vṛttijñāna* and its validity or invalidity, truth or falsity. The *Sākṣī* acts as the principle or criterion of truth or of value determination of all knowledge. It reveals such knowledge and its validity. The *Sākṣī's* judgement about validity or invalidity, truth or falsity of cognition is absolutely certain. Its verdict puts an end to all doubt and error, which may occur in a few cases of *Vṛttijñāna*.[9]

Some may object to it by saying that knowledge itself can reveal and affirm its validity. If knowledge itself cannot do it, then nothing else can do it, hence *Sākṣī* is not required for this purpose. b) Making the *Sākṣī* the determinant of validity leads to infinite regress, for the *Sākṣī's* verdict about validity is itself cognition, the validity of which has to be judged again, and the validity of this second verdict of *Sākṣī* has to be determined again and so on indefinitely.

According to Dvaitins, these objections are baseless. The *Sākṣī* is necessary for grasping knowledge and its validity; for knowledge, in the form of *Vṛttis*, the modes of mind or *Antaḥkaraṇa* is *Jaḍa* i.e., unconscious or material and it can neither know itself nor other object.[10] Even if we suppose it to be sentient and capable of manifesting itself and other objects, it cannot reveal its validity. This is clear from the fact that the Vedas contain knowledge, and if knowledge itself were capable of revealing validity, then the validity of Vedic knowledge would be self-evident to all, and all would have accepted Vedic teaching.

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[9] "The approbation of the *Sākṣī* is the logical limit of all certainty, clarification and validation as it is intuitive". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.163

[10] "Knowledge, as an activity of the mind, cannot be viewed with any kind of self-luminosity". "As knowledge, by itself, is *Jaḍa*, the insentient (p.159) as a modification of the *Antaḥkaraṇa* and therefore incapable of self-revelation, we have to admit some other principle by which the knowledge itself and its validity could be intuited. Such a principle is the *Sākṣī* or *Svarūpendriya* of the knowing self, which being *Caitanyasvarūpa* is capable of being both *Svaprakāṣaka* and *Paraprakāṣaka*. Both knowledge and its validity are thus grasped by the *Sākṣī*, in the ultimate analysis". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.149

But there are thinkers such as Cārvakas, Buddhists and others who reject Vedic teaching. Hence the knowledge cannot reveal its own validity.[11] So the *Sākṣī*, which is *Jñānagrāhaka* and *Jñānaprāmāṇyagrāhaka* is indispensable to determine validity. Since, the *Sākṣī* has the ability to grasp its own validity and the validity of its verdicts, there cannot be any infinite regress in determining the validity of cognition. It's only one judgement about the truth or validity of cognition that is sufficient to be final and ultimate. Here arises a difficulty which requires clarification.

In response to the view that no way of wholly eliminating risks of error has been found, it is said that *Sākṣipratyakṣa* which puts an, end to tests and, reasoning, can convert belief into a logical certainty. Hence the logical certainty may mean: a) Logical necessity, cognition is logically certain, in this sense, if and only if its denial is self-contradictory. The clear instances of logically certain or logically necessary cognitions are analytical propositions like father is a male parent, triangle is a plane figure bounded by three straight lines etc. The *Sākṣī* cannot convert all cognitions into logical certainty. There are synthetic propositions. 'Rose is red', 'Mango is sweet' whose validity when determined by *Sākṣī* does not turn into logical certainty. They remain synthetic propositions; their denial would not be self-contradictory though it may be false.

Such synthetic propositions belong to the field of *Vṛttijñāna* and Madhva who distinguishes *Sākṣijñāna* and *Vṛttijñāna* cannot hold that the latter is converted into the former by the *Sākṣī's* judgement of its validity ... etc. b) Logical certainty may mean a level of certainty after reaching which, further questioning or doubting becomes useless or absurd – irrational. Doubting the cognitions of objects like table, chair, etc., under certain bad circumstances and upto a certain level is not illogical. But in normal conditions beyond a certain point, doubting becomes illogical or irrational. Take the case of feeling, X says, 'I am in pain'. If I doubt or deny this, it would be irrational. My statement 'you are not in pain' would be absurd though it is not a logical contradiction.

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[11] B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya. (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi). p.159

Madhva holds that the *Manas* or the inner organ has important functions: a) It enables us to perceive objects and events in the world by coming into contact with the external sense organs, e.g., the visual perceptions arise when the *Manas* is in contact with the eyes, the auditory perceptions are the results of the contact of *Manas* with the ears etc. b) It acts as a separate organ for the memory, which is the means of the direct and valid cognition of the past. The memory is an activity of remembering at some later time what was known at some earlier time. Thus in memory, the effects of what we had experienced or learnt in the past are shown in the present. The object of memory belongs to the past; it is not before us when we remember it.[12] It is said that our former experience of an object or learning produces *Saṁskāras*, the impressions and when the *Manas* comes into contact with them, we remember the object. The flawless contact of *Manas* with *Saṁskāras* gives valid knowledge about the past.

According to Madhva, the knowledge of the past gained through memory is as direct or immediate as that got through the external senses. Hence, it is treated as one kind of perception. On the direct knowledge provided by the memory is based the vast indirect inferential historical knowledge about human societies and cultures, the origin, growth and extinction of species of living beings, about the formation of galaxies of stars, planetary systems, oceans, rivers, mountains etc. It is abundantly clear that memory plays an important role in our knowledge. Hence, Madhva rightly rejects the view of the Mimāmsakas and the Advaitins that the memory is not a *Pramāṇa* on the spurious ground that it does not yield new knowledge.

According to Mimāmsakas *Apūrva*, the novelty is the essential feature of knowledge, and that means, that which gives new knowledge is *Pramāṇa*. Memory fails to satisfy this condition, it is calling to mind what was already known, there is nothing new in it. Hence, it is not a *Pramāṇa*. That this view

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[12] This is so, not only in recall in which the material learnt by heart in the past is reproduced at some time later (e.g., a student repeats today a poem which he had learnt by heart yesterday) but also in recognition, in which though the object is before us, what we remember about it belongs to the past (e.g., this hand bag is the same as that which I had perceived in the market two days ago).

is clearly very weak. Madhva points out clearly its weakness by saying that it is not novelty, but the truth or validity that is the essential characteristic of knowledge, that knowledge is not a new cognition but a true or valid cognition. A true cognition remains true even when it is repeatedly known thousands of times. Indeed, the view that the truth or validity of a cognition depends entirely on its novelty that leads to very absurd consequences. E.g., a Mimāmsaka teaches his philosophy to a disciple. To the former who has taught it many times, it may not be novel, hence it is invalid for him; but to the disciple who learns it for the first time, it is valid. And his teacher is not a real teacher but a cheater because he teaches what is invalid. Another e.g., A teacher who already knows a subject teaches it to students in the class. Then in the examinations, the students write in answer to questions what they were taught in the class. So there is nothing new in the answers both to the teacher and the students; all the answers are incorrect or *Avidyā*. Hence, if the Mimāmsaka's view is correct, no student should be declared to have passed in the examinations.[13] This is sufficient to disprove Mimāmsaka's view.

Memory is a means of valid and direct cognition. It is a *Pramāṇa*. It is true that errors occur sometimes in memory, as they do in perception. They are due to a defect in the contact between the *Manas* and the *Saṁskāras*. But most of the knowledge derived from memory is free from doubt and error, hence can be accepted as correct.

According to Madhva, the ground for treating memory as a means of immediate knowledge of the past is the ability, based on their yogic power of the Ṛṣis, of perceiving the past and future. The Ṛṣis were called *Trikālajñānis*, the knowers or seers of all times, the past, the present and the future.

Thus to deny validity to knowledge derived from or based on memory would mean not only rejecting a vast amount of knowledge about the past

[13] Madhva gives another example. We know by experience that heat removes cold. The same thing is stated in the *Śruti* ... as *agnirhimasya bheṣajam* "Is this" false because it states what we already know by experience? Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), pp.563-565

but also the past itself. For we know that there was a past through memory. And if memory itself is *Pramāṇa*, then the past would be *Mithyā*, the false just as in the case of the world, if all experience is *Apramāṇa* then world would be *Mithyā*. But the past is real and we can have valid knowledge about it through memory. Hence memory is a *Pramāṇa*.[14]

Anumāna

Perception requires the contact of the sense organ with its proper object to yield the knowledge of its object; it is confined to the present. If all our knowledge were limited to perceptual knowledge, it would be very narrow. But our knowledge is not thus limited. We have also knowledge of things which are not perceived by us and of things, which transcend the bounds of our perception. This knowledge of things which, though perceptible by us, are not perceived by us and those that cannot be perceived is derived through inference and *Āgama*, the scriptures. These, besides perception, are the two other *Anupramāṇas* accepted by Madhva.

Anumāna, the Inference is a means by which the unperceived *Sādhya* is proved to belong to the *Pakṣa* on the basis of the *Vyāpti*, the extension and the presence of *Hetu* in the *Pakṣa*. The conclusion arrived at is *Anumiti*. *Anumiti* consists of *Pakṣa* and *Sādhya* and the relation between the two. *Pakṣa* is its subject (minor term) and *Sādhya* is its predicate (major term) and the *Hetu* or *Liṅga* is the reason (ground) that is given to prove the relation between the two. *Vyāpti* is the generalization that states the invariable relation between the *Hetu*, the middle term and the *Sādhya*. From this, it is clear that there are some similarities between the Aristotelian syllogism and the Indian inference. An e.g., of *Anumiti*, the latter is Rāma is mortal.

[14] "But for the fact of memory in this sense, we should not know that there ever was a past at all, nor should we be able to understand the word "past any more than a man born blind can understand the word "light". Thus, there must be intuitive judgements of memory, and it is upon them ultimately, that all our knowledge of the past depends". B Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p.115

Because Rāma is a man (*Hetu*, the reason) whoever is a man is mortal (*Vyāpti*, the pervasion). The *Anumiti* is stated first. Here "Rāma" is a *Pakṣa* and 'mortal' is *Sādhya*. The characteristic of being a man is the *Hetu*. The *Vyāpti* states the invariable relation between the characteristics of being a man and mortality i.e., between the *Hetu* and *Sādhya*. The extension of *Sādhya* is wider than that of *Hetu*. For, not only men, but also other living beings are mortal. The *Sādhya* is called *Vyāpaka*, the pervader and the *Hetu*, the extension of which is narrower than that of *Vyāpaka* is called *Vyāpya*, the pervaded. The invariable relation between the *Vyāpya* and the *Vyāpaka* is the *Vyāpti*.

Usually two kinds of inference have been recognized. a) *Svārthānumāna* is the inference in the form of thinking carried on by a person to convince himself of the truth of something or to decide something. b) *Parārthānumāna*, the inference in the form of an argument put forward to prove to others a certain conclusion. The Nyāya School, whose contributions to Indian thought are in the field of logic holds that *Parārthānumāna* must consist of five *Avayavas*, the parts or propositions:

a) *Pratijñā* is the conclusion to be proved. What one wants to prove by his argument is clearly stated at the outset for the benefit of others: Rāma is mortal.

b) *Hetu*, the reason. This proposition states a reason in support of the conclusion. This is also called *Liṅga*, the mark or *Sādhana*, the instrument of proof, e.g., because, Rāma is a man.

c) *Udāharaṇa*, the example, this is *Vyāpti*. It states the invariable concomitance between the *Hetu* and *Sādhya* in the form of a generalization. This is based on the observation of copresence of *Hetu* and *Sādhya* in all the observed instances. For example, "whoever is a man (or anything that is a man) is mortal, e.g., Basava, Bhīma and thousands of other men have so far been found dead." This may take a negative form when there is coabsence between *Sādhya* and *Hetu*, e.g., no immortal man has so far been observed. This also supports the conclusion. *Hetu* and *Udāharaṇa* together constitute a sufficient ground for the proof of the conclusion.

d) *Upanaya*, the application, in this step *Hetu*, the reason is stated to be present in the *Pakṣa*. *Hetu* is applied to the *Pakṣa*. E.g., Rāma is a man.

e) *Nigamana* also called *Anumiti*. This is the statement of the conclusion in which *Sādhya* is stated to be present in the *Pakṣa*, e.g., Rāma is mortal.

To state the *Parārthānumāna* succinctly; a) *Pratijñā* – Rāma is mortal. b) *Hetu* – Because Rāma is a man c) *Vyāpti* or *Udāharaṇa* – whoever is a man is mortal. d) *Upanaya*, the application – Rāma is a man. e) *Nigamana* – Therefore, Rāma is mortal.

There is a difference of opinion regarding the number of propositions in the *Parārthānumāna*. Some say that two propositions, some, three propositions, some five propositions and some say that more than five propositions are necessary. Later Naiyāyikas seem to admit that only three propositions *Pratijñā*, *Hetu*, *Udāharaṇa* or *Udāharaṇa* (*Vyāpti*), *Hetu* and *Nigamana* are sufficient for the purpose of proving the conclusion.

It should be noted that in this controversy on the nature, validity and fallacies of inference, the formal and practical considerations are mixed up; mostly the latter are given the predominance. The practical aim is that of helping the disputants to have a clear understanding of the subject of dispute and to reach the conclusion by flawless reasoning. With this aim, Madhva disagrees with the views regarding the number of propositions in an inference and correctly points out that the generalization or *Vyāpti* is absolutely necessary in any valid inference. When *Vyāpti* and *Hetu* are stated, the statement of other *Avayavas*, the parts would be unnecessary; when the point under discussion is clear, *Pratijñā* may be dropped. When the subject under discussion is difficult or complicated or when the disputants have no honest aim of arriving at inferential knowledge, but want to dispute for the sake of dispute a series of *Parārthānumānas* consisting of many propositions would be required to end the dispute or discussion.

In short, the number of propositions in *Parārthānumāna* depends on the nature of subject under discussion, the level of understanding or intelligence and the purpose of the participants in the discussion. There cannot be any

rule regarding the definite number of *Avayavas*, the arts in *Parārthānumāna*. Some logicians divide *Parārthānumāna* into three types; a) *Kevalānvayī* inference b) *Kevalavyatirekī* inference c) *Anvayavyatirekī* inference.

Kevalānvayī inference is that in which its *Vyāpti* is arrived at by the method of observing only positive instances, i.e., the instances in which both *Hetu* and *Sādhya* are present. This resembles Mill's method of Agreement.

Kevalavyatirekī inference consists of *Vyāpti* established by the method of observing only negative instances i.e., the instances in which both *Hetu* and *Sādhya* are absent. This is similar to the method of Difference.

Anvayavyatirekī is the inference consisting of *Vyāpti* established by the observation of both positive and negative instances. This is like Mill's joint method of Agreement and Difference. But Madhva accepts only one type of inference based on *Anvayavyāpti*.

The *Svarthānumāna* is a process of thinking in which a person arrives at a conclusion or decision on the basis of his experience. It is a psychological process consisting of the following steps: a) The formation of *Vyāpti*; the extension on the basis of the repeated observation of many cases of invariable concomitance between two objects (events or qualities) e.g., after observing the deaths of many men, one forms the generalization 'all men are mortal', (anything which is a man is mortal) which states the invariable relation between being a man and mortality. b) he perceives an object or event, which is invariably followed by another object e.g., he perceives a man. c) He remembers the *Vyāpti* that whenever on object is present the other also is (or will be) present e.g., whoever is a man is mortal. d) He notes that the object perceived by him is similar, in relevant respects; to those that were observed to be invariably followed by another object e.g., a person who is perceived by him is similar in being a man to those that have died. e) Lastly, he arrives at the conclusion that the object before him is (or will be) followed by another object, which is invariably connected with the former object e.g., 'This man is also mortal'.

Āgama

Śabda, the verbal testimony is of two kinds: a) *Pauruṣeya* b) *Apauruṣeya*

a) *Pauruṣeyaśabda* is a statement of some trustworthy person or a source or work. b) *Apauruṣeyaśabda* is one which is authorless; which is not created or produced or written by any *Puruṣa*, the person human or divine. According to Madhva and some other Vedāntins, the Vedas are *Apauruṣeya*. Madhva argues forcefully in support of the *Apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas because, *Apauruṣeyatva* is believed to imply flawlessness. It is only the flawless *Anupramāṇa* that can give the correct knowledge. Madhva believes that the Vedas give valid knowledge about matters which are beyond the reach of sense perception and inference, such as God, *Dharma* and *Adharma,* etc. So they must be flawless. It is argued that anything that is created, produced or written by a person is likely to contain error or some defect. Perception and inference e.g., mostly yield correct knowledge but on a very few occasions, they lead to mistakes. But Vedic knowledge which is about matters spiritual must be entirely flawless. Since it is absolutely valid, the Vedas cannot be the creations or works of any person, they must be *Apauruṣeya*. In short, the argument is – if anything is *Pauruṣeya*, then it is likely to be defective. The Vedas are not at all defective. Hence, the Vedas are *Apauruṣeya*.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the Vedas have no human author, but they have a divine author. God is their author. God is omniscient, truthful, and trustworthy and is without any defect. The Vedas are the Words of God. Since their source or author is flawless, they are flawless, and the knowledge derived from them is perfect and absolute.

The Dvaitins do not accept this, since the Vedas are the means of valid knowledge, their teaching must be acceptable by all human beings who understand them. But if they are regarded as the words of God, then they would not be accepted by the atheists. Moreover, the Vedas are eternal; as such they cannot be thought to be produced or written at a certain time;

for whatever is thus produced or has a beginning cannot be eternal. The Dvaitins say that the Naiyāyikas have misunderstood the relation between God and the Vedas. God is not their author. The Vedas are eternal. They exist in the mind of God who is also eternal since God is omniscient. He knows them intuitively. At the time of creation God chants the Vedas with the same *Svara*, the accent, *Chandas*, the metre, and in the same order in which the words and sentences occur in them, in short, he chants them without, in any way, changing them. Thus, God is not a creator, but a chanter or revealer of the Vedas.

The objection levelled against the *Vedāpauruṣeyatva* by some thinkers is that this view is opposed to human experience. Our experience shows that there cannot be a sentence or book which is not spoken or written by any person. A sentence is an arrangement of words so as to convey some meaning (and a book consists of many sentences properly organised into paragraphs and chapters so as to express some ideas) and such a composition can be made only by some intelligence or person. So it is not possible for there to be a sentence or book which is not a work of person. So the Vedas must be *Pauruṣeya*. It is strange to find that the Dvaitins who give so much importance to human experience uphold *Vedāpauruṣeyatva* which goes against the human experience.

Madhva replies that human experience is important and it is important in respect of the knowledge about the world i.e., in respect of sensuous matters. The means or the bases of our knowledge about such matters are perception and inference. Anything that goes against them in matters about the world cannot be accepted. But we have knowledge about things which are not of this world, i.e., things which transcend human experience e.g., Moral values like *Dharma, Adharma,* etc., and spiritual ideas like God, self etc., are super sensuous. We cannot see, hear, touch, smell, and taste *Dharma*.

Dharma is not something that can be perceived. It is true of other moral values, God etc. Since they are super sensuous, human experience cannot give knowledge about them i.e., perception and inference, which

are personal, which belong to some person, cannot be the means or bases of such moral and spiritual matters. But we do understand them, we have knowledge about them and they play the most important role in our life. As such, they are acceptable to all rational beings. So they must have some source, some ultimate ground that is impersonal. The Vedas are their ultimate bases, hence the Vedas must be impersonal. Thus, Madhva establishes *Apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas on the basis of the nature of moral values and spiritual concepts. This is an original and important argument in favour of *Vedāpauruṣeyatva*; and it is far more convincing than the argument based on the eternality of the *Varṇas*, that the *Varṇas*, which are distinguished from the spoken or written words (i.e., sounds or marks on paper), are eternal. The Vedas consist of *Varṇas*, so the Vedas are eternal.

But this argument has been rejected by the Cārvakas who do not believe in the existence of anything that is beyond sense experience. They hold that sense perception alone is the means of knowledge. According to them, the beliefs in super sensuous objects are superstitions propagated by some cunning people to gain their selfish ends by deceiving the common people. Really, there is nothing transcending sense experience. These thinkers say that the main purpose of their view is to free the peoples' minds from superstitions (like belief in the existence of God, the validity of *Dharma, Adharma,* etc.). So that the people can enjoy their lives to the fullest extent by satisfying all their impulses for pleasure without the fear of hell. So they say that there is no need to accept impersonal verbal testimony, there is sufficient reason to reject it.

Madhva refutes this view. He says that such a view cannot be a *Śāstra* or *Darśana*, the philosophy. The view that is fit to bear the name *Śāstra* must teach people something important or useful, it must guide them properly in the conduct of their lives. But Cārvaka view has no subject to teach or guide people. For, if sense perception is the only means of knowledge and there is nothing transcending sense perception, then people can know all that is to be known by their sense experience, hence no *Śāstra* is required to teach them anything. Moreover, people already know the ways of getting all sorts of pleasures without needing any guidance in this respect from the Cārvaka.

The most important point in the refutation is that the Cārvaka view is opposed to his avowed aim of enabling people to enjoy their pleasure without fear. Indeed those who deny the religious and moral conceptions or values are forced to accept them for they are the very foundation of our socio-cultural life. The denial of them would lead to the condition in which there would be violence, deceit, insecurity, fear and misery. Man's life would be short and brutish nay, worse than the life of wild animals. In such a state, people would not be able to enjoy pleasure for such enjoyment of pleasure is possible only when there is security, cooperation, sympathy, friendship, affection among people and these would be absent if moral and religious values do not govern the life of the people. Thus, the consequence of rejecting moral and religious values would not be that of freeing people from superstition and fear and enabling them to enjoy pleasure without any let or hindrance, but that of destroying them or if they survive, plunging them into unlimited fear, vice and misery.

Some thinkers say that even if such pragmatic considerations in favour of moral and religious values are conceded, it does not follow that such values are true or real. Whatever is useful may not be true. Truth and utility are different; world peace would undoubtedly be beneficial to all but it is not actually a reality; it is yet a dream. This shows that pragmatic value of an object does not confer on it the cognitive value of truth.

It is said that besides their pragmatic value, there are other considerations in favour of moral and spiritual values. Simply because such values are super sensuous, they cannot be said to be false. We know that our sense experience is limited. Our senses are unable to show us many things which are imperceptible to our bare senses. When science itself accepts invisible objects, it cannot be maintained that there are no such objects. Further, when there are good reasons in support of the reality of super sensuous objects, when the saints have asserted that they have had intuitive experience of such objects, how can anyone deny the moral and spiritual values on the ground that they are imperceptible?

The next objection questions the very assumption on which Madhva's

arguments are based. The assumption is that there is a necessary connection between the existence of super sensuous objects and impersonal character of Vedic testimony i.e., if there are moral and spiritual values, then the Vedas which make them known, must be impersonal. It is said that such values can be known through the teachings of the great souls like the ancient Seers. Such great persons have full knowledge of all values and concepts. Hence they must teach the truth and such personal verbal testimony would be sufficient to bring out the full significance of the moral and spiritual values. The attempt to establish the impersonal character of the Vedas is therefore superfluous.

Madhva does not agree with this. He says that the author of such a work dealing with the spiritual and moral values which are the basis of our social life must have full and correct knowledge about them: indeed he must be omniscient, honest in teaching them and without any defect in him. There are two alternatives before us and we have to choose the simpler (i.e., which does not involve many assumptions) one. a) The Vedic testimony is impersonal b) It is personal being the work of a great person.

Madhva points out, if the latter alternative is accepted, then many following suppositions or assumptions will have to be shown to be true: a) that the author of such a work dealing with moral and spiritual values and the various concepts with which they are associated is almost omniscient, that he has full knowledge of all values and concepts, b) that he is really the author of that work c) that he has honestly stated his views about the values d) that he is without any defect such as partiality deceit, narrow-mindedness, etc., which are likely to mar or vitiate his work etc.

It is very difficult to prove these assumptions. So it is reasonable to accept the view that the authors of the Vedas are unknown and the Vedas are impersonal. If it is said that this idea is quite unfamiliar or novel no one has seen such a work, then Madhva says that an idea of a person who is without a defect, pure, and who knows all about the values and related concepts is equally unfamiliar and novel, and no one has met such a person. Besides, it is not difficult to prove the anonymity of the author of the Vedas.

One most important argument in support of it is that the moral and spiritual values have to be accepted by all rational beings; and these values must have a solid foundation. Such stable and strong bases for values could be provided by an impersonal work like the Vedas which being without an author or above the conception of an author must be without any defect, for any work produced by a person happens to be defective in one or the other respects.

Secondly, there is a long tradition upholding the view that the authors of the Vedas are unknown. There are great works other than the Vedas dealing with religious or spiritual matters, produced by great persons who are famous and known to us. It is simply unbelievable that our people who have preserved the Vedas with sincere faith and devotion, without changing their words, sentences and *Svaras* etc., might have forgotten the name of their author. If the Vedas had an author, his name would have been certainly mentioned but no one is stated to be their author. The names of some Ṛṣis have been mentioned in connection with some Vedic mantras or hymns, but they are not the producers or authors of those hymns; they are only the seers and hearers of them. Those hymns were revealed to them on account of their great spiritual achievements, and they communicated those hymns as they had seen or heard them.

The Vedic hymns have been revealed, not created, truths. Compare the case of the Vedas with the case of a person who writes a book dealing with moral and spiritual values; but does not mention his name as its author; instead, propagates the idea that the book is written by an anonymous person. Will the people believe him? No, they will not. Though the people readily believe in the anonymity of the author of the Vedas, they will not believe that such a book is without an author. This is because the Vedas have an unbroken, long, tradition in support of their anonymity; the teachers of the Vedas and their taught belonging to every generation have firmly believed that they are teaching and learning something which is not a work of a person, but it has been handed down to them from generation to generation. But a book written by someone and claimed to be without an

author does not have such a tradition in support of it.[15] The Vedas are called *Śruti* and *Dṛṣti*. *Śruti* means what is heard. The Vedas are always heard; but they are never created or written. *Dṛṣti* means what is seen. The Vedas are always seen but never created.

Let us put a stop to this discussion by stating Madhva's observation that all such objections against *Vedāpauruṣeyatva* are based on the wrong idea that the Vedas are ordinary works. Since the ordinary works have authors it is said that the Vedas must have an author. But the Vedas are not the ordinary works. They are *Viśiṣṭa*, the unique, Suigeneris, hence they are above all objections.

Now about the question of the validity of the Vedas or *Śabdapramāṇa*, according to Madhva, *Anupramāṇa* is a flawless means of correct knowledge. He regards not only the four *Apauruṣeya* Vedas but also *Pauruṣeya*, Itihāsas, the Mahābhārata and Mūlarāmāyaṇa, Brahmasūtras and some Purāṇas as verbal *Anupramāṇa*. Vedas themselves declare that the Itihāsas and some Purāṇas are *Pramāṇa*. They praise them as constituting the Fifth Veda. But we are told that all the Purāṇas are not *Pramāṇa*.

The basic criterion to be adopted in deciding whether the Purāṇa or other *Pauruṣeyaśabda* is a means of valid knowledge is its conformity with the teaching of the Vedas. If the content of a Purāṇa agrees with the main purport of the Vedas, then it is *Pramāṇa*, called *Sadāgama* or *Sadāgamas*, the valid scripture, if it is different from or is opposed to the purport of the Vedas it is *Apramāṇa*, it is not a means of true cognition. And according to Madhva, the real purport of the Vedas is that of extolling the supremacy and sovereignty of lord Viṣṇu teaching the ultimate difference between the self and God and emphasizing clearly the reality of the world and dependence of the self on God. Some Purāṇas accord the highest status

[15] Madhva's arguments in support of *Vedāpauruṣeyatva* are interesting; they are the paradigm of the philosophical arguments. They show with what great tenacity the philosopher refuses to concede objections to his view, thus making his view immune to them. Hence, a priori, in spite of some empirical considerations that occur in its discussion. Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), pp.150-193

to some deity other than lord Viṣṇu, hence are *Apramāṇa*; their teaching is false. The Vedas, Itihāsas and Purāṇas are the integral parts of our tradition. Therefore, in interpreting some Vedic statements that are under dispute such as *ahaṁ brahmāsmi*, the teaching of Itihāsas and Purāṇas has to be taken into account.

According to Madhva, the *Sadāgamas* are *Pramāṇa*. They contain valid knowledge about the super sensuous objects – God, self, moral and spiritual values. The validity of the Vedas is self-evident; they are *svataḥ prāmāṇa*, self-valid. We have already considered his view of *Prāmāṇyasvatatsva*, that all knowledge derived from flawless means is self-valid and the Vedas, which are *Apauruṣeya*, are free from all defects. Madhva therefore refutes the view of the Naiyāyikas according to which the validity is not intrinsic to knowledge but is extrinsic to it because the validity is derived or inferred from some factors external to it. They hold the *parataḥ prāmāṇyavāda*, they infer the validity of the Vedas from the nature of God.

The definition of *Śabda* given in Tarkasangraha is '*Śabda* is *Āptavākya*'. *Āpta* means 'a trust-worthy person', i.e., a person who knows the truth and communicates it sincerely or honestly as it is; *Vākya* means a sentence or a statement. So *Śabda* is a sentence written or spoken by a trustworthy person. Naiyāyikas divide *Śabda* into two kinds: a) *Laukikaśabda* is a sentence of a trustworthy worldly person. b) *Vaidikaśabdas* are the statements in the Vedas. According to the Naiyāyikas the Vedas are the words of God who is omniscient and completely trustworthy. Hence Vedas give correct knowledge.

Thus, the Naiyāyikas establish the validity of the Vedas by inference from the omniscience and trustworthiness of God. They define that *Śabda* by its definition is a statement of a trustworthy person. Since the Vedas consist of statements, they must have some trustworthy person as their author. The Vedas give knowledge about *Alaukika*, the super sensuous matters which can be truly known and communicated by God; and God is omniscient and trustworthy. So the Vedic teaching is valid. Madhva rejects this view by showing that if the validity is derived from inference, then there will be the fallacy of infinite regress.

The critics point out that Madhva's procedure is self-contradictory, for he argues that the Vedas are valid because they are *Apauruṣeya* and for establishing the *Apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas he uses inference and he also holds that knowledge is self-valid that its validity cannot be proved by inference.

Madhva's reply is that this objection is based on misunderstanding, for *Apauruṣeyatva* is not given as a reason for validity; validity of Vedas is not inferred from their *Apauruṣeyatva.* As knowledge, Vedic knowledge is self-valid. The *Sākṣī*, which grasps knowledge intuitively grasps its validity. Inference has been used to remove the false conception about the nature of the Vedas. The nature of the Vedas was in doubt. Naiyāyikas hold that they are *Pauruṣeya*, while Vedāntins say that they are *Apauruṣeya.* Inference was used for removing this doubt to show that the Vedas are not *Pauruṣeya* but are *Apauruṣeya.* This is what we usually do in other cases of knowledge.

When I perceive this book, I immediately know that my perception is true. No investigation or inference is required to convince me that my perception of the book is veridical, for there is no doubt about its being true. Only in a very rare case when we feel doubt about our perception we resort to investigation or inference to clear the doubt. When the doubt is cleared, the *Sākṣī* intuitively grasps the validity of knowledge. This is also a reply to the objection that if knowledge is self-valid, how can there be doubt or error? Doubts and errors do arise. But these are due to the defects in the *Anupramāṇas* and the conditions in which cognitions occur. Defective perception, defective inference, defective memory, defective *Śabda* lead to doubt or error; and in such cases, when the doubt is cleared, the *Sākṣī* immediately grasps the validity or invalidity of the cognition.

The other minor objections against the validity of the Vedas have been easily answered by Madhva: It is said that in the Karmakāṇda of the Vedas, it is stated that a performance of some rite is followed by a certain result or fruit, e.g., if one performs *putrakāmeṣṭiyajña*, one begets a son or that performance of *Yajña* to please Varuṇa will lead to sufficient rain fall. But

many people, who have performed these rites, have not got the stated results. So how can one believe that what is stated in the Vedas is true?

There are some absurd statements in the Vedas like: 'The plants spoke to one another', 'the stones spoke to the cows' etc. Some Vedic statements appear to be meaningless, some to be opposed to one another. When there are such defective Vedic statements, how can one believe in the validity of the Vedas?

The answers to these objections are: It is not right to deny the validity of the Vedas on the ground that we are not getting the stated results after the performance of some rites or sacrifices. For, the Vedas also lay down the proper time and place of doing the *Yajña*, *Yāga*, the proper physical and mental conditions of the person involved in performing them, the quality of the things like ghee, rice, *Samit*, *Tila* used, and the proper ways in which they should be used while performing the rites. If such requirements are not fulfilled and no one can be certain that their, especially mental conditions such as purity of heart, *Śraddhā*, the sincere belief, devotion on the part of persons involved in doing rites, are properly fulfilled, the mere mechanical performance of the rites would not produce the stated results. Further, there are cases of some persons (mentioned in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas) who, after performing the *Yajña*, *Yāgas* in the proper manner, have been blessed with the stated results.

So this objection must be rejected. The second objection is also baseless. Some Vedic statements appear to be absurd, meaningless, contradictory only to those whose study of the Vedas is perfunctory, and the understanding of their import is quite shallow or superficial. When the Vedas are studied properly and deeply, one finds very useful meanings in every sentence, every word, and every letter of a word, as Madhva has found it. The Vedas are absolutely flawless, they contain the valid knowledge.

Scope and strength of *Pramāṇas*: Madhva's view regarding the scope and strength of the *Pramāṇas* is epistemologically very valuable. It tells us about the kind of evidence that is required to establish the truth of the different kinds of propositions. It is remarkably modern in its approach and content.

According to Madhva, the validity of statements about *Laukikaviṣayas* or empirical matters i.e., about the things and events in the world, including ourselves can be established by our perception only. The inference and the *Śabda* are useless for this purpose. In the field of empirical matters the perception is stronger than the inference and the Vedic testimony, so that if there is opposition between the latter two and perception, the evidence yielded by perception must be accepted and the inference and the scripture must be rejected. It follows that the great mistake of the Advaita is that it tries to show the *Mithyātva* or unreality of the world by inference when perception, the legitimate *Pramāṇa* in regard to this matter, clearly proves that the world is real. Similarly, the Advaitic view of the identity of *Ātmā* with Brahmā based on the inference is opposed to both the perception and the Vedic teaching, which are the proper *Pramāṇas.*

Our experience tells us that the self is limited in its knowledge, power, action etc. Hence it cannot be the creator of the world; the Vedas teach that Brahmā, the God is omniscient, omnipotent etc., and the creator of the world. Thus, *Pramāṇas* bring out clearly the difference between Brahmā and the self. So no amount of inference on the part of the Advaitin can either prove the unreality of the world or the identity of the self with Brahmā because, inference by its very nature is incapable of doing so.

There are statements rightly based on inference. Mathematical propositions deduced from the axioms are good examples of these, e.g., 2+2=4. The sum of all the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles etc. To know their truth, it is not necessary to resort to observation or perception or to the study of the Vedas. If they are correctly deduced or inferred from the axioms, we have to accept them as true. If one points to the fact observed by every one that when two drops of water are added to other two drops of water, then there will not be four but one drop of water or if any Scripture says that 2+2=5, then we do not regard 2+2=4 as false simply because the perception and the scriptures of these *Pramāṇas* are irrelevant to the truth or falsity of such propositions.

There are statements about *Alaukikaviṣayas*, the supersensuous matters like the existence and attributes of God, nature of *Avatāras*, *Mokṣa*

and other values. The perception and the inference cannot prove their truth; their validity can only be established by the teaching of the *Apauruṣeya* Vedas, which deal with the subject matters that are beyond the reach of the ordinary perception. Cārvaka is wrong in denying super-sensible matters by restricting the perception to sense-perception. Besides sense-perception, there is *Sākṣipratyakṣa* (*Sākṣātkāra*), which can correctly inform us about the super-sensuous matters. As Madhva says, "Generally speaking, the perception is the criterion of truth. In some cases, it is also inference. With regard to the things presented only on the evidence of scripture, the position of being the criterion belongs only to it."[16]

The *Sākṣipratyakṣa*, the intuition is the ultimate criterion of validity or invalidity, truth or falsity of all knowledge that is perceptual, inferential and scriptural. Its judgement about the validity or invalidity, truth or falsity of all cognitions is indubitable, absolutely certain and final. To repeat (because it is very important), the determination of validity or invalidity comes under the scope of *Sākṣipratyakṣa*.

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[16] In this connection Madhva states "the experience of perception of the difference of the self from the all-powerful God is naturally stronger than all *Pramāṇas*. Since the validity of all other *Pramāṇas* is known to us through experience *Sākṣipratyakṣa*, the experience is stronger than all *Pramāṇas*.

a) To make known the identity (of the self with Brahmā) the Vedas have to depend upon *Sākṣipratyakṣa* or *Svānubhava*, the self-experience and on Vedic sentences that state the difference (between the self and the Brahmā). Only after the knowledge of the self through experience and of God through the Vedas, the Vedas can teach the difference or the non-difference between them. So *Sākṣipratyakṣa*, the experience which is a support and *Upajīvya* to the Vedic sentences and the Vedic sentences that uphold the absolute supremacy of God should be accepted as very powerful. As this experience grasps the self as the non-creator of the universe, while the Vedic sentence teaches God to be the creator of all, the difference between God and all others becomes quite clear.

b) The difference between God and the self is upheld by many *Pramāṇas*. When experience, reasoning and thousands of Vedic sentences show or teach, the difference between God and the self, without heeding them, the identity between them (i.e. God and self) cannot be proved on the basis of a few sentences."

Daśaprakaraṇa, (ABMMM, Bengaluru), pp.221-223

Chapter VIII – Madhva's Doctrine of *Mokṣa* – the Liberation

The reference has already been made in some places to Madhva's classification of selves into three types, his ideas of bondage, and *Mokṣa*, the liberation. Madhva divides selves into three kinds: a) *Muktiyogyas*, those who are fit for *Mokṣa*; b) *Nityasaṁsārīs*, those who are eternally involved in transmigration; and c) *Tamoyogyas*, those who are condemned to suffer eternally in hell. This division is based on their natures, which are eternal and permanent. Hence *Mokṣa* is beyond the reach of the *Nityasaṁsārīs* and *Tamoyogyas*. Thus, this division implies the rejection of the concept of *Sarvamukti*, the liberation of all, because it ignores the natural, deserts the souls, which according to Madhva is unjust and irrational. Thus, the *Mokṣa* can be achieved only by those who, by their very nature, deserve it, after reaching the level of spiritual development that secures them the grace of God.

The grace of God is the absolutely essential and the final means of attaining *Mokṣa*. The bondage, liberation, ignorance and knowledge of the selves depend upon the will of God. It is lord the supreme, who binds and liberates the selves. He is the *Bandhaka* and *Mocaka*.[1] These are the ones among *Aṣṭaiśvarya*, the eight cosmic attributes or glories of the lord. *Mokṣa* is freedom from bondage, which is due to the association of the self with the *Prākṛtika* or material elements like *Buddhi*, body, senses and the object of enjoyment; it is not freedom from its dependence on God. The self's dependence on God is eternal; but its association with matter, here in the case of *Muktiyogyas* (and it should be noted that the reference to *Mokṣa* in Madhva's philosophy refers only to *Muktiyogyas* and not to other kinds of selves) is temporary; it comes to an end when *Mokṣa* is realized; *Muktiyogyas* are, normally and spiritually, very good persons. *Mokṣa* is realization of the nature of the self and the nature of such a self consists of

[1] *Bandhako bhavapāśena bhavapāśāccha mocakaḥ*

pure joy and clear consciousness of its dependence on God. Such a soul, as a result of its deep, firm and uninterrupted pure devotion to God, gets, not automatically but depending upon the will of God, *Sākṣātkāra*, the intuitive perception or vision and grace of the lord, becomes free from its bonds to material elements, and begins to enjoy an unalloyed spiritual joy.

The consciousness and bliss enjoyed by all the released souls is not of the same kind. It differs in quantity and quality from the one released self to another. This is the consequence of the plurality of liberated souls and the intrinsic differences in their natures. The self in its released state does not merge in the *Nirguṇabrahmā* and lose its identity or individuality. Self retains its individuality or personality. It is a spiritual person enjoying its nature consisting of consciousness and bliss to its heart's content. Its spiritual personality blossoms out into a beautiful flower, becomes manifest to it spreading out a sweet scent and message of goodwill to all around and thanking the lord with all its heart and might for this mercy in conferring this grace on it.[2] It is always and everywhere aware of God's presence and of its dependence on him. *Mokṣa* is self realization through God realization.

Muktas have *Svarūpadehas*, spiritual bodies and through them they can act and enjoy. They can clearly distinguish between the self and material body, they can remember their past life in *Saṁsāra* and know the difference between it and their released state, they can serve and worship God in many ways and they can sing his glories etc. They are free to do whatever they want to do; they act spontaneously and are not bound by anything except the will of the lord, which they know and according to which, they always act. They are always contented and their acts are not directed towards getting some satisfaction. All that they do is an end in itself.[3] They are not required to follow or observe the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions, rites etc. They are above all these, which are meant for the bound selves.

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[2] "Madhva, therefore, regards *Mokṣa* as a complete self-expression, self-manifestation and self-realisation a complete unfolding of the self in all its promise and potency". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass MLBD, Delhi), p.450

[3] "The worship and activity in *Mokṣa*, such as they are, an end in themselves, they are not means to an end". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (MLBD, Delhi), p.451

Madhva's view of *Ānandatāratamya* in *Mokṣa*

The distinction and gradation in the nature of pure bliss enjoyed by the released souls, is a logical consequence of his doctrines of *Svarūpābheda*, the plurality based on the difference in the intrinsic natures of selves and *Tāratamya*, the gradation among them. The released selves, like the bound ones, are many. The multiplicity of the liberated *Jīvas* must have as its bases the distinctions in the intrinsic natures of these selves. Since the released selves are without physical adjuncts like the body etc., the distinctions between them must be due to the differences in their spiritual natures. Though the selves are similar in being eternal, conscious, active etc., they differ from one another in specific aspects e.g., some have more and clear knowledge than others, they are skillful in doing different activities etc.,

The doctrines of *Svarūpābheda* and *Tāratamya* among selves are supported by the *Śāstras*, the doctrines. Thus, we are taught that there are such gradations among the *Jīvas* as gods, Ṛṣis, Munis, Yatis, human beings, animals, plants etc., from the highest to the lowest selves. Caturmukhabrahmā, Pradhānavāyu (Mukhyaprāṇa), the wind god are *Jīvottamas*, the best and highest among the *Jīvas*. Then there are Brahmāṇī, Bhāratī, Garuḍa, Śeṣa, Rudra, Sauparṇī, Vāruṇī, Rudrāṇī and others in the descending order Gods, Goddesses and the best human beings are *Muktiyogyas*. It is perfectly logical or rational to hold that such selves, because of their *Svarūpābheda* and *Tāratamya*, enjoy in their released states, bliss of different quality intensity and quantity e.g., that the bliss enjoyed by Brahmā and Vāyu in *Mokṣa* must be far superior to the bliss enjoyed by the liberated human beings. This type of situation in the released state does not give rise to jealousy, strife, hatred etc., among the released souls as it is likely to do among the bound selves.

The bound selves are most likely to become jealous of those who have more and better things than those they have, to desire to have more and better things, and to come into conflict with others in getting them. The bound selves are never fully satisfied. But this cannot happen in *Mokṣa*, simply because every released soul is fully contented with blissful consciousness that has been granted to it, according to its own nature, by the merciful

God. It enjoys forever its share of pure bliss without bothering about other selves. Its very nature prevents it from desiring for more and better, for it cannot enjoy more than what it deserves. Thus, there cannot be room for such petty emotions and actions like jealousy, hatred and conflict in *Mokṣa*.

The second reason for the *Ānandatāratamya* in the released state is the means *Japa*, *Sādhanas*, *Tapa*, Worship, *Yajñayāga*, Sacrifices) used to attain *Mokṣa*. Some use more rigorous means for a longer time than others to achieve *Mokṣa*. It is reasonable to accept that corresponding to such differences in the means employed by *Muktiyogyas* there must be graded differences in the quantity and intensity of the bliss enjoyed by the freed selves.

The *Śāstras*, the doctrines teach that there are four forms or states of liberation: Sālokya, Sāmīpya, Sārūpya and Sāyujya. Residing in the same Loka or place where God resides, being near to God, being more like God, being intimate with God. These are said to represent the ascending order in the state of *Mokṣa* in the sense that each succeeding state includes the bliss of the preceding state and goes beyond it, in the sense of being superior to the preceding state. This certainly implies gradations in the bliss enjoyed by the liberated selves.

Thus, there are very strong reasons to accept Madhva's view of *Ānandatāratamya* and to reject the view that bliss enjoyed by all the liberated souls is the same. *Mokṣa* can be attained, not always and necessarily after the death; it can be attained by the *Muktiyogya* even when he is alive. *Jīvanmukti* is possible. Madhva accepts the conception of *Jīvanmukti*. The *Aparokṣajñāna* or *Sākṣātkāra* and grace of God burn down the *Muktiyogya*'s *Sancitānārabdhakarmā*, the accumulated but still non-productive of its influence or inactive *Karmā*, but he continues to live till his *Prārabdhakarmā*, the *Karmā* that has begun to produce its effects, is exhausted by Bhoga or its enjoyment. The *Jīvanmukta* being naturally, morally and spiritually the best person, goes on doing good meritorious works to please God till his death. Madhva lays it down that the *Muktiyogyajñānī* and *Jīvanmukta*

should be the best social worker, spiritual and moral guide to the members of the community.

The liberated soul never returns to the *Saṁsāra*. It will never be born again; it is beyond the cycle of birth and death. This is what distinguishes *Mokṣa* from *Svarga*, the heaven. A self that does a lot of good work with the desire for fruit, *Kāmyakarmā* in this world and as a result accumulates a large stock of *Puṇya*, the merit may go to heaven and enjoy happiness till its merit is exhausted. As soon as its merit is completely exhausted, it is born again. Thus, *Svarga* is temporary state of happiness; it has a beginning and an end. While *Mokṣa* is a permanent state of bliss, it has a beginning but no end.

Madhva's conception of bondage

Mokṣa is defined as freedom from bondage to *Saṁsāra*. *Mokṣa* has two aspects a) negative b) positive. A self's freedom from bondage is its negative aspect. Liberation is attained only when the association of the self with the material elements – the body, *Karmā* is destroyed; liberation is absence of bondage. The positive aspect of *Mokṣa* consists of a self's clear, firm, permanent awareness of its intrinsic nature including its dependence on God, deep gratitude towards him for this grace bestowed upon it, and enjoyment of pure bliss according to its fitness. This is its positive aspect, which renders *Mokṣa* worth of hard striving to attain it.

Madhva's view of bondage is called *Svabhāvajñānavāda*. *Svabhāva* means intrinsic nature and *Ajñāna* means nascence or ignorance, so the whole expression signifies ignorance of the intrinsic nature. Ignorance cannot belong to God who is perfect in all respects; it can characterize the self, which is finite. And according to Madhva, bondage is due to the ignorance of the self about it sown nature; and this self's ignorance about its essential nature is produced by the will of God; the *Jīva* has many *Viśeṣas*, aspects it is *Saviṣeṣa* real; it is not *Nirviṣeṣa* and *Nirguṇa*. Though it is self-luminous, some of its aspects like its dependence on God, its sense of the sovereignty of the lord over all *Prākṛta* or material objects that he is the real owner of all and its blissful nature etc., are concealed from the self by

God. As a result the *Jīva* wrongly believes that it is independent, that it does things on its own without any *Preraṇā*, simulation from God, that its body and other material possessions are its own that it is the sole owner of them and that they are not the gifts of God) etc.

Thus, the *Jīva* acts as a thief. As a thief who misappropriates things that belong to others, the *Jīva* misappropriates independence, material possessions (wealth), which really belong to God, to itself, though it does not know this. It is haunted by *Ahaṅkāra*, the sense 'I' and *Mamakāra* or Svārtha, 'Mine' to such an extent as to identify itself with its possessions or to believe that they are parts of itself, so that when it accumulates them it feels pleasure and when it loses them, it feels pain. Its sense of its basic difference from matter is blurred or even lost. This is the self's involvement in *Saṁsāra*, its attachment to the objects of the world. This explains the severe struggle and strife to acquire wealth, pleasures and pains. That we suffer in life through ignorance, pride, selfishness, is a fact known to us by experience, which cannot be denied. Therefore Madhva's view is bold and realist.

God's will is the ultimate cause of the bondage of the self. *Ajñāna, Karmā* and *Vāsanās*, which in their subtle forms persist in *Liṅgaśarīra* and transmigrate with self till its release, etc., are also responsible for our bondage but they are penultimate dependent factors. Since they are *Jaḍa*, unconscious factors (unconscious factors), they are without initiative, and they cannot operate by themselves. The self being conscious, is superior to them. They are set in operation by God who determines the manner of their working in binding each *Jīva* according to its nature, which is concealed from it. God, being, omniscient intuitively knows the natures of the selves. Even the nature of the *Muktiyogya* self is revealed to it by God when it attains *Mokṣa*. Hence, he is able properly to guide and control the operation of *Ajñāna, Karmā*, etc., in binding a self in conformity with its nature.

Bondage of the self is beginningless though depending on God's will. The questions like "When does the self become bound? When does the pure self begins its first life, accumulate its *Karmā* and become bound?" These questions are unanswerable, not because they are very difficult, but

because they are improper based on the misconception of the nature of the bondage. The bondage though beginningless, is not endless, it is Anādi but not *Ananta*. If it were *Ananta*, no self would have attained *Mokṣa*. It has an end, it is *Sānta*. It is ended or destroyed when the *Muktiyogya* self attains *Mokṣa* (or when other kinds of selves realize their nature by the grace of the lord).

Bondage is real, though destructible; or temporary; what is real need not be eternal, permanent or indestructible. The Advaitic belief, if bondage is real, it would be eternal or indestructible, is quite baseless and false.

Here, reference has to be made to the problem of evil, which is intimately related to the concepts of bondage and of the God. Bondage is an association with a body and its consequent birth and involvement of a self in *Saṁsāra*. Not only the Vedāntins but other thinkers believe that *Saṁsāra* is full of suffering, which is an evil. This presents a serious problem to theism which holds that God has infinite number of auspicious attributes. Two of his attributes; love and omnipotence are relevant here. Theists hold that God is full of love for his creations and he is omnipotent, while atheists deny this using the problem of evil as the bases of their attack against the theists. The atheists argue that if God loves his creatures, he should make them happy and if he is omnipotent, he should be able to destroy everything that makes them miserable and to maintain everything that is conducive to their happiness. But we see that all sorts of human suffering caused by human beings (war, murder etc.,), diseases and by natural calamities are rampant in the world. Thus, it is clear that God does not love his creatures and he is not omnipotent.

This is a very serious objection against theism. The theist cannot accept the conception of God who is indifferent to his creatures' suffering and whose might is limited. The religious intuition tells that the atheist's objection is wrong.

The Advaitin seems to be undisturbed by the objection because according to Advaita, there is no problem of evil simply because there is

no evil, that evil is *Mithyā* unreal or only apparent. If there is only the Brahmā, which is blissful consciousness and nothing else, how can there be any evil? We believe that there is evil, but our belief is false, because the evil is unreal. The Advaitin offers an explanation of this false belief as due to *Avidyā* or *Upādhi* or both which, as Madhva has clearly shown, is unacceptable because the conceptions of *Avidyā* and *Upādhi* in Advaita are full of confusion.

Further, the statement that 'evil is unreal' may be interpreted in two ways; a) There are no feelings of pain, no commitment of sins etc., or we seem to feel pain but we never really feel pain, we think we committed sin but we never really commit sin. b) There is pain; we feel it, we do commit sin but pain, sin etc., are not really evil.

According to Madhva, our knowledge of our feelings, thoughts etc., is derived from Sākṣipratyakṣa and *Sākṣijñāna* is indubitable, absolutely certain. No one can have doubt or misconception about what one feels, thinks etc., and *Sākṣipratyakṣa* inform us that we do really feel pain, we do really have the sense of having done something wrong. Since the first interpretation is opposed to what we know with absolute certainty, it is undoubtedly false.

Our normal intuition tells us that suffering, sin, etc., are bad, they are evil. As the, second interpretation contradicts such moral intuition, it is also false. Thus, there is nothing to support the Advaitic view that evil is unreal.

Madhva holds that evil is real. There is lot of pain and sin etc., in the world. It is because there is evil we desire to get released from it and for this purpose; we subject ourselves for hard moral and spiritual preparation. If there were no evil, if the universe were as it ought to be or perfect, our strenuous striving for *Mokṣa* would be unnecessary and meaningless. If that is essential and meaningful, and it is so, then the bondage and *Mokṣa* both must be real.

We the *Jīvas*, and not God are responsible for the existence of evil in the universe. We are the real *Kartṛs*, the doers of act and *Bhoktṛ*, reapers

of the fruits of what we do. This is proved by the fact that the *Śāstras* contain instructions about the performance of some actions for getting good and non-performance of other actions for shunning bad results for whom these instructions are given. Certainly, they cannot be meant for God who is perfect. They are not addressed to *Jaḍa*, or matter which cannot be expected to understand and follow them. So it must be the reasonable *Jīvas* for whom they are laid down in the *Śāstras*.

However, the *Jīvas* are not the absolutely free agents. God alone is absolutely free or independent. The *Jīvas* have limited freedom in action. Their activities are limited or determined by the body, senses their intrinsic nature, the psycho-socio-physical circumstances in which they act, and the most important factor, God's *Preraṇā*, will or direction. Nothing moves without the *Preraṇā* or will of God. But the *Jīva* is not a puppet in the hands of God. For, the self is endowed with the freedom of choice, though it is circumscribed by God's will and its own nature etc. The self is free to choose the right or the wrong, the good or the bad. It is because he is free in his choice of action, that he can be held responsible for his actions. That is, an agent is responsible for his voluntary action i.e., those actions, which he is free to do or not to do and only voluntary actions are subjects of moral judgements. Thus, moral life implies freedom of choice. Since, men are by their nature moral beings, they are free (in some sense of "free") in doing or avoiding actions.

It is also true that to be responsible for an act, an act must be one's own act; and to be one's own act, it must be determined (in some sense of that word) by one's own nature (character or personality), it must issue from ones intrinsic nature. If an act is not intimately connected with the nature or character of a person, it cannot be his act. B's voluntary act is not A's voluntary act (hence A is not responsible for it) simply because it is not determined or related to A's nature while it is B's act (and he is responsible for it) because it is determined by his character. A voluntary act, due to its determination by or close relationship with the character of a doer, manifests or reveals his character; it is an outward expression of his inner nature. It is a fact that we come to know the character of a person

from the knowledge of his acts. This would not have been possible if his acts were not intimately connected with his character. Thus, we see that if an agent is to be held responsible for his act, his act should be free or voluntary act and it should be determined by his nature.

Though circumscribed, (but not forced to act in a definite way) by the factors such as psycho-social situation in which the agent is placed, *Karmā*, his nature, and God's *Preraṇā*, inspiration yet the individual is free to act according to his desire, free to choose the right or the wrong. The individual acts with a desire but without a right, to have a certain fruit good or bad. God does not force him to act or prevent him from acting; God leaves him to act according to his desire.[4] The lord grants the fruit, not that is desired by the agent but that is deserved by him (sometime, the desired and the deserved, fruits may be the same). The agent reaps or enjoys the fruits good or bad depending upon his right or wrong choice. Hence, he is responsible for what he does and what he gets. He wants the fruit for himself and acts.

God does not want it or anything for himself. For, he is *Pūrṇa*, the full or complete, *Nityatṛpta*, the ever content or perfect. The individual is wholly responsible for what he does and as a result what he gets by it. The large amount of evil in the world is thus due to the past and present wrong choices or actions of the individuals. God's role is Preraka, that of director or inspirer or initiator. He directs or inspires the individual to act and enables him to act by providing the required conditions, including the instructions

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[4] This is the significance of the instruction: *yathecchasi tathā kuru* "Do as you like" given to Arjuna by lord Kṛṣṇa. This implies that Arjuna, a *Jīva* (rational being) is free to choose the right or the wrong the good or the bad. Śrī Kṛṣṇa has pointed out to him that his duty as a *Kṣatriya* is to fight, and Arjuna being the *Sātvikajīva* chooses to fight i.e., to do the right or the good. Before the commencement of war between Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas, Śrī Kṛṣṇa tries all means to prevent it and to establish peace. He advises Duryodhana to give five small villages to Pāṇḍavas. Thus, to stop destruction that will result from war. But Duryodhana being *Tāmasa* refuses to give anything to Pāṇḍavas. All this supports two important points made by Madhva a) There are intrinsic differences in the natures of selves and b) a person, though determined by the will of God, his own nature, *Karmā* etc., has yet the moral ability to choose to do the right or wrong that he is not a puppet in the hands of God etc. Hence the person is morally responsible for what he chooses to do.

about what is right or good, and leaves it to the individual to choose or do the right or good, wrong or bad.

From this it follows that the following beliefs commonly held by many individuals are wrong. To evade their responsibility, some people argue that since nothing moves without the will of God, or since God is *Sarvakartā*, the all-doer, we are not responsible for anything; God is responsible for everything. We are helpless toys in his hands. To justify their inaction or laziness people argue that the fruits of our action are not in our hands. They are gifts from God, God grants them according to his will. So we need not do anything, it does not matter whether we do something or not.

Madhva does not tolerate this. He condemns this kind of attitude as leading the individual towards hell. It is based on the total misunderstanding of theism. It is true among the causal factors producing action God's will is mentioned. But along with it the nature of the *Jīva* is also mentioned which means that the *Jīva* is also *Kartā*, a doer that the action depends upon his choice or will also. Hence he is responsible or his action. And his *Prayatna*, moral struggle or effort is, among other factors, important in shaping his own future and also of the world.[5] Admitting that the *Jīvas* are responsible for evil, one may still ask why does the kind loving God do not prevent or destroy. Being omnipotent he must be able to destroy it.

The answer is he does destroy it. Our mythologies are full of accounts of destruction of *Asuras*, the devils by the God. For this purpose, God, out of his kindness and love for his creatures, has incarnated in human or other forms, has lived in this world, but without being in any way tainted by

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[5] "The innate fitness of *Jīvas* for good or evil, which makes them *Sātvika*, *Rājasa* and *Tāmasa*, as the case may be, is called Hatha. The Hatha is the innate disposition which finds divergent expression in internal and external behaviour through intensive effort. All these three factors depend on God's will for their existence and functioning like everything else in finite life ... while *Svarūpayogyatā* is the basic determinant of human destiny. it lies more or less dormant until it is awakened and transmitted into *Karmā* through intensive effort. Human effort or endeavour is thus made to play the key role in making man the architect of his own future in keeping with his own basic nature ..." B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), pp.365-366

evil and has mitigated or completely freed the deserving *Jīvas*, from the suffering. It is true that he has not destroyed all evil; he has allowed the proper amount of evil to exist.

This shows that he has the right to destroy all evil if he wishes to do so. But he does not will to do so, neither because he is cruel nor because he is impotent to remove all evil but because, according to Madhva, the existence of evil is necessary for the spiritual development of the *Jīvas*. Creation is emergence of immature *Jīvas* from the womb of *Prakṛti* where they have been existing, during *Pralaya* and their entrance into the world of *Saṁsāra*. They are provided by God with conditions (including instructions about the good or the bad, right or wrong), in which they can make efforts, struggle very had to realize their own nature, if not in one life but in a series of lives, and in which the best among them win over the bad or the evil and attain the eternal permanent pure bliss or *Mokṣa*, from which there is no return to *Saṁsāra*, by the grace of the greatest lord.

This world is created by God. This world and God is real, though God is the independent real while the world is a dependent real. Creation is also real; creation is his *Līlā*, the effortless easy sport. There is benevolent purpose behind the creation of the world. It is a place, in which the selves are enabled by the conditions provided by God, to attain, by their own *Prayatna*, hard efforts, their full spiritual destinies or evolution good or bad, in accordance with their natures and the will of God. Bondage, though it involves suffering or evil, is necessary for the gradual unfolding of the spiritual natures of the selves.

All finite selves; *Muktiyogyas*, *Tamoyogyas* and *Nityasaṁsārīs* have to be born into the world, i.e., have to become associated with their respective maternal adjuncts such as bodies, *Karmās*, *Vāsanās* etc., have to be bound, in order to achieve their respective spiritual and moral developments. The *Muktiyogyas* get an opportunity to please God by their deep, firm and pure devotion to him, and by doing good in various ways to their fellow beings. Thus, become completely free from all suffering and enjoy pure and permanent bliss inherent in their natures. *Tamoyogyas* displease God

by their indifference or hatred towards God and by doing bad in many ways to their fellow beings and thus to go to hell. The *Nityasaṁsārīs* get an opportunity to show devotion to God to get some the desired fruits, and to do some good and some bad things, and thus to subject themselves to the cycle of births and deaths. However, the omnipotent God has the might to destroy all evil. He does not will to do so and allows some amount of evil to exist, for the sake of the spiritual evolution of the selves.[6]

Moreover, all the selves born in this world, are more or less good or bad. *Sātvika* or *Muktiyogya*, the good selves cannot tolerate the existence of the bad or evil. The presence of evil stimulates or energizes them to put forth hard struggle against the evil and to destroy it; in doing so, all the good that is latent in them becomes manifest. They become more pure, hence they go nearer to *Mokṣa*. But *Tamoyogyas*, the bad selves try to destroy the good, they traduce or try hard to pull down the good ones to the path of sin and hate them. By such means they bring out all the evil that is latent in their natures, become worse and worse and thus pave the way to their damnation. The severe fight between the forces of good and evil; just and unjust, is an essential characteristic of human life in *Saṁsāra*. Without it human life in this world would be meaningless. Certainly, kind and merciful God does not will to make it meaningless by eradicating all evil from it.[7]

Sādhana, the means of realization of *Mokṣa*

According to Madhva, only *Muktiyogyas* can attain *Mokṣa* by the grace of God. So these means of *Mokṣa* realization are meant for them.

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[6] "The association with *Prākṛtika* bonds is a necessary step in the spiritual evolution of the souls and is, therefore, permitted by God. It is an ordeal through which every one of them has to pass before attaining his or her full status, whatever that might be. It is the desire of the almighty that the souls shall fulfil themselves only in this way and in no other. And there is no questioning his will, as he is Satyasaṅkalpa". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.270

[7] "... the presence of evil is an incentive to the better class of souls, to keep off from its temptation" B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.371

There is consensus among our thinkers that philosophical knowledge should be a guide or means to the moral and spiritual progress of human beings and finally, to the attainment of the ultimate ideal of life. Their view about the nature of the ultimate spiritual ideal differ depending upon the differences in their metaphysical doctrines; but there is general agreement about the means to attain it, though these means are called by different names and though there is some difference of opinion about the importance of a certain means as against another in leading to the final end. Among all these Madhva's view about the means to *Mokṣa* is undoubtedly the best one. The means to be considered are a) *Vairāgya*, the detachment from worldly pleasures b) *Karmā*, the *Bhakti* and *Jñānamārgas* c) *Śravaṇa*, the study d) *Manana*, the reflection e) *Nidhidhyāsana*, the meditation f) Sākṣātkāra, the vision and grace of God.[8]

Vairāgya

Man has animality as a part of his nature. He is said to be a rational animal. His spiritual progress consists in subduing his animal to his rational nature by making the latter more and more dominant over the former. This is, difficult, though not impossible. For this has been achieved by our Ṛṣis and other *Sātvikajīvas*, whose lives serve as ideals for us to follow. We should make constant hard effort to go along their way of life.

The animal nature of an individual consists of impulses and passions which drive him on to act in various ways to satisfy his material wants, such as need for food, water, shelter etc., in short, those wants the satisfaction of which is necessary for his bodily growth, health, survival and propagation of his species. In the field of material wants, there is much scope for the manifestation of the passions like anger, fear, greed, pride, jealousy, sex, i.e., *Ṣaḍvairīs*, the six enemies of spiritual development. These impel men to act in harmful, selfish and destructive ways.

[8] Thus, the conceptions of *Mokṣa* in Advaita and Dvaita are basically different, Advaita holding that the released soul is one with Brahmā while Dvaita holding in release state also the self remains different from God. Some say that *Śravaṇa* is more important than other means, some accord the highest place to *Dhyāna* while Madhva holds that *Sākṣātkāra* including grace of God is the most important. B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.380

The aspirant for spiritual development should not be a slave of impulses and passions. For these produce mental restlessness which is a great obstacle to mental concentration that is essential for the achievement of the spiritual end. The passionate, impulsive individual is like a thin long plant in the wind blowing from different directions. It tosses to this side and that side, never standing steady and breaks down in the end. It is true that the *Muktiyogyas*, being *Sātvika* by nature, are less likely to be influenced by such impulses and passions; but since they are not perfect, the possibility of their coming under the influence of passions, at least on some rare occasions and becoming the victims of this pest of passions, cannot be ruled out.

There are many stories about good individuals slipping towards the wrong path and as a result, suffering in *Saṁsāra* e.g., Jaya, Vijaya, the door keepers at Śrī Viṣṇu's Vaikuṇṭha. So the first step in the spiritual training of an individual is that he should be a master of his impulses and passions, desires and thoughts. He should never speak or think ill of others but should always have in his mind the good of others. To be alive he has to satisfy his wants but he must put a proper limit on their satisfaction, e.g., take the case of food and water. He has to eat and drink in order to survive but he should not eat and drink anything that pleases him. He should take *Sātvika* food and drink[9] in such a limited quantity as is necessary for survival of the individual. Also detailed rules as to how, when and where such food and drink should be consumed, are laid down. The ways of controlling passions and wants are described in the *Śāstras*. He should learn and follow them under the guidance of a proper Guru, the preceptor.

According to Madhva, the blessings of the Guru are very important in the spiritual training of the disciple. Without *Guruprasāda* it is almost impossible for the disciple to reach his spiritual goal. This does not mean that *Guruprasāda* is alone sufficient. It is necessary but not sufficient for spiritual progress because the disciple's effort in the right direction and his intrinsic nature and grace of presiding deities and the God are also

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[9] The *Sātvika*, *Rājasa* and *Tāmasa* foods and drinks are described and also such three kinds of Faith, Sacrifice Penance are described. Bhagavadgītā, Chapter xvii

necessary for his success in achieving his spiritual end.[10] The aspirant must be always vigilant or alert in regard to the working of his senses and *Manas*. He must be able to check their tendency to seek external pleasures and be adept with drawing and redirecting them towards better or higher spiritual ends.

It is hard and painful, but also necessary for spiritual development, its opposite course, to wit, allowing the senses and the *Manas* to run after the sensuous pleasures is easy, and temporarily pleasant, but it is a spiritual downfall and destruction. Callousness (indifference), sloth (laziness) mental and physical, is dangerous to spiritual well-being. There should not be any scope for it in his life. He must be diligent and watchful over his thoughts, desires, feelings and doings. In short, he must have proper control over all aspects – cognitive, conative and affective of his personality. He should see that no element foreign to his *Sātvika* nature enters into his character. He should abstain from injuring others from stealing, deceiving, lying, avarice etc. He should have the good moral characteristics like speaking the truth, keeping promises, helping and co-operating with others, honestly doing his *Varṇāśramadharmas*, the duties attached to his role and status etc. In short, he should form the firm habit of doing the good and avoiding the bad.

Self-control does not mean torturing the senses body and *Manas*. It means disciplining or training them in a proper way, so that, instead of becoming hindrances, they become aids to moral and spiritual progress.

The cultivation of the habit of self-control in what one does, thinks and feels becomes easy by *Vairāgya*, and the unshakeable, genuine, sincere, clear conviction that everything that exists and happens depends on the will of God grows. *Vairāgya* means detachment from the worldly and heavenly objects of pleasures. The knowledge of the nature of such pleasures gives rise to *Vairāgya*. Such knowledge can be had by the study of the *Śāstras*

[10] "The emphasis on *Guruprasāda* does not mean that individual effort and the deserts of the aspirant do not count. They are the foundations of one's spiritual progress; but *Guruprasāda* is the crowing point of this development". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.279

under the competent guru and by reflection on one's previous deeds and experiences. The *Śāstras* teach us that such pleasures are transient and evanescent. They are deceptive for their enjoyments never produces peace and real satisfaction, on the contrary, it produces restlessness and anxiety by making us desire more and more pleasures.

Many wise men have said that detachment from the pleasures cannot be attained by indulging in them; that hankering after them is a wild goose chase. This is true of heavenly pleasures also. Many people do *Kāmyakarmās* i.e., acts done with a desire to get various worldly benefits. They do *Yajñayāga*, the rituals, sacrifices *Japa* and *Tapa* with the desire to get children, wealth, energy, etc. Thus, they accumulate *Puṇya* or merit. As a result they enjoy pleasures in heaven till their *Puṇya* is finished. After the exhaustion of their merit by enjoyment of it, they return to *Saṁsāra* where they are again subject to the cycle of births, deaths and suffering. Reflection on his previous deeds and experience brings home to him the vanity and worthless of his worldly gains and achievements.

Sātvika realizes that he has done many wrongs; that he has failed to live as he ought to have lived. The *Sātvika* individual feels that his greatest mistake is that instead of devoting himself to the service of the lord, he has frittered away or wasted his time and energy in doing frivolous and trivial things. All this give rise to feelings of dissatisfaction, despondency and desperation in him. Yet instead of becoming a pessimist (being a *Sātvika*, he is a theist and a sincere believer in God can never be a pessimist), disregarding all mundane matters he wholeheartedly and devoutly appeals to the only refuge that can save him, i.e., to God the Almighty, to be merciful towards him and to forgive him.

In this state, the spiritual aspirant is mostly conscious of God; God is the centre of almost all his interests; what he does is worship, what he says is prayer, and what he feels is gratitude towards God. He believes that everything he has, including his body etc., is a gift from God. He is ready to surrender himself and his possessions to God. In short, he is completely detached from worldly pleasures and lovingly and gratefully attached to

God. This does not mean that he does not eat food, drink water, does not mix with people etc. He takes food and water of proper quantity and quality, not for the sake of pleasure that he gets, but with a view to live and serve God. He mixes with good people who like himself are servants of God. Thus, he is indifferent to worldly affairs which attract the attention of many and make them forget God. but is very attentive to spiritual matters which make him remember God with reverence.[11]

Karmayoga

Many Vedāntins equated "*Karmā* " with *Kāmyakarmā*, i.e., with doing of sacrifices and rites and the duties of one's Varṇāśrama that are prescribed in the *Śāstras*, for the sake of attaining rewards in this world or in the next. In this sense of the term *Karmā* they thought that doing such *Karmā* might be profitable in this world or in the next, but that it was a great impediment to spiritual progress, that this kind of selfish *Karmā* was not at all conducive to attain *Mokṣa*, because it was a cause of bondage. So they advocated that the spiritual aspirant should abandon all *Karmā*, that *Mokṣa* and *Karmā* were opposed to one another, hence *Mokṣa* could be attained only by becoming free from *Karmā*. They emphasized that *Jñāna* was necessary for attaining *Mokṣa*, but *Karmā* was not. Accordingly the terms *Nivṛttimārga*, *Karmasanyāsa* were interpreted to mean "giving up of all *Karmā*" The *Mukta* was supposed to be free from the performance of *Karmā*.

Sri Bhagavadgītā altered this way of thinking about *Karmā* by teaching that the significance of *Karmā* in the sense of doing something with a desire to get some worldly benefit was very narrow in its scope. Gītā expanded the significance of *Karmā* by recognizing two types of *Karmā*; a) *Kāmyakarmā* b) *Niṣkāmakarmā*. The Gītā, while agreeing that *Kāmya* or selfish *Karmā* acts as a shackle attaching or binding an individual to the *Saṁsāra*, teaches that

[11] "Dispassion or *Vairāgya* is the first step and primary requisite of a true aspirant. ... Attachment to sensuous life is the greatest impediment to devotion to God. One cannot serve two masters. One must choose sooner or later between the two". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi). p.376

Niṣkāmakarmā is absolutely necessary for attaining *Mokṣa*. The Gītā points out that everyone has to do *Karmā* in both the bound and the released state. This is supported by the *Śāstras*.

There are many passages in the *Śāstras* that state that even the *Muktas* who have become free from all physical accessories but have only *Svarūpadehas* or spiritual bodies, do *Karmās* according to the will of God. Śrī Krishna, the supreme lord, the supreme *Jñānī* among the *Jñānīs*, who is *muktānāṁ paramāgatiḥ*, the ultimate reality and refuge for *Muktas* says that though he is *Nityatṛpta*, being ever satisfied himself, *Pūrṇa*, all full or perfect does not need anything for himself yet does *Karmā* like creating, maintaining destroying etc., of the world for the sake of the spiritual evolution of the selves. Thus, since all selves bound or released are required to do *Karmā*, it is not *Karmā* as such is an evil that binds but it is the mental condition. Motive or intention of the self that acts which is the cause of its bondage or liberation. So it is on the basis of the nature of the intention or motive with which an act is done, *Karmā* is distinguished into *Kāmya* and *Niṣkāmakarmā*. The *Kāmyakarmā* (also called *Pravṛttimārga*) involves i) the desire to get certain fruits here or in *Svarga*, ii) *Ahaṅkāra*, the 'I' consciousness i.e., 'I am doing this on my own' and *Mamakāra*, the 'mine' consciousness i.e., 'the possessions are my own'. Thus, it is done with *Ajñāna* of which the *Ahaṅkāra* and the *Mamakāra* are the results and iii) it involves very little or no knowledge of and devotion to God. It is full of *Moha*, the attachment and selfishness. Hence it leads to the bondage of the self. The spiritual aspirant must abandon it. But he has to perform *Niṣkāmakarmā* also called *Karmayoga*, which is an essential means to *Mokṣa*.

It is an altruistic, benevolent spiritual work. It is done without the selfish desire for fruit, but with *Lokasaṅgraha*, the pure desire to do good to the society, with the full knowledge that it is God, who is the real doer behind it, that the self-doing it is only his servant carrying out his will to please him. Thus, it involves knowledge of and deep devotion to God. It is done with detachment from the worldly pleasures. It is done with knowledge about the nature of the self and of God and of the *Pratibimbabimba* relation between the two; i.e., the *Karmayogī* knows that he and all other selves and

everything else is dependent on the will of God, and what matters in life is devotion to God only and nothing else.

Thus, *Karmayoga* is not possible without purification of mind and heart. This makes the meaning of the expressions *Karmasansyāsa*, *Nirvṛttimārga* clear. Their meaning is not 'renouncing all action', but "renouncing all selfish desire for worldly pleasures and doing one's duties with dispassion and dedication and devotion".[12] If this is so, one may ask, why the rewards such as wealth, children, fame, power etc., are said to result from the performance of many though not all, rites, sacrifices etc., in their *Phalaśrutis*? The answer is that to the ordinary people, they are inducements to perform *Pūjā*, *Yajña*, *Yāga*, *Yoga*, *Vṛta* etc., which involve some *Tyāga*, the renouncement (sacrifice) and devotion to God. They are devotees but of a lower order. But the *Karmayogī* knows their perishable and temporary nature, and also that they are obstacles in the path of spiritual progress. Hence, he is not at all attracted or tempted by them. He avoids them and directs his efforts towards superior spiritual ends.[13]

Thus, *Jñāna* (Mukti) and *Karmā* are not opposed to one another. The *Karmayogī* is an enlightened person, he is a *Jñānī* and the *Jñānayogī* has to do *Karmā*; only in *Karmayoga* the emphasis is more on *Karmā* and in *Jñānayoga* the emphasis is more on *Jñāna* than on *Karmā*. But it is true that whether a person becomes a *Karmayogī* or a *Jñānayogī* depends upon his nature and the will of God. Some persons are fit to become *Karmayogīs* than *Jñānayogīs* while some others, to become *Jñānayogīs* than *Karmayogīs*.

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[12] ... True *Niṣkāmakarmā* is not what other commentators think it to be, viz., the abandonment of all *Karmā*, but its active in a spirit of devotion and dispassion. B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.385

[13] He (Madhva) suggests that the purpose of these prescriptions is, paradoxically enough, to warn us away from the attractions of perishable rewards and pull us up gradually to a life of disinterested action ... B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.385

Jñānayoga

Jñāna, the knowledge means the comprehensive spiritual knowledge. It includes knowledge about the a) nature and greatness of the supreme God b) nature of the self and c) the relation between God and self. Since God has infinite number of infinite attributes, no finite mind can have full knowledge of his nature and majesty. Moreover, there is variation in degree in respect of clarity, depth and extension of knowledge about God according to the rank of the *Jīva* in the hierarchy. The *Jīva* having the higher status in the hierarchy has clearer, deeper and more knowledge about God than the *Jīvas* lower than it. The term *Jīva*, the self refers not only to human selves but also to the deities having their respective ranks according to their intrinsic natures in the *Tāratamya*, hierarchy. It is essential for the spiritual aspirant to have this knowledge of the hierarchy of selves. The knowledge of the *Tatvas* other than God and selves, such *Prakṛti* and its evolutes and of the purpose of creation and destruction is said to be necessary for spiritual progress. The seeker after *Mokṣa* is expected to have the required qualifications – *Indriyanigraha, Vairāgya*, good moral qualities etc., to become fit to acquire such knowledge. He needs guidance and instruction from a preceptor. So the aspirant should become a disciple of a competent guru to acquire such knowledge. Such a guru can prepare him physically, morally and mentally for the accomplishment of the very hard task before him. It is possible to acquire such knowledge by self-study. But the study under a guru is said to be better than the self-study, because it is laid down that the blessings of guru play an important part in the spiritual progress of the aspirant.

The study of the *Śāstras* under a guru is *Śravaṇa*. Its purpose is to know the real, correct import of the *Śāstra*, which is that Sri Viṣṇu is alone the supreme, ultimate independent reality having infinite number of infinitely perfect attributes and all other realities (selves and the world) are dependent on him for their existence, nature and activity. *Manana* means impartial profound reflection on what one has learnt with a view to get all the doubts and difficulties in it removed and to make the true import firmly fixed in ones' mind. Thus, learning the truth is not at all dogmatic, it is impartial and critical.

The aspirant is not forced to accept a doctrine. He is asked by the guru himself to consider open mindedly, without any preconception or partiality, what has been imparted to him, and to accept it only if the disciple is convinced of its truth after its critical examination. The disciple is entirely free respectfully to reject or modify the teaching of his guru.[14] This fact should be taken in to account by those critics who charge Indian philosophy with dogmatism.

Then comes the third and the highest stage of acquiring knowledge which is called *Nidhidhyāsana* (*Dhyāna*), it is uninterrupted unshakable constant meditation on the truth i.e., God, the complete concentration on God, the absorption of the aspirant in deep meditation in such a way that he is unaware or indifferent towards everything else except the object of his meditation (God). In this state, he does not feel heat and cold, hunger and thirst etc. He is too engrossed in meditation on God to be aware of anything else. He may have in his mind the mental image of God and concentrate his attention on that image. But this is not *Sākṣātkāra* (*Aparokṣajñāna*) i.e., seeing or vision of the immediate intuitive knowledge of, real God. It is mediated knowledge. It is awareness of an image of God mentally constructed by the aspirants. Excluding all else from his mind, he fixes his mind on the image till God is moved, by his meditation and devotion, to confer his grace on him and reveal himself to the devotee. *Sākṣātkāra* is a sacred gift of God to the aspirant depending on the pleasure or grace of God.

Nidhidhyāsana is similar to what is *Samādhi* in *Yoga*. The aspirant is trained to use other yogic steps preceding *Samādhi*; *Yama*, *Niyama*, *Āsana*, *Prāṇāyāma*, *Pratyāhāra* etc. *Yama* is abstention from doing the wrong,

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[14] "King Priyaṁvada, the God intoxicated King, had mind to retire to the forest. Brahmadeva himself came down to persuade the King to give up his resolution to renounce the world. He is charged by Brahmadeva to stick to his duties and responsibilities as kind even though he is highly enlightened Jñānis. "B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), pp.384-385

F.N. Madhva himself did not accept the Advaitic teaching of his guru. Other famous followers of Madhva such as Jayatīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha, Vādirājatīrtha and Rāghavendratīrtha studied impartially the Advaitic view but rejected it and accepted the doctrine of Madhva.

Niyama, the performance (observance) of the right, *Āsana*, the comfortable posture, *Prāṇāyāma*, the control of breathing, *Pratyāhāra*, a withdrawal of senses and mind from the bad things, *Dhyāna*, the concentration of attention, *Dhāraṇa*, the contemplation (meditation) and *Samādhi*, the *Nidhidhyāsana*. Following these steps regularly under the guidance of an expert is very conducive to bodily and mental health. Hence is essential to spiritual progress. The aspirant gains perfect self-control by these means.

All this including *Dhyāna* is only a preparation for *Mokṣa*. Without the grace of God, *Mokṣa* cannot be attained.[15] No amount of pure knowledge of God on the part of the individual is, by itself, sufficient for his release. The reason is clear. According to Madhva, the Individual himself is not the cause of his own bondage. If his bondage were in his own hands, he would not have become bound. It is foolish to suppose that the individual binding himself desires to be free from the bondage. Since he is not the ultimate cause of his bondage, the individual cannot be the ultimate cause of his release. God binds the *Jīva* and God releases the *Jīva*; both bondage and release of the *Jīva* depend on the will of God. God should graciously reveal himself to and confer a boon on the individual for his release. For getting the graceful vision of the supreme lord turned towards the *Jīva*, the pure, firm and deep devotion towards God on the part of the *Jīva* is absolutely necessary.

Bhakti

Bhakti is a very complex conception consisting of knowledge of and love, regard or respect admiration gratitude, etc., for God. The full connotation of *Bhakti* has been clearly brought out by its definition given by Śrī Jayatīrtha.[16] Its various aspects are as follows:

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[15] "It is divine grace that plays the most decisive role in the final deliverance of the souls ..." B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.417

[16] "*Bhakti* is, thus, the steady and continuous flow of deep attachment to God, impregnable by any amount of impediments and transcending the love of our own selves, our kith and kin, cherished belongings etc., and fortified by a firm conviction of the transcendent majesty and greatness of God, as the abode of all perfections and free from all blemish and by an unshakable conviction of the complete metaphysical dependence of everything else upon him". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.389

It is the firm, uninterrupted, deep and sincere love of God. We know by experience that a true lover is always prepared to sacrifice everything including his life for the object of his love. Similar is the case with a sincere devotee of God. He is always ready to give up himself and his possessions for God. He strongly believes that God alone is valuable and significant and that everything else other than God is valueless and insignificant. Indeed, the devotee is a *Virāgī*, a person who has abandoned all worldly pleasures and who desires wholeheartedly to serve God. Detachment from worldly pleasures is necessary for the development of *Bhakti*. So it is very easy to the real devotee to renounce the worldly pleasures. The mind of a person who is not a *Virāgī* is distracted from God and attracted by the worldly pleasures. Hence his devotion to God is shallow, interrupted and infirm.

Bhakti is far superior to our attachment to our relatives and friends, our own self and our body and to our possessions, fame, power etc. It is pure spiritual love, directed towards the supreme lord.

No obstacle, suffering or anything else can deter or prevent the true devotee from worshipping, serving God to his heart's content. Many devotees regard the various difficulties and troubles as a means for remembering God with great respect and gratitude.[17] Like Prahlāda they are not afraid of them. On the contrary they welcome them as a means which make their devotion to God stronger.

The real devotion, according to Madhva, is a synthesis of knowledge and pure love. It is based on knowledge of splendour, greatness, majesty and sovereignty of the supreme God. Such knowledge is derived by the devotee through *Śravaṇa*, *Manana* and *Nidhidhyāsana*. The company of other good persons devoted to God is also helpful. In such a company of *Sātvika* persons, the ideas about the greatness and perfections of the lord are exchanged. This leads to the enhancement of devotion to God. By such means, the devotee becomes firmly convinced that God is free from defects but is full of all perfections – infinite knowledge, power, goodness, beauty,

[17] Kunti's prayer to lord Kṛṣṇa to give her various troubles on the ground that they make her remember and pray to God for protection.

infinite grace etc., and that everything including himself is dependent on the will of the God. It should be noted that the devotee's knowledge of the attributes of God, however, vast and deep it may be, can never be complete. Without the bases of clear knowledge and firm conviction about the majesty of God, the devotion to him will be blind, shaky and sentimental; it will not be steady, permanent and rational.

Bhakti makes the lives of the devotees spiritually meaningful and worthwhile. The devotee truly feels that his eyes are there to see God, his ears to hear songs about the glory of God, his tongue to praise God and his hands and legs are there to serve God. He dedicates his body, mind, wealth, and his whole, which he regards as gifts from God, to serve God. He believes that he returns to God what he has received from God, to please God. His concern with God is ultimate and all absorbing. Naturally, the devotee sincerely believes that human life without devotion is in vain and meaningless. This is denied by some thinkers. Their view will be considered briefly later.

Bhakti is the best of all the means of attaining *Mokṣa*. This view of Madhva differs from the Advaitic view that *Jñāna* alone is sufficient. Hence, is superior to all other means of attaining *Mokṣa*. This doctrine of Advaita follows from its view of bondage according to which bondage is due to *Avidyā* consisting of the belief that the world with all its variety and difference is ultimately real, that the self is different from the Brahmā etc., the intuitive knowledge of Brahmā destroys *Avidyā*, it reveals that the self and the Brahmā are identical, that the world is unreal, Advaita holds that this intuitive realization of Brahmā is *Mokṣa*.

Thus to attain *Mokṣa*, nothing more than the intuitive immediate knowledge of Brahmā is required. Madhva does not accept this. According to Madhva, God is the ultimate cause of bondage and he is the ultimate cause of liberation of the *Jīva*. Hence God's grace is absolutely necessary for salvation. No amount of any kind of knowledge by itself has the energy of liberating the self. The knowledge is a *Jaḍa*. Hence, it cannot do anything without the *Preraṇā* of God. God has to be moved to grace the self with release. It is *Bhakti* that can make God to bestow his *Kṛpākaṭākṣa* or

Prasāda, the grace on the self. Gītā makes it quite clear that God's grace is necessary for attaining *Mokṣa* and this is the view of Madhva.[18]

This does not mean that *Jñāna* is unimportant; knowledge is important and necessary; indeed emphasis on *Bhakti* implies the importance of *Jñāna* because knowledge of the greatness of God is a constituent of *Bhakti*. Madhva shares the doctrine of Gītā that *Karmā*, *Jñāna*, *Bhaktimārgas* are intimately interrelated, one passes into or involves the other, that they are not water tight compartments excluding one another. And Madhva is mainly concerned to show and stress the interrelation among them rather than the importance of one of them as against the others.

The Advaitins emphasized the importance of *Jñāna* at the cost of *Karmā* and *Bhakti* in realizing *Mokṣa*. They said that *Jñāna* was most important while *Karmā* and *Bhakti* were least important in attaining *Mokṣa* ; that *Karmā* and *Bhakti* were said to be *Mārgas*, the Paths followed by *Mandādhikārī*, the slow-minded while *Jñānamārga* was one followed by *Uttamādhikārī*, the best or intelligent persons.

Madhva rejected this and pointed out that *Karmā*, *Jñāna*, *Bhakti* extend over and interpenetrate into each other, which is the teaching of Gītā. The spiritual evolution or progress is a continuous process usually extending over many lives of a *Jīva* and it involves intermingling, mutually influencing, enhancing of *Karmā*, *Jñāna*, *Bhakti* depending upon the intrinsic nature, effort, and the will of God. *Karmayoga* requires the knowledge of and respectful and grateful love towards God. The *Karmayogī* does his duty with awareness of the greatness and splendour of God; he knows that his action is inspired by God that he has the right to do his duty but no right over its fruits, that he does his duty to serve his fellowmen and thereby to please God.

The very nature of *Niṣkāmakarmā* is that it is based on knowledge of

[18] "It is only the grace of God that can raise these veils of bondage and uncover the true nature of the self to itself and reveal the true nature of the lord to it". B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.423

and devotion to God. It issues from a pure mind and heart and it leads to further purification of mind and heart, which is necessary for acquiring more knowledge and devotion. It should be noted that the purification of mind, *Jñāna* and *Bhakti* of *Jīva* are not static and complete at any stage of its spiritual growth. They are subject to development in quality and quantity according to the *Svarūpa* and *Prayatna* of *Jīva* and the will of God. *Śravaṇa*, *Dhyāna*, *Darśana*, i.e., *Aparokṣjñāna*, *Mokṣa*. All these are due to *Bhakti* at those respective stages and the *Bhakti* at those respective stages is due to all these.

Bhakti, the devotion alone is the cause of *Mokṣa*. Śravaṇa, *Manana* etc., are the cause of *Pakvabhakti*, the mature-devotion. *Pakvabhakti* is the cause of *Dhyāna*. *Dhyāna* is the cause of *Paripakvabhakti*, the most mature devotion. *Paripakvabhakti* is the cause of *Aparokṣajñāna*, the vision of God, It is the cause of *Atiparikpakvabhakti*, the completely mature devotion, which leads to *Mokṣa*, the salvation. Thus, *Bhakti* is the primary means of attaining *Mokṣa*.

To repeat, because the point is very important and deserved to be noted, Madhva emphasizes to the utmost the great significance of *Sākṣātkāra* and *Prasāda* of God and *Bhakti*, the complete devotion as their means, in achieving *Mokṣa*. It would not be wrong to say that it is the inner most kernel, the kernel of kernel, of his philosophy. As the function of philosophy, according to Madhva, is to show man the way to realize *Mokṣa*, which is the most valuable among the *Puruṣārthas*, this point which shows the last stage of that way, is the proper zenith, the culmination of his philosophy. *Aparokṣajñāna* (*Sākṣātkāra*), the vision of God is different from even the profound knowledge got from *Śravaṇa*, *Manana*, and *Dhyāna*. The latter is mediate knowledge while the former, the *Sākṣātkāra*, is immediate flash like revelation of God himself.

God is essentially *Avyakta*, the indiscernible, but out of his grace or kindness for his devotee, whom God wills to liberate, God reveals himself through his own *Acintya*, the unthinkable or unimaginable, *Atyadbhuta*, the wonderful power. In the *Sākṣātkāra*, the veil that conceals some intrinsic

aspects of the *Jīva*, such as its pure bliss, its interminable, eternal dependence on God etc., and its difference from God connection with physical adjuncts like *Liṅgaśarīra*, *Vāsanās*, *Prārabdhakarmā*, etc., are rent or destroyed by God, and the *Jīvas* real nature its pure bliss its dependence on God, etc., is manifested to the *Jīva*. The *Jīva* knows intuitively itself and God to the extent that it is by nature capable of knowing him in accordance with his will. This spiritual mutual love or the communion, the secret and sacred bond between God, and the released self, cannot be described by me, an ordinary person having no inkling of it. lord Vāyu in his three incarnations as Hanumān, Bhīma and Madhva was always in spiritual communion with lord Viṣṇu by the grace of Viṣṇu. He was the greatest devotee from whose mind and heart God was never absent.

In many cases *Bhakti* serves as best means to liberation. But in some cases, *Bhakti* is valued, not as a means, but as an end in itself. *Bhakti*, as a *summum bonum*, is called *Ekāntabhakti*. The great devotees like Sanaka, Sananda et al., are *Ekāntabhaktas*. They prefer *Bhakti* to *Mukti*. For them *Bhakti* is an end in itself, or the highest end.

Madhva rejects outright the conception of *Dveṣabhakti*, the *Bhakti* through enmity or hatred of God or hateful devotion. Some thinkers are of the opinion that one can be 'devoted' to God through one's enmity and hatred, towards him. Their argument is that one's attention is always fixed on one's enemy, one always thinks of one's enemy, keeps watch on the movements or doings of one's enemy. Hence the person who regards God as his enemy and hates him heartily is naturally always aware of God; God is always present in their mind and heart. In this way they are devoted to God. They give as examples of such persons Hiraṇyakaśipu, Rāvaṇa et al. the names of the very powerful and frightful Asuras, the Devils who regarded lord Viṣṇu as their arch-enemy because they knew that no one except lord Viṣṇu would kill them and always hated God and were always busy with the plans to kill him.

Our mythologies tell us that God after destroying them granted them *Mokṣa*. But according Madhva, there cannot be such a thing as *Dveṣabhakti*;

it is excluded by the very nature of *Bhakti*. For besides intuitive knowledge *Bhakti* includes pure love and regard for God, love and hate are opposed to one another and the expression *Dveṣabhakti* is self-contradictory; just as it is logically impossible for there to be a square circle, so also it is logically impossible for there to be the *Dveṣabhakti*. Moreover, the *Dveṣabhakti* is not at all recognized by the *Śāstras*. If it were accepted in the *Śāstras*; the *Śāstras* would have emphasized that God has defective, low, or bad attributes; which give rise to hatred. They do not do so. On the contrary, they clearly state that God is *Nirdoṣa*, *Doṣavarjita*, Acyuta i.e., defectless and praise him *Sakalakalyāṇaguṇaparipūṇa*, the auspicious, the full, the best and the perfect, being complete in all respects.

In the case of above mentioned *Asuras*, the explanation is that they were formerly by their nature *paripakvabhaktas* of lord Viṣṇu, the doorkeepers of his auspicious and sacred abode, and owing to a small mistake on their part became the victims of a curse, the result of which was their birth as the mighty enemies of God. Thus their *Asuratva*, the devilish character was temporary; it had a beginning and an end. When they were destroyed in a fierce battle by God, their devilish character disappeared, they assumed by God's grace, their original good nature and became the devoted servants of lord Viṣṇu. So such mythological stories do not lend support to the conception of *Dveṣabhakti*. It is condemned by Madhva.

The last important point about *Bhakti*, is the observance of *Tāratamya* in manifesting devotion towards our superiors. It has already been pointed that, according to Madhva, there is a hierarchy of grades or ranks among the dependent *Jīvas* or selves. God is *Paramātmā*, the highest and the best independent soul. Among the dependents, Lakṣmī is the highest in rank, following her, there are Caturmukhabrahmā, Pradhānavāyu (Mukhyaprāṇa) Brahmāṇī, Bhāratī, Garuḍa, Śeṣa, Rudra, Sauparṇī, Vāruṇī, Rudrāṇī and other gods and goddesses. The devotee must know this difference in their grades and devotionally serve or worship them according to their status in hierarchy. There must be a difference in the quantity, quality, intensity or depth of his devotion corresponding to the differences in their grades. It is necessary though not enough, to devotionally serve the highest lord

Viṣṇu, it is also necessary show devotion to the other gods and goddess according to their ranks in the hierarchy; for these gods and goddesses are Jñānīs and devotees of the lord who are spiritually superior to us. If they are properly worshipped they become pleased and they protect, guide us and increase and intensify our knowledge and devotion to the lord Viṣṇu; thus help and inspire us in continuing our devotional practices with greater and deeper *Bhakti*; in short, without their help, guidance and encouragement our *Bhaktimārga* will not be successful in leading us to the highest end.

It is necessary on the part of the devotee to have a thorough and correct knowledge of the hierarchy of gods and goddesses. He must avoid the mistake, which he is likely to make in his zeal to serve a god, from whom he believes to have received some benefit, of worshipping that god as equal or superior to the god of higher rank. This is a sin. And worshipping a god of lower grade as equal to the highest lord Viṣṇu is an unpardonable sin, which leads a person to *Naraka*. The fundamental principle which is upheld by Madhva in his philosophy is the rational and sacred principle of justice, which can be stated and as recognizing the natural differences and gradations among the *Jīvas*, and giving each *Jīva* what it really deserves, neither more nor less.

To the question raised by some as to whether human life can be meaningful without devotion to God, and the concern for salvation, some thinkers answer it in the affirmative, while Madhva's answer to it is emphatically in the negative. Their view contains the following points:

a) Before stating that God responds in one way or the other, to man's devotion to him, one should establish the existence of God. But no independent good reasons are given in support of his existence e.g., Madhva holds that *Sākṣātkāra*, the vision and grace are the sacred responses of God to man's *Atiparipakvabhakti*. This statement presupposes the existence of God. What grounds are there for this presupposition?[19]

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[19] Even so, the existence of a deity of whatever character would have to have been established on other grounds before we could profitably speculate about his attitude to men and so far, these grounds have not been forthcoming. A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, p.233

It is true that Madhva holds that the traditional arguments for the existence of God produced by the Naiyāyikas are inconclusive, though he would agree that they have some persuasive value. His own argument is that God's existence is necessary to explain the existence or creation of the world. If one holds the opinion that men and not God created the world, Madhva rejects it on the ground that if we were the creators, we, who so ardently desire happiness, would have made us perfectly happy by creating favourable conditions; but we are actually miserable.[20] But his most important argument is that the authority of sacred scriptures is the sufficient ground for the existence of God. And he has strongly argued that Vedas, the scriptures are *Apauruṣeya* thus avoiding *Cakrakadoṣa*, the fallacy of circularity.

Further another very potent argument, that leaves no room for reasonable doubt is that testimony based on the experience of Ṛṣis, the Sages. The Ṛṣis, the most reliable, honest, noblest and best persons, have claimed to have had the *Sākṣātkāra*, the vision of the lord. If we do not believe them, how can we be justified in believing any other person? It is true the skeptics have made the proof of the existence of a physical object as difficult as the proof of the existence of God. Madhva has shown that this sort of absolute skepticism is irrational, that doubt has a limit, within that limit it is reasonable, but beyond that limit, it becomes unreasonable and innocuous. Indeed it is self-destructive. If everything is doubtful, then skeptics doubt must be doubtful, hence unacceptable. The argument can be continued but it is clear that there are good reasons in support of the belief in the existence of God.

b) It is further contended that the belief that the human life in general has any ulterior motive, such as devotion to God and desire for salvation is baseless. Hence, it is wrong to believe that its achievement makes human life meaningful. It follows that trying to achieve salvation through devotion to God is in vain. But this does not mean that human life is meaningless.

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[20] "If there was no God, how could we explain the existence of the world? If it be contended that we created the world then how is it that incapable of making ourselves happy forever."

There are other concerns or goals, such as knowledge, literature, fine arts, social service, economic or commercial enterprises etc., by dedicating oneself to the attainment of which one can make one's life meaningful. Certainly the life of a scientist, poet, novelist, painter and entrepreneur, etc., is meaningful. It is meaningful to the extent to which he tries to put meaning into it. And not only the spiritual life, but also the dedication to science, art, social service etc., also requires *Vairāgya*, the indifference to or detachment from the worldly affairs.

Partially this argument is acceptable, even from Madhva's point of view, but its most important argument is baseless, hence has to be rejected. Let us start with the consideration of the former part.

It is true that there are many human concerns or goals other than the spiritual goal; different persons are interested in achieving them. And it is their concentrated or dedicated effort to achieve the objects of their interests that gives some meaning to their lives or makes their lives worth living. This is acceptable to Madhva who has condemned indifference to or neglect of duty and sloth. He has emphasized the great value of effort in making life significant or satisfying. Indeed, the very recognition of the *Puruṣārthas* other than *Mokṣa*, *Dharma, Artha*, and *Kāma* under which the various human activities imply that the pursuit of these other Puruṣārthas or goals, lends some significance to human life.

But Madhva would rightly say that the attainment of these other goals by itself does not give permanent satisfaction or bliss, that it does not give a full significance to human life, that it leaves a large lacuna or gap in it and to fill this gap, to make human life full and perfect as far as it is possible to do so, the achievement of the spiritual end or the ulterior purpose viz., devotion to God and attainment of *Mokṣa* is keenly felt to be necessary by human being. This is supported by the experiences of millions of persons who have been successful in the fields of other activities poets, scientists, social workers etc., and who, on taking stock of their achievements. These people have felt that what they have achieved is so little as to be negligible, that they should have made their lives more worthwhile by trying to achieve

the ultimate spiritual end, that is, the endless pure bliss. They feel that in spite of all that they have done and accomplished, their life is empty and meaningless, as they did not try to attain the most important goal viz., the everlasting peace and pure bliss by devoting themselves to the service of the lord and thereby, earning his grace. The recognition of *Mokṣa* besides the *Puruṣārthas* is based on such poignant spiritual experiences of human beings. And this fact, being the most valuable aspect of reality, cannot be overworked or denied by a philosopher. Therefore, Madhva's sincere concern with *Mokṣa* through devotion to and grace of God is quite relevant and justified.

This leads us to the consideration of the sound part of the above argument. The reasons so far adduced show that there is, indeed, no ground for thinking that human life in general serves any ulterior purpose[21] is sweeping generalization, which itself is groundless. The existence of devotees of God the world over seeking salvation is enough to uphold the belief in "ulterior purpose" of human life. It cannot be that all these devotees are wrong or deluded while Prof. Ayer alone is right.

Further Madhva holds that the *Puruṣārthas* are not independent of one another, *Dharma, Artha* and *Kāma* are means to the attainment of *Mokṣa* through devotion to God.

To put the same thing in different words philosophy has to give a coherent account of the whole human life or experience which has many aspects. According to Madhva the spiritual aspect is the most important one. Man spiritually needs God and salvation as he physically needs food and water. The other goals *Dharma, Artha*, Kāma and *Jñāna* should be sought as means to *Mokṣa*. A man desires *Mokṣa*, he has to eat and drink to live to

[21] "... A (Human life) can have just as much meaning as one is able to put into it. There is, indeed, no ground for thinking that human life in general serves any ulterior purpose but this is no bar to a man's finding satisfaction in many of the activities which make up his life or to his attaching value to the ends which he pursues ... A philosopher may become detached from the ordinary concerns by being absorbed in his work, but so may an artist or a mathematician". A J Ayer, Central Questions of Philosophy, p.235

attain *Mokṣa* for which he requires Artha, the wealth. To be a good member of society he has to do *Sādharaṇadharma* and *Viśiṣṭadharma*, the universal and specific duties, the latter are those belonging to *varṇāśrama, Dharma* in order that he may try to attain *Mokṣa* with courage born of his morally good life.

Madhva boldly emphasizes the importance of good character to such an extent as to break or go beyond the barriers of Jātivyavasthā, the Caste system. This is clear from the fact that he quotes with approval Bhagavadgītā statement, 'A *Śūdra* having many good qualities is a Brahmā, while Brahmā full of bad qualities is a *Śūdra*'. Further, in laying down that the Jñānī must work for the welfare of all people, he intends to convey that the welfare of people belonging to all castes should be the aim of the Jñānī. Śrī Madhva fully endorses the teaching of the Bhagavadgītā that a life of a person should be a spiritual *Yajña* in which every activity is carried out with devotion as a service or worship of the lord. Every possession is sincerely regarded as belonging to him, but gifted by him to a person for a time being; the person should neither be proud nor happy in having it; neither be crest fallen nor miserable when he loses it, but always maintain a cheerful, peaceful balanced mental attitude as one detached from all worldly concerns, and also as the fully dedicated servant of the lord.

Chapter IX - Conclusion

It may safely be said that Logical Positivism is a highly sophisticated or refined form of our Cārvākism. Both these views insist upon confining human knowledge within the bounds of sense perception, both deny the claims of reason and or intuition and establish "The Truth of Reason" i.e., the ultimate truths about the existence or reality of supersensible entities. Both were accused of overthrowing the traditional, moral and spiritual values and thereby giving scope for confusion or chaos in thought and life.

Madhva severely condemns the Cārvāka view on the ground that its teaching benefits none but harms every one. Hence, it will not be a *Darśana*, the philosophical view at all, for the essential characteristic of *Darśana*, worth the name, is that it must do good, at least to its followers, but Cārvākism instead of doing good, when faithfully followed leads to anarchy or social disruption. Madhva argues that; i) Cārvākism is suicidal. If the sensible world alone is real and if there is nothing that goes beyond sense perception, if there is no God, *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Puṇya*, *Pāpa*, heaven, hell etc., as the Cārvākas hold, then philosophy is not needed to teach people. The sensible world can be known by ordinary perception and scientific observation. To enlighten people about the subjects which are useful to them in living a good life, but which are not known to them as such subjects are supersensible, philosophers spread their views through preaching and books. But if there are no supersensible entities and values of life, *Śāstra*, philosophy etc., including Cārvākism, become superfluous and futile. Thus, Cārvākism implies its own baselessness and purposelessness andis self-destructive.

But Madhva does not brush away Cārvākism on the basis of this objection only. He himself states a reply to it pointing out how Cārvāka could escape from this difficulty.

The Cārvākas would say, that the function of philosophy is to state the truth and the truth is that there are no supersensible realities. It is the so-

called philosophers who taught the utter falsehood that there are realities that go beyond sense-experiences. They have made the people dogmatic, they have led them to believe blindly in the existence of such entities.Not only this, people have been advised to strive hard to achieve non-existent *Puṇya, Dharma, Svarga, Mokṣa* etc., by cultivating noble qualities of character such as honesty, kindness, temperance, benevolence, mutual co-operation, love, etc., and to avoid their opposites like *Pāpa, Adharma, Naraka,* etc. To do this, people have been admonished to observe certain customs and conventions framed by these philosophers and the observance of these prevents people from enjoying the pleasures of life to their hearts' content.

People are put to unnecessary suffering and pain. They are advised to shun or curb the enjoyment of various sensual pleasures in order to please God or to get *Svarga* or *Mokṣa* i.e., to get really nothing in return for their severe suffering. People are advised to give up or to use as little as possible such necessities of life like food, drink, clothing shelter etc. Thus, the unnecessary fear of sin, hell and even of God had made the unfortunate people to lose the golden opportunity of enjoying the pleasures to the fullest possible extent without any fear and restraint. The condition of our people who have accepted the baseless belief in supersensible realities is pitiable and very miserable. Cārvāka says that his view that there are no such entities will free the people from the fear and suffering and enable them to enjoy all pleasures in any way they like without any hindrance. Hence the followers of Cārvākism say that Cārvākism not only teaches the truth but also is very useful to the people.

But, Madhva gives a strong reply to the objection against the Cārvākism. Here we see that Madhva is quite impartial and open-minded in dealing with his opponent. He always strengthens the position of his opponents and then shows that even in its strengthened form his opponent's view is unacceptable. There cannot be a better way of attaining truth or rational justification. Madhva shows that eventhis form of Cārvākism is false for its teaching instead of making people fearless and happy will land them in greater and more severe fear, suffering and pain. The conceptions of God, *Mokṣa, Dharma, Svarga,* etc., and their opposites have played the most

important part in maintaining the social organization. To get the former and avoid their bad opposites people are required to follow certain customs and conventions, the observance of which develops in them the good attributes like truthfulness, honesty, affection, co-operation, benevolence etc. Such attributes are the very basis of peaceful, happy and prosperous social life and such a society will contribute to the growth of knowledge, industry, and agriculture.

But Cārvākism, by denying the super sensible spiritual and moral entities or values and by allowing people to live the unbridled life of sensual pleasures, spells the ruin to the society. If people follow its teaching, the social system will be utterly disorganized by the absence of social controls and the life of the people will be full of violence, deceit, doubt, hatred, envy, selfishness etc. As a consequence of this there will be no science, art, agriculture, industry, safety, peace, happiness; it will be full of fear, poor, it will be no better than animal life, nay, it will indeed, be worse than animal life. Thus instead of enabling people to enjoy unrestrained sensual pleasures, Cārvākism, will certainly subject them to unlimited fear and suffering.

Further Madhva finds fault with the epistemology of Cārvāka, according to which sense perception alone is the *Pramāṇa*, the source of knowledge and reason and intuition are *Apramāṇas*. Thus, Cārvākism gives undue importance to sense perception.[1] This rejection of reason and intuition as proper sources of knowledge leads to the restriction of the scope of human knowledge.

Madhva does not at all agree with this view of Cārvāka, which he points out, is quite unjustified. He impartially and clearly considers the nature of perception, reason, intuition and *Śabdapramāṇas* and brings out the role of each in the field of human knowledge. He explains how each of them contributes to the acquisition and development of our knowledge and points out correctly their merits and limitations. Madhva's theory of nature and validity of the *Pramāṇas* including that of memory, their scope and limitation,

[1] Daśaprakaraṇa (ABMMM, Bengaluru). pp.157-160

strength and weakness etc., is an invaluable contribution to epistemology. Madhva also rejects the *Dehātmavāda*, the view that body and self are identical and holds that they are different.

The problems of the natureand the relation between one and many (unity and diversity) substance and quality, God, self and the world etc., which have exercised the minds of philosophers for thousands of years, have been satisfactorily solved by Madhva.

Madhva does not emphasize the importance of one of them at the cost of another but credits them with proper significance in his system. Advaita e.g., denies multiplicity i.e., attributes and relations in the interest of oneness or identity without any rational ground and becomes open to the justified charge of Śūnyavāda, the nihilism. Logical Atomism emphasizes multiplicity and mitigates the value of unity in the universe. The ultimate real constituents of the universe, according to it are particulars or atomic facts. Each particular or atomic fact is quite independent of other particulars or atomic facts. They are not related by essential or intimate relations. The relation between them is external or accidental. Hence the world is not a system or a unity but a mere collection of atomic facts.

This objection to Logical Atomism may seem to be false, one may deny this objection by saying that according to Russell, the structure of the symbolic language of *Principia Mathematica*, which is deductive, is the essence of the structure of ordinary language and is almost the same as the structure of the world of atomic facts. Hence, the structure of the world must be very nearly the same as the structure of a deductive system. So the atomic facts must be necessarily or intimately related and the world must be a system. The reply to this is, deduction depends upon the relation of implication.

According to the conventional or ordinary notion, implication is an essential, a necessary relation between the antecedent or premises and the consequent or conclusion of a valid deduction. They are very intimately related in their meanings so that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises in a valid deductive inference. Hence according to this

conventional conception of implication "All triangles are two sided plane figures" does not imply that "All stars are self-luminous" because they are not related in their meanings or they are about different matters. But Russell's notion of implication which forms the basis of deduction in *Principia Mathematica* is quite different from its conventional notion. His conception of implication does not require the intimate relation between the meanings of the antecedent and the consequent. All that his notion requires is that the antecedents should be false or the consequent should be true. Thus it takes into account, or is based upon the truth values of the antecedent and the consequent but not their meanings. This is clear from his definition of implication in terms of negation and disjunction $P \supset Q = P \vee Q$ [df].

The relation of implication holds between any two propositions, one of which is antecedent and the other the consequent, that satisfy this condition whether or not they are related in their meanings. Thus, according to Russell's meaning of implication, the proposition (antecedent) "All triangles are two sided plane figures" does imply the consequent "All stars are self-luminous" for, here the antecedent about the triangles is false while the consequent about the stars is true, and therefore the latter can be validly deducted from the former. Thus, it is clear that Russell gives new meaning to the notion of implication.[2]

To differentiate Russell's notion of implication from the conventional notion, Russell's notion was called "Material implication" and the conventional notion was called simply 'Implication' or 'Entailment'.[3] I hope that this discussion has made it clear that, according to Russell, implication

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[2] We have seen that logical positivism also does the same thing.

[3] Morton White explains this "one result of Russell's training in mathematics was his willingness to construct artificial deductive systems and considerable lack of interest in whether the terminology he used was in absolute accord with ordinary language. He did not feel great uneasiness, for example, in so defining the notion of implication that the statements of the form "S implies T" are true just in case S is false or T true so long as it covered all of the mathematical examples, while Moore exclaimed "Why logicians should have thus chosen to use the word "implies" as a name for a relation in which it never is used by anyone else, I do not know." Morton White, Age of Analysis, pp.191-192

is a very loose relation. Hence, it cannot be the basis of unity or uniformity or a system. Thus, Logical Atomism does not do justice to the unity or uniformity in the universe. But Madhva gives proper importance to both characteristics of the universe, viz., unity and multiplicity which are vouched safe by our experience. Human experience shows that there are both diversity and uniformity or unity in the universe. A philosopher intends to make clear the nature of the universe. To do so, he has to give an account of both. Tatvavāda does this, so it is superior to Logical Atomism.

Another great difference between these views, which immediately strikes one who compares the two, is that the conception of God is totally absent from Logical Atomism while Tatvavāda is wholly full of this conception. Madhva exalts the majesty and supremacy of the lord Viṣṇu to the highest acme. The conception of God is the very core or the essence of his philosophy. God, in Tatvavāda is the highly independent, ultimate, sacred, spiritual reality. He is the supreme person. He is omnipotent, omniscient, omnific and the best and perfect. Everything that exists and happens in the universe depends upon his will. He is the controller of all things and events in the world. He is the chief centre of unity or uniformity in the world which is full of diversity. He being the basic ground of all reality, there could not be the selves and the world. The relation between God, the Creator and the individual selves and the world and his creation are intimate and necessary. There is thus the unity or uniformity and amazing variety in the world.[4] The

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[4] Russell's conception of implication gave rise to two paradoxes. This becomes clear from the examination of the truth-table for implication Russell's notion rules out only one possible conjunction of truth-values of antecedent and consequent, viz., antecedent P true and consequent Q false. When antecedent is true and consequent is false P É Q is false, i.e., P does not imply Q. In the remaining three possible cases viz., a) P true and Q true b) P false and Q true and c) P false and Q false, the implication between P and Q holds. Now from a) and b) the first paradox follows:

i) A true proposition is implied by any proposition, true or false.
ii) Any false proposition implies any proposition true or false
iii) Further discussion of these paradoxes is unnecessary. But it should be remarked in support of Russell's conception that whatever defect it may have from other points of view, yet it helped complete generalization of logic i.e., it helped to show that logic was not merely an art of argumentation but that it was, like mathematics a completely general or formal science.

superiority of Tatvavāda over Logical Atomism isin the fact that the former gives an intellectually satisfying account of the universe as characterized by unity or uniformity and variety while the latter does not do so.

Leibniz' Monadology also seems to give due importance to both unity and variety and it compares Monadology with Tatvavāda. There are a few similarities but more fundamental differences between the two. One major similarity between them is that both hold that there are many ultimate realities and both are pluralistic. Another is that both hold that God is the creator and controller of the world; both are theistic.

According to Leibniz, Monads are the ultimately real, indivisible, active, mental or conscious constituents of the universe. Everything in the universe is made up of Monads, which are infinite in number. They are simple in the sense that they are partless and they are substances in the sense that they have qualities but they themselves are not qualities of anything. Leibniz foresaw that matter and notion could be reduced to force or energy and that it is this force that always remains constant. But to the notion of force, he gave a new significance, viz., that it is mental in nature. In support of this, he pointed out that we are familiar with force, we use it in moving, lifting things and we know that it is mental by introspection. From this he inferred that force, whether it is internal or external, is mental in nature.[5] Monads are centres of mental force. Since everything consists of Monads, it follows that everything including matter is mental or conscious and active. Of course, all objects are not equally conscious and active. Some objects are more conscious and active than others. Nothing in the universe is absolutely inert and unconscious.

It is true that we ordinarily think of matter as dead, inactive and unconscious, but this, says Leibniz, tells us only about the appearance and not about the real nature of matter. Matter appears to us to be inert and unconscious but it is really not so; it is active and conscious but its activity and consciousness are of such a low degree or level that it prevents us

[5] *bahucitrajagadbahudhākaraṇāt paraśasktiranantaguṇaparamaḥ||*
Ānandatīrtha, Dvādaśastotra, Chapter VI

from recognizing their presence in it and misleads us into thinking that it is absolutely without them.

Monads always change internally. The internal change in a Monad is called Perception. Many or all of its perceptions happen to be indistinct and unclear. Every Monad always strives to perceive more and more clearly and distinctly, feels pleasure when it succeeds and pain when it fails to do so. To make or to destroy a thing in the ordinary senses of the words, means to put together or arrange the parts or to separate the parts of a thing. Since Monads are simple or partless, they can be neither made nor destroyed in this sense. They are unmakeable, indivisible and indestructible. They can come into being only by creation and go out of being only by annihilation.

Monads are qualitatively different from one another. This accounts for the variety in the world. If they were exactly similar in every respect, they would be identical and there would not be variety. But Monads cannot differ in such physical measurable qualities like size, shape, etc., for they are mental. The qualitative differences among them are mental in nature, they differ in respect of the degree of clearness and distinctness of their perceptions and in their view points from which they perceive the world. Each Monad perceives the world more or less clearly and distinctly, but it perceives it from its own point of view. It is an individual, a living active mirror that reflects the world more or less clearly and distinctly in its own way, it is a "world in miniature, a microcosm". It reflects more clearly and distinctly that these Monads are nearer to it and less clearly those Monads which are remote from it.

The differences or changes among the Monads are not the effects of one Monad, acting upon or influencing other Monads; for one Monad cannot influence any other Monad. As Leibniz puts it "Monads are windowless". No external influence can enter into a Monad. All changes that take place in a Monad are not due to other Monads in its vicinity acting upon it, but to its own internal nature or condition. Every Monad changes or develops continuously and its state or growth at any point of time is due to its own preceding state or growth. It contains potentially all its future states or

development which later become manifest gradually. Thus, "every Monad is charged with its past" and "big with its future". As far as its status in relation to other Monads, except God, is concerned, every Monad is self-contained and independent; but it is intimately dependent on God the supreme Monad.

There are different kinds of Monads. And there are all possible gradations in respect of degrees of distinctness and clearness of their perceptions and of the levels of their activity. In this regard they form continuous series without breaks or leaps between *Tāratamya*, the gradations.

In this series of gradations, the lowest of all are the "bare Monads" which make up the physical objects. Their perceptions are so confused and indistinct, and activities so slow that they appear to us absolutely unconscious and inactive. Next in the scale are those Monads which constitute the organic objects like bodies of plants and animals. These bodily Monads are almost similar to bare Monads, but their perceptions are less confused and indistinct than those of bare Monads. In addition to bodies, the animals have souls. The soul Monads have more distinct and clearer perceptions than the perceptions of body Monads. The soul Monads, also called queen Monads are the centres around which the body Monads are grouped together or organized.

A soul Monad having more distinct and clear perceptions than those of body Monads appear to be a controlling and guiding principle of body Monads. But, in fact, no interaction takes place between soul and body. The inorganic objects have no soul Monads and they are mere collections of bare Monads. The higher the organisms in the series, the more organized are their bodies. The relation between the soul and its body is that of pre-established harmony. God, in creating the minds or souls and their bodies has from the very beginning, arranged them in such a way that they always go together like two perfect clocks which always show the same time. There cannot be interaction between them. Body influencing the soul or mind and the latter influencing the former, as some philosophers have thought and as ordinary men think, because according to Leibniz, one Monad cannot influence another Monad.

There is really a harmony pre-established by God between mind or soul and its body i.e., God has created Monads in such a way that each Monad reflects the changes or perceptions of other Monads, thus the body Monad reflects the changes in the soul Monad and vice versa.There is therefore the agreement or similarity in the changes occurring in the Monads. This leads or rather misleads us into thinking that there is interaction between body and soul or mind Monads.

The soul Monads of higher animals have power of memory not of developed level as that of man but of the lower grade of forming associations between their experiences. E.g., the dog runs towards its master in friendly manner while it fiercely attacks the stranger, thus showing that it recognizes its master and distinguishes him from the stranger. But the soul Monads have no reasoning power.

Men are higher in the scale than other animals. The Monads which are human minds are rational spirits. These are persons. The spirits can reflect or think. They have superior memory and imagining power, they can remember many of their past experiences and plan for their future, they can reason and think about the abstract concepts like, being, substance, space, time, number, God etc. They are capable of logical reasoning in accordance with the principles of contradiction (A thing cannot be both B and Not B or A proposition cannot be both true and false in the same sense) and of sufficient reasons ("no statement is true and no state of affairs can exist unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise"). They are proficient in understanding and using mathematical principles. But their mental powers and knowledge are limited, some of their perceptions are clear and distinct but many of them are confused and indistinct.

God is the supreme Monad. He is the supreme person. He is the best and the perfect. He is the creator of all other kinds of Monads, bare Monads, souls and spirit of human minds. But he himself is not created or caused by anything. He is self-existent and independent. All other Monads depend on him for their existence (reality) and their perfections. Their perfections "come from God but their imperfections from their own nature". His existence is necessary as the sufficient ground for the existence or occurrence of

things in the world. That is the things and happenings can only be finally rationally or satisfactorily explained in terms of God as their basis. He alone is the necessary being while other things are contingent. The eternal truths-logical and mathematical principles, the principle of sufficient reason are in the mind of God, who also is an eternal being. God is infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, perfect, absolutely good and wise. Not only the actual but also all that is possible depends on God. Out of all the possible worlds any one of which he could have created, he has chosen to create this world. Hence this is the best of the possible worlds.

It should be noted that, instead of using the words 'creation', and 'emanation'; to the implications of which he was averse, Leibniz preferred to use the word "fulguration" to describe the relation between God and the world i.e., the Monads composing the world. He thought that 'creation' suggested that God created the world and left it to go on in its own way which implied that the world had much more independence from God than Leibniz was willing to allow it to have; while the word 'emanation' suggested that the world was too much dependent on or very similar in nature to, God and this, he thought, implied that imperfections of the world were also present in God. For, though this world was the best of all the possible worlds, Leibniz held that, yet it was not perfect; it had defects. It contained physical evil i.e., pain and suffering and moral evil, sin. It was impossible for him to admit that these forms of evil were part of nature of God. Hence he held that "God is the original simple substance and all created Monads arise through continual 'fulgurations' of the Divinity from moment to moment".[6]

God alone is infinite, unlimited, purely active and purely conscious. He sees all with perfect clearness and distinctness. His knowledge is immediate and complete. God does not change and develop as other Monads because he is perfect and complete.

All created Monads are finite, limited and imperfect. Their perceptions are more or less clear and indistinct; they are more or less active. A created

[6] This argument is similar in its nature to Advaitic argument i.e., we are familiar with false perceptions; we experience illusions so all perceptions are false. Hence the world is *Mithyā*.

Monad is more active and perfect than another Monad if its perceptions are clearer and more distinct than those of another Monad; it is passive and imperfect, if its perceptions are confused. There is, however, perfect harmony established by God between the states of one Monad and states of other Monads. The unity, order or uniformity in the universe is due to the a) harmony existing between the created Monads established by God and b) to the sameness of the content of perceptions of created Monads; every created Monad is the living mirror of the same universe. i) The qualitative differences among the Monads ii) the different degrees of clearness and distinctness of their perceptions and of their activity or passivity and iii) the differences in their points of view from which the Monads reflect the universe, constitute the basis of variety in the universe.

From this summary account of Monadology we come to know the similarities and differences between it and Tatvavāda. The important among them are:

Similarities

Monadology, like Tatvavāda, is pluralistic and theistic.

a) It accepts difference as the ultimate constituent of reality (though it does not classify Pañcabheda, the difference into five kinds).

b) It holds that the individual self and God are different and can never be identical at any stage.

c) It contains the concepts of *Svabhāva*, the nature and *Yogyatā*, the ability (by their very nature Monads are different from one another or perfections in the world are due to God while its imperfections are due to the nature of Monads).

d) It maintains that there is a continuous series of *Tāratamya*, the gradations among Monads from the lowest to the highest Monad.

Differences

The differences between Monadology and Tatvavāda are, strangely enough, seen to be the similarities between it and Advaita.

a) Monadology like Advaita is idealistic. It states that the reals (Monads) are conscious and active. The entirely unconscious and inactive is unreal.

b) The consequence is that the world of matter though not unreal like a dream world, is an appearance of the reality, the world of Monads, it is *Mithyā*.

c) The consequence of ii) is that our ordinary and scientific knowledge is 'knowledge' of *Mithyā*, an mere-appearance, hence it is not really a knowledge. It is *Vyāvahārikasatya*.

d) Only the knowledge of the world of Monads is *Pāramārthikasatya*, the real knowledge. Madhva has clearly and definitely disproved the idealistic part of Monadology in his severe attack against Advaita. It is clear that Monadology contains the contradictory points, hence not a consistent system of thought. But Tatvavāda is thoroughly consistent, it is a grand harmonious system of thought without a flaw.

Another great defect in Monadology is to be found in its conception of God, which seems to be an inconsistent conception, Leibniz intends to elevate God to the highest pinnacle of glory but unfortunately fails to do so.

On the one hand Leibniz holds that God is the creator of all other Monads and founder of the harmony among them. Hence all other Monads are dependent on him but he is absolutely independent. He is different in kind from other Monads.

On the other hand Leibniz also maintains that God is different in degree from other Monads. God is the highest and the greatest reality. He is a supreme Monad or person. None is superior or equal to him in majesty and perfection. There is a continuous series of gradations among the Monads extending from the bare or the lowest Monads to the highest Monad, God. This series of gradations is based on the degree of distinctness and clearness of the perceptions of the Monads. The greater the degree of clearness and distinctness of perceptions (i.e., the greater the perfection)

of a Monad, the higher its grade in the series, the lower the degree of clearness and distinctness of its perceptions, the lower is its level in the series. Since the series is continuous, a Monad at any level or grade in the series is just *infinitesimally* greater than a Monad which is just below it and *infinitesimally* lower than a Monad which is just above it. It follows that God is only *infinitesimally* more glorious or perfect than a Monad which is just below him i.e., the Monad which is just below God in the series is almost equal to God in majesty, activity, perfection etc. This makes God not different in kind but merely slightly different in degree from the other Monads just below him in the series, and thus brings down the majesty and perfection of God.[7]

But Madhva's conception of God is clear, consistent and grand. According to Madhva God is the supreme person and he is the creator of the whole universe. But his supremacy over all others is based, not upon, the difference in degree but upon the difference in attributes, i.e., difference in kind, from all others. He is different from others in being absolutely independent, in being the creator, sustainer, controller and destroyer of the universe, in giving to selves' knowledge or ignorance, liberation or bondage in accordance with their *Yogyatā*, the fitness. God has infinite number of attributes and each attribute is infinite but only a few of them are known to our limited intelligence. God is countless times great and glorious, and qualitatively different even from Śrī Lakṣmī the highest and the best among the dependent selves. The qualitative greatness of God over others, his difference in kind from others is infinitely immense. Thus, Madhva's view is free from the defects and is superior to that of Leibnitz.

Madhva's concept of *Viśeṣa* is hailed as an original and an important contribution to the philosophical thought, it is described as his 'outstanding discovery', and is thought to solve the difficult problem of relation between the substance and its characteristics i.e., attributes and relations. This concept, according to him, is the very basis of the thought and talk about things and persons. Without this concept our thought and speech about objects would consist of synonymous terms, it would degenerate into sheer

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[7] B N K Sharma, Philosophy of Sri Madhvacarya, (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), p.81

tautology, like man is man, self is self, table is table, which clearly would be completely useless for knowing and dealing with the things and persons. It would be useless for our ordinary, scientific and other purposes. This undesirable conceptual situation can be and is actually avoided, according to him, by the aid of concept of *Viśeṣa*.

According to Madhva an object is a homogeneous dynamic whole. But our thought and talk about it necessarily involves the distinction between its substance and its characteristics, i.e., its qualities and relations. We think of an object as having such and such attributes and standing in such and such relations with other objects. An object and its characteristics are real. It gives rise to the question "what is the relation between a substance and its characteristics?" If they are thought to be identical, then the distinction between them would become meaningless, if they are held to be different, the relation between them would be loose or external; but our thought about the object involves the distinction between its essential or internal and its accidental or external, characteristics. We regard some of its characteristics that constitute its nature as its essential and others as its external characteristics. In spite of the fact of having many characteristics and distinctions within it, an object is taken to be one; we believe, and our belief is true, that an object retains its unity. Its unity does not melt away amongst its multiplicity of distinctions and characteristics. This appears strange to the philosophers and they seek an explanation.

The Advaitic solution is simple and is entirely groundless. The Advaitin sees a contradiction in an object for its being one and many; he holds that it is impossible for an object to be one and many, hence declares that an object is a myth, or false or an appearance and that the world consisting of such objects is *Mithyā*, the false. His reality is one only devoid of multiplicity; *Nirguṇa*, *Nirviśeṣa*. The Dvaitin who holds that the truth or reality of the world having both the aspects of unity and multiplicity is firmly established by ordinary perception and the unquestionable or indubitable *Sākṣi*, the intuition, naturally finds this reply, quite unsatisfactorily. According to Dvaitin, the Advaitic view is not an attempt to solve but merely an attempt to escape from the problem.

Another solution is that the relation between the substance and its characteristics is *Samavāya* or inherence which is an internal or essential relation that differs from Saṁyoga or conjunction which is an external or accidental relation. "Two things in the relation of *Samavāya* cannot be separated without at least one of them being destroyed".[8] While in *Saṁyoga*, two things that are brought together continue to exist without being seriously affected when they are separated.

This reply is also rejected by the Dvaitin on the ground that it leads to infinite regress. He argues that if *Samavāya* is needed to relate the characteristics to the substance then to relate the *Samavāya* itself to those terms another relation would be required and to relate the second relation to the first a third relation would be required and so on ad infinitum. The only way to avoid the infinite regress is to say that the third or fourth relation is sufficient in itself to do the work of relating in the sense that it does not need another relation to do so. Instead of thus trying to stop the regress, it is said that, it is simpler and better to hold that the substance has in itself a potency to relate to itself the various characteristics and to remain as one homogeneous whole.

The substance according to Madhva is not passive, but active or dynamic. It contains in its nature the energy to show different reactions in the form of its different qualities and relations in different situations and such potency in a substance is *Viśeṣa*. In describing an object we state the characteristics manifested by it in a particular situation but in another situation it may and does show other characteristics. That is why it can be truly described in different ways in different situations and from different points of view. The nature of an object is a systematic unity of *Viśeṣas*. Though an object is a homogeneous whole, the *Viśeṣas* in it, by giving rise to different characteristics enable us to think and talk about them in non-tautological ways.

It should be noted that *Viśeṣa* is not a third separate factor, between a

[8] S Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy Vol. II. (Oxford University Press, Delhi), p.217

substance and attributes or between other terms. It is neither a quality nor a relation distinct from its terms. If we think of it as a third separate factor between the terms, we will be landed in the infinite regress. According to Madhva the very nature of an object is such that it can relate itself to and differentiate itself from its characteristics without the aid of any other third factor, *Viśeṣa* is the self-unifying and self-distinguishing power in a substance. "*Viśeṣa* is there in the nature of things, as it is only another name for substance with all its wonderful capacities."[8]

Viśeṣas introduce uniformity or order in the world. They are self-differentiating capacities in the substances, the variety in the world is due to them; yet the world is not chaos of mere variety or change, for the *Viśeṣas* lend unity and continuity to the objects. This aspect makes possible the discovery of laws of nature and the scientific predictions based on them. "*Viśeṣa* is but another name for the potency of the thing in itself (or substance) whereby it maintains its unity and continuity through all its modes, predicates and aspects".

Viśeṣa's work of differentiating is confined to the ambit of identity, where there is non-difference or identity, there the *Viśeṣa* enables us to make the required conceptual distinctions. According to Madhva, *Viśeṣa* is the potency of things in themselves which determines the use of non-synonymous expressions in predicting something of them provided.However, that in such cases there is no absolute difference between the thing and its predicates. "*Viśeṣa* is a particular characteristic or potency of things which makes description and talk of difference possible where as a matter of fact only identity exists".

Viśeṣas are present in all objects. They exist in sentient and insentient real. They are in the nature of even the supreme lord Viṣṇu. Lord Viṣṇu essentially remains one and the same through all his manifestations. All His incarnations though different in the sense that they admit of different descriptions are yet basically or substantially one and the same. All incarnations are of one Viṣṇu. Wherever there is one in all, one in many, identity in difference, as in one God, His many incarnations and attributes, one substance its many characteristics, one genus its many species, one

species its many particulars, one whole its many parts etc., there must be *Viśeṣas*. It is the *Viśeṣas* that reconcile such seemingly opposite aspects as one and many, internal and external etc., and unify them into homogeneous wholes.

Madhva argues absolutely correctly, that it is impossible for any object to be without any *Viśeṣa*. We know the objects through their characteristics or *Viśeṣas*. If there are no *Viśeṣas* there would be no characteristics and the object i.e., *Nirguṇa* would be completely unknowable, hence unreal or nothing. Nothing can be said about it, because saying involves ascribing the attribute of "unknowability" to it.[9] Thus Madhva, clearly and repeatedly shows that the Advaitic idea of *Nirviśeṣa*, *Nirguṇa*, the undifferentiated indeterminate reality is entirely unacceptable. To justify and clarify his stand point he takes the famous statement *satyaṁ jñānamanantaṁ brahmā*, Brahmā is reality, knowledge or consciousness and infinity, which the Advaitin accepts as the best description of Brahmā and shows that it needs *Viśeṣas* which make it possible to talk of Brahmā as having these different attributes without losing the underlying oneness or identity. If one regards the attributes as simply different from any identity underlying them then there would be multiplicity in Brahmā which is unacceptable to Advaitin. If one regards them as identical without in anyway different, then one of them would be enough to describe Brahmā and using three of them would be redundant.

Thus, there cannot be pure identity nor pure difference but *Saviśeṣābheda*, the identity that denotes the difference between substance, and the qualities and actions of the substance. An Advaitin has to accept presence of *Viśeṣa* in the nature of Brahmā and give up his conception of

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[9] "Nothing can be at all without being in some determinate way and this is precisely what we mean by the qualities of the thing. And a thing cannot be without behaving in special ways towards its environment and these special ways of behaving are the thing's qualities. We cannot therefore divorce the being or that of a thing from its determinate mode of being or 'what' and regard the latter as something which supervenes on or is derived from the former or the former as something which can exist without and apart from the latter. Elements of Metaphysics, A E Taylor, p.132

Nirviśeṣabrahmā. Thus, Madhva justifies his view that everything is a system of *Viśeṣas* which is *Svanirvāhaka* in the sense that they do not need the aid of any other factors to do their functions of unifying and distinguishing. They are the essential elements or principles of our thought and talk about things which consist of judgements stating the modes or predicates of and relations holding among, the objects. In short, our predicative and relational way of thinking needs *Viśeṣas.* "*Viśeṣas* are substance's potency of self-expressions as modes, relations, predicates, subjects".

There are different kinds of Viśeṣa; a) God's attributes, activities, organs, incarnations, forms, all these are identical, yet His wonderful or amazing, unthinkable, supernatural potency or *Viśeṣas* make possible the thought and talk of distinctions in His incarnations, attributes etc. These may be called supernatural *Viśeṣas.*

b) There are two kinds of *Viśeṣas* in dependent sentient beings. Both kinds of these *Viśeṣas* constitute the very nature of sentient beings. Since, the nature of sentient beings is eternal, both kinds are eternal, yet some *Viśeṣas* of sentient beings are said to be eternal and others as produced. These *Viśeṣas* which are always manifested in the nature of a sentient being, such as, its sentience existence, substance or essence etc., are eternal. Though the sentient eats, walks, sits, feels moods, emotions etc., and does other various things, it does not always do so. E.g., it does not always eat or sleep or feel anger. It does so sometimes and at other times, it does other things. When it doesthey are 'produced' or 'manifested' and, when it does not do them, they are unmanifested. But other *Viśeṣas* are manifested. But when they are unmanifested, they do not disappear from the nature of sentient being, they are hidden or latent in its nature in the sense that the capacity to show them at some later occasion is still present in its nature. The relation between the sentient being and both kind of its *Viśeṣa* is identity.

c) In non-sentient dependent objects too there are two kinds of *Viśeṣas.* In their case, the substance is their material cause and though the two kinds of *Viśeṣas* exist in substance as part of its nature yet the distinction between

them can be made. Those which characterize the object as long as it exists are inseparable from the object. These are called *Yavadravyabhāviviśeṣas.* E.g., the mango exists. Here the *Viśeṣa* mangoness (essence of mango), existence, thingness or substance are always present in the nature of mango, hence are identical with it. These are Yavadravyabhāviviśeṣas. But in "The mango is green or it is yellow" the *Viśeṣa* the colours green or yellow are transient, they do not always remain in the mango; green mango gradually becomes yellow. Such *Viśeṣas* which characterize the object for sometime and then disappear from the object are called *Adravyabhāviviśeṣas.* That is why when one is told to bring the green one, one does not necessarily bring a mango because the mango might have become yellow, he may bring a green leaf. So the mango remains a mango when it is not green or yellow. This shows that such separable *Adravyabhāviviśeṣas* are different from their objects. But when they are present in the object, they are not distinguished or separated from the object. When it is green, e.g., the whole mango characterized by green is taken as one whole object. Thus, the *Adravyabhāviviśeṣas* are taken as identical with their objects. Thus, the relation between such *Viśeṣas* is identity-cum-difference. It is possible to raise a question here as to why the *Adravyabhāviviśeṣas*, when they are not present should not be regarded as latent or unmanifested? When they are present as patent or manifested in the natures of their objects, on par with the produced *Viśeṣas* of sentient beings, be treated as identical with their objects?

Madhva's answer is that this cannot be done for the simple reason that in respect of produced *Viśeṣas*, to regard them as unmanifested when they are not present and as manifested when they are present in their objects, there is a convention or usage to support it. But there is no such convention or usage to treat the *Adravyabhāviviśeṣas* in the same way.

The concept of *Viśeṣa* in Tatvavāda of Madhva is different from its conception in Vaiśeṣika system. The Vaiśeṣika system derives its name from its acceptance of *Viśeṣa* as one of the categories.The problem in the Vaiśeṣika system in which the atomic theory of matter is accepted was that of distinguishing one supersensible eternal from another eternal. E.g., one

Paramānu, the atom from another atom, one type of eternal from another type of eternal (the atom of earth from the atom of water), and Vaiśeṣikas solved it by stating that it was the *Viśeṣas* that helped to distinguish one eternal from another eternal. Thus, the *Viśeṣas* in the Vaiśeṣika system are confined to the field of simple supersensible eternals. The sensible objects according to Vaiśeṣikas, do not need *Viśeṣas* to distinguish them, they can be distinguished by their sensible characteristics.

Viśeṣas in Madhva's philosophy differ from those of Vaiśeṣika in their extension and function. According to Madhva *Viśeṣas* are ubiquitous, they are found in all reals, eternal or non-eternal, sensible or supersensible, sentient or non-sentient and their function is not only distinguishing parts from their wholes, substances from characteristics etc., but also unifying them into homogeneous whole. Besides the concept of *Viśeṣa*, Madhva's other great contributions to epistemology are:

a) His theory of *Pramāṇas*, especially his demarcation of the fields of strength and weakness, merit and demerit of perception inference and the verbal testimony, which involves the insight into the distinction between different kinds of propositions, like empirical, inferential and ethico-theological on the basis of the type of evidence that is required to accept them as true, is highly valued or appreciated by the modern thinkers.

b) His insistence that though doubt to a certain extent is healthy or valuable yet beyond that limit doubt degenerates into meaningless quibbling is a great lesson to many thinkers.

c) He provided the norms of evaluation of information. We do say that a certain information is absolutely certain or that it is true or doubtful or false. Madhva held that *Sākṣi* was the norm of absolute certainty or validity, sound *Pramāṇas* of truth and unsound Pramāṇas of doubt or falsity.

d) He gave the correct interpretation of the purpose or significance of the Vedas as that of singing and exalting the infinite glory of God. His conception of *Mokṣa* and of the means to attain it is entirely satisfactory. He

declared that the Vedas were consistent in their teaching and he reconciled all the apparent contradictions in their statement. He brought to the fore the great importance of Brahmasūtras, Bhāgavata, Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata. He showed the right way of life in which not only the proper methods of performance of spiritual activities like worship, prayer, temple construction, sculpting of idols etc., were taught but also the best way of leading personal and social life was emphasized. It is said that "in Vedānta none other than Madhva has given so much importance to social service". His ethico-social teaching can be summed up by saying "Do the right and the good but do it humbly as a service to God. Let your whole life be a beautiful *Yajña*, the sacrifice lovingly dedicated to the welfare of others and to the service of God". This brings us to his another great contribution to mankind viz., the conception of *Bhakti*, the devotion which, according to him is not blind faith but a pure love and high respect for God arising from the knowledge of perfect nature of God. Madhva is a main spring of *Bhaktimārga*. According to him, peace here and salvation afterwards can be had only by living a life of full devotion to God. He gave the entirely satisfactory conception of *Mokṣa* as that which is not in itself *Śūnya*, the nothing nor is it merging into or becoming one with nothing, but enjoying, by the grace of God, the pure bliss arising from the awareness of flowering or unfolding of one's own spiritual nature. His activities and achievements are amazing and even astounding. They are too many to be enumerated suffice it to say that impartial understanding of them will lead even the unbelievers to believe that he is truly God Vāyu incarnate and is undoubtedly the highest and the best among the selves.

APPENDIX

Sarvamūla - The Works of Madhvācārya

Key to transliteration and pronounciation

Sarvamūla - The Works of Madhvācārya

Bhagavadgītā-prasthānam

1. Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣyam
2. Bhagavadgītā-tātparyanirṇaya

Upaniṣat-prasthānam

3. Mahaitareyopaniṣad-bhāṣyam (Aitareyopaniṣad-bhāṣyam)
4. Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣyam
5. Chandogopaniṣad-bhāṣyam (Chāndogyopaniṣad-bhāṣyam)
6. Talavakāropaniṣad-bhāṣyam (Kenopaniṣad-bhāṣyam)
7. Kāṭhakopaniṣad-bhāṣyam (Kaṭhopaniṣad-bhāṣyam)
8. Ātharvaṇopaniṣad-bhāṣyam (Muṇḍakopaniṣad-bhāṣyam)
9. Ṣatpraśnopaniṣad-bhāṣyam
10. Yajñīyamantra-vyākhyānam (Īśāvāsyopaniṣad-bhāṣyam)
11. Māṇḍūkopaniṣad-bhāṣyam
12. Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣyam

Brahmasūtra-prasthānam

13. Brahmasūtra-bhāṣyam
14. Brahmasūtranuvyākhyānam (Anubhāṣya)
15. Brahmasūtranuvyākhyāna-nyāyavivaraṇam
16. Sarvaśāstrārthasaṅgraha (Anubhāṣya)

Itihāsapurāṇa-prasthānam

17. Mahābhārata-tātparyanirṇaya
18. Mahābhārata-tātparya (Yamakabhārata)
19. Bhāgavata-tātparyanirṇaya

Śruti-prasthānam

20. Ṛg-bhāṣyam
21. Khaṇḍārtha-nirṇaya (Karmanirṇaya)

Prakaraṇa-grantha

22. Viṣṇutatva-nirṇaya
23. Vāda (Tatvodyota)
24. Māyāvāda-dūṣaṇam (Māyāvāda-khaṇḍanam)
25. Māyāvāda(Upādhi)-dūṣaṇam (Upādhi-khaṇḍanam)
26. Mithyātvānumāna-dūṣaṇam (Prapancamithyātvānumāna-khaṇḍanam)

27. Tatva-saṅkhyānam
(includes Dvādaśastotra – Chapter 2; an conclusive invocation)
28. Tatva-viveka
29. Pramāṇa-lakṣaṇam
30. Vada-lakṣaṇam (Kathālakṣaṇam)

Karma-prasthānam

31. Kṛṣnamṛta-maharṇava
32. Tantrasāra-saṅgraha
33. Sadacāra-smṛti
34. Jayantī-kalpa (Jayantī-nirṇaya)
35. Aumtatsat-praṇavakalpa (Yatipraṇava-kalpa)
36. Nyāsapaddhati

Jyotiṣa-prasthānam

37. Tithi-nirṇaya

Stuti-prasthānam

38. Śrī-stuti (Dvadaśastotra – Chapter 7)
39. [Madhvaprokta-bhāgavatānusāri-bhagavaddhyānam]*
(Dvadaśastotra – Chapter 1)
40. [Śaṅkhacakrādidhara-stuti]*
41. Hari-stuti (Dvadaśastotra – Chapter 3 and 4)
42. Narasimhanakha-stuti and Lakṣmikānta-stuti
43. [Prīṇayāmo Vāsudevam]*
(Dvadaśastotra – Chapter 8)
44. Hari-gāthā 1 (Dvadaśastotra – Chapter 6)
45. [Rāmaramāramaṇa-nuti]*
(Dvadaśastotra – Chapter 9)
46. Hari-gītī (Dvadaśastotra – Chapter 5)
47. Hari-gāthā 2 (Dvadaśastotra – Chapter 10)
48. [Ānandapada-stotram]*
(Dvadaśastotra – Chapter 11)
49. [Ānandatīrtha-parānandavarada]*
(Dvadaśastotra – Chapter 12)
50. Kṛṣna-padyam (Kanduka-stuti)

The titles of the works of Madhvācārya mentioned here, * which are not inside the square bracket, are according to ancient manuscripts. The titles that are popular by other names are mentioned in parentheses.

Key to Devanāgarī pronunciation and diacritical transliteration

Svarāḥ Vowels

Devanāgarī	Diacritical transliteration	Pronunciation	उच्चारणास्थानम्	Vocal Tract
अ (अजः) क् [ा] क	a (ajaḥ) k ka	Come	Kanṭaḥ	Gutturalis brevis
आ (आनन्दः) का [ा]	ā (ānandaḥ) kā	Call	Kanṭaḥ	Gutturalis longa
इ (इन्द्रः) कि [ि]	i (indraḥ) ki	Kill	Tāluḥ	Palatalis brevis
ई (ईशः) की [ी]	ī (īśaḥ) kī	Keep	Tāluḥ	Palatalis longa
उ (उग्रः) कु [ु]	u (ugraḥ) ku	Could	Oṣṭhau	Labialis brevis
ऊ (ऊर्ज्जः) कू [ू]	ū (ūrjjaḥ) kū	Cool	Oṣṭhau	Labialis Longa
ऋ (ऋतम्भरः) कृ [ृ]	ṛ (ṛtambharaḥ) kṛ		Mūrdhā	Cerebralis brevis
ॠ (ॠघः) कॄ [ॄ]	ṝ (ṝghaḥ) kṝ		Mūrdhā	Cerebralis longa
ऌ (ऌशः) कॢ [ॢ]	ḷ (ḷśaḥ) kḷ	Cling	Dantāḥ	Dentalis brevis
ॡ (ॡजिः) कॣ [ॣ]	ḹ (ḹjiḥ) kḹ		Dantāḥ	Dentalis longa
ए (एकात्मा) के [े]	e (ekātmā) ke	Cake	Kanṭha-tālū	Gutturo-palatalis longa
ऐ (ऐरः) कै [ै]	ai (airaḥ) kai	Kite	Kanṭha-tālū	Diphthongus gutturo-palatale
ओ (ओजभृत्) को [ो]	o (ojabhṛt) ko	Cold	Kanṭha-oṣṭham	Gutturo-labialis longa
औ (औरसः) कौ [ौ]	au (aurasaḥ) kau	Cow	Kanṭha-oṣṭham	Diphthongus gutturo-labiale
अं (अन्तः) कं [ं]	aṃ (antaḥ) kaṃ	Come	Nāsikā (Anusvāraḥ)	Nasalis labiale
अः (अर्द्धगर्भः) कः [ाः]	aḥ (arddhagarbhaḥ) kaḥ	Kaha	Kanṭhaḥ (Visargaḥ)	Aspirata gutturale

***Vyañjanāni* - Consonants**

Devanāgarī	Diacritical transliteration	Pronunciation	Vocal Tract
Kaṇṭhaḥ Guttural - pronounced from the throat (back of mouth and throat)			
क (कपिल:)	ka (kapilaḥ)	Come	Tenuis gutturale
ख (खपति:)	kha (khapatiḥ)	Blockhead	Tenuis aspirata gutturale
ग (गरुडासन:)	ga (garuḍāsanaḥ)	Give	Media gutturale
घ (घर्म:)	gha (gharmaḥ)	Ghee	Media aspirate gutturale
ङ (ङसार:)	ṅa (ṅasāraḥ)	Sing	Nasalis gutturale
Tāluḥ Palatal - pronounced with middle of tongue against palate (near palate)			
च (चार्वङ्ग:)	ca (cārvaṅgaḥ)	Check	Tenuis palatale
छ (छन्दोगम्य:)	cha (chandogamyaḥ)	Catch Him	Tenuis aspirata palatale
ज (जनार्दन:)	ja (janārdanaḥ)	Judge	Media palatale
झ (झाटितारि:)	jha (jhāṭitāriḥ)	Hedgehog	Media aspirata palatale
ञ (ञम:)	ña (ñamaḥ)	Canyon	Nasalis palatale
Mūrdhā Cerebral - pronounced with tip of tongue against roof of mouth			
ट (टङ्की)	ṭa (ṭaṅkī)	Tear	Tenuis cerebrale
ठ (ठकल:)	ṭha (ṭhakalaḥ)	Anthill	Tenuis aspirata cerebrale
ड (डरक:)	ḍa (ḍarakaḥ)	Dwell	Media cerebrale
ढ (ढरी)	ḍha (ḍharī)	Godhood	Media aspirata cerebrale
ण (णात्मा)	ṇa (ṇātmā)	Under	Nasalis cerebrale
Dantāḥ Dental - pronounced as cerebral but with tongue against teeth (with tip of tongue near gum ridge)			
त (तार:)	ta (tāraḥ)	Think	Tenuis dentale
थ (थभ:)	tha (thabhaḥ)	Theft	Tenuis aspirate dentale
द (दण्डी)	da (daṇḍī)	The	Media dentale
ध (धन्वी)	dha (dhanvī)	Breathe	Media aspirata dentale
न (नम्य:)	na (namyaḥ)	Not	Nasalis dentale

Oṣṭhau Labial - pronounced with lips (movement of lips)

प (परः)	pa (paraḥ)	Pen	Tenuis labiale
फ (फली)	pha (phalī)	Loophole	Tenuis aspirata labiale
ब (बली)	ba (balī)	Bag	Media labiale
भ (भगः)	bha (bhagaḥ)	Abhor	Media aspirata labiale
म (मनुः)	ma (manuḥ)	Mother	Semivocalis labiale

Antasthāḥ Semivowel – a vowel like sound that serves as a consonant

य (यज्ञः)	ya (yajñaḥ)	Yes	Semivocalis palatale
र (रामः)	ra (rāmaḥ)	Run	Semivocalis cerebrale
ल (लक्ष्मीपतिः)	la (lakṣmīpatiḥ)	Luck	Semivocalis nasalis dentale
व (वरः)	va (varaḥ)	Victory	Semivocalis dento labiale

Ūṣmāṇaḥ Sibilant – pronounced by a hissing sound (like s or sh)

श (शान्तसंवित्)	śa (śāntasaṃvit)	Show	Spiritus asper assibilatus
ष (षड्गुणः)	ṣa (ṣaḍguṇaḥ)	Information	Spiritus asper cerebrale
स (सारात्मा)	sa (sārātmā)	Sun	Spiritus asper dentale
ह (हंसः)	ha (haṃsaḥ)	Home	Spiritus asper gutturale
ळ (ळाळुकः)	ḷa (ḷāḷukaḥ)		Semivocalis mollis dentale
क्ष (क्षत्रियः)	kṣa (kṣatriyaḥ)	Rickshaw	Gutturo dentale

Saṅkhyā - Numerals

०	१	२	३	४	५	६	७	८	९	१०
शून्यम्	एकम्	द्वे	त्रीणि	चत्वारि	पञ्च	षट्	सप्त	अष्ट	नव	दश
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Śūnyam	Ekam	Dve	Trīṇi	Catvāri	Pañca	Ṣaṭ	Sapta	Aṣṭa	Nava	Daśa

अवग्रहः (अ) ऽ

Avagrahaḥ (a) :'